

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



JANUARY 1941

Is Defense Enough?	<i>Raoul de Roussy de Sales</i>	269
A Trade Policy for National Defense		
	<i>Percy W. Bidwell and Arthur R. Upgren</i>	282
European Factors in Far Eastern Diplomacy	<i>A. Whitney Griswold</i>	297
Gamelin.	<i>André Géraud</i>	310
The Character and Fate of Leon Trotsky	<i>Max Eastman</i>	332
What Is the Western Hemisphere?	<i>Vilhjalmur Stefansson</i>	343
Wings for the Trojan Horse	<i>Melvin Hall and Walter Peck</i>	347
Britain and the Axis in the Near East	<i>Albert Viton</i>	370
The Enigma of Soviet Production	<i>Freda Utley</i>	385
The War in the Air: Second Phase	<i>J. M. Spaight</i>	402
The Lansing Papers	<i>Charles Seymour</i>	414
Ireland Between Two Stools	<i>Ernest Boyd</i>	426
Science in the Totalitarian State	<i>Waldemar Kaempffert</i>	433
The Canadian Economy in Two Wars	<i>Grant Dexter</i>	442
The Anzacs March Again	<i>Donald Cowie</i>	453
South Africa at War	<i>G. H. Calpin</i>	458
Recent Books on International Relations	<i>Robert Gale Woolbert</i>	462
Source Material.	<i>Denys P. Myers</i>	477

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries FOREIGN AFFAIRS can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.

The Editors.

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IS DEFENSE ENOUGH?

By Raoul de Roussy de Sales

THE attitude of the American people towards this war and the inherent revolutionary conflict which it contains has undergone profound modifications during the last fifteen months. The most important changes took place after the surrender of France in June.

The first shock was stunning. The fact that the French army, considered at least as good as the German, could be defeated in less than forty days, and that France, one of the main pillars of democracy, could become enslaved to the Axis, demoralized Americans as it demoralized the French themselves. In spite of a great deal of wishful thinking, faith in the ability of England to withstand the well-advertised final blow was at a low ebb during the first part of the summer. Isolationist sentiment, founded more or less consciously on the conviction that the Allies would win the war, underwent a radical transformation: it became quite strong again, but for opposite reasons. The possibility that England might be doomed and that help would come too late incited the former isolationists to become appeasers. Colonel Lindbergh, speaking for many of them, expressed the idea that it did not really matter who dominated Europe and that it was in the interest of the United States to establish good relations with the probable victor. Like Chamberlain and Bonnet at the time of Munich, the neo-isolationists denied or disregarded the validity of the ideological world conflict created by the Nazi and Fascist dictators. They argued, as European appeasers had argued, that democracy and freedom could survive in America while totalitarianism ruled the rest of the world.

This doctrine would probably have gained ground more rapidly had it not been for the extraordinary resistance put up by England. As the summer ended, a counter-current of public opinion set in. Confidence in the British was restored. It might be too

much to speak of real optimism and truer to say that the sense of acute alarm was followed by a reappraisal of a situation which, temporarily at least, appeared slightly less depressing. To quote a correspondent of the *New York Times* writing from the Middle West during the election campaign: "The American people, like the English themselves, are growing accustomed to the bombing of London." There is no way of telling whether this was written with irony or candor, but it probably reflects the state of mind of the average American at the time.

This return of relative confidence was not due alone to the British resistance. The American people's unanimous acceptance of the necessity of directing their efforts towards national defense improved the American morale. The fact that the necessity was recognized by both parties during the presidential campaign is proof of the deep evolution of American thinking in recent months. If the elections had occurred a year earlier such unanimity could hardly have been achieved.

At the time of writing, one can say that the extreme confusion which characterized American thinking during the first year of the war has been to a large extent dispelled. The question of whether the frontiers of America are on the Rhine is not asked since it has become so generally apparent that they have been moved back to the Channel and since the fall of France has brought the Germans to the shores of the Atlantic. Criticism of England has died down because the British Isles are now considered to be fulfilling in the Atlantic a rôle analogous to that of the Philippines in the Pacific. They are part of the defense system of this country. The conclusion of the triple alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan and the open admission by Fascist and Nazi spokesmen of the universality of the Fascist revolution have made the American people conscious of the fact that their country is now at the geographical and psychological center of the conflict and not on the outskirts. The United States is not at war with the Axis Powers. But it recognizes the now obvious fact that the domination of the world by the totalitarians, under the guise of establishing "New Regional Orders," cannot be prevented unless the armies, navies, air forces and civilian populations of their actual opponents — which for the moment means England, Greece and China — are assured of the increasing moral and material support of the United States.

True, there is a great deal of reluctance to admit that the real

backbone of resistance to totalitarian imperialism is the United States. The American people have a traditional distaste for any intimation that they can influence the destinies of the world in any other way than by example and moral suasion. They feel that the last time they undertook a crusade it failed. There is no desire to repeat the experiment. Nevertheless, in spite of this disillusionment, in spite of the suspicion of all things European, in spite of the nostalgic attraction of the idea that they can pursue their own course alone, they find themselves confronted today with a situation of immense responsibility, one from which it is difficult to imagine any satisfactory escape.

In this situation the American people have developed a fairly clear line of policy which can be summed up as follows: 1. Development of national defense to meet all contingencies, including those that might arise if England were to be defeated. 2. Increased help to England of all descriptions short of sending an expeditionary force abroad. The hope is, of course, that England will be able to resist and even to defeat the Nazis either by acquiring a crushing superiority in the air, or following the development of rebellions in the conquered countries, or following an internal collapse of Germany, or by a combination of these three factors.

In any event, the American aim is to retain a purely defensive attitude. In one of his campaign speeches, Mr. Roosevelt said: "By defense, I mean defense." Both he and Mr. Willkie repudiated vigorously any suggestion that the United States might at any time resort to war or commit any act which might too obviously lead to war. The vast armament program adopted by the United States, the large army and navy which it is creating, are not for the purpose of making war but to prevent war from reaching the shores of this continent. This has been made quite clear by the leaders of public opinion, and apparently the majority of Americans believe in the soundness of the program.

It has been noted, of course, that the solemn pledges given by both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Willkie not to take the country into war were inspired by the political necessities of the campaign. Both candidates were intelligent enough to know that if a situation developed in which American public opinion manifested its will to make war, no President could effectively oppose the trend. But the important point is that, at present, recourse to war is not to be contemplated except on the basis of national defense. Americans would fight if they were attacked on this continent, or if their

neighbors to the north or south were attacked. They repudiate the idea that they might take the offensive themselves. That the United States wants peace is fundamental; and every effort to reinforce national defense is intended as a step in preserving it.

The question is whether such a defensive policy will insure the desired result.

II

Neither England nor France wanted to go to war, either in 1939, or in 1938, or at any other time. The intensity of the anti-war feeling which existed in these two countries during the last twenty years has probably never been fully appreciated on this side of the Atlantic. This is due to many reasons. One is that as Americans have had a few less wars than the European Powers have had, an illusion was created that the American people were by nature more peace-loving than the Europeans. Also, the complexity and instability of European politics fostered the notion that "Europe was always at war." Too many Powers were too often engaged in maintaining or restoring some sort of equilibrium either by diplomatic bargaining or by force. In contrast, the American continent, dominated as it is in fact by the overwhelming might of the United States, offered a much simpler picture. Another reason why European pacifism was underestimated is to be found in the "disillusionment" following the last war. This found expression in American condemnation of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. The United States having decided to withdraw from European affairs, a strong contrast was created in the public mind between the easier course of aloofness which America had set for herself and the chronic maladjustments characteristic of European politics. Having rejected the Treaty and the Covenant, many American scholars and leaders of opinion tended to emphasize constantly the defects and insufficiencies of these instruments.

This does not alleviate the responsibility of European statesmen for having failed to organize Europe. It does explain, however, the general impression prevalent in America during the past twenty years that the peoples of Europe were not as interested in maintaining peace as they were in practising power politics. In fact the opposite is true, as concerns both the people and most of their leaders. The horrors of the last war left too deep an imprint to be so easily forgotten. And it must be remembered that the real

slogan of that war — for the English, the French and their Allies — was not that it should make the world safe for democracy, but that it should be a war to end all wars. Anyone who remembers November 11, 1918, in Europe knows that the dominant note that day was not the elation of victory, nor the glorification of any particular political philosophy, but merely a sense of relief because the war was over.

The anti-war feeling expressed then is the real clue to the history of the following twenty years. It is the clue to the breakdown of the policy of sanctions at the time of the conquest of Ethiopia. It is the clue to the policy of non-intervention in Spain. It explains why the French let Hitler reoccupy the Rhineland in 1936. It explains the betrayal of Czechoslovakia and the explosion of popular enthusiasm which greeted Chamberlain and Daladier when they came back from Munich. And when a second armistice was signed in France on June 22, 1940, there came from the hearts of many French men and women the same sigh of relief that had greeted the first one, nearly twenty-two years before.

Unfortunately this profound anti-war feeling is also the reason why the dictators have succeeded in conquering the whole of continental Europe and why they threaten today to dominate the rest of the world.

III

For love of peace to be one of the causes of war may appear as a paradox. Yet the conclusion is inescapable.

Mussolini avowed the doctrine that war is justified as a means of fulfilling national aspirations, but in view of the prevailing pacifism of the time the Duce's philosophy was taken as a purely local phenomenon. The spirit of modern pacifism, later formulated in the Briand-Kellogg Pact actually outlawing war, continued to permeate the consciousness of the masses. The idea that war might be reinstated, could ever be glorified again as it had been in less civilized ages, encountered stubborn resistance. Despite many disappointments, the great hope that the war of 1914-18 had been the last one, at least for those who had taken part in it, could not be abandoned. People held to it even when Hitler had begun to boast of his intentions to use force and later on had begun putting them into action in a series of acts of violence.

Even in Germany, despite the efforts of Nazi propaganda to whip up a warlike spirit, the mass of the population was satisfied

that Hitler could attain his objectives without actually going to war. This is so true that when war finally came in September 1939 it had to be sold piecemeal to German opinion. During the first weeks of the war, the Germans thought that they would have to fight only the Poles. Later on, German propaganda was careful not to treat France as an enemy and to concentrate all its animosity against England. This of course had the advantage of tending to separate the Allies; but it had the additional purpose of reassuring German home opinion, which was quite as reluctant as the French to face again the wholesale massacres of 1914-18.

As we look back at the policy followed in the past few years by England and France, as well as by all the smaller nations, whether so-called neutral or not, the dominant impression we receive is of inexcusable blindness. Hitler's plans could have been thwarted with little effort or danger at the time he reoccupied the Rhineland. The same result could have been obtained later on — though with increasing efforts and risks. All that was required was determination in London and Paris and cohesion between the two responsible governments. The necessary determination did not exist or when it did exist could not be synchronized. This is the common responsibility of practically all the British and French statesmen in power in these years. Yet it should not be forgotten that any attempt on either side of the Channel to show firmness always collided with the popular fear of war. It was the dominant instinct of the European masses at that time, just as it is of Americans today.

After every new and successful step taken by Hitler the risk that to oppose him would bring about war became greater. War finally broke out not because the anti-war feeling was less but because the tension created by the threat of war had lasted too long, had become unbearable. By offering to guarantee Poland, Rumania and Greece, the Allied Governments set a kind of automatic deadline in the long story of their humiliations and retreats. It was almost as if they wanted to place the question of going to war beyond their own will, or lack of will. But in doing this they did not change the fundamental attitude of their people towards war itself. When war came, the people of England and France met it with determination but also with fatalism; and consciously or not they clung to the idea that real war, total war, could still somehow be avoided. The Germans had been mobilized for nearly seven years, so that for them the transition from peace

to war was insensible. The English and French, on the contrary, would have had to repudiate suddenly not only their normal habits but a whole attitude of mind towards the idea of war as such. They would have had to accept the fact that war implies the total transformation of the nation and of every individual in it. They would have had to reject — overnight — all their peacetime conceptions of the freedom of the individual, of material values, of the meaning of life. Briefly, they would have had to adopt at once the attitude of mind that pervades England today. But it was nearly a year before the British people crossed this frightful threshold which divides peace from total war.

The French and all the other nations which are now under German domination never had time to place themselves in this attitude of mind. Or if that time existed, it was not properly utilized by their leaders. Quite the contrary: the prewar policy of chloroforming the people into complacency was pursued right up to the very end. The Allied states and the neutrals alike were led by kings, queens, ministers and generals who had been and still were ardent pacifists, men of good will, members of the Oxford Movement. In France the newspapers which for years had suppressed or distorted unpleasant news continued their demoralizing work. The French leaders never even tried to explain the real nature and meaning of Nazism, for the simple reason that neither before nor during the war were they able to understand its real nature and meaning themselves.

It is a strange thing that Americans, so far removed from Germany, have been the first people to grasp the full meaning of Nazism — to understand that its dynamics implied *both* military aggression and revolution, and to draw the conclusion that the only choice offered by Nazi Germany to other nations was subjection or a fight to the finish. Europeans, and particularly the French, were not made to perceive clearly the magnitude of the peril that was threatening them, not because they were less intelligent than the Americans but because their proximity to Germany made the horror of war so real and so imminent that they tried in innumerable ways to delude themselves rather than face the grim reality. Hence France's contradictory policies and internal dissensions, and the constant effort of politicians and groups to blame opponents for heading the country into war.

In this respect those who in September 1939 advocated a second Munich and those who decided that the moment to resist had

come were both guilty of the same error of judgment: they underestimated Hitler's limitless ambitions. The appeasers who wanted a second Munich hoped (and are still hoping) to find a livable compromise. The so-called "bellicists" could not bring themselves to draw the logical conclusion from their attitude; they lulled themselves into the belief that merely defensive measures, psychological and military, would suffice to preserve France's moral integrity and keep the invader off her soil. If the idea that at a given moment the offensive should be taken was ever considered, it was discarded as too costly. The whole conduct of the war was determined by public opinion — and it had not been told the truth for years.

Today it is fashionable to blame democracy for the softening of the national spirit and the lack of preparedness. But it would not seem that this phenomenon is a factor of any particular form of government. The conduct of the English is an example. The truth is that since democracy is founded on the principle that public opinion is free to express itself, democratic régimes can only reflect the trends of the moment. Ever since 1918, the dominating trend in the world has been an effort to eliminate war. Democracy has reflected this trend faithfully. The increasing threats from aggressor nations, where the will of a few men or of one man alone creates a warlike spirit, disturbed and strained the pacifism of the democracies. But even in nations obviously menaced in their very existence, as was France, public opinion could not evolve quickly enough to face the full implications of a modern war. People accepted the war because there was no escape, but they limited it in their minds to defense. This negative attitude is probably the most important single factor in the defeat. It explains the over-confidence in the Maginot Line and the ensuing demoralization when suddenly it was proved useless. It had enabled the Germans to maintain the initiative in propaganda and diplomacy. It now enabled them to take and hold it in the field of military operations.

IV

A parallel has often been drawn between the evolution of public opinion in the European democracies and in the United States. It is said that, with a certain time lag, the United States has been following the same path as England and France. To support this view it is pointed out that Americans, having refused for a long

time to believe in the reality of any danger, now face the necessity of taking important measures to protect themselves. Clearly, however, all their preparations are not intended to bring the United States into the war. Quite the contrary, they are intended to keep war away. They are measures of defense.

The question arises whether the course followed by other great nations in Europe, in analogous circumstances, really constitutes a precedent or whether the case of the United States should be considered as a totally new problem.

Comparisons between diverse peoples are apt to be misleading. To satisfy an intellectual inclination for symmetry, one is apt to distort reality, to overlook differences. For instance, the sense of security which the Atlantic gives to Americans is often compared to the Maginot Line psychology in France. This is stretching the point too far. Even if the British and American navies lost control of the seas, an actual invasion of United States territory would be very difficult. The Channel has so far proved impassable. But if the Axis Powers actually controlled the seas they would not need to invade the United States. Their domination over the world, including the Americas, would be a *fait accompli*. American independence would have lost its meaning.

But though the threat of actual invasion is not so great for America as it was for France and as it is for England, there still are other threats which are more dangerous for the United States than for these two countries. Both England and France, and especially the latter, have survived many changes in the structure of government and many social upheavals. They are not necessarily dependent on the survival of democracy to maintain themselves as national entities. The same cannot be said of the United States, where national consciousness and national unity do not spring from the notion of a common origin nor even from the tie of a common language. Quite the contrary: American unity is founded on the unanimity of faith in the harmonious coexistence of diverse races, creeds and cultures, blended into one by a long practice of mutual tolerance, respect for the individual and freedom. No system of government except democracy — and specifically American democracy — can insure the perpetuation of this kind of national unity. It is profoundly and essentially ideological, which means that the most dangerous threat to the existence of America is not — and never has been — actual military invasion but internal disunity.

Now the attempt of the Axis Powers to reorganize the world assumes a dual form: military conquest *and revolution*. When and if they attempt to destroy or subjugate America they will naturally adopt the second weapon as more efficient and less costly than an effort to conquer America by force.

It may be argued that America has outlived many European revolutions and that the general course of its development has not been changed by them. This is true, but only because all the revolutions which have taken place in Europe in the last hundred and fifty years have been oriented in general towards the same goal which Americans themselves accept. The revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century were all in the direction of liberalism, freedom and more social justice. Today for the first time the United States is confronted with a counter-revolution, the object of which is precisely to deny and destroy the very principles upon which the United States was founded — which are, in fact, the reason why the United States exists at all. The only persons who can conceive that the United States could survive and live its own life in a Nazified world are those who consider material and economic forces the only real world forces and who therefore imagine that since deals might be made with the dictators on economic problems no other conflicts would arise.

This, however, does not seem to be the prevailing point of view. The majority of Americans give every indication of instinctively understanding the magnitude of the peril that confronts them, even though they cannot make up their minds as to just how and just when it will become acute. The fact that England is holding out, and that the Axis Powers find it to their interest to minimize the importance of the United States as an obstacle to their program, tends to blur the picture and to encourage the sincere hope of Americans that they will weather this crisis without actually having to go to war themselves.

This is why the policy of intensive national defense and all help to England short of actually sending an expeditionary force has been generally accepted. It is a policy that satisfies equally the sense of increased danger and the profound feeling against war. It can be supported by isolationists as well as by those who think that the main job is to reinforce England. In case England should succumb, it even leaves the door open to appeasement. For there is little doubt that America would continue to arm — as England

did after Munich — even if she thought it expedient to “coöperate” and do business with the triumphant Axis Powers.

The present policy of the United States is the subject of much rationalization by political leaders and writers. It has been almost universally presented as the only sound course to be followed at the moment. And that is true if one takes into account the fact that American public opinion, like opinion in France and in England up to a few months ago, will agree to think about the problem only in terms of defense. The fact remains that it is not the only possible course, and hence that it may not be the best one to achieve this country's ultimate aims — to halt the spread of Axis domination in the world and to check or re-direct the revolutionary processes which the dictators have set in motion.

An example of rationalization of what is in fact merely the expression of a profound anti-war feeling is the often-heard argument that England does not need men and that even if an American expeditionary force were ready to sail there would be no place to send it. This is true if one thinks of millions of half-trained and unequipped American soldiers and pictures them as landing in England or France. But suppose there existed today an American army of a few hundred thousand men trained and equipped in the same way as was the relatively small German force used to conquer France. Can one doubt their effectiveness in Africa or in the Near East or in the Orient? Would Mr. Winston Churchill reject such help as superfluous? Would not the plans of Hitler, Mussolini or the Japanese be considerably upset by it?

Then there is the question of the American navy. Obviously it is fulfilling an important function in the Pacific. The argument is that most of it should remain there even if the United States went to war. This may be true. But when one sees with what anguish the British waited for the release of 50 over-age destroyers one understands that the help of a hundred others and of some cruisers would be highly welcome. The same might be said about the American air force and American pilots.

These examples have not been cited to prove that it would be better for the United States to go to war now. There are many arguments in favor of that policy and many against it — one of them being the difficulty, or perhaps the impossibility, of convincing the bulk of American public opinion that it was indeed the best course. The point is that there is a considerable similarity

between the state of mind of the American people at the moment and that of the French and the English a year ago. Due to their fundamental sentiment against war, the American people put their entire trust in defense (with its corollary, help to England). They are no more willing than were the French to envisage the possibility that it might be more advantageous to face the conflict in all its aspects. That would mean taking certain initiatives and running certain risks.

v

In details, too, the policy of the United States is reminiscent of the policy of the European democracies during the last few years.

Thus the way in which help is sent to England reminds one of the non-intervention policy applied to Spain. There is the same wish to give as much aid as possible and the same determination not to make any definite commitments. The survival of England is spoken of as "vital" to the security of this country. But there is great alarm at the mere thought that some "secret understanding" might exist between the British and American Governments. England and the Dominions are looked on as part of a "system of alliances," but there is no treaty bond with them. They are treated much as the allies of England and France in Eastern Europe were treated before they were lost or abandoned.

Another analogy might be found in the policy of guarantees. Mr. Chamberlain guaranteed Poland, Rumania and Greece. The United States now has guaranteed Canada and all the South American Republics against aggression. The undertaking might easily be extended to include Greenland, Iceland and the Azores if the Axis Powers threatened to use those territories as naval or air bases. In other words, the United States intends to keep control of the Atlantic and Pacific, which means in fact a return to the doctrine of the freedom of the seas, seemingly abandoned when the Neutrality Act was adopted.

All the moves so far made and those now taking shape — the arms program, help to Britain, hemispheric defense, resistance to Japanese imperialism — spring from the same mass instinct which prevailed in England and France for so many years: the hope of avoiding war. Whether the hope will be justified in America after having failed in England and France nobody can predict. And in plain fact the task of determining the answer to the problem has been delegated, for the time being, to England. So

long as England fights, public opinion in America can remain pacifist.

It is now fairly clear that England will not defeat the Axis Powers by remaining on the defensive. It is the hope of Mr. Churchill, and in the circumstances must therefore be the hope of most Americans, that the time will come when British superiority in the air will enable the R.A.F. to inflict such blows on the German population and on German industry as to cripple Nazi striking power. Whether this will suffice to bring about the collapse of the dictators is again debatable. A time may come, then, when the United States will be faced with the choice of accepting some kind of a stalemate in Europe — which in the long run means a victory for the Axis — or of changing its present conception of its own rôle in the conflict.

This may mean war or it may not. Certainly it will imply a change in the anti-war sentiment which has dominated the thought of this country since 1918. It will mean abandoning the negative attitude expressed in the concept of defense in favor of a positive attitude which finds expression in some form of counter-offensive. It will mean a recognition by public opinion of the fact that if Hitlerism and democracy cannot in sober fact live side by side in this world, then the future world order will be determined by one side or the other. The social and economic revolution which is taking place in the world cannot be stopped. The question is: Who will direct it and towards what ends? Mere resistance to it will not be enough.

The transition from a negative attitude of defense to a positive conception of counter-attack did not take place in France. There was no time. This was as true of the military aspect of the problem as of the social and psychological readjustments which should have been made, and were not. In England the transition has taken place. Whether it will occur in America cannot be predicted. But one thing can be predicted: that the evolution and outcome of the present world conflict will depend on the evolution of public opinion in America.

A TRADE POLICY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

By Percy W. Bidwell and Arthur R. Upgren

NARROWLY interpreted, national defense means simply preventing hostile armies from landing on our shores and keeping hostile airmen from bombing our cities. If this definition be accepted, then the area to be defended might be limited to the United States and its possessions. But in the broader sense in which we find the term generally used today, national defense means protecting ourselves against a variety of threats to vital national interests, not only threats to our physical security but also threats to the stability of our economic organization and to the permanence of our free institutions. As the content of "defense" is thus expanded, we find that the territory we are concerned with defending is enlarged. We begin to think about Canada, the Western Hemisphere and the British Empire. We begin to realize, also, that the methods of defense at our disposal include more than battleships, airplanes and tanks. We have powerful financial and economic weapons, and these have the advantage that they can be used *now* while our rearmament program is still in its preparatory stages. It is with the use of these weapons, our buying and selling power in foreign trade, and our lending capacity, that this article will chiefly deal.

The Nazis have now brought under their political and military control practically all of Continental Europe, except Russia and the Baltic states. The extension of German power over the entire Mediterranean basin and the Near East seems not improbable. The economic potential of this area, assuming that Germany could integrate its industries and agriculture, is enormous. To find a combination of nations which would be equally self-sufficient and equally powerful, judged by the ability of their economies to sustain modern armies and navies, one would have to bring together practically the entire non-German world.

The 400 million inhabitants of this German-dominated area would include some of the world's best disciplined and most productive industrial workers. The vast expanse of the area, lying between the North Sea and the Black Sea, and between the Baltic and the Desert of Sahara, comprises great varieties of soil and climate — the great wheat-growing regions of Germany,

France, the Danubian states and northern Africa; the potato and sugar-beet areas of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany; the vineyards and olive and orange groves of Spain, Italy and southern France. The coal and iron ore so essential to heavy industries are available in abundance. The iron and steel producing capacity of the area, in 1937 and 1938, was approximately equal to that of the United States. Its shipbuilding capacity exceeded ours in the ratio of four to one.

Import and export statistics show that Europe already is a well-integrated economy, with possibilities for increased self-sufficiency. In 1937, the total external trade of the 26 sovereign states which then composed Europe was valued at around \$20 billions. Of this amount, about 60 percent was intra-European, comparable to trade between our 48 states, and only 40 percent extra-European. Since 1937, the active pursuit of bilateral trade policies by Germany, reënforced since September 1939 by the British blockade, has tended to raise very considerably the proportion of intra-European exchanges. It seems certain that Germany, if she should succeed in maintaining political and military domination of the Continent, would aim to perpetuate the self-sufficiency which war has enforced. By requiring that each formerly sovereign state should satisfy its demand for foreign goods as far as possible by purchasing from some other European state, and that, conversely, each state should sell its export surpluses as far as possible within the European bloc, the ratio of intra-European to external trade could be raised from 60 to something like 75 percent. If such a policy had been enforced in 1937, the value of the European products finding markets outside the Continent would have been practically cut in half.¹

The centralized control of import and export trade could accomplish a good deal in reducing Europe's dependence on imports from other areas, particularly in foodstuffs, but self-sufficiency in industrial raw materials would be more difficult to attain. Taking the area which we have designated as "Continental Europe" as a unit, we find that in 1937 the production and consumption of rye, wheat and potatoes were roughly balanced. This was also true of two important fodder crops, barley and oats. There were net exports of meats, butter and cheese, but they were

¹ The estimate is based on an analysis of import and export trade in leading commodities and commodity groups. The net exports to other areas, according to our calculations, would have been about \$1,900 millions. Trade of the United Kingdom is, of course, excluded from "Continental European" calculations.

not indications of real self-sufficiency, for cattle and hog raising and the dairy industries were all heavily dependent on imports of corn, oilseeds and oil-cake. In general, even if a forced redirection of trade reduced purchases from non-European sources to a minimum, the diet of Europeans would have serious deficiencies. It would lack sufficient animal and vegetable fats and sugar. It would have no tea, coffee or cocoa, the stimulants which help to make the life of the masses tolerable when on scanty rations. Tobacco consumption, if supplied entirely from European sources, would be cut in half.

In industrial raw materials, imports and exports of coal and iron ore were balanced, indicating a possible self-sufficiency in these two essentials of modern industrial life. The same situation existed for two critical non-ferrous ores, magnesite and bauxite. But for many raw materials generally regarded as essential to an industrial economy, a unified Europe would have to depend on outside sources. The extent of this dependence is indicated roughly by the following calculations from 1938 data:²

<i>Commodities</i>	<i>Percent of Consumption Supplied by Imports</i>
Copper ore.....	81
Lead ore.....	17
Zinc ore.....	59
Manganese ore.....	84
Tungsten ore.....	76
Chrome ore.....	18
Crude petroleum.....	55
Cotton.....	65
Wool.....	69
Raw silk.....	37
Crude rubber.....	100

By conquering the Near East and by developing synthetic processes, the Nazis could solve Europe's oil problem. The reclamation of scrap metals, and the development of substitutes for rubber, cotton and wool go far in periods of emergency to plug the gaps in raw material supplies. Most important of all the emergency measures is the restriction of civilian consumption,

² The figures are taken from "European Foreign Trade in, and Production of Principal Commodities, 1938," a publication of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, and from publications of the League of Nations. The data are imperfect since they do not take account of the amounts of the materials imported and exported in the form of semi-manufactured and finished products, e.g., copper pipes, electrical appliances, cotton and woolen yarns, etc. See also, Percy W. Bidwell, "The Battle of the Metals," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, July 1940.

which frees the limited supplies for military uses. But emergency conditions cannot be expected to last forever. Substitutes are expensive; they require large expenditures of labor and of power. The synthetic products, moreover, are often much less satisfactory to consumers than those derived from imported materials. All of these considerations must be taken into account in estimating the effectiveness in the postwar period of a European economy organized for maximum self-sufficiency.

II

Granting that the Nazis intend to take maximum advantage of Europe's natural resources and to develop internal trade so as to reduce dependence on outside areas, and granting that they will be reasonably successful in this type of economic policy, what does this mean in terms of the interests of the United States? What policies could be devised to protect these interests?

It seems certain that Germany will seek to become the principal, if not the exclusive, supplier of manufactured goods for European consumption. The result would be a heavy loss in our export sales to the Continent. For several decades, owing to changes in our economy and to hostile tariff policies on both sides of the Atlantic, our European market has been declining in relative importance. Yet in 1937, it still took \$345 millions of manufactured goods and \$463 millions of semi-manufactured goods and raw materials. These sales accounted for 19 and 31 percent, respectively, of all exports in these classes.

Even under the new régime Europe will need, if its economy is to function effectively, raw materials and feed for livestock to the value of \$2 billions annually. Payment naturally will be offered in the products of European factories. Consequently, we may expect intensified competition of European goods in world markets, particularly in South America. A two-way trade is already strongly established. Continental European markets before the present war took over half of South American exports outside the hemisphere. By exercising coördinated control over Europe's vast purchases, Germany might monopolize the foreign trade of certain of the republics, by bilateral agreements and bulk purchases, so as practically to exclude United States' goods. Further, we may expect that German economic power would be utilized to influence to our disadvantage unstable political situations whenever they appeared.

How can the United States best defend the interests which are thus endangered? It would be a stupendous undertaking to endeavor to set up under our leadership a bloc whose economic and military potential would be equal or superior to that of Europe. Trade and production statistics indicate that we should have to bring together the Western Hemisphere, the British Empire, the Dutch East Indies and Japan — practically the entire non-German world, excepting the U. S. S. R. But Germany's Europe would still have the military advantage of occupying contiguous areas. Our rival bloc would be scattered over the seven seas. Moreover, before it could be made to function effectively, we might have to fight a major war with Japan.

Better results, in the opinion of the present writers, can be achieved by less spectacular methods. We should concentrate attention less on what the Nazis might be able to do, and more on what we, practically speaking, can do. In place of a mechanical process of bloc building, we should substitute a biological process of proliferation. We should begin with the area in which our traders can now operate freely, and enlarge it as rapidly as possible by bringing into closer association countries, complementary in their economic organizations, whose political ideals and institutions are harmonious with ours.

III

Any plan for safeguarding an area in which the United States might conduct its foreign trade free from the restrictions of barter and bilateral trading should logically begin with improving our trade relations with Canada and the Caribbean countries. Our close political association with Canada has already been emphasized by the establishment of a Permanent Joint Board on Defense. The investment of 2 billion dollars of United States capital in Canadian enterprises, and the great volume of trade passing every day across our northern border, are evidences of a firm basis for closer economic and political relations. In the trade agreements of 1936 and 1938, tariff barriers were lowered on both sides. As a result of these changes, added to the fact that Canada's economic organization and our own are in many respects complementary, our trade with Canada in 1939 amounted to 15 percent of our total foreign trade. We took in the same year 42 percent of Canada's exports, and supplied 66 percent of that country's imports. The volume of trade might be increased by reducing our

import duties and enlarging our tariff quotas on Canadian dairy products and cattle.

The United States already occupies a preponderant position in the trade of Mexico and the entire Caribbean region. Many of the principal products of this region — bananas, coffee, henequen, chicle — are complementary rather than competitive with our agricultural products. Sugar, petroleum and copper are competitive, but we can absorb them in large amounts without serious derangement of our economy. Trade figures show how closely the economies of these regions are geared to ours. In 1937, we supplied over half the imports of Cuba, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Panama and Haiti, and between 40 and 50 percent of the imports of Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica and El Salvador. We furnished a market for over half of all the exports of all these countries, except Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Costa Rica. There are definite possibilities, moreover, of expanding this trade if we are willing to make tariff concessions on such commodities as lead, zinc, copper, petroleum and sugar.³

Considerations of military defense make a quarter-sphere policy attractive; but on the economic side this policy offers no adequate solution of American trade problems. Even the freest type of trade relations with Canada and the Caribbean republics would not afford a market for the \$1,500 millions of American manufactured goods which we regularly sell abroad. Nor would it solve the very troublesome problem of finding purchasers for 200 to 250 million bushels of Canadian wheat produced annually in excess of Canadian consumption. We must remember that almost two and a half million people in Western Canada derive one-half of their income from wheat exports.

The Caribbean countries have their export surpluses, too. Even those whose economies are most closely geared to ours are accustomed to sell sugar, coffee, petroleum and copper to the value of over \$500 millions annually outside the hemisphere. Obviously if the American and the Canadian economies are to function smoothly, they need a wider horizon.

The logical next step in enlarging the area where multilateral trading might be carried on would seem to be the addition of the remaining countries of South America. Politically, this would be

³ For a discussion of the possibility of a Western Hemisphere bloc, see Professor Alvin Hansen's article, "Hemisphere Solidarity," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, October 1940.

in accord with our policy of hemisphere solidarity. Economically, however, the addition of southern South America would seem to complicate rather than simplify our trading problem; for in order to be effective a bloc must meet two tests: (1) its basic industries must be reasonably supplementary as evidenced by an active intra-regional trade; (2) it must be able to furnish from internal resources most of the raw materials essential to modern industry and modern military defense.

The Western Hemisphere fails to satisfy these requirements. If we take the foreign trade data of the 21 republics, plus Canada, and analyze them in the same way we did the trade data of Continental Europe, we get very different results. The total imports of the Western Hemisphere group in 1937 were valued at \$5,601 millions. Of this amount, only \$2,385 millions, or 43 percent, represented intra-hemisphere trade. On the export side, the total of all shipments across national borders was \$6,790 millions. Out of this total, \$2,656 millions, 39 percent, was intra-bloc trade. In other words, the problem of arranging in the Western Hemisphere a free-trading area is the problem of finding sources of supply for \$3,200 millions of imports and markets for \$4,100 millions of exports.

Even were we to apply to Western Hemisphere trade the drastic policies which we assumed the Nazis might use in Continental Europe, we would produce a considerably lower degree of self-sufficiency. If we insisted that each of the 22 states should purchase all of its imports from another state in the hemisphere, and conversely that each state should sell its exports first to its neighbors, we would reduce the imports from outside areas to something like \$1,882 millions, and the exports to extra-hemisphere markets to \$2,959 millions.

The weakness of a Western Hemisphere economic bloc is briefly this: The aggregation of 20 Latin American republics, plus the United States, plus Canada, contains two great areas in the northern and southern temperate zones which are among the world's largest exporters of industrial raw materials and foodstuffs. There is, on the other hand, only *one* great industrial population in the Western Hemisphere, only *one* great aggregation of consumers of cotton, wheat, meat, hides, copper, oil, sugar and coffee. It is the United States. As things stand now, a Western Hemisphere bloc would be a lop-sided economy in which the production of primary products and crude foodstuffs

would far overbalance consumption. Furthermore, on the production side it would not furnish in nearly adequate volume the following raw materials essential in peace and in war: antimony, chromite, magnesite, manganese, manila fiber, mercury, potash, quinine, rubber, tin, tungsten, vegetable oils.

From the time it began to participate in international trade, the Western Hemisphere has occupied the position of a colonial economy, furnishing foodstuffs and raw materials to Europe in exchange for manufactured products. Even now, notwithstanding the rapid industrial development of the United States, this kind of exchange is still of primary importance. The hemisphere still finds its dominant market for foodstuffs and raw materials in Continental Europe and in the United Kingdom. The following table lists the principal exports of the Western Hemisphere absorbed primarily by Continental Europe and the United Kingdom in 1937 (figures in millions of dollars; source, "Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1938"):

<i>Commodity</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>Canada</i>	<i>Argentina and Uruguay</i>	<i>Brazil</i>	<i>Chile</i>	<i>Colombia and Venezuela ^a</i>	<i>Total</i>
Wheat (incl. flour)	\$ 64	\$148	\$164	\$ 376
Meat	43	58	101	11	3	..	216
Cotton	369	64	433
Tobacco	135	3	..	6	144
Corn	196	196
Linseed	93	93
Copper	94	55	104	..	253
Petroleum	376	195	571
Totals	\$1,081	\$264	\$554	\$81	\$107	\$195	\$2,282

^a Figures for Venezuela are for 1936.

IV

True, we do not have to accept the economic organization of the Western Hemisphere as immutable. Given enough time, we can change it; we can give new direction to the utilization of its natural resources and of its labor forces. But such changes will prove expensive.

The costs of readjusting the economic structure of the Western Hemisphere would fall principally on Canada, and on Argentina and other areas in southern South America. Canada would have to cut down its wheat production drastically. Argentina would have to convert to other uses much of the land, labor and capital now used in growing wheat, corn, flaxseed, and in producing meat,

wool and hides. Chile would have to reduce its production of wool and fruits. Having lost a large portion of their export markets, these countries would have to reduce their imports of automobiles, tires, sewing machines, typewriters, refrigerators, and clocks and a thousand other conveniences and luxuries. To reemploy the millions of agricultural workers thus deprived of their livelihood would require a huge program of new capital investment in Latin America, financed, of course, by the United States. The program would be directed partly toward supplying factories in the United States with the rubber, tin and other raw materials formerly imported from outside the hemisphere, but partly also toward increasing production of manufactured goods in such countries as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile.

Rubber furnishes a good example of what we mean by the costs of readjustment. Our factories use 500,000 tons of crude rubber each year. We can, if necessary, spend several hundred millions of dollars building plants to produce synthetic rubber. But if we do, we cannot use the same funds, which means the same labor, in building armament or airplane factories. Natural rubber can be grown in its original habitat, the Amazon basin. About 15,000 tons were produced there in 1938. Given time, this output can be enlarged; but first forests must be cleared, plantations made and brought to maturity, native labor recruited and trained in the discipline of a new economic system.

Again, the United States uses each year about 70,000 tons of tin. Bolivian mines, the most important source in the hemisphere, produce 25,000 tons. Various obstacles, including labor shortage, high transportation costs and the lack of adequate smelting capacity, would have to be overcome before we could attain hemisphere self-sufficiency. Granted these can be overcome, the stimulation of Bolivian tin mining does not touch (any more than does the stimulation of Brazilian rubber production) the problem of reemploying the gauchos of the Argentine pampas, or the wheat farmers of Alberta and Saskatchewan, or the tobacco growers in Virginia and the Carolinas. Programs of development in one part of the hemisphere can create activity *there*. However, the labor force deprived of its earning power through the loss of exports may be situated thousands of miles away. More than the lure of high wages is needed to move hundreds of thousands of workers from the temperate zones in South and North America to the tropics. We should find that the forced contraction

of certain major enterprises such as wheat farming, and the forced expansion of others, would be a terribly expensive process, reckoned either in terms of the necessary government subsidies, or in the hours of labor lost in acquiring new skills, or in the disturbances of home and community life resulting from mass transfers of workers, or in the wholesale substitution of government direction for private initiative.

Our contention that the Western Hemisphere does not possess the characteristics of a self-contained economic area, and could not be converted into such an area except by economic revolutions in the United States, Canada and South America, does not imply disapproval of efforts now being made by the United States Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce and other government agencies to stimulate intra-hemisphere trade. Certainly, we need to increase our knowledge of the resources of the Latin American countries. We should give technical aid in the development of new agricultural and industrial products and in the exploitation of mineral resources. The stimulation of manufacturing in South America and the improvement of inland transportation would furnish an enlarged market for exports of American heavy machinery and industrial equipment. Industrial progress would decrease the dependence of the South American countries on markets outside the hemisphere. There is an important field here for action by the Export-Import Bank, and, if adequate guarantees can be obtained, for private capital as well.

Much could be accomplished by the mutual reduction of tariffs between countries in this hemisphere. A promising beginning in this direction has already been made in our trade agreements with Canada, Brazil, Cuba and some of the smaller Latin American states. Negotiations with Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, begun several years ago but interrupted by the clamor of protected interests in the United States, should be resumed. In addition to stimulating intra-hemisphere trade, tariff reduction at this time would afford a safeguard against the inflationary influence of our rearmament program. Latin American states could well lower the tariff barriers they have raised against each other. Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have already taken steps in this direction. But such measures produce results only over a period of years. We may have to supplement them with emergency schemes such as commodity cartels or other methods of "orderly marketing" for hemisphere surpluses.

V

The danger in these and other plans for developing inter-American trade is that, forgetting the fundamental weakness of the Western Hemisphere bloc, we shall expend all our energies on a project which in the long run is visionary and impracticable. It seems impossible, in the opinion of the present writers, to create inside the Western Hemisphere new conditions of trade which would replace, satisfactorily to ourselves or to Canada or to our Latin American neighbors, the century-old trade relations of this hemisphere with Europe.

Continental Europe in recent years purchased about 37 percent of all Central American exports to points outside this hemisphere, and 55 percent of the corresponding exports of the South American republics. Should this war end either in stalemate or in a German victory, Hitler stands ready to resume this trade on an imposing scale. Any interference with this trade on our part, either by economic pressure or by force, would destroy the delicate fabric of Pan Americanism which we have striven so sedulously to weave. In certain of the South American republics, as Mr. Arthur Krock has observed, "there is no especial objection to relations with European dictators, no such distaste for their methods or such love for democracies on the American and British models as exist here."⁴ They will naturally suspect any scheme we devise for substituting hemisphere markets for European ones of being more in our interests than in theirs.

We do not need, however, to prevent Brazil, Chile or Argentina from selling their coffee, meat, wool, hides, wheat or any other surpluses to Germany, or to countries that may be under German control. All that we need to do is to prevent the development of a situation in which the Germans can exercise monopoly of buying power. In other words, American policy should aim to provide all major South American exports with alternative markets sufficiently large so that our Good Neighbors to the south shall not lack ample bargaining power.

We have already indicated that adequate alternative markets are not available in the Western Hemisphere. They can be found in only one place, namely in the United Kingdom. For many years the United Kingdom has been the world's greatest market for foodstuffs and primary products. In 1937, the 45 million in-

⁴ *New York Times*, November 19, 1940.

habitants of the British Isles bought \$1,400 millions of Western Hemisphere products — an average of \$31 per capita. Continental Europe, the area now controlled by Germany, bought \$1,600 millions, only \$5 per capita. English markets in 1937 took 62 percent of all the wheat and flour exported from the Western Hemisphere to European markets, and 58 percent of the meats. It bought between 30 and 50 percent of all European purchases of Western Hemisphere cotton, tobacco and corn. These are some of the striking facts to be learned from the following table giving European imports of the principal commodities exported by Western Hemisphere countries (figures are for physical quantities imported 1935-1937):

<i>Commodity</i>	<i>Proportion imported by United Kingdom</i>	<i>Proportion imported by Leading Continental European Countries</i>
Wheat (including flour)	62 percent	38 percent
Lard	58 “	42 “
Meats	90 “	10 “
Cotton	37 “	63 “
Tobacco	32 “	68 “
Corn	40 “	60 “
Coffee	0 “	100 “
Copper ^a	49 “	51 “
Petroleum ^a	38 “	62 “

^a Proportion based upon value.

If the markets of the United Kingdom, alone, could be preserved for the Western Hemisphere, its export surpluses of food and raw materials would be reduced from \$2½ to approximately \$1 billion.

Earlier in this essay we pointed out that the economic disequilibrium in the Western Hemisphere arose principally from the fact that two of its great areas specialize in cereals and meats and other products of the temperate zone, whereas it contains only one great specialized industrial area. In the rest of the world, outside of Continental Europe, there is only one other great industrial area — the United Kingdom. Thus in our search for a wide field where liberal trading practices might be effectively exercised, we are led to include the United Kingdom with the Western Hemisphere. But the close economic, political and sentimental ties binding the United Kingdom to the Empire make it impossible to deal with the mother country separately.

Canada we have already considered as a charter member of the association of freely trading nations. India's exports, except

for cotton, are largely non-competitive with Western Hemisphere products. But the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, countries in the south temperate zone, would seem to destroy the balance which we have been seeking between producing and consuming areas. The southern countries, however, already market a large share of their wool, wheat, dairy products and meat either in the United States or in the United Kingdom. Cut off from supplies of Dutch and Danish butter and cheese, the United Kingdom might well increase its purchases from Australia and New Zealand.

Offsetting the disadvantages of surpluses in certain agricultural products, we find that the addition of Empire countries in the southern hemisphere safeguards important markets for United States exports of machinery, automobiles, iron and steel products.⁵ Balancing all the factors, it appears that the inclusion of the entire British Empire in a trading area with the Western Hemisphere would roughly reduce by one-half the export surpluses of that area. The addition of Empire countries, moreover, would assure supplies of essential raw materials in which the Western Hemisphere is deficient: the jute and manganese of India, the rubber and tin of the Malay States, the chromite and tungsten of South Africa.

The combined Western Hemisphere-British Empire bloc would not provide complete self-sufficiency on the import side. Judging from 1937 figures, it would still need to purchase from other areas such items as dairy and poultry products, meats, timber and lumber, pulp and pulpwood. But its needs would not be so critical nor so extensive as to place the area in a position of inferiority if it had to bargain with, or to fight against, other areas.

VI

The two foci of American foreign policy at present are (1) the economic and military defense of the Western Hemisphere, and (2) the support, by all methods short of war, of the British Empire in its struggle against the Axis Powers. The people of the United States demonstrated in the recent presidential campaign that they overwhelmingly support these policies. But they really are not two policies. They are one policy. Hemisphere self-sufficiency is an impracticable dream. The attempt to realize it

⁵ In recent years 60 percent of all United States exports have been marketed in the Western Hemisphere and the British Empire; while about 65 percent of our imports came from these areas.

would weaken the economic basis of our rearmament program; it would endanger our political relations with Latin American countries. If our argument is sound, there is no way of defending adequately either our interests in the Western Hemisphere, or the interests of other member states, except in close association with the British Empire. The British area furnishes the markets and supplies the materials which can keep the Western Hemisphere a going concern. We are interested, therefore, in preserving the British Empire as a political entity so that its markets may remain open to our exporters and so that its raw materials may remain accessible to our importers.

Discussions of American trade policy after the war are generally premised upon three alternative outcomes: (1) a British victory, meaning the overthrow of the Nazi power and the liberation of the European democracies; (2) a German victory, meaning the incorporation of the United Kingdom in the Continental European bloc, with the dismemberment of the British Empire and the destruction of the British fleet; and (3) a stalemate or negotiated peace, leaving Hitler supreme on the Continent and the English still in possession of their fleet and their Empire.

One or other of the outcomes is assumed as data, and then a hypothetical American policy is fitted to it. But mental gymnastics of this type give no satisfactory answer to today's pressing question. For the American people today, the vital issue is not: "On what terms can we trade with Europe after the war is over?" It is: "How can we bring about the struggle to the conclusion which will be most advantageous to us?"

Certainly a sweeping German victory would impose on the United States a serious limitation of its freedom of action in foreign trade and in foreign affairs generally. Our traders would find their activities confined in a network of Nazi trade agreements. We might be forced in self-defense to accept a quarter-sphere or hemisphere policy, with ensuing painful readjustments in our economy.

But we should frankly recognize that neither a stalemate nor an outright British victory would in itself, without positive and constructive action on our part, reestablish liberal trade policies in the world. The revolutionary disturbances which the war has produced in the English economy, internally, and in its relations with the outside world, will require the continuance of wartime controls of trade into the postwar period. Trends toward bilater-

alism already in evidence before 1939 will be emphasized. But whether such policies actually become permanent depends in large measure upon what trading conditions are offered in the Western Hemisphere, on whether we have succeeded in preserving an area of liberal trade, or whether we have ourselves gone over to totalitarian methods.

These considerations lead to two conclusions: (1) American aid to Britain should be extended immediately by every means in our power. We should enlarge the proportions of our output of planes and ships which are made available. The restrictions of the Johnson Act and the Neutrality Act on the grant of credits and on the use of American ships should be removed. (2) To supplement such aid while the war continues, but particularly to forestall the lapse of the English area into tightly controlled trade on Nazi lines after the war is over, we should set in motion now plans for an economic union which would include the Western Hemisphere and the British Empire.

A year ago, such a proposal might have seemed unnecessary. Six months ago, it might have been considered useless. Today, knowing both the extent of the Nazi menace and the British capacity for resistance, we should be prepared to proceed from that knowledge to bold and far-reaching measures. The association here proposed would be based on a substantial community of economic interest. On the political side, not pretending to be an exclusive union of simon-pure democracies, it would associate a few powerful states, in which democratic traditions are strongly entrenched, with others which have shown that they sincerely strive toward democratic ideals.

To sketch the organization of the proposed union would go beyond the scope of this paper; however, it would obviously have to include a system of preferential tariffs and an agreement looking toward the stabilization of exchange rates. The purpose of these and other arrangements should not be to cement the member states into a water-tight bloc, with trade with the outside world reduced to a minimum. Trade with other nations or blocs should be welcomed if conducted under adequate safeguards. Other nations should be admitted to membership if they agree to trade on liberal principles. The union thus would provide a genuine *Lebensraum* for all who love peace and freedom. Within it they might lend and borrow, migrate and trade without fear of exploitation or oppression.

EUROPEAN FACTORS IN FAR EASTERN DIPLOMACY

By A. Whitney Griswold

TO American eyes the Far East is a scene of rapid and bewildering change. Three times within the last four years Japan has revised her foreign policy in ways which would have been considered revolutionary if followed by the United States.

On November 25, 1936, Japan became a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Her relations with Soviet Russia had been going from bad to worse because of her undercover penetration of China. She had common strategical interests with Germany vis-à-vis the Soviet which made ideological rationalizations unnecessary. It was a "natural" alignment. Until the eleventh hour Americans expected Japan to play a part (no one knew how active) on the Axis side in the oncoming European war.

The expectation was not fulfilled. Instead, Germany made her deal with Russia, and Japan left the Anti-Comintern Front in a panic. This deal (the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement of August 23, 1939) not only sent a Japanese cabinet toppling; it caused the next cabinet to adopt a more friendly policy toward England, France and the United States. The sincerity of the spirit underlying this new policy may be open to doubt. It nevertheless lasted as long as there was any possibility of negotiating, as between England, France, Japan and the United States, a mutually profitable and viable understanding.

Exactly when the possibility vanished, or why it never developed, is known to the statesmen in London, Paris, Tokyo and Washington. Their colleagues in Berlin and Chungking might also do some explaining. At all events, Japan on September 27, 1940, rejoined her old Axis partners, this time in a ten-year military alliance, and let it be known that a *rapprochement* with Russia was in the tea leaves.

Such an opportunist trafficking in alliances is the rule rather than the exception in Far Eastern politics. The scene has changed many times in that part of the world during the past half century, but the players remain the same and the plot consistent. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. Japan's frequent shifts of allegiance have all been means toward a single end. It is western

diplomacy, not Japanese, that has been inconsistent and erratic, and for one basic reason. The European Powers, Russia and the United States have all treated the Far East as a sphere of interest subordinate to Europe or Africa or India or the Near East or the Americas, as the case might be. Their Far Eastern policies have been as variable as the ulterior, non-Far Eastern motives by which they have been governed. Hence the periodic swapping and dickering in the Far East, as these Powers bargained there to save what they would not place on the counter elsewhere.

During this process, the balance of power in the Far East has depended upon the balance of power in Europe. Japan has needed every bargain she could strike. Only when her rivals were divided against themselves could she hope to rule, even in her own hemisphere. Western harmony, or a balance of power which gave supremacy and freedom of action to a given combination of western nations, always spelled danger to Japan. She has never forgotten, for example, the Triple Intervention of 1895, when Russia, France and Germany denied her access to the continental foothold she had wrested from China. With France allied to Russia, and the latter a willing stooge of Germany, Japan had to wait until the European disbalance frightened England into an alliance with her before she could resume the effective pursuit of her continental goal. Then, as England built the alliance into an anti-German coalition which included France and Russia, Japan discovered more formidable limits to her continental ambitions than the decrepit Tsarist military power which she had smashed in 1905. Only the First World War, which immobilized all of these nations in Europe, gave Japan the free field she really desired. Nor did she have this to herself for long. American participation in the war and the resultant Allied victory confronted her with a formidable combination of mobilized naval, military and economic power. It forced her, in the Washington Treaties, to apply the brakes once more. Not until this combination had first been weakened by the depression, and then put on the defensive by Italy and Germany, were the brakes released.

Conversely, it should be noted that Japan has exerted little influence on the balance of power in Europe. It is true that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance rescued England from her "splendid isolation" in 1902 and helped pave the way for the Entente Cordiale with France of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. But when the hour of trial came for England in 1914, far

from relying on Japan's assistance, Sir Edward Grey tried to persuade the latter to stay out of the war. Japan made no contribution to her ally's war effort in Europe. On the contrary, as is well known, Japan's war against Germany consisted of seizing as many of the latter's Far Eastern possessions as she could get away with, badgering China with the Twenty-One Demands, and overrunning northern Manchuria and part of Siberia.

Japan's membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact evidently was not enough to insure Hitler's eastern front in the Second World War. What other reason was there for the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement in August 1939? And now, even with Japan a full-fledged military ally of the Axis and a Russo-Japanese treaty in process of negotiation, it is doubtful if Hitler can expect much effective Japanese assistance in Europe. While Japan might contribute indirectly to an Axis victory by diverting American or Russian attention from Europe, the point to be made here is that, until the outbreak of the present war, the Far Eastern balance of power has always been determined by the balance of power in Europe, and never *vice versa*.

The war and the new alliance raise the question as to the state of this inter-continental balance today. How much of it, if any, remains? Since 1931, western and Russian influence combined has been insufficient to deter Japan from pressing forward her invasion of China, nor to call into question her naval supremacy in the Japan, Yellow and China Seas and adjacent waters. It has barely sufficed to hold in check a process of overseas expansion which has long seemed imminent and may, with the invasion of French Indo-China, actually have begun. With England fighting for her life, France and the Low Countries under the German yoke, the United States preoccupied with the defense of an entire hemisphere and the survival of England, how much of this restraining influence remains today? Can it be strengthened, and, if so, how? Is the latest scene-shifting just one more in the old Far Eastern political drama, or is it the curtain-raiser to a New Order? Let us seek answers to these questions in the recent policies of the five principal Powers currently interested in the Far East: Germany, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, Japan and the United States.

The world has forgotten Germany's lost colonies in the Pacific, and Hitler, to placate his Japanese ally, has not pressed his claim to them. The Marshalls and Carolines, German Samoa, German

New Guinea, Tsingtao, Kiaochow and the Shantung Peninsula were all once outposts of German empire, trade and missionary work. Germany came out of the Great War having been harried from her islands by Japan, Australia and New Zealand, pushed out of Shantung by Japan, and with her business men rounded up and deported from China by the British.

Starting from behind scratch, Germany then proceeded to build up a thriving trade with China and Japan and to rehabilitate her political influence in both countries. In China, German officers organized and trained the armies of Chiang Kai-shek. They were not recalled from that mission until the spring of 1938. Germany's political relations with Japan improved in direct ratio to the worsening of the latter's relations with the Soviets. This accounts for the fact that German neutrality was more benevolent to Japan than to China during the present Sino-Japanese conflict. After a half-hearted, or at all events unsuccessful, effort to mediate peace in 1937, Germany — already associated with Japan in the Anti-Comintern Pact — recognized Manchukuo. Loans and barter agreements with both Manchukuo and Japan followed; Hitler called home the last military experts from China; and the foundation of the recent triple alliance was completed. It was so strong a foundation that Hitler evidently believed it would survive the shock of his deal with Stalin, and time has proved him right.

In addition to her commercial and political interests in China and Japan, Germany has considerable trade interests in the East Indies. This trade has consisted mostly of imports of tin, rubber, tobacco, oil and bauxite. While Germany's dependence on the East Indies for these resources is by no means as great as Japan's, it is great enough to stimulate her concern for the future of the islands. In a purely negative sense, it might be of value to Germany to deny unfriendly powers access to them, to use them for bargaining purposes. Moreover, the Australians have discovered rich gold deposits and are on the trail of oil in what was once German New Guinea. With these economic incentives, what more logical price might Germany demand for the evacuation of Holland than the return of her former colony and substantial concessions in the Dutch East Indies? For the time being, Hitler is content to use Japan as a scarecrow in that cornfield. His victory in the war would place him in a position to dictate to his ally, and the rich East Indies is a possible sphere of conflict be-

tween the two. But though Germany's economic interests in the Far East are significant, and though Hitler is advised by his official prophet of *Geopolitik*, the mystical Haushofer, not to overlook the *Raum* of the Pacific, Germany's present interests there are chiefly political and wholly subservient to her interests in Europe.

Nothing points more clearly to this conclusion than the recent Triple Alliance of the Axis partners and Japan. The timing of this *coup* indicates German rather than Japanese initiative and European rather than Far Eastern objectives. In the first place, two of the three signatories are European Powers, primarily concerned with winning a European war. It is easy to read in the terms of the alliance a warning to the United States to stay out of this war as well as the one in the Far East. Article Three pledges the signatories "to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." It is less easy to see a similar warning to Russia. Article Five expressly states that "the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia."

But consider the time scheme. Hitler's air attack on England had not produced the desired results. It was burning up German oil. For every day that the British stood up and struck back under the hammerings of the *Luftwaffe*, Axis prestige declined. Some complimentary editorials on the R. A. F. appeared in the controlled Soviet press. Autumn was approaching, a season considered less favorable for continuing the Battle of Britain and more favorable, perhaps, for beginning the Battle of the Near East. As Hitler and Mussolini planned their thrusts into Rumania and Greece they undoubtedly employed all the diplomatic means at their disposal to insure their flank against Russian attack. The tepid phrases of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement were not enough; and Italy had no pact with Russia. There was no assurance that "the political status which exists *at present*" as between the Axis and Russia should continue to exist. What more expeditious means of achieving this end than a revival of the old Anti-Comintern Pact with real military teeth in it and a pious exemption for Russia? Under these circumstances Stalin could either be bought off with a Russo-Japanese non-aggression treaty

backed by Hitler's guarantee, or fought off on two fronts if he refused the deal and intervened in the Near East. It is true that the alliance followed hard upon an American embargo of scrap steel; but it was itself immediately followed by an Axis invasion of the Balkans rather than a Japanese attack on Hong Kong or the East Indies. Again the time scheme is worth noting. That the Alliance is dominated by Germany and intended by Germany for European use may be inferred even in its Far Eastern application. American assistance to Britain is one of the chief obstacles in the Axis' path, and there could be no more effective way of cutting this off than by diverting it to a conflict with Japan in the Pacific.

In short, Hitler follows a combination of the policies of Bismarck and the Kaiser. Like Bismarck, he seeks to stay on good terms with Russia. Like the Kaiser he presses hard on Russia's Near Eastern sphere of interest and overlooks no chance to encourage (or embroil) her in the Far East. Now, as in the past, Germany draws opportunistically on her Far Eastern deposits of influence to finance more important ventures closer to home.

The same can be said of Russia. Though foreign observers have tried to make her an oriental nation, and European statecraft has sought to encourage her interest in the Far East, Russia has gazed much more intently through Peter the Great's window on the west, eyed the Bosphorus more hungrily than Tsushima, and dreamed the Pan Slav dream, not the Pan Asiatic. This has been true throughout her history, and it is true today. The Russo-Japanese War and Soviet activities in China have made Americans forget Russia's many wars with Sweden, Poland and Turkey, and the part she played in the Napoleonic, Crimean and First World Wars. They have made them forget the alliance with France and Soviet support of the Spanish Loyalists.

The high water mark of Russia's eastward expansion was reached when a pioneer movement not unlike the American had carried her political influence across Siberia and down through Manchuria into Korea. Since Japan rolled back these frontiers in 1905, Russia has made no serious effort to extend them again. Before the Great War she concluded no less than four secret "appeasement" treaties with her former foe. After the war, though her agents carried a short-lived ideological imperialism into China, and though in 1929 she was the first nation to defy the Kellogg Pact and make war on China in Manchuria, she

withdrew before the Japanese advance to the empty spaces of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia, and the forts and blockhouses north of the Amur. She sold out her share in the Chinese Eastern Railway. And though from 1931 to 1937 she was involved with Japan by actual count in 2,400 border disputes, many of which caused bloodshed and some severe loss of life, she chose to make none of them a *casus belli*.

This is not to say that Russia's present interest in the Far East is negligible. Since the beginning of the "China Incident" Russia has loaned China more money and rendered her more direct and effective military assistance than the rest of the Western Powers combined. Yet Russia's desire for an independent China has not prevented her from concluding a truce in the border warfare with Japan and from placing in negotiation with that nation a still more comprehensive settlement of boundaries, spheres and economic and political issues. Neither has it prevented Stalin from reaching first, through his window on the west, into Poland, Finland, the Baltic States and Bessarabia, before moving an inch from his Amur blockhouses in Eastern Asia. He has double-tracked the Trans-Siberian Railway and along the Manchurian border he has concentrated a self-sustaining army and air force which could strike Japan a heavy blow. But the offensive potential of these troops depends upon the plans which Stalin has for them, and these plans are being resolved right now, not in eastern Asia, but in Rumania, Turkey and along the Greco-Albanian frontier. It is what happens in the path of Hitler's *Drang nach Osten*, not American shipments of machine tools, which in the last analysis will determine Russia's policy in the Far East.

Great Britain's wartime relations with the Far East hinge so obviously on her success in withstanding the German air siege and preserving her sea power as to require little discussion here. But in the background of the present situation we can discern a trend in the Far Eastern policy of Britain which is often overlooked. The fact is, that British sea power has been on the decline in the Far East ever since the Great War, and perhaps longer. As Japan gained naval command of the Yellow and China Seas, Britain (and the United States too, for that matter) lost it. England recognized this fact, as was evident in her desire to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921. Her Pacific Dominions concurred in the wish, believing this to be the only way to protect themselves against the rising power of Japan. But all three, the

mother country and Australia and New Zealand, were thwarted by Canada and the United States. The Alliance was terminated. Britain thereupon fell back on the Washington Treaties as a poor substitute for the Alliance, on Singapore as the surest bulwark of her Pacific defenses, and on the naval coöperation of France, Holland, Australia and New Zealand to reënforce it. In addition, she hoped that the American fleet, based in the Pacific while she kept her fleet in the Atlantic, would act as a deterrent to Japanese incursions into Australasia or the East Indies. Thus, while Britain continued to share equally with Japan three-quarters of all foreign investments in China, and to endorse with the United States the principles of the Open Door and the territorial integrity of China, her postwar policies were primarily aimed at defending India, Malaya, the East Indies and the Dominions rather than her stake or her principles in China.

Since British sea power has not for a long time been adequate, either alone or in friendly conjunction with American sea power, to command the China and the Yellow Seas, its survival in the present war is not likely to augment British influence in the Far East beyond its pre-war limits. These limits have included the defensive security of the islands and possessions already mentioned, and control of the sea routes thither. But they have not included the maintenance of the Open Door and the territorial integrity of China. This was clear in the Manchurian Crisis ten years ago. Since the beginning of the present Sino-Japanese War, British diplomacy has waged a rearguard action against the advancing Japanese, doing much to support the Chinese currency, suffering the indignities of the Tientsin blockade and the virtual blockade of Hong Kong, clinging doggedly to the old *points d'appui* in China and, most recently, reopening the Burma Road. But there is no talk in London of restoring British influence in the Far East to its nineteenth-century peak, when Lord Salisbury took Weihaiwei as "cartographical consolation" for the Russian seizure of Port Arthur. There is no hope of forcing Japan to abandon her campaign in China. There is only a desperate effort to prevent that campaign from sweeping down along the Chinese littoral until it cuts off Singapore *from the rear*. The Japanese are already based in Indo-China, less than 700 miles from Singapore by sea. They are speaking loudly in the councils of Thailand. Let them cow Thailand, or bribe her into submission, and not only will they have cut off Singapore by land, but

they will have placed themselves virtually on the shores of the Indian Ocean and the edge of the Burma Road. It is only 300 air miles from Bangkok to Rangoon, the port that feeds the Burma Road, and the road already is under Japanese bombardment at other points. The reopening of the Burma Road may slow the Japanese momentum; it can stop it only if Britain survives to keep the road open.

Meantime, *all* roads lead to London, even those of the Dominions most in jeopardy from Japan. Australia and New Zealand have a combined population of less than nine million, and though they are responsible for contributing to the active defense of Singapore they are concentrating on the training of fliers and troops for service in England and the Near East. They are likewise building up their territorial defenses. But their primary concern is that England, and the British Navy, come through their present ordeal. And even the restoration of British influence in the Far East on an *ante bellum* scale promises them such a precarious security that they are turning, hopefully, to the United States. The last diplomatic scene-shifting in the Far East, Japan's alliance with the Axis, has had little effect upon these basic, long-term trends of British policy.

Japan has the advantage of all the Powers under discussion in that her interests in the Far East, unlike theirs, are direct and primary. We are not concerned here, however, with a minute analysis of these interests but with Japan's position in the changing balance of world power. Her fundamental goal today differs little from her goal during the First World War. Nor are her policies very different. She is ready, quite free from moral or ideological scruples, to associate herself with the winning side in the war in Europe. If she succeeds in doing this she will have a reserved seat at the Peace Conference, a chance to pick up crumbs from the tables of the mighty. Her alliance with the Axis means that she has bet on the Axis to win. Or, if we accept the thesis that the Triple Alliance sprang from German initiative, she has bought a premium from the high-pressure Nazi insurance salesman. In either case, it is hard to see how Japan can contribute directly to an Axis victory in Europe, *e.g.*, by dispatching thither her troops, planes, warships or munitions. She did not do this in the First World War. With the "China Incident" still on her hands, she is even less free to do so now. Nor does the Axis need or expect that kind of help.

As already indicated, Japan can make her contribution to an Axis victory in indirect ways. She could embroil the United States in the Pacific, and that would divert American energies from assistance to England. She can help Hitler kill Stalin with kindness. Whether or not the Russian dictator acquiesces by treaty in the New Order in both the Near East and the Far East, the military potential of the "natural" German-Japanese alignment vis-à-vis Russia continues to exist. That Stalin understands this would be proved rather than confuted by his adherence to the Triple Alliance. No doubt Japanese diplomats have been telling their Soviet colleagues that the Alliance is intended against the United States and their American colleagues that it is intended against Russia. Both of the statements are true, especially the second.

Japan does not need to fight either America or the Soviet in order to make some minor, though by no means insignificant, contributions to her allies. Merely by threatening the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, she anchors the American Navy in the Pacific, and draws to the Philippines American bombers that might otherwise be doing service over Germany. A Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies alone would not strike either Britain or the United States a mortal blow. In the first place, it would be no easy task for Japan to dominate a land area of 734,000 square miles, extending 3,200 miles from west to east on both sides of the equator. Here is a theatre of war in which the Dutch, British and Dominion naval and air defenses, though small, could harass the invader indefinitely. Secondly, Japan could not cripple the British nor prevent an American war effort by stopping the flow of oil and rubber from the Dutch East Indies. Both nations have abundant alternate sources of oil. Their dependence on East Indian rubber sources is greater, the United States obtaining upwards of 25 percent of its rubber imports from these islands. But both England and the United States are far more dependent for this commodity on the Malay States (from which the United States draws nearly 70 percent of its supply), a region under perhaps greater danger from Japan than the more conspicuous East Indies.

Should Japan occupy both territories, or put herself in position to control the sea routes to and from them, Britain and the United States could still get rubber from Ceylon, their third larg-

est source, and sustain themselves on reserves, substitutes and reclaimed stocks. But the practice would be expensive and hence would constitute a Japanese tax levied on Britain's defense against Hitler and on American assistance to Britain in that task. It is possible, moreover, that Germany and Japan could exploit this rubber hoard either by bartering it between themselves and their allies or by selling it at monopoly prices to their enemies. The mere possibility has already given a powerful stimulus to the American development of rubber plantations in South America and of substitutes at home. Neither of these sources could supply the normal, non-emergency, industrial needs of the United States, at costs to which the American market is adjusted. A seven-year period is required for a rubber tree to mature and begin to yield. Satisfactory substitutes might conceivably be produced more quickly, at as reasonable costs and in as adequate volume as the Malaysian plantations or their prospective successors in South America. Meantime, the capacity of Japan or Germany to use rubber as an economic weapon against both England and the United States depends upon the British Navy's control of the Atlantic and Indian sea-lanes to Singapore; and this in turn rests on the girders of the political house-that-Jack-built, the foundations of which are under German air bombardment.

If it is true that Japan will make no direct contributions to the Axis cause in Europe, it is also true that Germany and Italy will make no direct contribution to Japan in her war on China. The Russo-Japanese relationship works both ways. Hitler can aid Japan indirectly by merely continuing to do what he is already doing in the Balkans. He can hobble Stalin with non-aggression pacts or admit him to partnership in the New Order. He might even compel Stalin to abandon his support of Chiang Kai-shek and dictate a Sino-Japanese peace which would free Japan for an outright assault on the British Empire. The idea has certainly crossed his mind. The more his prestige feeds on success in Europe, the easier it will be of execution. Moreover, by keeping his armadas in the air over England, he attracts in that direction American resources which otherwise might be employed against Japan. But unless and until he breaks the British blockade, the R. A. F., and the morale that sustains them both, he can inflict no serious injury on the United States. So long as Britain survives, the American fleet can remain at Pearl Harbor, the one last western counter in the Pacific scales of power.

As we trace out these various lines of European and Far Eastern policy we see one compelling implication for the United States. For more than half a century the Far East has been America's backdoor to Europe. Today Europe has become America's frontdoor to the Far East. This is not something that ought to be or ought not to be. It is what is. The pragmatic decision of the American Government has been made to concentrate whatever energies and resources it can spare from its own defense program on assisting England to withstand the German siege. This does not mean that the United States has turned its back on the Far East. Far from it. It does mean that no major decision of Far Eastern policy is taken in Washington without a preliminary appraisal of its costs or benefits to the British war effort.

How much latitude this rule of thumb permits for American diplomatic action in the Far East is a question compounded of many elements: the relative effectiveness of the Chinese and Japanese armies in their present theatre of war; the relative naval and air strength that the British, Dutch, Australians and New Zealanders could muster against the Japanese in East Indian waters; the 2,920 miles from Yokohama to Singapore and the 6,107 miles from Singapore to Pearl Harbor; the relative indispensability of East Indian and Malayan rubber to the United States and of American cotton, iron, steel, oil and tools to Japan. But these are as chips on the gaming table in comparison to the basic will of the American people regarding the rôle they intend to play in world politics. There is no doubt at all as to what rôle they would like to play. If all they had to do was to pull a lever, they would immediately bring peace and justice to both Europe and the Far East, which, practically speaking, would mean a free and independent England, France and China, the demobilization of the Axis legions and a universal restitution of human, *i.e.*, civil liberties. How far they are prepared to go to accomplish this end in the difficult byways of world politics outside their own hemisphere is another matter. Nor has it been settled beyond the lines already indicated by the unprecedented third election of President Roosevelt.

Since the First World War, Americans have tried to banish from their minds the belief that war was an unavoidable or even a necessary part of civilization. They have listened eagerly to the prophets of peace, disarmament, international coöperation. They have clutched at the hope that their great economic wealth

and sincerely peaceful intentions could in some way influence the outer world to share their views. One by one they have watched these ideals, beliefs and hopes go a-glimmering. Today, for the first time in their history, they have adopted peacetime conscription and appropriated the money for the greatest navy and air force on earth. Thinking of France, they have come with regret to adopt the prudent counsel of Machiavelli, who wrote:

Every one may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot so finish it. A prince, therefore, before engaging in any enterprise should well measure his strength, and govern himself accordingly; and he must be very careful not to deceive himself in the estimate of his strength, which he will assuredly do if he measures it by his money, or by the situation of his country, or the good disposition of his people, unless he has at the same time an armed force of his own. For although the above things will increase his strength, yet they will not give it to him, and of themselves are nothing, and will be of no use without a devoted army. Neither abundance of money nor natural strength of the country will suffice, nor will the loyalty and good will of his subjects endure, for these cannot remain faithful to a prince who is incapable of defending them. Neither mountains nor lakes nor inaccessible places will present any difficulties to an enemy where there is lack of brave defenders. And money alone, so far from being a means of defense, will only render a prince the more liable to being plundered. There cannot, therefore, be a more erroneous opinion than that money is the sinews of war.

Until the United States has built its new army, navy and air force, this sense of prudence will probably continue to direct its major attention — apart from that devoted to its own defense program — to the defense of the British Isles. This will not preclude maintaining, and perhaps even strengthening, the moral and legal embargoes on the export of certain strategic war materials to Japan. Neither will it preclude Export-Import Bank credits and the continued sale of war materials to China, the concentration of bombers and submarines at Manila, the continuous mobilization of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, political arrangements for the use of British and Dominion bases in the Pacific, and opportune conversations with the Soviet Ambassador. Add all these probabilities to the Far Eastern capacities and propensities of the other Powers already itemized, and how much do they weigh? Enough to force Japan to evacuate China? Hardly. Enough to prevent Japan from sapping Britain's capacity to resist Germany from the rear? Perhaps. Enough to ensure the security of the Philippines? Probably. To bring the Far Eastern scales of power into balance? No. That can only be done in Europe.

GAMELIN

By *André Géraud*
("Pertinax")

WE know in fairly accurate detail the attitude of the French and the British Governments in the long period of waiting before war at last broke out again in Europe. We know that they did not really decide to defend themselves until eighteen months after Germany had uprooted the first frontier markers, until the balance of military power in Europe had been changed seriously to their disadvantage. But the activities of the French High Command in the decisive years between the summer of 1935 and the summer of 1939 have been left in obscurity. It had the supreme responsibility of evaluating, at each successive moment, the chances of military victory. The time has come to make an examination of its policy.

On March 7, 1936, the date when the German *Reichswehr* marched into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, General Gamelin had been Commander-in-Chief of the French Army for fourteen months. On this occasion he gave evidence of caution. He did not refuse, as has been reported, to occupy the Saar. But he was unwilling, if he was expected to carry out that movement, to accept Premier Sarraut's suggestion that no more than the three most recent classes of the French trained reserves need be called up. He said that if any military action were taken, the French Government must be ready to carry it through to the limit; and that the Government therefore must be prepared, if necessary, to proceed to a general mobilization. The French military machine was rigid; no risks should be run of breaking it by setting certain parts of it in operation without the others. For the first time we learnt the inconveniences of a lack of elasticity — a lack we were to pay for so heavily in 1940. Meanwhile, however, Gamelin also made plain that if the machine were used under proper conditions he had every confidence that it would prove unbeatable.

Early in September 1938, at the time of the Nuremberg Congress, General Gamelin showed his hand again. Accompanied by Generals Georges and Billotte, he visited Premier Daladier and gave him assurances that the democratic Powers would be able to "dictate the peace." Called to London on September 25 of that

same year (just after Prime Minister Chamberlain's visit to Godesberg), he expressed himself again in similar terms in the presence of Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Thomas Inskip, M. Daladier and Ambassador Corbin. Later, having heard that M. Bonnet was interpreting certain of his statements tendenciously, and that this had upset Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, he sent a letter to Mr. Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War, setting forth his exact position.

General Gamelin made his attitude clear once more on the very eve of Munich. In a letter to Premier Daladier, he laid down the limits of the concessions which he thought could be made to Hitler. He underlined that neither the main line of the Czechoslovak fortifications, nor the Czechoslovak strategic railways, nor the chief Czech munitions factories, ought to be handed over to the Nazis.

The evening of March 14, some six months after Munich, I met General Gamelin at dinner in the house of a foreign ambassador in Paris. The German troops were already marching on Prague. Nobody could any longer hope that the German flood could be held back by diplomacy or compromise; it could be done only by force. I asked General Gamelin if a test at this moment would not be made in less favorable conditions for us than had prevailed before Munich. "Undoubtedly," he replied, and he added: "On balance, Munich was against us." He went on to explain why. There had been an increase both in the quality and in the quantity of the German troops. There now were 140 German divisions as against 100 in 1938 (50 of them insufficiently trained, moreover, and lacking the proper number of experienced officers). There were five armored divisions in place of three in 1938, and the number was about to be doubled. The three Czechoslovak armored divisions not merely would be incorporated into the German army but would furnish the latter with valuable models. Goering's air force now counted something like 6,000 machines against 3,500 or 4,000 the year before. The Siegfried Line, which in 1938 consisted of hardly more than field fortifications, was now made of steel and concrete. Germany's war industry was at full flood, while our engineers were still debating between various prototypes and still working over all sorts of production problems. Finally, not only would the equipment of 30 Czech divisions fall into the hands of the Nazis, along with the Czech fortifications and all the matériel contained in them, but the excellent Czech factories would also begin working for the Reich.

In spite of all this, in spite of recognizing that our strength had shrunk relative to German strength since before Munich (aviation excepted: here Franco-British inferiority had probably improved from a ratio of one to ten to a ratio of three to ten), Gamelin remained confident of an Allied victory. I saw him again in July. He was still of the same opinion. At that time, he expected war about September 20. He thought Mussolini insisted on waiting till that date, when the first snows would have strengthened Italy's Alpine defenses.

Then on August 23 came the signature of the non-aggression pact between Ribbentrop and Molotov. Russia definitely was not to be in our camp, and might even be in the enemy camp. The Anglo-French military conversations in Moscow broke down at the same moment that the political conversations did. Even M. Bonnet, who had been hostile to the idea of coöperation with Moscow, and who even had tried to hamper the English talks with Russia (as if Mr. Chamberlain needed any seconding!), had become alarmed in the early part of the summer at the imminence of a German attack on Poland and had been doing his best to win Stalin over. The Soviet-Nazi pact was a severe blow to French and British diplomacy. The principal aim of the German general staff after 1918, namely to avoid at any cost having to give battle again on two fronts, had been crowned with success. Once Germany had finished with Poland in the East, she now could concentrate her forces in the West and deal France a tremendous blow. In 1936 General von Fritsch, then in command of the Reichswehr, said to the Belgian Military Attaché: "We shall never pardon Hitler for having given France a chance of seducing Russia." Hitler had made good this earlier error.

I have never known, except at second-hand, how the Commander-in-Chief felt in the decisive days between Soviet Russia's defection and the beginning of the German attack on Poland. But I know that M. Bonnet, who questioned him about a week before the declaration of war on Germany, did not find him discouraged. In other words, General Gamelin was not distressed that all possibility of carrying on a war of movement against Germany in the plains of Eastern Europe, between the Baltic and the Carpathians, had now disappeared. He foresaw that the Polish Army's resistance would be rapidly beaten down, and that France would thus be left fighting for the liberty of peoples without the support of a single one of the East European nations most

evidently menaced. But this sudden reversal of French calculations left him unafraid.

On September 3 there came another chance to reestablish the balance of forces which had been turned even more heavily against us by Russia's "defection." Italy declared herself neutral. But it was a very special sort of neutrality, in full harmony with the "pact of steel" signed the preceding May 22 between the Fuehrer and the Duce. This meant that Mussolini intended fighting by Germany's side in every way except with arms, but at the same time wished to enjoy the prerogatives of neutrality. The two despots exchanged telegrams showing that this was the meaning of Italy's "non-belligerency." We were faced with the choice of submitting to this trickery or of demanding that Italy came to terms with us.

I talked in October with the best French expert on Italian affairs. Despite the fact that the "pact of steel" had postponed recourse to war for three years, and despite the way Ciano had been treated recently at Salzburg, Mussolini on September 3 wished to enter the war at once. Badoglio and the other army chiefs restrained him, pointing to the impossibility of fighting without artillery and citing all the other arguments against immediate Italian participation. My informant said the Italian High Command at that moment would not have hesitated even to undertake a military *coup d'état* if Mussolini had refused to pay attention to its warnings. Italy lacked many of the most elementary supplies. She had built hardly an airplane since September 1938. She simply was not in a position to choose between war and peace. We had only to "put her on the spot" while Germany was occupied in Poland. But we failed to act. Molotov's deal with Ribbentrop had broken the circle that France was trying to throw about Germany. Italy's declaration of non-belligerency gave warning that another circle was about to be created, one which threatened to hem us in in Western Europe. By intimidating Italy we would have reversed the tendency once again, we would have shown that we still could invest the enemy.

General Gamelin understood no better than the Daladiers and Bonnets, nor indeed than most French parliamentarians, what a shining opportunity lay open in the Italian peninsula. Like the others, he shied away from facing the problem. Towards the end of August the Committee for National Defense discussed what might be attempted if Italy took the field against us. General

Vuillemin, in charge of the French air forces, was all in favor of sending our bombers from Tunisia against strategic points in Italy. Gamelin on the other hand contented himself with saying that he would put himself "au balcon," by which he meant that he would send French troops to the top of the valleys leading down into the plains of the Po so as to be ready to invade Italy in the spring of 1940. Darlan, the French naval commander, who generally liked to pose as a bully, kept quiet. I have been told that General Weygand saw quite well what French interests demanded. But at this point he had no authority.

II

How are we to explain the imperturbable calm with which the Generalissimo looked forward into a future of fire, iron and blood? The answer is that he accepted absolutely the *credo* of the Maginot Line.

This *credo* contained the following articles of faith: *First*, belief in the superiority of defensive weapons over those of the offensive. "The attack must have three times as many infantry effectives, six times as much artillery, and twelve times as much ammunition, if it hopes to dominate the defense." This sentence from Gen. Chauvineau's book, "Is an Invasion Still Possible?", is cited with approval in the preface, signed Pétain. *Second*, belief that, whatever the Germans might say, they had not found any sure way of breaking the front. The plane and the tank could not do what the combination of infantry and artillery had not been able to do in the last war. *Third*, belief that for the foregoing reasons war would be a war of attrition. The Maginot Line would permit France and Britain to mobilize their resources at leisure and to choose the time to attack. It was this disdain for great masses of effectives which accounts for the half-hearted way the British set out to create more divisions, and for the inadequacy of the plans for recruiting colonial troops drawn up by Georges Mandel, Minister of Colonies. The Maginot *credo* nevertheless did not exclude the possibility of a counter-offensive in the event that the *Reichswehr* became disorganized in the course of its attacks. Even a battle in the open was considered, if the Germans could be taken by surprise on the German-Belgian frontier.

These ideas about the superiority of the defense were not peculiar to Gamelin. They were accepted by Pétain, Weygand, all the top flight of army leaders, active or retired. Colonel de

Gaulle warned his countrymen repeatedly, from 1933 on, that planes and tanks made it possible to break the front. He was considered a heretic. Weygand sent Paul Reynaud a note, acknowledging receipt of a book containing a chapter giving the de Gaulle thesis, saying, in effect: "It has interested me greatly, but I am not in agreement with your views." There were other young officers who echoed in various forms the old proverb: "In war everything immobile will be destroyed." But their arguments either never reached the top of the military hierarchy, or failed to convince those they did reach.

But did not the war in Poland, coming on top of the lessons of the Spanish War, invalidate all the official conceptions? Not in the eyes of the military high priests. They took the position that Poland's military weakness forbade any positive deductions.

The eight months of breathing-space given us by the Germans on the Western Front seemed at first sight to confirm the doctrines of the French High Command. The respite was unexpected, and Gamelin received it with joy. It took an enormous weight off his mind. Neither the mobilization nor the concentration of the French army was disturbed. He found himself presented with time to make good the deficiencies of the military system, to fortify the French frontier from Montmédy to the sea, to hasten industrial production and to imbue the troops and their leaders with enthusiasm.

Unfortunately, these things were not done. Gamelin did not shake off his torpor, and he did not break the hold of either the military or the civil bureaucracy. He did not concern himself with the morale of the men and of their officers, who waited around idly in their cantonments and often became corrupted by the totalitarian propaganda of sheets like *Gringoire* and *Je Suis Partout*. This side of the French tragedy is well enough known and need not be stressed here.

As for what was done to improve matériel, here is the picture:

In the month of September 1939 the French Army had approximately the arms and ammunition necessary to fight a war of the 1914-18 type. In everything else it was sadly deficient. But even the weapons and munitions of the older types were going to be used up by May, even under the slow rhythm of operations which prevailed. A flood of new manufactures must begin rolling in by spring. But little by little we saw that we should not be ready, at the very best, until the end of the summer or even until autumn.

Only a few fragments of the pitiable story are known. I shall set them down here without any attempt to draw the whole picture.

The chapter on artillery is the most satisfactory. The old matériel was abundant: more than 4,000 75's, including the new model with a range of 11 kilometers, and more than 3,000 heavy cannon. The factories were busy making the 105 mm. gun, intended to replace the 75's. The chief problem here was the lack of shells — except for the 75's, which by March or April had a full supply. The 105, the 155 and the 25 anti-aircraft guns lacked ammunition. There was a hot discussion on the type of fuse to adopt: it never was settled.

We possessed two weapons which, it seemed, had no equals in other countries — the 47 mm. anti-tank gun and the 90 mm. anti-tank and anti-aircraft gun. The latter can penetrate 90 mm. armor at a range of 1,800 meters. Unhappily, there was nothing to put in these two guns. The first thousand shells intended for the 90's were not received until April. At the end of May a total of 5,000 shells had been delivered. This is why in the Battle of France it became necessary to fall back on the old 37 mm. infantry gun, the 25 mm. anti-tank gun, and the 75's — all out of date or unsuitable.

In April the Staff still had not yet decided whether to fix its monthly needs at three, four or five million shells. With respect to quality, it still hesitated between a steel shell and an iron-and-steel shell. The latter could be made more cheaply, and therefore in greater quantities, whereas the former was more effective. It might be noted in passing that there were no gas bombs on our side. If the Germans had thrown this weapon into the fray, we would have been unable to reply. As for land mines, instead of just copying the German model we looked for perfection. Endless studies were made, and never finished.

We entered the war with some 1,700 tanks, and we had 3,600 on May 10.¹ These were mostly 20 and 30 ton tanks, though a few were of 70 tons. Some were grouped in three armored divisions, and in another division which was half-organized. Others were scattered among the light motorized divisions, etc. The Samua factories were to deliver 4,000 tanks in September, and more later. These were splendid instruments. However, there

¹ During this period the number of German tanks increased from 6,000 to at least 11,000, and perhaps even to 16,000.

were few trucks actually in service — from 600 to 900 at most, and this was fatal, for each tank needed three trucks to service it, one going, one coming, the third filling up. In one of the battles of the North a magnificent armored division ran out of fuel and had to form a square in the manner of a Boer convoy, and shoot without moving.

When war was declared, we had from 1,300 to 1,400 planes, but practically none of them were bombers. When the "*de facto* armistice" ended on May 10 the same number of planes was in line, but behind them a reserve had been built up from the monthly production of some 350 units (70 of them bombers) and the monthly American contribution of 70 or 80. These are the figures given by M. Guy La Chambre, M. Daladier's Air Minister. But some experts consider them inflated.

Details like these reveal the whole general picture. Gamelin and the other army leaders who saw the crisis coming in the spring simply did not know how to impress the Minister of Munitions with the imperative need for haste. There were any number of faults in the army organization itself as well. Take the single striking fact that there were not enough proper maps, first of Norway, then of Belgium. And though the actual mobilization had taken place with clock-like precision, various articles of equipment and clothing were found to be lacking.

III

It should not be deduced from the foregoing that this General Gamelin, who reigned at the apex of the French military pyramid, was not a man of great intelligence. He was a man of greater intelligence, perhaps, than the other military leaders who had been his rivals in the past or still were in the present. He was 68 years old, but he had lost none of his vigor of mind or body. His reports to the Committee of National Defense were models of lucidity and precision. Léon Blum, very much the intellectual, very hard to please in such matters, admired them to the point of seeing something of himself in them, and hence, perhaps, of feeling a vague sense of mistrust. Gamelin dominated most persons who discussed military matters with him, and this was notably the case in the Franco-British Supreme Council.

What, then, were his weak points? "Gamelin is not a fighting man," Lord Gort said to the English Ministers. But he had won and deserved the name of "fighting man" in 1918, when he kept

an almost completely surrounded division in the fight. And he did not show himself lacking in imagination when, as an officer of Marshal Joffre's Bureau of Operations, he was the first to suggest the counter-offensive called the Battle of the Marne. The truth is that he became "academic" with the passage of time. He buried himself in the lessons of the last war. His ideas became ready-made — he ceased to examine whether they still were valid. He felt that he had foreseen everything, calculated everything, arranged everything, and that he had nothing more to do. Aristotle had fallen into scholasticism.

He was not an executive but a thinker. Every organization needs a spur as well as a plan. Nobody who talked with him could call him sluggish or say that he liked red tape. But he allowed military life to be routinized. Initiative was frowned on. In June General Weygand told the story of a General of Division who on receiving instructions regarding the different ways of destroying tanks telephoned to G. H. Q. to ask which article of the regulations justified one method recommended, namely the throwing of bottles of burning gasoline. There were no human bonds between the Generalissimo and the army. He was a cold light, an abstraction.

How different Foch had been, with his thoughtful but also ardent face! Foch was physically incapable of losing hope, of giving up. Gamelin's temperament was just the opposite — he sat at his military table as if at a chessboard. He was quite capable, at a given moment, of saying "All is lost!" and of upsetting the pieces. Marshal Pétain is of the same type. General Gamelin changed gradually into a functionary, a very high functionary, who felt he was safe so long as he had expressed some reservation or posed some condition in a letter to the Premier. He was not dominated by a passion for getting results. Temperamentally a mere officeholder himself, he created about him, in his image, other officeholders, high, medium and low. The Republic of 1875 lived in the fear, inherited from December 2, 1851, of "*coup d'état* generals." It hoped that it had rooted out the breed after the Dreyfus Affair. In fact it had succeeded only too well!

Gamelin had gotten into the habit of compromising with the politicians. Instinctively he sought the middle ground. But despite this, and despite what people say, his relations with Daladier were not really of the best. Between January and March 1940

he tried, if we can believe him, to resign eight times. He irritated the Premier by his negative turn of mind. "The Premier doesn't understand me," he said, "and I don't understand him." On the day when Paul Reynaud became Premier, Gamelin hastened to invite to luncheon the men he thought would be influential under the new régime. And they laughed over it. In conversation it was difficult to catch and hold his eye. I ought to say that when I saw him he expressed himself in the most direct terms. He was extremely courteous. But it was pretty disillusioning when he accompanied you to the door and you turned to find him bent in a bow, his eyes fixed on his shoes.

At his headquarters in the keep of Vincennes he lived in an atmosphere of adulation and flattery, surrounded by a small military cabinet of fifteen officers known for their devotion to his person. None of them ever stayed at the front for any length of time. In this little circle they prided themselves on high culture — books on history and on art were in favor. An officer who spent two weeks there after serving in a combat unit never had a chance to speak of his months in the field. Nobody thought of questioning him.

The General Staff itself was established at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, around General Georges, Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the north and north-east, that is to say of all the front from the North Sea to Switzerland. There were assembled all the academic celebrities of the army, all those who had shone in tests and competitive examinations — a thousand officers or more. It will be interesting to know what were the discussions that went on in this military convent, but doubtless we shall have a long wait before the story is written.

General Georges was a product of Foch's staff; and Weygand, if he had had the power, would have chosen him as his own successor in January 1935. He was reputed to be a vigorous leader, and, more than Gamelin, had the confidence of the army. He did not have Gamelin's intellect, but he was supposed to have energy. However, he had been terribly wounded on October 9, 1934, with King Alexander and M. Barthou, and had never recovered completely.

The division of commands dated from a time when General Gamelin believed he would have many fronts to superintend (on the Italian frontier, in North Africa and in Eastern Europe, as well as in Northern France), and when he was entitled to think

that his title of Chief of Staff of the National Defense (distinct from that of Inspector-General or Commander-in-Chief of the Army, which was not conferred on him until early 1938) would subordinate all the fighting forces to him, on land, on sea and in the air. Thus if everything had worked out, Gamelin would have held the place of General Keitel, and Georges that of General von Brauchitsch. But Russia's defection, Italy's non-belligerency, and the resistance of interests and of individuals cut down Gamelin's own field of action to a point where it coincided very nearly with that allotted to Georges.

The two men therefore met as rivals. The paradox was that the General Staff, the organ of the High Command, was grouped around the subordinate commander. To mitigate this shocking situation, Gamelin contrived in December to dismember the G. H. Q. and install part of it (including the Bureau of Operations and the new Fifth Bureau, an annex to the Intelligence Office) at Meaux, halfway between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Vincennes. To sum up: the Commander-in-Chief and a military cabinet at Vincennes; Headquarters No. 1 at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre; and a Headquarters No. 2 at Meaux. The result was divided authority.

There also were disagreements between Gamelin and Darlan, the Commander-in-Chief of the sea forces — "the Admiral of the Fleet," as he improperly styled himself, adopting a British term. Admiral Darlan was a curious character. The son of a southern politician, he grew up under the protection of President Fallières and Georges Leygues, both of them from his home district, the Department of Lot-et-Garonne. In recent years it had become his ambition to be named Chief-of-Staff of the National Defense, *e.g.* to have the same rôle as Keitel in Germany. When the office was intrusted to Gamelin, he tried to limit and weaken it. He affected the rough language of a sea dog, which had the advantage of concealing his natural vulgarity. He was always elbowing the Generalissimo on the Committee of National Defense. He did not like to be called on to give his ideas in broad outline because he soon got tangled up. He preferred to throw into the debate brief remarks, exclamations, fragments of a sort of dialogue with himself. Gamelin exasperated him and he did him an ill turn whenever he got the chance. As for his navy, he pretended to think that everything was easy for it, that no enterprise was beyond the forces under his command, and that he could readily dispense with British assistance. Driven into a corner (for example, in connec-

tion with the projected action at Petsamo or in the Black Sea) he got out of the difficulty by the simple manœuvre of laying down preliminary conditions which could not possibly be fulfilled. "If diplomacy doesn't know how to do its job, if it doesn't get me the two ports I need, then don't ask anything of me!" He repeated the same phrase both for Norway and for Turkey. He flattered the English, but underneath was jealous of them and detested them. "I won't shout it from the housetops, but if I hadn't lent them six torpedo boat destroyers, etc. . . !" With that, he had some really good qualities — a taste for detail and a gift for organization.

In general, high French army circles were too much like an exclusive club. From 1920 to 1940 the lieutenants of Joffre, of Foch and to a lesser degree of Pétain enjoyed the privilege of a sort of apostolic succession. Dissenters were deliberately persecuted. The age regulations ordinarily guard against the formation of cliques and monopolies; but after 1919 exceptions were often made for those most highly placed. Marshal Pétain relinquished the command of the French army in 1931 when he was 75 years old, and General Weygand in 1935 when he was 68. Compare this with Hitler's action in placing two vigorous men in their fifties at the head of the *Wehrmacht* in February 1938. Some remarkable men have commanded the German army since 1919 — von Seeckt, von Hammerstein, von Fritsch. Not one of them held on to office, and not one of them, once gone, was ever recalled.

IV

Now we must follow Gamelin's rôle in the war. After Russia signed her pact with Germany, and after Italy proclaimed her non-belligerency, the Commander-in-Chief never wanted to carry the war on land outside of Western Europe. He was convinced that sooner or later Hitler would throw the *Reichswehr* into an assault on the Low Countries and on France. He believed the attack was imminent on November 12, on January 15 (although on this occasion he did not completely share Belgium's sudden fears), and again in April. On April 3 General Weygand was invited to a meeting of the War Cabinet. He made a long speech in favor of establishing a front in the Balkans. He was sure that the three French divisions in Syria and a fourth brought from France or from Tunis would soon rally the 100 divisions scattered among the four Balkan states friendly to the Allies. Gamelin

raised his eyes to heaven. He felt such schemes dangerous and absurd in view of the fact that the Germans would soon outnumber us and the British almost two to one on the western front, and that their offensive might begin any day.

The blockade held an important place in Gamelin's strategic plan. However, under pressure of the neutrals it had to be relaxed. This meant that we were compelled to strike at the source of raw materials. In this connection Gamelin, like Daladier, was torn between two conflicting wishes — not to divide his forces, not to set the German avalanche in motion by undertaking expeditions to outlying areas, and yet to cut off Germany's essential supplies.

First as to oil. In the matter of air raids on the Caucasus oil fields, the British refused to furnish the bombers, as they were unwilling to divert a single one from the defense of London. We bowed. On the other hand, they wanted to destroy the depots of synthetic gasoline in Germany. We were afraid this would arouse reprisals. We interposed a veto,² and did not lift it until early May; moreover, we stipulated even then that the raids should begin only when the Germans had already entered Belgium.

In the effort to cut off Germany's iron we were bolder, even too bold. The Finns, having received arms, asked for men to help them fight against Russia. Intervention in Finland would give us the opportunity to seize Narvik, the main outlet for iron ore on the North Sea. Daladier prepared "volunteers" for Marshal Mannerheim with such ardor that he risked driving into conflict with Russia, which would have complicated our problems and added to our burdens. Gamelin agreed sourly. Then the Finns delivered us from that risk by signing the Peace of Moscow on March 12. Gamelin thereupon allowed the 58,000 French and English troops that had been collected as the nucleus of an expeditionary corps to be dispersed. For this he was much censured in April, when troops were needed for Norway at short notice.

On March 28 Premier Reynaud had Gamelin with him in London when he recommended more direct action in the matter of iron — intervention in Norwegian waters. On April 8 the British fleet took the Norwegian waters under its control, and the German riposte came on the ninth. But the British Cabinet did not dare to risk sending warships against the batteries which commanded the entrance to the Trondheim fjord. This meant the

Supreme Council meeting early in March, the last which Daladier attended as Premier.

loss of central Norway (April 27). Reynaud resigned himself, but he blamed Gamelin, who had been opposed to the widening of the operation as likely to use up increasing quantities of troops and arms. Fourteen thousand Frenchmen had been transported to Norway: in his opinion that was enough.

Gamelin emerged from the Norwegian affair under a cloud. Hitler's success in Norway no doubt encouraged him to go ahead in the Low Countries. On May 10 his troops entered Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. Immediately Gamelin rushed 22 picked French divisions (including two armored divisions), together with nine English divisions and an enormous matériel, to the rescue of the Belgian army. The latter comprised 18 or more divisions.

Here arises a great problem — a problem over which controversy will rage for years to come.

Ever since 1937, when the new Belgian policy called "neutrality and independence" came into effect, Gamelin had been constantly telling all French premiers that since he had no staff agreements with Brussels he would be forced to put strict limits on the aid given Belgium. The formal warning which he addressed to the Belgian General Staff on January 16, 1940 (via Daladier and the Belgian Ambassador) was to this effect. As in November, when Brussels similarly had sounded the alarm, 22 French divisions were thrown forward into advanced positions. "We cannot have this tremendous and dangerous disturbance every two months," Gamelin now declared. "Make up your minds before eight o'clock this evening. Either you call us in by way of prevention, in which case we shall attempt a grand coup — we shall fall on the German army, which is off its guard along your whole frontier because it thinks that you will never give us the initiative and that in any case we would fear to accept it.³ Or else you decide not to appeal to us until your soil has already been invaded. In this case, French troops will go to your rescue. But then do not expect that with the Germans upon you our troops will be able to go far beyond our frontier." This was clear. Unhappily, actions were not so unequivocal as words.

The French and British Governments did not denounce the declaration of March 1937, in which they had undertaken to defend Belgium, even though that state broke its alliance with

³ Thus Gamelin's defensive doctrine not merely admitted of a counter-offensive against an enemy disorganized by an attack against fortified lines, but went further and permitted the seeking of battle on open ground — the war of movement. General Giraud was of the same opinion.

them. More than that. After the alarm on November 12, Gamelin came to an understanding with the Belgian staff by which he would advance to the Namur-Louvain-Antwerp line. Some say that the British, desiring to protect the Belgian coast, won him over to this. That is not correct. They accepted his plan only after several days of discussion.

For practical purposes, Gamelin's message of January 16 meant only that he reserved the right to limit future operations if the circumstances demanded. The main point is that he had not felt it incumbent on him to require M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain to abandon the declaration of 1937; hence he now felt himself morally bound to execute the political obligations of Paris and of London to the full extent of his forces. Here in Belgium, a zone so vital for France, just as in Norway, the Commander-in-Chief did not coördinate his thought and action.

On the morning of May 10 the French and British entered Belgium. There was no air attack on their marching columns, such as the French staff had feared. Instead, the enemy aviators rained blows on the rear, on railway stations and supply lines. The very ease of this advance should have aroused suspicion. But there was no suspicion — not even caution. According to the original orders, the advance was to take place at night only. But under the calm, unguarded sky the Allied troops pushed forward during the day as well.

Instead of moving the bulk of his troops forward toward Sedan, Givet and Namur, as many people expected, so as to cover the historic path of German invasion, Gamelin dispatched it toward Antwerp and beyond. General Giraud, the most impetuous soldier in the French army, even pushed on into Zeeland. Nevertheless, he disapproved of the entire operation, for he saw that as the Belgians had not sent for us until after their territory had been invaded, the initiative no longer belonged to us.

I shall not recapitulate the details of the campaign in Belgium. Suffice it to say that Gamelin calculated that the Belgian Army would resist for five days on the Albert Canal and that thanks to this delay he could establish the French troops on the Namur-Antwerp line, a course consistent with his offers in November. The defensive theory would have counselled awaiting the German attack in the fortified lines in the north of France, or at the most along the Upper Scheldt. Yet Gamelin undertook a much more audacious course. How did this happen?

v

There are two possible explanations. Gamelin knew that two days earlier Reynaud had decided to replace him in the high command by Weygand — or even by Giraud or Huntziger — on the score that he was not being energetic enough. Psychologically he might like to prove himself capable of a decisive movement, even a risky one.

But there is a more likely explanation. Gamelin, always an apostle of the counter-attack, believed that he had a wonderful chance to bring the war to a quick and successful conclusion. He ruled out any direct attack on the German fortifications; but he thought that if the German forces attacked a line of steel and concrete they would be thrown into disarray and could then be attacked successfully. He expected the Belgian fortifications along the Albert Canal, the fortified region of Liège, and the rugged terrain of the Ardennes (penetrable, it was supposed, only with great difficulty) to break the spearhead of the German attack. After the Germans had been slowed down by these obstacles and had suffered enormous losses he counted on being able to polish them off. In fact he was so anxious to try this that he was willing to risk advancing very far from the security of his own fortified lines.

According to information received by the General Staff, the Germans would launch their major attack on Antwerp. This is significant as explaining why Giraud was sent beyond the city. The German army would be caught between the hammer of Giraud's army in the north and the anvil of the mass of the French army coming up from the south. It also explains France's undoing. The French plan was destroyed by the evening of May 10, but the French High Command took five days to realize the fact. Already on the evening of May 10 a commander who was really well-informed about each turn of the battle, and who was ready and able to judge its implications, would have reversed the morning's decision and given the order to retreat. The five days spent by Gamelin, Georges and the others in studying the tactics of the Germans, and then the paucity of their means for launching a counter-attack, combined to make the final disaster all but inevitable.

Gamelin's classic military world of three dimensions met a different military world of four or five dimensions. The blitzkrieg uncovered a series of surprises for the Generalissimo. First of all

the Belgians did not stand on the line of the Albert Canal. Before the first morning of fighting was over, the enemy had already crossed the Meuse near Maastricht and the Albert Canal between Maastricht and Hasselt, and had captured part of the fortifications at Liège. From the morning of the second day they were hurtling through the Ardennes, a supposedly impenetrable forest and mountain area, towards Sedan and Montmédy. By the third day, as we now know, they had crossed the Meuse at two points between Dinant and Sedan. The hinge of the French line was already threatened. Thereafter the German machine which obtained these extraordinary results assumed a new function. Not only was it a thing of planes and tanks to pierce the front line; it became an instrument for breaking rear lines, supply lines and morale. It found a beautiful opportunity. The confusion caused by the inability of the Belgians to hold or retake the line of the Albert Canal was augmented when French and British advance units entered the melee without regular battle order, without the normal functioning of their services, and without readily available reserves. The Allied armies were caught in the vast ocean of refugees and disorganized troops and could hardly move.

The French and British fought very well in several places — to the west of Brussels, around Louvain, and between Namur and Dinant. The battle of mechanized units near Saint Trond, in which two of our three or four armored divisions participated, is a glorious chapter. But all this availed little, because on May 12 and 13, from Dinant to Sedan, the Ninth Army under the command of General Corap was smashed. Thence began the formation of the "pocket" which eight days later extended to Abbeville. Blanchard, Gort and Giraud — all of whom were in the north — were doomed to rapid retreat or encirclement.⁴

Gamelin bears the general responsibility for the campaign, but there is also a particular responsibility on the shoulders of General Corap, the commander of the Ninth Army. We do not yet know where his responsibility ends and that of Gamelin begins. Corap's army was the hinge between the line of the Meuse and the Maginot Line. The technical experts of the General Staff always maintained that it would be easy to prevent an enemy from crossing the line of the Meuse, although General de Gaulle held otherwise in a book published in 1933. Corap's army

⁴ For details of the whole campaign which cannot be given here see Mr. Armstrong's day-by-day account in *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, October 1940.

was given very extended lines; indeed they say the division commanded by General Vautier was spread along 26 kilometers. Moreover, garrison life seems to have made both officers and men slack. At any rate, the Ninth Army was late in moving up to the Meuse River, and not all units had assumed their new positions when the attack began.

General Corap had been Weygand's chief-of-staff until 1933, but he was never too able a soldier. Seniority had lifted him to positions beyond his abilities. Certainly he was not the man of tempered steel to save something from the formidable attack which now beset him. He was replaced by General Giraud on May 15. Meanwhile the Ninth Army's general staff had been scattered to the winds. Giraud, travelling about to pick up officers wherever he could find them to form a new army staff, was captured by the Germans on May 18.

It was not until the evening of May 15 that Gamelin really grasped the enormity of the Allied rout. Until then he imagined that everything could still be patched up — the word he used was "colmaté," borrowed from the war vocabulary of 1914-18. It proved in itself how he had misread the course of the battle. Suddenly, just following the session of the Committee of National Defense which took place that afternoon, his eyes were opened, and on reaching his staff headquarters in the donjon of Vincennes he telephoned Daladier and spoke in the gravest tones. Daladier was overwhelmed.

On May 16 I was awakened by one of my friends who came to tell me what he had just learned from the Countess de Portes. It seemed that since dawn a German armored column had been at Laon. Georges Mandel, the energetic Minister of Colonies, heard the same report. He telephoned Gamelin (he told me) and said: "Sitting before me is a coldly calculating and desperate man." It was Reynaud. The Premier at first refused to speak directly to the Generalissimo whom, for the past week, Daladier had refused to remove. Then after receiving confirmation from him that the Germans might reach Paris that same evening, he sprang to action. The Government was to be transferred to Tours, the archives of the Foreign Office were ordered destroyed. But although the German columns were ready, and were protected from French artillery by their own planes, they did not press on toward Paris. Their first work was already accomplished: they had disrupted the lines behind the French front. They prepared to turn off to-

wards the Channel. By mid-afternoon Reynaud was reassured and the ministers remained.

On the sixth day of the battle, Gamelin, that infinitely serene military Buddha, admitted that he was beaten. The indelibly rigid military system which he inherited from his predecessors, and to which he had given the finishing touches, lay condemned without appeal before his very eyes. As in a flash of lightning, he saw everything. The architects of the Maginot Line, in sacrificing depth and elasticity to rigid strength, had miscalculated. The entire Line must stand or fall as a unit; it could neither be repaired, moved, or rebuilt in some other region. Only in North Africa could its strategic equivalent have been improvised. The wishes of certain generals to retreat and organize new bases in Brittany or in the Morvan, between the upper Loire and the Saône, went up in smoke in the next days.

Is it correct, then, to say that the doctrine of the defense was a colossal error? Not necessarily. How much could the Germans have accomplished if France had had plenty of modern anti-tank guns, if Gamelin had insisted that armaments production of all sorts be rushed? However this may be, the more allowances we make for Gamelin's strategic conceptions the severer must be our judgment of his muddled execution.

To Daladier on the evening of May 15, and to Mandel and Reynaud the next morning, Gamelin spoke frankly and openly, without attempting to hide his own anxiety. But he expected that Reynaud would now certainly dismiss him, and he assumed, vis-à-vis the world, a mask of inscrutability and confidence. With Daladier's approval, but without having consulted Reynaud, he issued his famous order-of-the-day of May 17: "Conquer or perish." It recalls Joffre's appeal on the eve of the battle of the Marne, which Gamelin may well have drafted. Some authors do not know how to find a new vocabulary. Whatever effect that appeal may have had twenty-five years ago, it rang false now. Had Gamelin really regained hope? Or was he more anxious to avoid disgrace than defeat?

As it turned out, Reynaud did not succeed in obtaining Gamelin's dismissal in favor of Weygand at the cabinet meeting on May 17. The next day the Generalissimo pleaded his own cause before Daladier and Pétain, who had just been named Vice-Premier and principal military adviser to the Government. Both men were disposed to accept his argument. Daladier knew that Weygand dis-

liked him; while Pétain, although he had accepted Weygand as Chief-of-Staff in 1928 and approved of his elevation to Commander-in-Chief in 1931, had not forgotten the harsh criticism which Foch and his group (to which Weygand belonged) had often levelled at him.

But Reynaud was not to be intimidated, and at three o'clock on the afternoon of May 19 he appointed Weygand to head the French army. The day previous Weygand had had a brief meeting with Gamelin and had asked to see his register of orders. Reynaud and Baudoin subsequently related that Gamelin was unable to show one, having always allowed his subordinates to choose their own strategy in battle without interference from himself. This testimony may not be altogether reliable. They were worried about how public opinion would accept the news of a change in the high command, and were willing to pile all faults on Gamelin. Weygand himself confided to friends that Gamelin had been unable to tell him the disposition of the French forces, and that he decided he must locate and observe the French lines himself by plane. It is only fair to Gamelin, however, to add that Georges, who was personally devoted to Weygand, could give him no more information than Gamelin. In any case the story does not prove that Gamelin had been negligent, merely that communication between the Generalissimo's headquarters and the commanders on the field had simply ceased to exist.

VI

After Gamelin's dismissal the rumor spread through France that he had committed suicide. But on May 23, when one of his friends visited him, he found him calm and ready to defend his policy. He still believed that although France was in grave peril, it was not too late to save things. Gamelin's friends have pointed out that Communism was rampant in Corap's army. They also have not allowed it to be forgotten that at 10 A.M. on May 19, five hours before his dismissal, Gamelin gave General Billotte, who commanded fifty French, British and Belgian divisions, instructions to counter-attack. Weygand's first decision was to postpone this counter-attack. The apologists continue by suggesting that if Joffre had been dismissed after Charleroi, if the ministry of that day had refused to allow him time to reassemble his armies and lead it anew to battle, France would have had no victory of the Marne.

It is true that the men in power in 1940 were not the equal of those of 1914 — Poincaré and Millerand. But if Gamelin himself had been really convinced of the likely success of a counter-attack, he could have won over the cabinet the evening previous in spite of opposition from Reynaud. If the Allied armies in Flanders never were able to strike across the German salient between Arras and Péronne, if they remained on the defensive until finally the Germans had them completely surrounded, it was because an offensive was impossible both materially and spiritually. In fact things had reached such a pass that the British General Staff had lost confidence in the French General Staff and was drawing up its battle plans alone.⁵

Let us concede Gamelin his fundamental doctrine. Let us forget that the General Staff underestimated the ability of the German army to break through, though for years it had known that Germany counted on that strategy and planned to use planes and tanks ahead of the infantry, with the planes serving as a form of artillery; also that the General Staff ignored the political and psychological weapons at Germany's disposal. We still will find difficulty in explaining why the General Staff rashly abandoned the defensive and threw itself headlong into a counter-attack. And why was the defense of the Meuse — the historic gateway into France — so neglected? Why had not more effective fortifications of the Maginot Line type been continued, from beyond Montmédy to the North Sea, in the breathing spell between September 1939 and May 1940? Why were they not garrisoned with permanent troops trained for that particular service? Why were not the armies in Belgium, which protected the French left wing, withdrawn before May 15 or 16 so as to fill the gap that yawned behind? Why was no general reserve available to be sent to their aid? Why were such inadequate efforts made to free the French and British armies of the thousands of refugees who, in effect, paralyzed military movements, as lilliputians can enslave a giant by a myriad of small fetters?

Even the most competent military authorities will hardly risk anything but a partial answer to such questions. France, it is claimed, expected the Belgians at least to block their roads and destroy their bridges; they did not. Our line of concrete and steel

⁵ Weygand later alleged that the British General Staff had disregarded his orders to attack. The British have strenuously denied this. According to a reliable source, Weygand from the beginning held to the idea that the armies in the north must be kept there in order to occupy as large a German force as possible.

which reached to the Luxembourg border in 1937 was subsequently extended to Montmédy. West of this, water in the subsoil made it impossible to dig fortifications to the depth of nearly 100 feet, as in the Maginot Line, with the result that the fortifications here were lighter. When the troops sent into Belgium quit these fortifications they sealed up the casements and small fortresses, and when new troops were sent hurriedly to man them there was delay in getting access to them. As the battle progressed, moreover, communications were disrupted and local commanders were left without information of the general strategic situation.

But most of these are secondary matters. One of the profound handicaps was the fact that General Gamelin had failed to measure up to Clausewitz's dictum: "A commander-in-chief must be a statesman." To be a statesman meant that a French commander-in-chief in the 30's would have insisted on powers of an almost dictatorial nature in order to prepare the nation to meet the totalitarian onslaught. But Gamelin was not the authoritarian type. Tardieu, who made him second to Weygand in 1931, and Flandin and Laval, who made him generalissimo in 1935, chose the wrong man. Because Gamelin lacked steel in his will, the duty of giving France the necessary leadership and drive devolved on the parliamentarians. Daladier, and later Reynaud, tried to supply what was missing. For reasons we are not concerned with here they did not succeed.

Even after these pages of analysis the reader will find Gamelin still a puzzle. If the conclusion is that he was blindly convinced of the rightness of his plans, he was, for all his abstract knowledge of military science, an incompetent general. If he realized the weakness of his military machine, but lacked courage to resign and give the country a warning in time, then he was a man without character.

THE CHARACTER AND FATE OF LEON TROTSKY

By Max Eastman

TROTSKY stood up gloriously against the blows of fate these last fifteen years — demotion, rejection, exile, systemized slanderous misrepresentation, betrayal by those who had understood him, repeated attempts upon his life by those who had not, the certainty of ultimate assassination. His associates, his secretaries, his relatives, his own children were hounded to death by a sneering and sadistic enemy. He suffered privately beyond description but he never relaxed his monumental self-discipline. He never lost his grip for one visible second, never permitted any blow to blunt the edge of his wit, his logic or his literary style. Under afflictions that would have sent almost any creative artist to a hospital for neurotics and thence to the grave, Trotsky steadily developed and improved his art. His unfinished life of Lenin, which I had partially translated, would have been his masterpiece. He gave us, in a time when our race is woefully in need of such restoratives, the vision of a man.

Of that there is no more doubt than of his great place in history. His name will live, with that of Spartacus and the Gracchi, Robespierre and Marat, as a supreme revolutionist, an audacious captain of the masses in revolt. Beyond these clearly shining facts, however, the doubts about Trotsky, the problems of his character, are many and complex. Few great men lend themselves to false portraiture and extreme overcorrections of it as he does. His inward nature, like Robespierre's, will remain a subject of hot argument while history lasts. Moreover, those in a position best to give testimony, his colleagues in great action, are all dead or destroyed. Stalin has not left one to tell the story. I have been less close to him than many knowing of our literary collaboration think; but I have received a definite impression of his character which is surely worth setting forth.

As a young man of twenty-six Trotsky presided over the revolution of 1905, the first assault of the Russian masses on the Tsar's government. Twelve years later he organized and led the victorious October revolution of 1917, a model for all insurrections and one of the turning points in history. In the next years he created a revolutionary army out of hungry and bedraggled hordes, and

fought off on seven fronts the invading forces of Europe. He played, next to Lenin, the major rôle in founding the Soviet state. And when it was done, he wrote a three-volume history of these events that holds a permanent place in the world's literature. With all this behind him, he died in a strange loneliness, hunted out of every country, starved of friendship, imprisoned without being protected, robbed almost of the company of the earth.

The causes of this sad story are of course as complex as the forces he attempted to manipulate. But large among them, in my view, looms a singular defect or weakness in his own motivation. When I went to Russia in 1922 he was more popular among the masses than Lenin was. He was a military victor and a national hero. His oratorical ability, which surpassed that of all his rivals put together, seemed to guarantee this popularity. His prestige and personal power, had he known how, or wished, to use them, were invincible. And to certify this, Lenin, when he fell sick, offered to make him vice-president of the Council of People's Commissars — offered, that is, to designate Trotsky before the world as his successor, an act which would have made the rise of Stalin, whom they both despised, well-nigh impossible.

Trotsky declined the offer. He stood meekly aside while Stalin organized a political machine capable of displacing him at Lenin's death. When the expected death occurred he was en route to the Caucasus, and to the amazement of all did not come back to be on the spot and make the funeral oration. He let Stalin push him off with a lying telegram about the date — and complained about it long after:

"I immediately telegraphed the Kremlin: 'I deem it necessary to return to Moscow. When is the funeral?' The reply came in about an hour: 'The funeral will take place on Saturday. You will not be able to return in time. . . . Stalin.' Why this hurry? Why precisely Saturday? But I did not feel that I should request postponement for my sake alone. Only in Sukhum did I learn that it had been changed to Sunday."

There had been no change. Lenin's body lay in state four days. Trotsky could have returned from twice as far. He did not want to be there. He did not want to fight for power. He sidestepped the power at every vital turn, rationalizing his conduct by appeals to etiquette or ethical punctilio. The future of the revolution was at stake, but its leader "did not feel that he should request postponement for his sake alone"!

Having evaded the power at these two crises, Trotsky adopted, while Stalin laid the groundwork for his counter-revolutionary tyranny, a "policy of silence," disheartening to his followers, bewildering to the Russian masses, astounding to the whole world. In 1926, when I crashed that silence with my book "Since Lenin Died," exposing Stalin's conspiracy to seize the power, and quoting Lenin's deathbed warning to the party against Stalin and endorsement of Trotsky as "the ablest man in the Executive Committee," he disavowed my book. He disavowed it, although he himself had given me the key facts, and done so with the express understanding that I was going to publish them. He denied over his signature that there was any such thing as this document, called "Lenin's Testament," which I had quoted directly from his lips. To be sure, he disavowed his disavowal long after, exonerating me and endorsing me beyond my merits, but by that time Stalin was secure. Trotsky will go down to posterity as a great man, one of the few men who ever wrote history as brilliantly as he made it. But he will go down as a great man who let himself be jockeyed out of the supreme position by a second-rater.

Of all mistaken judgments of him, the most fantastic is that he was, in these late years, eaten up with a yearning to "come back." His basic policy, since Stalin established his dictatorship, has been to advocate the overthrow of Stalin, but at the same time the defense of the Soviet Union. The workers of the world, he has insisted, while rejecting Stalin's tyranny, must defend the Russian state, if necessary with arms in their hands. After the Stalin-Hitler pact and the invasion of Finland this was almost quixotic, but Trotsky stuck to it. That made it seem plausible that he wanted to return to power — but only to those who did not realize that he had dropped the power when he had it, dodged it when it was thrust at him.

Trotsky advocated the defense of the Soviet Union, and insisted on calling Stalin's one-man rule a "workers state," because he was an orthodox Marxian, and according to Marx only the workers can expropriate the private capitalists. If it was Stalin's bureaucracy and not the Russian proletariat that nationalized the Russian land and industries, then Trotsky's whole philosophy of life, his inward flame of faith, was wrong. That is why he stuck out loyally for the defense of Stalin's Russia as a workers' state even when it cost him the last appearances of good sense. And

Stalin of course foiled him once more in the very hour of death — placing in the assassin's pocket a prepared statement that he had killed Trotsky because Trotsky had urged him to "sabotage the Soviet Union." Everyone has read that statement. Few will ever read the torrent of Trotsky's sixteen years of impassioned argument to the contrary.

Trotsky was not eaten up with any yearning at all. It was natural to him to be in opposition, to be fighting with a sense of righteous indignation those who ruled. That is what, in his deep self, he wanted. He would rather be right than president — yes, and more: he would rather be right and *not* president. That was his weakness. Some say that he dreaded to become a Bonaparte and I think that that thought did dwell in his mind. But deeper and nearer the heart of this over-confident brandisher of programs was an instinctive distaste for the power to put them through.

Others, who realize that Trotsky dodged the power, imagine that he did so because his pride was hurt — he wanted power handed to him on a golden platter. In France a book was published on this subject, "La Vie Orgueilleuse de Trotsky." It is pure nonsense. Trotsky did like admiration, and liked it fairly thick. Worse than that, he did not know he liked it. He thought he was very "impersonal," "objective," as Marxists are supposed to be. In his "History of the Russian Revolution" he always speaks of himself in the third person. "The then head of the Red Army did thus and so," he says. Once he alludes to himself in the same passage as "the author of these lines" and "the then head of the Red Army," not realizing that two impersonals make an especially obtrusive personal. Genuine modesty would say simply "I did thus and so." But Trotsky did not know that. He did not know himself. That made it possible to influence him sometimes by mixing flattery with only a fair argument. But not often — not on questions of principle. His vanity was superficial.

His consecration to the cause of socialism was deep. It was absolute. I talked about Trotsky's famous pride one day with his first sweetheart, one who loved him and conspired with him when he was eighteen, married him and bore him two children in Siberian exile.

"Arrogance," she said, "would be a better word than pride. Leon Davidovich is self-assertive and explosive, a little difficult that way sometimes in personal life, but he is the most conse-

crated person I ever met. Nothing, absolutely nothing — not even a disgraceful death — would swerve him from the path of his objective duty to the revolution." I quote her because she was an exceptionally wise, warm and judicious person, herself a devoted Communist. But I could quote to the same effect anybody who ever really knew Trotsky.

I think the main reason Trotsky side-stepped the power is a good one — namely, that he could not wield it. He could not handle men. He did not live among men. He lived among ideas. As a politician in the narrow sense, the Jim Farley sense, Trotsky was a total loss. He had no genial tastes or habits. He did not "smoke, drink, chew, swear, dance nor play cards." He could not bring an improper word to his lips. He tried once to tell me the obscene remark made by Stalin when he first read Lenin's "Testament." It had to be conveyed in a paragraph of fastidious circumlocutions. He hated the smell of tobacco, hated a speck of ashes on his desk. He could not put his feet up on a chair — he lacked the art. He dressed like a dude — not in bad taste, but too immaculately. And although he could laugh heartily, he had also, when embarrassed, a nervous clicking giggle in his throat, a sort of ghost laugh that made you feel he was not present in reality at all.

I once attended an anniversary Smoker in the Kremlin where all the old Bolsheviks used to assemble, as the Dutch Treat Club does, to put on some fool acts and exchange a little jovial gossip jazzed up with alcohol. Somebody played the Volga Boat Song on all the various parts of a kitchen stove. Trotsky wandered among those old revolutionists, of whom he was then still the chief, like a lost angel, faultlessly clad as always, with a brand new shiny manuscript-case under his arm, a benign sort of a Y. M. C. A. secretary's smile put on for the festivities, but not an offhand word to say to anybody. It seems a funny epithet to use about a Commander, but he reminded me of Little Lord Fauntleroy.

I remembered, of course, that these were for the most part veterans of a party to which he had come over only in the hour of action, a party which, even when he led them, insisted upon regarding him as an outsider. But why — when his loyalty had been so tested, and his service to the party greater than that of anyone but Lenin — why did they hold him off? Why could Trotsky never win his way in, with no matter what achievements,

to the heart of the Bolshevik Party? I felt that what I saw was the reason for this strange fact, not merely its result.

To correct the impression, you have to remember that all those men knew Trotsky for the bravest of the brave. He had defied two governments, daring them to arrest him while he organized their overthrow. He had refused to go underground, as Lenin did, in the dangerous July Days when Tsarist generals undertook to liquidate the Bolsheviks. As head of the Red Army he had been criticized for the recklessness with which he exposed himself to rifle fire. He was not the kind of general who dies in bed. They knew, also, that at the drop of the hat he could mount the platform and raise them out of their chairs with a revolutionary speech. They respected him, but he was not one of them.

That would not have mattered fatally if he had had the gift of personal friendship. He lacked that also. Aside from his quiet, thoughtful wife, toward whom his attitude was a model of sustained gallantry and inexhaustible consideration, he had, in my opinion, no real friends. He had followers and subalterns who adored him as a god, and to whom his coldness and unreasonable impatience and irascibility were a part of the picture. And he had admiring acquaintances charmed by his brilliant conversation and those "beautiful manners" for which he was famous at the age of five. But in a close and equal relation he managed to get everybody "sore." One after another, strong men would be drawn to him by his deeds and brilliant conscientious thinking. One after another they would drop away.

Lacking both sympathetic imagination and self-knowledge, he seemed spiritually, in an intimate relation, almost deaf and dumb. He would talk with you all night long, very candidly and about everything under the sun, but when you went home at dawn you would feel that you had not been with him. You had received no personal glance out of those cold light-blue eyes. You had heard no laughter but of mockery. You had been exchanging ideas with a brilliant intellect, one that had heard about friendship and had it explained to him, and with consummate skill and intelligence was putting on the act. That at least was my experience.

People who disliked Trotsky were always calling him an actor. He was not an actor when motivated by ideas. His passion for ideas was instinctive, deep, disciplined. His loyalty to ideas was absolute. It was his whole natural self. He had no other loyalty (once more making exception of his wife — or rather, I assume,

his family), and therefore, in personal relations he *was* in some degree an actor. The part he acted was that which a high idea of personal relations demanded of him, but since the whole feeling was not there he fell often and too easily out of the part.

He would make promises and forget them, make contracts and try to squirm out of them, conveniently failing to remember the aspect that was important to the party of the second part. When he arrived in Prinkipo and was in a way to be mulcted by American publishers and their agents, I took on the job of his literary agent as well as personal representative in this country. Much of my spare time was spent trying to get contracts amended or backed out of, contracts which he had signed without quite clearly noticing what he was giving as well as getting. It seemed to me that his idea of how a revolutionist should act would dictate a proud recklessness in signing a contract, and then the authentic impulses and real necessities of his being would demand a cancellation. At any rate, I remember that two years of work trying to help Trotsky do business as a frantic period. I would as soon have tried to straighten out the affairs of General Grant.

That "ability to deal with people," for which Old John D. Rockefeller used to say he would pay more than for any other commodity, consists essentially in treating people as ends and not means. It consists in remembering that they are ends even when you are using them as means. Try as he would, Trotsky could not remember that for long. Sooner or later he would repel every associate not willing to take the position of an instrument in his hands. Of his genius for losing friends and alienating people there is a wealth of private anecdotes, and mine is too long to tell. But here is a little piece of it:

One of our amusements while I stayed with him in Prinkipo in 1932 was for him to dictate letters to me in his then horrendous English, and let me fix them up. It was entertaining, for although he had no grammar, he had a prodigious vocabulary. One day he showed me a letter from some woman in Indiana asking him please to look up her relatives in Russia. He asked me if I knew her name, and when I said, "No, it's just some half-wit," he agreed. I crumpled the letter and started to throw it in the wastebasket. He stopped me with a cry as though I were stepping on a baby's face.

"Is *that* the way you treat your correspondence! What kind of a man are you? That letter has to be filed by my secretaries!"

I straightened out the letter and passed it over to him laughing.

"Did you keep letter files," I asked, "in the days when you were a penniless agitator in Paris and Vienna? I'm not an army commander. I'm a poor writer."

He relaxed then, and smiled: "Well, I like to keep things in order so far as I can."

The incident in itself was not in the least unpleasant. But in a day or two another question arose between us. I was leaving for a trip through the Near East, and he had just finished a long article that I was supposed to translate. I said I would do it on the train and send the translation from Jerusalem to a literary agent in New York.

He said he would rather let the literary agent find a translator. I pointed out the scarcity of good Russian translators, and the unlikelihood that a commercial agent could find one or recognize one when found.

"Well, I don't want my articles carted around over Europe and Asia!" he said.

I answered: "Your literary agent is just as likely as not to send it to Canada or San Francisco to be translated."

Again he flared up as though ignited by a fuse.

"I don't want my articles translated by people who crumple up letters and throw them in the wastebasket!"

It was an angry shout. In view of what I had been doing for him, it was moreover unreasonable to the nth degree. To anybody but Trotsky, and perhaps Shakespeare, I would have said, "To hell with your articles!" and walked out. As it was, I recalled by good luck the criticism Lenin made of him in his Testament. I recalled it very exactly and rolled it off in perfect Russian:

"Lyef Davidovich," I said, "I can only answer you in the words of Lenin: 'Comrade Trotsky is inclined to be carried away by the administrative aspect of things.'"

I must say that he laughed at my thrust with great good nature, and dropped into his chair and relaxed. Inside of two minutes he was proposing that we collaborate on a drama about the American Civil War.

"You have the poetic imagination," he said, "and I know what civil war is as a fact."

It was a poor time to suggest collaboration — mighty poor. It shows what I mean by saying that Trotsky did not know himself or others. In relations with people he was nothing less than ob-

tuse. He had a blind spot. His life was in his head. A poorer politician never lived.

Lenin combined intellect and idealism with a mastery of the craft of politics. Trotsky inherited the intellect and idealism, Stalin the craft — a fatal split. Every move that Trotsky made when Stalin opened his attack on him was inept. At first, as I have said, he did not move at all. He stayed in bed while Stalin falsified his writings and misrepresented him without limit in the party press. Supposedly he had one of his mysterious fevers, but he would not have had a fever if the fight had been of mass against class. Trotsky could have gone into the factories and barracks with a few forthright speeches and raised every fighting revolutionist in Moscow and Leningrad against the Stalin clique. But that would have meant war. Lenin would have waged that little war without a moment's hesitation, because Lenin sensed things in their practical terms. Trotsky was theoretical, and there was no place in his theories for any war except between the workers and the bourgeoisie.

Moreover, he was squeamish, he was disgusted when he should have been enraged. His wife told me at the time, with tears flowing from her eyes, that he never read a word of the attacks that were made on him. "He couldn't stomach all that filth."

During that winter of 1924 while Trotsky gave him a free hand, Stalin changed the entire membership of the party and changed the essential policy of the press. By June, when the party held its convention, he had the delegates in the palm of his hand. Trotsky emerged then from his mysterious silence, like Achilles from his tent — but not to fight for his and Lenin's trampled policies, only to make what he considered a diplomatic speech.

"The party can never make a mistake," he said.

Incredible as it may seem, that is what he said. That was his idea of being a crafty politician. He also declared his readiness to go into the trenches and fight with the humblest soldier in defense of the revolution. Somebody yelled:

"That isn't what we expected from you, comrade Trotsky. We expected leadership!"

It was certainly the most ill-judged speech I ever listened to. I had just been talking to him about his real opinions. In fact it was in a little nook behind the platform at that convention that he told me about Lenin's Testament, his last letter to the party, which Stalin had withheld from them and locked up in the safe.

He quoted the main phrases of it for me to use. I was leaving Russia the next day, and we said goodbye.

"What are you going to do when you get home?" he asked.

"I'm not going to do anything except write books."

He smiled a deprecating smile and I added:

"I believe in the class struggle, but I love peace."

"You love peace? You ought to be arrested," he said.

I agreed; and that was, it seemed, our farewell word. But right after that he got up and made this insincere, inept, inadequate — to my mind blunderingly stupid — speech. I could not refrain from going up and drawing him into our nook again and telling him what I thought he ought to do.

"In God's name," I said, or words to that effect, "why don't you peel off your coat and roll up your sleeves and sail in and clean them up? Read the Testament yourself. Don't *let* Stalin lock it up. Expose the whole conspiracy. Expose it and attack it head on. It isn't your fight, it's the fight for the revolution. If you don't make it now, you'll never make it. It's your last chance."

He looked at me in some surprise. I had been on the whole a respectful biographer. He even weighed my advice seriously for a moment. Then he assumed a quizzical expression.

"I thought you said you loved peace," he said.

I knew then, as certain wise old Bolsheviki had told me, that although Trotsky's policies were right, he never could take Lenin's place. It was always the policies, not Trotsky's leadership, that they were fighting for. That made the fighting weak.

Trotsky must have been at least dimly aware of this himself. No man could be so lonely and not know it, or at least feel it, and not have it influence his acts. I asked him once why he declined the offer of Lenin to make him acting head of the government.

"Stalin and Zinoviev and Kamenev had already ganged up on me," he said. "What could I do with a majority of the Politburo working against me?"

What could he do? Kamenev was his brother-in-law. He could ask him in to the War Department for a glass of tea and talk it over man to man. He could ask one or two others in — Bukharin, especially, who adored him. He could *use* his charm and his overpowering prestige. He could play the heart as well as the head. That was really all he had to do. But that was beyond his powers.

Trotsky side-stepped the heritage of Lenin because he was inadequate to it. Although incapable of saying so even to himself,

he *felt* inadequate to it. He could command minds; he could command armies; he could sway masses from the safe distance of the platform. But he could not bring two strong men to his side as friends and hold them there. That, I think, is the secret of the sad arc traced by his life-story, his rise to supreme heights under another leader and in an epoch of war and insurrection, his incredibly swift decline when skill in politics and his own leadership were called for.

WHAT IS THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE?

By Vilhjalmur Stefansson

THERE is considerable confusion in the minds of the American people as to just what area of land and water they may be called upon to defend. This confusion is due in no small part to the lack of uniformity and definiteness which has characterized official statements of policy made on behalf of the United States Government.

Thus in his historic address to Congress on December 2, 1823, President Monroe warned the European Powers against trying "to extend their system to any portion of *this hemisphere*." The terms of the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Rehabilitation, and Reestablishment of Peace, adopted at the Inter-American Conference of Buenos Aires in 1936, were to apply to the "*American Continent*." Secretary Hull, in a letter of June 4, 1940, to Representative Bloom discussing a joint resolution then before Congress, used the expressions "*Western Hemisphere*" and "*the Americas*" interchangeably.

Numerous other examples could be cited. Many of them were recalled in the House and Senate during the debates last June on the joint resolution, mentioned above, in which Congress affirmed the principle that this country would not recognize the transfer of territories in the "Western Hemisphere" from one non-American Power to another — a principle implemented in the Act and Convention of Havana, adopted by the American Republics on July 29, 1940. Perhaps it was this extended discussion in Congress that has caused American official usage to crystallize on the term "Western Hemisphere." For example, the National Guard and Reserve Officers Mobilization Act of August 27, 1940, provides that those men and units "ordered into active Federal service . . . shall not be employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere except in the territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippines."

But just what is the Western Hemisphere and just where is the line that divides Europe from the Americas? The people of the United States are energetically building a system of "hemisphere defense." But until they know precisely where their hemisphere begins and ends they cannot give full effect to their determination to defend it. My object in these few paragraphs

will be to suggest a practical line drawn through the Atlantic Ocean to separate the two hemispheres, a line that will be rational from a geographical point of view and at the same time strategically defensible.

First of all, we may eliminate the idea that a meridian of longitude can serve as such a line, for no meridian makes a logical division between the two hemispheres. Let me cite a couple of examples to show what I mean. All geographers concede that Greenland is in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, in order not to exclude any part of Greenland from this hemisphere, the dividing line would have to be pushed eastward to the eleventh meridian. But that meridian, we find, cuts across West Africa and would thus include in the Western Hemisphere a thousand miles of African shoreline. Obviously, it would be impossible to uphold any such division on grounds of geography; nor would such a frontier be readily defensible. However, the use of any more westerly meridian as a demarcation line would put parts of Greenland and Iceland into the Eastern Hemisphere, to which the strategists would naturally raise strong objections. Take for instance the thirtieth meridian which has long served as a rule-of-thumb line to separate the hemispheres. This meridian misses Africa, but it cuts Greenland in such a way as to leave its best aviation territory to Europe. Some have contended that this is a matter of no great importance "because the Greenland east coast is inaccessible to ships except during mid-summer." But that was not the view of Jean Charcot after his numerous explorations of the East Greenland Sea; nor is it the common view among Norwegian explorers who have done good work on the northern east coast in the last few years. Nor does it seem to be true, as recent press dispatches have reported, that the part of Greenland east of the thirtieth meridian is topographically and climatically bad for flying. The topography, in fact, is no worse than on the southwest coast of Greenland, which the dispatches have described as good for aviation and therefore a desirable base for Western Hemisphere defense. As for the atmospheric conditions, so far as we know, the average flying weather is a good deal better in East Greenland around Scoresby Sound, and north thereof, than it is on the southwestern coast. Furthermore, air bases on one side of Greenland could easily be attacked by planes operating from bases on the other side, since the Greenland Ice Cap offers no obstacle to passage by air.

Clearly then, we must apply some principle other than that of the straight line — one which, without being arbitrary, answers the demands of both common sense and high strategy. This brings us to my suggestion, which briefly is that the *de facto* boundary between the two hemispheres should be the middle of the “widest channel.” In other words, a line should be drawn through the Atlantic Ocean in such a way that it would be equidistant from the European and African continents on one hand and from the American continents on the other. As part of



the continents I include the large islands adjacent to them, such as Svalbard, Greenland, Iceland, the British Isles, Newfoundland and the Greater Antilles, but not minor groups like the Faroes, Azores, Bermudas, Cape Verdes, etc.

As I have already indicated, objections against such a division might come from those who doubt that Greenland and Iceland may rightly be regarded as appendages of the American land mass and therefore, like Newfoundland, as parts of the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, the United States Government has

upon several occasions acted on the assumption that Greenland is in the Western Hemisphere, and recently President Roosevelt has given his express support to this view. In regard to Iceland the official American stand has not been so explicit. However, as long ago as 1868, the State Department published a study entitled “A Report on the Resources of Iceland and Greenland” in which the author, Benjamin Mills Peirce, declares, in reference to Iceland, that “it belongs to the western hemisphere and is an insular dependency of the North American continent.” There are several good reasons for taking this position. For instance,

Iceland does not extend so far east as Greenland. Thus to put it in the Eastern Hemisphere would be, from a purely geographical point of view, quite illogical. Furthermore, Greenland is visible from the mountains of northwestern Iceland, whereas no land to the east, southeast or south is visible from any part of Iceland. Iceland is only about 180 miles away from Greenland, but is 300 miles distant from the Faroes, over 500 miles from Scotland, and more than 600 miles from Norway.

We therefore, in my opinion, are thoroughly justified in holding that Greenland and Iceland belong to the North American continent rather than to the European, and hence that they form part of the Western Hemisphere. It is upon this assumption that I am suggesting that the line between the two hemispheres should be as indicated on the accompanying map. This line is drawn midway between such points as the northeast corner of Greenland, and the westernmost cape of Svalbard; easternmost Iceland and northwest Scotland; Cape Race (Newfoundland) and Cape Finisterre (Spain); the "bulge" of Brazil and the nearest point to it in Africa; and Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope.

This "middle-of-the-channel" line is not only rational from the standpoint of geography, but offers the United States the best "rampart" behind which to defend this hemisphere, for it puts the maximum possible distance between us and any potential aggressors in Europe.

WINGS FOR THE TROJAN HORSE

By Melvin Hall and Walter Peck

THE drone of German and Italian airplanes over South America is not a new sound. It has been heard, at least in the case of German aircraft, in steadily increasing volume for the past twenty years. But we in the United States have been slow to recognize it as the audible warning of Nazi-Fascist penetration in the Western Hemisphere. Only belatedly are we coming to realize that one of the most dangerous weapons in the hands of the dictators is the ever-widening network of airways controlled by them throughout South America.

The airlines under German and Italian control or domination on that continent comprise more than 20,000 miles of scheduled routes. Many of these have no commercial justification, and serve political and military rather than commercial aims. They are arteries of totalitarian propaganda, nerve centers of totalitarian espionage. Many hundreds of German military pilots have used them as a training ground for long-distance flying and as a means for becoming familiar with South American topography. The lines traverse the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific along two separate routes and provide swift means of communication between the Nazi-Fascist *Stützpunkte* strategically located all over South America.

The airlines controlled by the Nazis and the Fascists fall into three general categories. One is represented by the Sindicato Condor, a camouflaged offshoot of Deutsche Lufthansa flying the Brazilian flag. The second comprises a half dozen ostensibly national lines whose management and policies are controlled by Lufthansa through the device of long-term equipment contracts which provide that the operating personnel shall be appointed by or be acceptable to the German company or its Brazilian subsidiary. Third, there are the undisguised operations of Deutsche Lufthansa itself and the Italian Lati, international air transport enterprises which are agencies of their respective governments.

The United States is represented in South American skies by the 15,000 miles of Pan American Airways. In addition, the Brazilian and Colombian affiliates of Pan American, Panair do Brasil and Avianca, cover 11,000 miles between them. Pan American operates from Miami via the West Indies down the

east coast of South America to Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Lines also extend from both Miami and Brownsville (Texas) to the Canal Zone. Another line operates along the northern shore of South America to Trinidad, where connection is made with the east-coast route. The Brazilian affiliate conducts local services in Brazil over much the same routes as Pan American and also extends into the Amazon hinterland. Pan American-Grace Airways operates a line from the Canal Zone down the west coast to Santiago, Chile, and two transcontinental lines across to Buenos Aires — one out of Santiago, the other via La Paz in Bolivia. Schedules on both the east and west coasts have recently been speeded up through the use of more modern flying equipment and the opening of a direct “cut-off” route in Brazil from Belém to Rio de Janeiro. These new schedules have reduced the trip between Miami and Rio de Janeiro to three days. Further improvements are projected for the near future. Even so, the Fascist Lati line reaches Rio from Rome as quickly as Pan American does from Miami.

The Dutch K.L.M., whose services in Europe have been suspended by the Germans, operates 1,850 miles of route along the north coast of South America, connecting Dutch Guiana and Curaçao with points in Venezuela and Colombia. Before the war, it also ran lines to Trinidad and Barbados. Air France used to operate a transatlantic air mail service from Toulouse to Natal in Brazil, and from there a passenger and mail line to Santiago de Chile via Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. But this line was suspended following the capitulation of France. Thus far the British have failed to open any lines to or in South America.

Neither the Dutch nor the French lines have ever constituted a menace to the safety of the United States. The airway network of the Nazis and Fascists and of the national affiliates which they control, however, does represent a definite threat to the security of the United States. Let us therefore examine it in detail.

CONDOR

Syndicato Condor, Limitada, though not the oldest, is the most strongly entrenched and most aggressive of the German-controlled airlines in South America. It covers the whole of Brazil's 4,000-mile seaboard, traverses Uruguay to Buenos Aires in Argentina, and thence swings west across the Pampas and the Andes to Santiago. It penetrates deep into Brazil's sparsely

populated interior, following the Bolivian border to the far western Territory of Acre¹ and serving a vast unremunerative area in the northern states of Pará, Maranhão and Piahy. It connects, through the German-affiliated Lloyd Aereo Boliviano, with the German-owned Lufthansa of Peru, and thus reaches Lima. Its lines cover nearly 10,000 miles.

Syndicato Condor is a but slightly disguised offshoot of Deutsche Lufthansa, though its officials persist in denying any connection with its German forebear. It flies the Brazilian flag and receives a subsidy from the Federal Government of Brazil. To all intents and purposes, however, it is a German concern, owned and controlled by Deutsche Lufthansa — which in effect is an organ of the German state. Condor is the spearhead of Germany's aerial penetration in South America. Its primary purpose is to further Nazi expansion in the Western Hemisphere.

Condor's managing director is a German named Ernst Hölck, or Ernesto Hölck as he calls himself in Brazil. The company's technical staff is also German. Its chief pilot is "Senhor" Fritz Fuhrer. Of its eighteen registered pilots nine are, or were until quite recently, "naturalized" citizens of Brazil who have retained their German nationality, and nine are native-born Brazilians of whom six have German names. The mechanic personnel consists of seven native-born Brazilians of German descent, three "naturalized" Brazilians born in Germany, and three uncammouflaged German citizens employed as instructors. The "naturalized" pilots, radio operators and flight mechanics log about three times as much flying as do the native-born.

Some of Lufthansa's German flight personnel remained in Brazil when the parent company's trans-Atlantic and South American operations were suspended as a result of the war. At that time Lufthansa's aircraft and operations in South America were turned over to Condor. Though not listed on the Condor rolls, the former Lufthansa crew members have made frequent flights in charge of Condor planes. It has been noticed that on the coastal trips the Condor crews are usually larger than necessary. One German crew member who flies both as pilot and mechanic on scheduled runs holds a valid aerial photographer's license. The company maintains an aéro-photogrammetric section which during the past five years has carried out air surveys over large areas of Brazil for the Federal Government.

¹ Condor's service between Corumbá and Porto Velho is reported temporarily suspended.

Brazilian law requires that at least two-thirds of the executive personnel and all the flying staff of air transport enterprises under domestic registry shall be native-born. The affiliate of Pan American Airways, Panair do Brasil, has complied with this law to the fullest degree. But owing to an insufficiency of Brazilian transport pilots, the authorities have only recently attempted to apply it to the other air carriers operating under the Brazilian flag. Approximately half the pilot personnel of Condor, Varig and Vasp — the three other commercial air lines under Brazilian registry — were Germans who for expediency's sake have taken on Brazilian nationality. It is of course well known that Germans who naturalize themselves in other countries remain Germans in the eyes of the Third Reich. Early this year, Condor asked for, and obtained, a two-year extension of its exemption from the rule requiring it to replace its foreign-born pilots with those of Brazilian birth. On October 6, President Vargas renewed his ruling that pilots of Brazilian-registered aircraft must be native-born Brazilians, except in the case of Varig, which was given until next February to comply. Condor was subsequently granted another extension; but it now appears that the government is insisting on full compliance.

The main offices of Condor and those of Deutsche Lufthansa for South America occupy the same premises in Rio de Janeiro. They are designed to impress the Brazilians with the strength of German air "commerce." Well supplied with funds for many not too obscure purposes, working closely with the diplomatic, naval and military staffs of the German Embassy and with "Cultural Attaché" Herr von Cossel, the airline's offices constitute a busy and important propaganda center. Condor's plans to extend its coastwise line from Belém to the border of French Guiana, over jungle wastes of no possible commercial interest, followed a prolonged visit to Pará state by the German Naval Attaché. The concession to operate this extension has, however, been annulled on the order of the Federal authorities. It has quite recently been reported in the press that Sindicato Condor has entered into a contract with the Amazon River navigation company and port authority, known locally as "SNAPP," for the development of traffic to the Atlantic from the Amazon hinterland and, eventually, Ecuador and Colombia.

The Lufthansa-Condor system has kept its passenger fares well below those of Pan American Airways. Commercial revenue is not

a primary consideration to the Germans. Some of Condor's operations into the remote interior of Brazil have little other justification than to provide transport for government officials.

In equipment Condor is at present the largest airline in South America. Its radio communication and direction finding systems consist of the latest types of Telefunken and Lorenz installations. Its fleet comprises sixteen tri-motored Junkers Ju52 17-passenger convertible land or seaplanes, eight older Junkers, and two 26-passenger four-engined Focke-Wulf FW200's. Accompanied by a fanfare of publicity, the two Focke-Wulfs were flown across the Atlantic last year to be placed in service on the Rio de Janeiro-Buenos Aires route. The first to arrive made the trip from Berlin to Rio in 34 hours 55 minutes flying time, or 40 hours 50 minutes elapsed time including stops at Seville, Bathurst and Natal. Together with Lufthansa's six Ju52's these planes were turned over to Sindicato Condor by Deutsche Lufthansa when the parent company suspended its South American operations owing to the war.

There is an interesting story in connection with these two Focke-Wulfs. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, officers of the British cruisers *Ajax* and *Exeter*, on patrol duty some 75 to 100 miles off the south Brazilian coast, sighted a large plane flying high above them. Through binoculars they identified the plane as a Focke-Wulf bearing the Sindicato Condor insignia. The cruisers reported their observation by radio to the British Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires. Immediate inquiry by this officer disclosed that one of Condor's Focke-Wulfs had departed from Buenos Aires several hours earlier on a test flight and had not yet returned. When the crew returned after a flight of ten hours they were questioned as to the reasons for going so far out to sea, but failed to give a satisfactory explanation.²

Following this incident the Argentine Government issued instructions that no Condor plane was to make a non-scheduled flight out of sight of the airport without having on board an Argentine Army officer as observer. It further ordered that Condor aircraft were not to depart from the airway between

² *La Nacion* of Buenos Aires, reporting this incident on September 15, 1939, offered a possible explanation. The German steamer *Monte Pascoal* had left Buenos Aires on September 9 taking some two hundred Germans, including part of the Lufthansa personnel, back to military duty in the Fatherland. Information as to the position of the *Ajax* and *Exeter* on September 10 would have been of extreme value to the *Monte Pascoal*. It is quite possible that her captain received such information from the Condor plane. There is no report that the German vessel was intercepted.

Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro while making regular passenger flights. The Condor management vigorously protested these rulings, and on the very next day requested special permission to make another "test" flight without an observer. They said the flight was being made at the instance of the Brazilian Government in order to conduct certain special trials desired by the Brazilian Army. Argentine officials communicated with the Brazilian Government, and learned that no such trials had been requested. Permission for the flight was refused.

There were other instances of Condor planes being sighted well out to sea, in spite of the efforts of both the Argentine and Brazilian Governments to prevent the use of Condor aircraft for military observation purposes. It may have been that the action of the Argentine officials in refusing permission for the second "test" flight saved the *Ajax* and *Exeter* from an untimely end. The German pocket-battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* was lurking in the vicinity at that time. The Condor crew, having located the two British cruisers the day before, may well have wished to communicate the latter's position to the *Graf Spee*, so that, if no British battleships were near, she might attack and have the effect of her fire reported by the Condor plane.

Syndicato Condor was officially founded at Rio de Janeiro December 1, 1927, though it had been engaged in operations between Porto Alegre and Rio since February of that year under the name of the Condor Syndikat. The latter was the outgrowth of a project dating back to May 1924, when a group of "American and European businessmen" organized a company⁴¹ to establish an air mail and passenger service between Key West, Florida, and Colombia via the Canal Zone. It does not appear that the "American businessmen" included any North Americans. The principal proponents were Dr. Peter Paul von Bauer and Captain Fritz Hammer, respectively managing and technical directors of Scadta, a German-Colombian airline which had been operating in the northwestern corner of South America since 1920. Dr. von Bauer visited the United States in 1925 with the object of obtaining capital and government support for this project. In April 1925 he wrote to an official in the United States Department of Commerce that a company to be called Inter-American Airlines had been incorporated under the laws of Delaware, with "three dummy directors so that the identity of the real promoters will not appear in the charter."

To this letter there was appended the confidential prospectus of the International Condor Syndicate.

The Syndicate realized "that it was inadvisable at this time to organize national German companies." Its proponents therefore sought to form a holding company in which the financial control would be American but in which they would furnish the technical direction and would handle the sale of their own equipment to the company. With this end in view they had associated with themselves the developers of a type of seaplane called the Dornier Wal. This was being built at Pisa (Italy) by a company registered under Italian law — since the manufacture of aircraft in Germany was restricted by the Treaty of Versailles — with the "technical assistance" of Dr. Claude Dornier, former chief engineer of the Zeppelin Company, and a full staff of German experts. Thirty percent of the initial capitalization of the International Condor Syndicate, or Condor Syndikat, was reported held in the name of Deutsche Lufthansa of Berlin through Aero Lloyd, and thirty percent by Schlubach, Thiemer & Co., of Hamburg — with possibly some participation by the Hamburg-American Line. Central and South American capital controlled a minority.

Dr. von Bauer failed to interest United States capital in his inter-American air service. Condor Syndikat then shifted the field of its activities to Brazil. In November 1926 a Dornier Wal named the *Atlantico* was flown from Buenos Aires to Rio on a successful demonstration tour in which an ex-Chancellor of Germany, Dr. Luther, took part. Shortly after this the Condor Syndikat obtained a license from the Brazilian Government to establish a regular air transport service between Rio and Porto Alegre. From that modest beginning the enterprise has spread over the greater part of South America.

VARIG

Condor's initial Brazilian undertaking was an airline established in January 1927 between Porto Alegre, Pelotas and Rio Grande over the coastal lagoon known as Patos. This line lay wholly within the state of Rio Grande do Sul, whose population is strongly German. Four months after its establishment, following the opening by Condor of a service between Porto Alegre and Rio de Janeiro, certain capitalists of Rio Grande do Sul bought up the Condor interests in the Rio Grande line. The terms of purchase have never been disclosed, but it is clear

that the deal which resulted in the founding of Varig — S. A. Empresa de Viação Aerea Rio Grandense — in no wise excluded Condor's participation in that enterprise. Varig purports to be purely Brazilian. In reality it is an affiliate of Sindicato Condor, and therefore of Deutsche Lufthansa.

Varig receives a substantial subsidy from the state of Rio Grande do Sul, and for the past two years has obtained an equal amount from the Federal Government. Ever since its formation it has received strong support from the principal officials of the State. In 1932, the State became an important stockholder, reputedly to the extent of a quarter interest, the balance of the stock being privately held. It is generally believed that Sindicato Condor controls a substantial interest in the enterprise. Sindicato Condor acts as Varig's agent in Rio de Janeiro, while Varig is Condor's agent for Rio Grande do Sul. Condor coöperated in Varig's first experimental flight in 1927. Varig's latest plane, a Ju52, was assembled in Condor's Rio de Janeiro shops. It is supposed to have been acquired on one of the long-term Lufthansa-Junkers equipment contracts. Varig's managing director is Otto-Ernst Meyer, a German World War veteran of dual nationality, German and Brazilian, either of which he assumes as the situation may suggest. Its technical director is Rodolfo Ahrons, a Brazilian of German extraction. The Board is composed of nine members and nine alternates, all of German extraction or strong German sympathies.

Varig's flying equipment consists of seven planes, all German, including the one tri-motored Junkers Ju52. The routes which it is at present operating total some 940 miles, serving the principal towns of Rio Grande do Sul and extending to the Uruguayan border, with connections to Montevideo through the Uruguayan air transport company Pluna. At Porto Alegre, connection is made with the Condor system. Varig also maintains a German-equipped flying school.

VASP

The third Brazilian-flag airline under German control or influence is the Viação Aerea São Paulo, usually known as Vasp. This concern was formed in 1934 by a group of German-Brazilians of São Paulo State. It receives subsidies from the state governments of São Paulo and Goyaz and from the Federal Government. The State of São Paulo is the largest stockholder. The balance

of the stock is ostensibly held by São Paulo citizens, but as with Varig it is generally believed that Deutsche Lufthansa controls a substantial interest. German influence is further entrenched through Lufthansa-Junkers equipment credits.

The managing director of Vasp is a German-Brazilian, Dr. Ismael Guilherme. Instruction of the company's personnel and aspirant pilots is in the hands of Commander von Bueldring, a German specialist designated by Lufthansa. Two of its six pilots are, or were, German applicants for naturalization. The other four, of whom one has a German name, are native-born. At the invitation of Lufthansa-Junkers, Dr. Guilherme made a four-months' visit to Germany, all expenses paid, in the early part of 1939. The purpose of the trip was to study German airline practice, and to arrange certain details in connection with the delivery of two new Junkers Ju52's ordered from Dessau, for which the State of São Paulo had provided an additional subsidy. Owing to the war these planes were not received. One of them is reported to have been en route to Brazil via Russia and Japan since last July.

The Vasp fleet consists of three tri-motored Junkers Ju52's and two small twin-engined planes of English make. The Junkers units are under the technical supervision of Sindicato Condor. Vasp operates approximately 1,200 miles of routes in São Paulo and contiguous states in southern Brazil. Its most profitable run is the direct line between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, operated twice daily. Its lines connect at various points with the Condor system. Present plans call for further extensions totalling 1,950 miles across the wild country of central Brazil to Cuyabá in Matto Grosso and to Carolina in the State of Maranhão, in order to connect at both points with Condor's "penetration lines." An international service from São Paulo to Asunción in Paraguay is also projected.

LLOYD AEREO BOLIVIANO

Condor's activities within Brazil and across the continent to Santiago are becoming increasingly coördinated with the activities of other air lines under German control or influence. On the west, Condor's Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo-Corumbá line meets with Lloyd Aereo Boliviano, which in turn connects with Luft-hansa of Peru at La Paz to form a second German-dominated route between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. For, while Lloyd

Aereo is nominally a Bolivian company with forty-six percent of its stock held by the Bolivian Government, its managerial and operating personnel is German, seven of its nine aircraft are German, and its schedules are coördinated with those of the German network.

Lloyd Aereo Boliviano was founded in 1925 when the German colony at La Paz presented a German airplane to the Bolivian Government during the celebration of the centennial of Bolivia's independence. It thus antedates Condor as an active operator. There is small question that Deutsche Lufthansa has furnished equipment to Lloyd Aereo Boliviano on long-term contracts at low cost, and that in so doing has acquired an effective control over Lloyd Aereo's activities. Deutsche Lufthansa Peru is believed to hold thirty percent of Lloyd Aereo's stock.

Lloyd Aereo Boliviano's founder and present vice-president is Wilhelm (or Guillermo) Kyllmann, a German allegedly the head of the Nazi Party in Bolivia. Its general manager and chief pilot is Herman Schroth, also a German, who has held this position since 1927. Two of its pilots and most of its technicians are German. Its flying equipment consists of three tri-motored Junkers Ju52's, one twin-engined Junkers Ju86, three older Junkers and two American-built amphibians. Deutsche Lufthansa has reputedly offered to supply Lloyd Aereo with three new Junkers planes from Germany, though how delivery could be made is difficult to see. The Junkers planes now on hand are overhauled at Condor's Rio de Janeiro base. There is a continual interchange of personnel between Lloyd Aereo and Condor.

Lloyd Aereo now operates some 3000 miles of routes in Bolivia. Its importance lies in its being a primary link in one of the German transcontinental systems.

DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA

From the beginning the Lufthansa-Condor combination contemplated a transoceanic air service between Europe and South America via the west coast of Africa. In February 1930 Condor inaugurated a weekly service between Rio de Janeiro and Natal. One month later this was extended experimentally to the Island of Fernando de Noronha, where the Condor plane delivered air mail for Europe to a Hamburg-American Line steamer. This in turn transported it to the Canary Islands, whence it was taken by a Lufthansa plane to Europe. This operation, which effected a

two-day saving over the all-sea route between Rio and Europe, was of course only a temporary expedient.

In May 1930 the dirigible *Graf Zeppelin* made its first landing at Rio, presaging the regular airship service established between Germany and Brazil in 1931. After three years of lighter-than-air service the Brazilian Government and the Luftschiffbau Zeppelin of Friedrichshafen entered (March 1934) into a contract calling for a minimum of twenty airship trips per year. Sindicato Condor worked closely with the Luftschiffbau Zeppelin up to the time service was suspended following the disaster to the *Hindenburg* at Lakehurst in May 1937. Condor remains general representative for South America of the Deutsche Zeppelin-Reederei, operating company of the Zeppelin ships. If the Nazis are successful in imposing their "new order" on Europe and Africa, airship operation across the South Atlantic will probably be resumed.

In February 1934 Lufthansa, with Condor's close collaboration, established a regular weekly air-mail service between Central Europe and South America via the west coast of Africa. This was the first all-air transoceanic airplane route in the world. It was flown with the aid of catapult depot-ships stationed part way out from each coast. This Lufthansa-Condor mail service soon proved faster than that provided by the *Graf Zeppelin*; beginning in 1935 the airship was therefore reserved for passenger traffic only, the mail being carried by the flying boats. The latter traversed the South Atlantic from coast to coast in fewer than twenty hours, bringing the air trip between Central Europe and Rio de Janeiro to less than three days. Up to the outbreak of war this line operated with remarkable regularity. It served as a proving ground for various types of heavy flying boats developed especially for Lufthansa, and also provided valuable training in long distance over-water flights for many German military pilots.

In 1934, with the inception of all-air service from Europe, Condor extended its lines into Uruguay and to Buenos Aires. At the same time Deutsche Lufthansa extended its own operations from Natal to Rio and Buenos Aires. This in effect made for a dual German air system along the coast with Lufthansa operating weekly express flights for the European mails and Condor a weekly local passenger and mail service. More and more German personnel arrived to serve as flight crews or as instructors.

In October 1935 Condor established the trans-Andean line between Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile. It was Captain

Fritz Hammer — co-founder of Scadta in Colombia (oldest of all the German air lines), one of the founders of Condor Syndikat and later to be the organizer of Sedta in Ecuador — who secured the concession from the Chilean Government for this operation. The second pilot accompanying Hammer on his flight to Santiago for negotiations was Gustav Wachsmuth, who later became technical director of Sedta. These details indicate the close interrelationship between the various units of the German chain. Two years later, in 1937, service on the trans-Andean line became bi-weekly and operation was taken over by Lufthansa under a special authorization-decree of the Chilean Government. At almost the same time Condor doubled its hitherto weekly service on the long coastal route from Buenos Aires to Belém.

The four-year concession in the name of Sindicato Condor which Hammer had secured from the Chilean Government in 1935 was extended by decree in 1939 to run until December 24, 1942. This time, however, the decree designated Deutsche Lufthansa as the concessionaire. Lufthansa also obtained the right to operate in Brazil on a twice-weekly frequency but without the right to carry traffic within the borders of the country. Condor, as ostensibly a Brazilian enterprise, is of course privileged to engage in internal air commerce.

All of Lufthansa's operations in South America until the outbreak of the war, when they were temporarily suspended, have been regarded by well-informed quarters in Brazil and Argentina as more a military than a commercial activity. They were conducted primarily for the training of German military pilots on long distance flights and to further German penetration of Latin America, and not to make a profit.

After a short period of suspended service following the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Condor took over all of Lufthansa's operations and flying equipment in South America. The establishment in December 1939 of service from Rome to Rio by the Italian airline Lati, under the management of Bruno Mussolini, provided an Axis substitute for the Lufthansa trans-Atlantic service. Some time ago Lufthansa announced that its through service between Berlin and South America would be renewed during the summer of 1940 with Dornier Do36 four-engined Diesel-powered airplanes making the ocean crossing non-stop. Though this service could not be reopened as scheduled, it may quite possibly be under way in the fairly near future.

LUFTHANSA PERU

The most recent addition to the German airways network wears no camouflage. Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., Sucursal Peru (Peruvian Branch), is openly German, although registered as a Peruvian company. It was established in May 1938 by its parent concern. As yet it is a comparatively modest undertaking, operating only 1210 miles of routes with two Junkers Ju52 airplanes. But its potential importance is considerable, for it forms the westernmost link in the Nazi-controlled transcontinental airways system. It operates two weekly services between Lima and La Paz over separate routes, one of which connects at the Bolivian capital with Lloyd Aereo Boliviano's service to Corumbá. At that point, direct connection is made with Sindicato Condor's service to Rio, whence — until Lufthansa renews its trans-Atlantic operations — Lati's irregular service carries the mail to Rome. Lufthansa Peru's management is German, its flight personnel is German, the majority of its technical personnel and all its equipment are German.

The chief pilot of Lufthansa Peru, Capt. Berthod Alische, was recently in Iquitos, at one of the headwaters of the Amazon, to make arrangements for a service between that point and Lima. Should Lufthansa Peru inaugurate such a service its operations would then be within connecting distance of Sindicato Condor's "penetration line" in western Brazil. Some four years ago Condor made overtures to the Brazilian Government for a concession to extend its services westward to Tabatinga, 250 miles from Iquitos. At the same time the Peruvian Ambassador to Brazil announced that his Government would establish a corollary service from Lima to Ramón Castilla, just over the frontier from Tabatinga. Such a line would have no commercial advantages but would be a useful adjunct to Nazi penetration. The area it would cross lies on a direct line between Rio de Janeiro and the Panama Canal, astride the main tributaries of the Amazon River. Along such a diagonal route from sea to sea there are many points where secret bases might be established.

Since the outbreak of the war Lufthansa Peru has had difficulty in obtaining equipment and funds from the Fatherland: its flying personnel is on reduced pay and its program of expansion has been retarded. But this situation is expected by the Germans to correct itself before long. Before the war the company announced

that it would open a service between Lima and Guayaquil. (Well-informed sources have suggested that what Lufthansa most desires at present is to extend its services up the entire coast of Peru in order to check on the location of British warships.) This service would connect with Lufthansa's affiliate Sedta, which operates between Guayaquil and Quito. Quito is some four and a half hours flight from the Panama Canal by Junkers Ju52, or little more than three hours by a plane with the speed of, say, the Focke-Wulf FW200.

SEDTA

The Sociedad Ecuatoriana de Transportes Aéreos, known as Sedta, was organized in 1937 by a group of Germans and Ecuadoreans headed by the late Fritz Hammer, who, as already mentioned, was active in promoting German airlines in South America as early as 1920. He had vision, an individualistic temperament and the head of a wind-tossed hawk. He was killed in March 1938 when he flew a Sedta plane into a mountain.

In February 1935, Hammer negotiated a tentative contract with the Ecuadorean Government, though more than two years elapsed before it was actually signed. The contract called for regular operations between Guayaquil and Quito, with unspecified extensions every five years, in return for which certain subsidies were to be paid. In the final arrangements there was a tie-up with a general barter deal between the German and Ecuadorean Governments. Shortly after Hammer's death Messrs. Paul Moosmeyer, director of Lufthansa's head office at Rio de Janeiro, and Grotewold, Lufthansa representative in Argentina, descended upon Quito. They had just inaugurated the Lufthansa-Lloyd Aereo Boliviano-Condor service between Lima and Rio. In Quito they made certain arrangements with respect to Sedta, though their first plan to absorb that company in an extension of the Lufthansa service from Lima into Ecuador was not accepted by the Ecuadorean Government. Nevertheless, Lufthansa gained control of Sedta through an equipment agreement and by providing a subsidy from the Rio office reputed to be thirty thousand sucres (approximately \$2,100) per month.

Sedta has so far survived more than a normal share of ill luck. Its first plane, a light 4-passenger machine used by Hammer on a photographic mission, was damaged beyond repair before the final signing of the concession. Early in 1938 the company received

two single-engined Junkers W34's. A few days after the arrival of the second one, Hammer flew it into a mountainside near Quito, killing all on board. Following the company's realignment with Lufthansa, a Junkers Ju52 was placed on the scheduled service between Guayaquil and Quito. This plane was destroyed in December 1938 when it spun in at Quito airdrome, causing fatal injuries to co-pilot Musselberger and minor ones to the passengers. It was promptly replaced by another Ju52 from the Lufthansa pool in Brazil. In September 1939 the remaining W34 was washed out in landing at Cuenca, and was also replaced by a Ju52 from Brazil. These two tri-motored Junkers now constitute the company's fleet. Sedta operates approximately 900 route miles. Despite this distinctly spotty record the attitude of the Ecuadoreans towards Sedta remains favorable. Its elastic rate structure is not paying cash dividends, but it has built up local good will. Nearly fifty percent of Sedta's passengers are said to travel free, while barely ten percent pay the full tariff.

Sedta is a corporation organized under the laws of Ecuador. Its total Ecuadorean capital is said to be about \$12,000, and there is nothing to indicate that any part of this was ever paid in. Actual control rests with Deutsche Lufthansa through equipment credits or loans, other subsidies and the appointment of managing and technical personnel. The Minister of National Defense has recognized Sedta as a foreign entity despite its national disguise. Nevertheless, the company receives a subsidy from the Ecuadorean Government. The present managing director, appointed by Lufthansa after Hammer's death, is likewise a German, Gustav Adolf Wachsmuth, a graduate in aviation engineering from the Polytechnic School of Berlin, who spent ten years as a pilot with Sindicato Condor. Except for the traffic manager, all the company officials and operating personnel are Germans designated by Lufthansa. There are eight or ten pilots, co-pilots and radio operators of German nationality, plus a dozen or so other Germans in various capacities.

In accordance with the practice of all the German lines in South America, Sedta employs pilots sent to it from Germany for periods of instruction. One of its pilots flew for Lufthansa in China, Afghanistan and Arabia, and during the four months immediately preceding his transfer to Sedta he was pilot for Sindicato Condor on the Buenos Aires-Santiago line. Sedta's German personnel is hostile to the United States. Its members have at-

tacked Pan American-Grace Airways from the start — vocally, in the press, in resolutions before Congress and through local supporters. A well-informed source reports that a certain Schulte, employee in a bakery at Quito and reputed head of the Gestapo in Ecuador, pays substantial sums each month to Sedta. The German employees of Sedta live with German families, who are compensated in credits available in Germany. The pay of the German pilots, formerly 2000 sucres a month (about \$140), has been reduced by more than half since the outbreak of war; but the pilots feel that they are working for a "cause."

Presumably, the company's continued operation depends on its ability to obtain funds from Germany. Evidently it is still able to do this, though probably in restricted amounts. In any case, Germany is believed to have substantial sums available in Ecuador. Sedta's continued operation also depends on whether a United States-operated service satisfactory to the Ecuadoreans can be developed to take the place of the German company. Since such a service could not earn its way, it would need financial support from the American Government. This support would be repaid through increased hemisphere security.

In July 1939 Sedta made a "good-will" flight from Quito to Bogotá, announcing it as the inaugural trip of a weekly service to Colombia. The proposed service did not materialize owing to the refusal of the Colombian Government to grant the necessary permission. But the announcement itself was significant in view of Lufthansa's previous discussions with the Ecuadorean Government relative to a northward extension of Lufthansa Peru to connect with Sedta's thrice-weekly service between Guayaquil and Quito. Meanwhile, Sedta continues its endeavors to expand northward into Colombia.

Sedta recently attempted to secure a contract from the Ecuadorean Government to operate a service to the Galapagos Islands. Such a line could have no possible commercial justification; but it is more than a mere coincidence that the islands happen to lie in a highly strategic location off the Pacific entrance to the Panama Canal. The Government did not sign the contract. Sedta has also been negotiating for a concession to operate a seaplane line into the jungles of eastern Ecuador. The Ecuadorean Army would find such a line useful for provisioning its frontier outposts. If Sedta should obtain this concession, its operations would, as in the case of Lufthansa Peru, be brought within easy distance of the

Condor "penetration line" in western Brazil. This is believed to be Sedta's primary interest in this line, for it could scarcely be a paying proposition, even with a substantial subsidy. The Lufthansa strategy undoubtedly aims at creating a southeast-northwest belt line across the continent.

AVIANCA, FORMERLY SCADTA

The Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Aéreos, called Scadta, was the first permanent air transport operation in the Western Hemisphere and one of the first in all the world, and was the forefather of the whole German airline network of South America. It was founded in 1919-20 by a group of ex-officers and pilots from the German and Austrian armies. Dr. Peter Paul von Bauer and Fritz Hammer, of whom we have already heard, were the leading spirits. Hammer was Scadta's technical director until the time he left to help in the formation of Sindicato Condor. Under the initiative and ability of its organizers, Scadta thrived. Within a few years its operations had spread all over the country, by land as well as by water.

In 1931 Dr. von Bauer, who remained at the head of Scadta until early in 1940, sold a considerable block of its stock to Pan American Airways under an arrangement whereby this stock remained in his name in a form of voting trust. Von Bauer continued as managing director and the German staff remained with him. Seven of the company's twelve officers were Germans. Twenty-one of its pilots were Germans, believed to be reserve officers on the payroll of the German Air Ministry. They were — perhaps for that reason — willing to accept lower wages than pilots of other nationalities. The fifteen German flight mechanics were also suspected of being trained co-pilots and reserve officers.

Meanwhile there arose, both in the United States and in Colombia, increasing concern over the fact that a German-dominated airline was operating within easy striking distance of the Panama Canal. At the outset efforts to "de-Germanize" Scadta met with little result. But in 1939 the Colombian Government succeeded in bringing about a merger between Scadta and Saco, a *bona fide* Colombian-flag company, and in "nationalizing" this new line — Aerovías Nacionales de Colombia, known as Avianca — by retaining the right to acquire a controlling interest in the enterprise at any time within ten years of its reorganization. Avianca now operates a total of 5,175 route-miles.

With this merger the situation became somewhat clearer. The new company was under Pan American's financial control. Nevertheless, von Bauer and his German associates remained, and difficulties were encountered in replacing the German operating personnel. United States or Colombian pilots could not take over from the Germans without first familiarizing themselves with the Scadta routes and it was feared that a program aimed at the gradual replacement of the German pilots would result in the immediate resignation of all of them, thereby crippling the whole organization. The thesis was therefore accepted that replacement of the German communications personnel would provide a sufficient check on the movement of aircraft to guard against a surprise attack on the Panama Canal. Nevertheless, pressure for the "de-Germanization" of the new company continued.

At the end of January 1940, von Bauer finally submitted his resignation. This was followed within a month or so by the resignations of Albert Tietjen, elected acting president when von Bauer resigned; Herman Kuehl, manager and vice president; Wilhelm Schnurbusch, technical director; and several others. (Schnurbusch was reappointed in an advisory capacity, for a period of two years.) But of the seventy-nine or eighty Germans who had been connected with the company's technical and managerial staff, there still remained a substantial number in the operating, maintenance and communications departments.

The blitzkriegs against Scandinavia, the Low Countries and France, with their disclosures of fifth column activities, finally gave the joint guardians of hemisphere defence serious alarm. On June 8, therefore, the Scadta-Saco merger was finally ratified by the stockholders, and immediately thereafter all of Scadta's German flight, radio and shop personnel still on the rolls were retired with substantial bonuses. But an approximately equal number of German office personnel, including the traffic manager and chiefs of postal and express services, still remained.

Immediately after the discharge of the pilots and technicians, the German Legation at Bogotá announced that no attempt would be made to repatriate citizens of the Reich, despite the fact that nearly all of them were military reserve officers. However, Associated Press despatches from Panama reported the departure during August of some twenty of these men with their families on a Japanese steamer bound for the Orient. Twenty more are said to have escaped on board the German freighter

Helgoland which slipped out of Puerto Colombia on October 29 without obtaining proper clearance from the Colombian authorities. Some of the dismissed personnel remaining in Colombia are reported to have settled in the sparsely populated *llanos* in the eastern part of the country in order to take up "farming," an occupation which seems scarcely suited to airplane pilots, mechanics and radiomen. Two former Scadta pilots, Hans Hoffman and Fritz Herzhauser, have been conducting an unscheduled air transport service in this region under the corporate name of Arco. These two men have been in an excellent position to survey landing fields in Colombia's unpatrolled eastern plains, and even to lay out and stock such fields. Although the Colombian Government revoked their concession last August, it is reported that they are seeking to expand their activities.

Other Germans, formerly with Scadta, still remain in Colombia engaged in various activities. One suspects that the last has not been heard of the goodly company of Scadta alumni.

AEROPOSTA ARGENTINA

Aeroposta Argentina is an Argentine company; its board of directors is one hundred percent Argentine and all its capital is Argentine. It is an outgrowth of the French Aeropostale company. Its administrators, most of whom are well known in Argentine politics, are not at all pro-Nazi or pro-Fascist. The President and owner of the company, Ernesto Pueyrredon, belongs to one of Argentina's oldest families. Yet Lufthansa-Condor is in a position to dominate Aeroposta's policies.

Aeroposta dates back to October 1929. Its services have been efficiently operated and its traffic has steadily improved. At the present time the company is said to be on a paying basis. In 1936 the Pueyrredon group took it over from the government, which had been operating the line since its abandonment by Aeropostale in 1931. The new management soon found itself in financial difficulties. That was where Lufthansa-Condor stepped into the picture with its outwardly attractive long-term, pay-as-you-earn equipment rehabilitation proposal. Under this scheme three trimotored Junkers Ju52's were delivered to the company against a minimum cash outlay. The contract, of course, mortgaged Aeroposta's assets and future earnings, which in the event of default would provide the Germans with an effective wedge for further infiltration. Furthermore, it provided that specifically designated

German pilots and mechanics should be employed for fixed periods, that German specialists were to train Aeroposta's Argentine personnel, and that Condor should direct and supervise the maintenance of the planes, including major overhaul in Condor's own shops, until final payment had been made in full. As a result of these terms Lufthansa-Condor has obtained a considerable degree of control over the line. Innocent-appearing equipment contracts of this sort have constituted one of the major weapons in Germany's penetration of South American skyways.

Aeroposta Argentina now operates approximately 1,600 miles of scheduled routes. It has for some time been seeking additional subsidized extensions, including an eventual junction in the northwest with the Lufthansa-affiliated Lloyd Aereo Boliviano. Junction is already made at Buenos Aires with the Lufthansa-Condor system. Aeroposta also connects at Buenos Aires with the Compañía Aeronáutica Uruguaya S. A., known as Causa, which operates to Montevideo and other points in Uruguay. Causa is a small company whose principal financial backing comes from the Supervielle family, Uruguayan bankers and ranchers. It is considered to be a Uruguayan enterprise, though under some degree of German influence. Its pilots are, or have been, Germans; its flying equipment consists of two Junkers Ju52 seaplanes; while the technical supervision of these aircraft, including major maintenance, is in the hands of Condor.

THE NAZI-FASCIST LINK WITH EUROPE

Fascist Italy has long had aerial aspirations in South America; but only in December 1939, after a lengthy period of preparation, did the Ala Littoria company finally inaugurate its widely publicized service from Rome to Rio. This line is operated by a heavily subsidized offshoot called Linee Aeree Transcontinentali Italiane, or more briefly Lati. Its managing director is Bruno Mussolini, the Duce's son.

The preparatory period gave certain indications as to the nature of the service which the Italians proposed to give. In Brazil the Ala Littoria staff, engaged ostensibly in preliminary studies and negotiation, comprised some thirty persons, most of whom were officers of the Regia Aeronautica. They made great efforts to curry Brazilian official favor, with some success. In Argentina similar efforts were less successful. Argentine opinion, since the Ethiopian, Spanish and Albanian episodes, has been decidedly

antagonistic to the Fascists, despite the existence of a large Italian element in the population. The Argentines were also alarmed by the fact that the airplanes used on Ala Littoria's survey flights were bombardment craft — one of them even carried machine-gun mountings and a coat of camouflage. Popular indignation was so aroused over the proposed use of military pilots that the Argentine authorities flatly refused to permit this phase of the program.

Ala Littoria also acted as sales agent in South America for Savoia Marchetti bombardment planes. It controlled a pseudo-Argentine air line company called La Corporación Sudamericana de Servicios Aéreos. That venture nearly came to an untimely end when the Department of Civil Aeronautics suspended its service because the company's Italian pilots had refused to turn the Sudamericana planes over to Argentine co-pilots at the end of the first six months of operation, as prescribed in the terms of the concession. Shortly thereafter Sudamericana lost its operating license because of its persistent refusal to submit its planes to airworthiness inspection and test. The license was reinstated, however, when the company agreed to the government's demands, and Sudamericana is again flying its Macchi planes on daily schedule between Montevideo and Buenos Aires.

Ala Littoria's authorization to operate its transoceanic service as far as Argentina has not been exercised and has now lapsed. Presumably a new permit will be sought in Lati's name. Lati's Rome-to-Rio service continues in operation, though somewhat irregularly. At present it is the only air service across the South Atlantic, Lufthansa having suspended at the beginning of the war and Air France at the end of June 1940.³ The Lati route in Brazil is 1,800 miles long.

The Italian service has taken the place of Lufthansa for all Nazi-Fascist communication with South America. Air mail from South American cities to Central Europe "Via Condor-Lati" takes less time than from the same points to New York. Instructions, funds and propaganda material for Nazi agents in Latin America are transmitted in this manner from Berlin. The planes used, convertible bombers with a cruising speed of better than 220 miles per hour and a range of over 2,500 miles, are tri-motored Savoia Marchetti S83T's, known as "Green Mice." These planes go from Rome to Rio in three days via

³ For a description and map of transatlantic air routes see Edward P. Warner's "Atlantic Airways," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, April 1938.

Seville, Rio de Oro (Spanish), the Cape Verde Islands (Portuguese) and Recife. The Atlantic crossing takes about nine hours.

CONCLUSION

This network of airlines controlled or dominated by the Germans and Italians now covers a good part of South America. The German components are integrated by the directive genius of Deutsche Lufthansa, and they are coördinated in matters of propaganda and public relations with the general program of the Wilhelmstrasse. Through its Fascist partner, the Germans control the only airway connection now operating between Europe, Africa and South America. As for the future, the Germans are planning to expand their airways in and to South America. Dr. von Bauer is understood to be preparing such plans to be put into effect after the war.

It need hardly be said that neither the present activities nor the future plans of the Axis-dominated airlines in South America are advantageous to their American competitors; nor are they compatible with our policy of hemispheric security. Several of the South American republics are becoming increasingly aware of this latter fact and of the threat to themselves inherent in the activities of the Nazi and Fascist air transport enterprises. Yet it is not sufficient merely to be aware of the situation; prompt and effective measures are required. That such measures are possible is evidenced by the recent progress in "de-Germanizing" Scadta. All the South American governments should coöperate in a policy of nationalizing whatever airlines under their flags which engage in activities that are actually or potentially subversive, and they should scotch the misuse of commercial permits granted to the Nazi and Fascist lines by cancelling them if necessary.

Some progress is being made toward these goals. In Ecuador the government has permitted Pan American-Grace to extend its routes so as to include certain points until recently served only by Lufthansa's affiliate Sedta. In both Brazil and Argentina, the governments are making concrete efforts to eliminate the employment of non-native-born pilots by Sindicato Condor and certain other lines operating under the Brazilian and Argentine flags. Pan American is stepping up its schedules to Latin American points and increasing frequencies of service by placing new aircraft of greater speed and range in operation, day and night, over

routes more direct than those flown heretofore. But more remains to be done.

For example, a wisely planned and coördinated program is needed for the replacement of equipment on the national airlines of the Latin America countries. Many of the South American air carriers seriously require new aircraft, spare parts and other matériel which they can no longer obtain from Germany. The United States could well step into this breach. If aircraft, engines and accessories were to be supplied to the national airlines on terms no less favorable than those provided by the Lufthansa-Junkers equipment contracts, there would be little inducement for the lines to revert later to German equipment. We might go so far as to assist the national lines in liquidating these German contracts. In return for this, and in full coöperation with the governments concerned, the lines should be induced to divest themselves of all German control, or influence, and personnel.

To accomplish all this we might have to aid in providing trained flying and technical personnel for an interim period, under some arrangement whereby the lines would not be burdened with too great an increase in pay-roll expense over the cost of the present German staffs. We should make every effort to coöperate in training more Latin Americans to be competent transport pilots. They make excellent aviators when properly schooled, but there is at present an insufficiency of experienced men to staff the national lines. We can furthermore aid the airlines themselves by providing the local departments of civil aeronautics in some of the Latin American republics with ground equipment and installations on liberal terms, as well as technical collaboration where desired. The Export-Import Bank of Washington is now in a position to extend its facilities for such purposes.

In all of this the coöperation of the South American countries is, quite evidently, essential. There is reason to believe that this coöperation would be forthcoming, in most cases at least, if we presented them with a clear and properly coördinated program. Such a program will, of course, cost a considerable sum. It will need both the financial and technical backing of the United States Government. It will require the support of the War and Navy Departments and of the Council of National Defense in the matter of priorities on equipment and flight personnel. But there can be no question that it would pay high dividends in terms of national and hemispheric security.

BRITAIN AND THE AXIS IN THE NEAR EAST

By Albert Vinton

MUSSOLINI'S hope, like that of Stalin, has been to reap the rewards of victory without sharing in its risks. On June 10, 1940, it was logical enough for him to assume that these rewards would be his by a mere declaration of war against the Western Powers. Denmark, Norway and the Low Countries had been overrun by German troops, France was on the verge of collapse, and even the British Isles seemed wide open to Nazi invasion. "There came a moment — let it now be acknowledged," *The Times* reminisced editorially on September 3, "when imminent defeat stared the British Empire in the face. That was the time when the retreating Army stood at bay in the Channel ports and the informed judgment of the High Command estimated that not more than 30,000 of them would escape the enemy's clutches. Had that prophecy been fulfilled . . . the British Isles would have lain naked to the invader." But though the prophecy was not fulfilled, Mussolini was in the war and the Mediterranean had become a battlefield.

The Fascist Government has managed to concentrate a very imposing force in North and East Africa. The number of troops in Libya at the end of the summer was certainly in excess of 250,000 and was perhaps as high as 350,000; and some 200,000 troops, including natives, are believed to be located in East Africa.

Mussolini's preparations for the campaign against Egypt, unlike those for the abortive blitzkrieg against Greece, were most careful. The men were seasoned for desert warfare and supplies were available in abundance. British observers expressed admiration and surprise at the speed with which supply dumps followed the advancing units. There appeared to be plenty of motor vehicles, and apparently endless supplies of all types of artillery and ammunition, especially of 75 mm. guns, also anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. The small Fiat tanks, though no match in direct combat against the larger British models, demonstrated their effectiveness in the early days of the Italian advance. Oddly enough, the Italians seemed to be deficient only in aircraft, the weapon which was supposed to be their *forte*. During the first four

months of war, less Italian aircraft was in evidence than had been anticipated, and it was of an inferior quality.

The Italians worked out a specific tactic for desert warfare which showed good early results. Every advance was carried out by two or three tanks making a forward thrust. After them came groups of ten or twelve swift-moving trucks loaded with artillery. Apparently the guns, chiefly of light types up to 75 mm., were sometimes fired directly from the trucks. The infantry, also transported in trucks, came only after the guns, and its duty was to occupy and defend territory seized by the tanks and artillery. The infantry was itself protected by light and anti-aircraft guns on the periphery. "The formation is so characteristic," wrote a British correspondent, "that British staff officers have already dubbed it 'the hedgehog.'" Once a stretch of land was occupied, the advanced units lost no time in fortifying it. Major stations on the road, where supplies of water and ammunition were concentrated, were laid out as "perimeter camps" for defense against the resourceful and daring British armored units which seemed always ready to dart out of the horizon and which frequently took a heavy toll. Obviously, the perimeter camps offered excellent targets for the Royal Air Force, especially since — for some not easily comprehended reason — Graziani preferred to establish almost all his camps on the coastal road rather than on the escarpment or in the desert. It was by nipping off some of the perimeter camps, and then cutting the Italian line of communications west of Sidi Barrani, that the British began the counter-offensive which is making such good progress as this article goes to press.

II

The British Army in Egypt has had to operate under conditions which no one could have foreseen. Britain never expected to be left to fight alone in the Near East. She counted first on a certain amount of military support from Egypt and the Arab countries, even though the value of this assistance was not rated very high. Far more valuable support was expected from the Turks — at least after 1938, and more especially following the signature of the treaties of alliance in 1939. Above all, British plans were based on the closest possible Anglo-French military coöperation: it was fully expected that the French forces would bear the brunt of the fighting till England's unwieldy empire got into its war stride.


Accordingly, the British Navy coöperated with the French in

concentrating large military forces and vast amounts of supplies in Syria and French North Africa. By June 10, 1940, between 125,000 and 175,000 soldiers are believed to have been concentrated in Syria and the Lebanon, with another quarter of a million in Africa. A great deal of motorized equipment and heavy artillery was taken to the Levant; considerable ammunition dumps were established in the mountains of the Lebanon; native troops, including an efficient Camel Corps, were trained in Syria; considerable oil and gasoline supplies were stored away; and perhaps as many as 1,000 aircraft were brought over, many of them modern Glenn Martin bombers, which the Italians are now eager to obtain.

Thus, at the moment of France's collapse and of Italy's entrance into the war, Britain's meager, rather poorly equipped forces in the Near East were left to cope single-handed with a situation for which they were quite unprepared. Had Mussolini been willing to risk a blitzkrieg in the middle of June, his forces could very likely have reached Suez. By then the French, no longer an asset, had become a positive liability to Britain. Nor could all of their actions be explained either on the ground of military necessity or by the desire of the men of Vichy to assert their authority. Was it, for instance, thoughtlessness or calculated sabotage that M. Massigli, the French Ambassador at Ankara, asked Turkey to fulfill her obligations under the alliance at the very moment when France was suing for peace, and thereby created a situation which, but for the coolheadedness of the Turkish authorities, might have turned out very badly for the British? Did French national interests require that Mr. G. T. Havard, the British Consul-General at Beirut, be forced to take up residence at the small village of Aley, that the British Consul-General at Algiers be placed "practically under arrest," that British consular and diplomatic representatives in Tunis and other French territories be subjected to indignities and hardships and then expelled?

Britain's other Mediterranean friends have not proved much more helpful. In all Allied quarters it had been expected that Egypt and Britain's Arab allies would enter the conflict when the war spread to the Mediterranean. True, the treaties granting 'Iraq and Egypt their independence did not oblige them to declare war on Britain's enemies, but merely to harmonize their foreign policies with those of Britain and, in case of war, to place

their communications and other resources at the command of the British military authorities. But the spirit of those treaties, as interpreted in numerous semi-official statements, proclaimed a different attitude, and the failure of the Arab states to declare



war on Germany certainly did not augur well. The Arab press and responsible statesmen nevertheless declared that they would not hesitate a moment to throw all their resources behind the Allies if the war should spread to the Mediterranean. Such a course was not only a matter of moral obligation but of self-interest, for every

Arab knew that Fascist Italy was as much his enemy as Britain's. Yet when the crisis came, not a single Arab state moved.

III

Egypt was immediately affected by Italy's entrance into the war. That the attack would be launched against her, not against Tunisia, had been common knowledge since the spring of 1939. And all indications were that Egypt would waste no time before taking her stand beside Britain. Accordingly, a few minutes after Mussolini's declaration of war the British Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, called on the Egyptian Prime Minister, Ali Maher Pasha, a liberal grandee and one of the most respected men in the country. What decision they reached is not known, but on the following morning (June 11), the *Egyptian Gazette*, generally regarded as a mouthpiece for the Embassy, announced that "it is practically certain that Egypt will immediately sever diplomatic relations with Italy." The next day, a secret session of Parliament decided "to support the government in continuing to give the greatest possible assistance to her Ally in her defense of rights and liberty . . ." The meaning of this resolution was clarified on the following day by an editorial in the *Gazette* which announced that, "In a short time Egypt will be at war with Italy. Her 'fight for independence,' of which much was heard in years past will, this time . . . be a real fight, with individual freedom and national life at stake." On the same day the Prime Minister announced at another secret session of Parliament that Egypt would fight "if Italian troops enter Egyptian territory; if Egyptian towns are bombed by Italian aircraft; if Egyptian military objectives are bombed." Parliament enthusiastically endorsed this policy.

These declarations were followed on subsequent days by still further assurances. On June 19, for example, the Prime Minister told Parliament: "The Government has not issued orders to the armed forces not to defend themselves because the right of defense is a natural one (applause). But the Government ordered them not to take the offensive. . . . The Government reiterates its announcement to this Chamber that it is anxious to carry out Egypt's obligations and also to assist her great Ally — assistance permeated with a spirit of cordiality and sincerity (wild applause)."

The 'Iraqi Government, not directly menaced, did not issue

such unequivocal declarations; but the tone of the press was distinctly favorable to the British. Yet, more than five months have elapsed and neither Egypt nor 'Iraq has moved to honor its promises. The Italian forces advanced across the frontier through Sollum and Sidi Barrani to a point about twenty miles beyond that place on the road to Mersa Matruh. But Egypt remained at peace and Britain had to fight the invader alone.

IV

The explanation for this extraordinary fact carries us into the very heart of Arab politics, in which many factors must be taken into account. First, much of the confusion now existing in the Arab camp is to be traced directly to Axis activities. The lull in Italian and German propaganda that began in September 1939 lasted only a few months. It was an unnatural lull, due more to temporary disorganization in Axis lines of communications than to anything else, and it ended when the Axis Powers had reorganized those lines by shifting the centers of their system from Cairo to the Yemen on the one side and to Iran on the other. Since the collapse of France, Damascus, Beirut and Aleppo have become the most important centers. This propaganda has followed two distinct lines. First, pamphlets, radio broadcasts and paid agents have been used to produce a defeatist atmosphere by proclaiming Britain's imminent collapse. From four to six times every day, Bari and Berlin have broadcast news of terrific British defeats, with announcers usually making the obvious deduction that to side with Britain under such circumstances would be foolhardy. In Istanbul, both the Germans and Italians found newspapers to take up this line. The Germans had in the *Cumhuriyet*, until its suppression by the Turkish Government, an ably-edited paper with a large circulation; the Italians supported a French language paper *Beyoglu*, which until its suppression on September 13 seconded the *Cumhuriyet* in "emphasizing the present predominant position" of the Axis and in "advising other countries to take account of this fact and shape their policies accordingly." The Germans also published a pictorial magazine *Signal* which kept Turks informed, by means of colored illustrations, concerning the state of Germany's armed forces and especially of the Luftwaffe. A British paper has described this publication as "a most effective pictorial supplement to the German High Command communiqués." Axis propaganda has reached as far south

as Medina and Mecca. This autumn the Italians began to send quantities of pamphlets and numerous agents to carry their gospel among the pilgrims en route to and from the Holy Cities.

More vicious were the stories of British atrocities against Islam. Those have been manufactured on a mass production basis along with secret documents purporting to reveal Britain's evil designs on Arab lands. One of Berlin's favorite stories has been about an alleged treaty between Britain and the Zionists by which the former undertook to deliver to the latter vast stretches of territory reaching from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates and beyond. So often was the story repeated that, apparently finding it was taking root, the London and the Jerusalem radios had to issue official denials. Later the Germans embellished the tale by adding that a bomb had been thrown in Jerusalem in protest against the secret agreement and that numerous people had been killed. Again the Palestine radio had to issue a denial.

Other favorites in Berlin have been stories about misbehavior — especially towards mosques and holy places — on the part of Australian soldiers and about their inhuman cruelty. Some of those yarns have been rather lurid and apparently appealed to the Arab imagination, for the British again hastened to issue official denials. The Hadhramaut has also figured prominently in anti-British propaganda. First came a series of broadcasts about a constantly spreading rebellion in that area. Then followed circumstantial accounts of how amazingly destructive British bombs had killed Arabs by the thousands — in the deserts of the Hadhramaut, mind you! Britain replied early in October by putting the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla on the radio to make the following announcement: "The Italian broadcasting stations have been reporting from time to time that heavy British bombing is being carried out in the Hadhramaut; and this has caused unnecessary unrest among the Arabs. I strongly contradict this statement as it is far from the truth."

V

No doubt, Axis propaganda has had some influence on Near Eastern opinion; yet its importance should not be overestimated. Much more significant in creating an anti-British climate of opinion have been the social, cultural and political conditions in the various countries themselves.

First, it must always be borne in mind that in the Near East

politics is still an intensely personal matter. Ideological differences, or even rival class interests, hardly count in political struggles. If Ali Maher Pasha happens to be Premier of Egypt and advocates the honest fulfillment of treaty obligations towards Britain, that in itself, without regard to the interests of the country, is sufficient to drive Nahas Pasha — leader of the Nationalist, or Wafd Party — or any other political bigwig who covets Ali Maher's job, to assume a diametrically opposite view. The same has been true of 'Iraq, where personal hostility to Nuri es-Said Pasha has impelled rival politicians to combat his pro-British policies mercilessly. Even the Zionist National Home has suffered immeasurably from this emphasis on personalities. Such conditions naturally play into the hands of Axis agents. By supporting, financially and otherwise, rival political groups, they are able to atomize public life and to destroy British efforts to create stable political conditions.

To these perennial sources of antagonism the war has added new ones. In each Near Eastern state there are groups which for one reason or another have an interest in coming to terms with the Fascist Powers. In Egypt, the chief Quisling has been the King himself. In his anti-British policy the King has been supported by the large court clique and by some of the shaikhs of al-Azhar, under whose influence he has been since boyhood. From the moment of his accession to the throne in 1938, Farouk has manifested a strong inclination towards personal power in the tradition of Mohammed Ali. But Parliament, the liberal elements in the country and, to a certain extent at least, the British Ambassador have stood in his way. But with the spread of war, Farouk saw an opportunity to rid himself of these elements and came forward as the leader of the pro-Fascist appeasement groups.

Opposed to this policy have been the middle and financial classes, trade union leaders and nearly all intellectuals, as well as the overwhelming majority of the landowners — in short, all those progressive elements which realize that they have everything to lose and nothing to gain from a Fascist victory. Since they look towards the West for intellectual leadership, they were anxious not to alienate the sympathies of the liberal democracies. Dr. Hafiz Afifi Pasha, one of the very few really able and honest political leaders in Egypt, spoke for all that is best in his country's public life when he appealed, on the fourth anniversary of the

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty on August 28, for honest execution of its obligations. He emphasized that not only political morality but sheer self-interest dictated such a course. He cited documentary proof of Italy's sinister designs on the country. "If we had not been assured through the treaty of help from Great Britain," he said, Egypt would long since have become an Italian colony, for it "was a great mistake to believe that if Italy attacked Egypt, her only reason for doing so was the presence of British forces." Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha, President of the Chamber of Deputies and one of the most respected men in Egypt, also came out repeatedly to plead for active support of Britain.

The press, with the exception of a few minor sheets representing the Court and religious cliques, has been overwhelmingly in favor of active defense of the country's independence. Probably no editorial written since the outbreak of the war has been more popular and more widely reprinted than the one which appeared early in August in *Al Mussawar* in the form of an open letter to Mussolini by its editor, Fikry Abaza, a Nationalist member of the Chamber. "Egypt will never think of replacing the alliance with Britain by a bond with any other Power. If she did, it would not be with the country which has proclaimed her intention of re-establishing the Roman Empire — a country whose imperialistic tactics have been cruel . . . Believe me, Egyptians are intelligent and they are not deceived by the outpourings of the Rome and Bari radios. Their memories are not short, nor are they blind to what happened in Libya."

The attitude of parliament, the press and the civil service has thus reflected, in general, the interests and sentiments of the intelligent, forward-looking classes. Those interests and sentiments were particularly well represented by the pro-British Ali Maher ministry, which was composed largely of landowners and was one of the best ministries Egypt has had for a long time. In his letter of resignation, delivered at the end of June, Ali Maher declared that the policy of his cabinet had expressed the will of the people and had gained the approval of the nation's representatives in parliament. He would have wished nothing better than to continue that policy, "but for reasons independent of our will and the will of the Egyptian people, we see that it is impossible to remain in power." The appeasement elements had triumphed.

To form a new ministry was not easy, especially as the King

refused to deal with the Wafd, the old bogey of the palace-Azhar clique. A fifth-rate politician, never before considered as a possible candidate for the premiership, Hassan Pasha Sabry, was finally brought forward. He succeeded in forming a coalition cabinet with parliamentary support only after promising to declare war if Graziani's legions made serious inroads into Egyptian territory. But even after Sidi Barrani fell on September 16 the Court refused to change its policy, and this produced a split inside the cabinet, with four Saadist (dissident Wafdists) members resigning before the end of September.

Hassan Sabry's sudden death on November 14 produced a new crisis. The Premier fell dead on the floor of parliament while reading a Speech from the Throne in which what was left unsaid was much more conspicuous than what was said. Egypt, it declared, is "anxious to fulfill her obligations toward her great ally Britain and to carry out her alliance of friendship in the letter and spirit;" but nothing was said about the Italian invasion and the Italian bombs on Alexandria, Cairo and Suez. Under ordinary circumstances the King would probably have found it even more difficult to form a ministry than at the end of June; but the dramatic manner of Hassan Pasha's death, as well as the fact that the opposition was unprepared for such a development, played into Farouk's hand. On the very next day, before the opposition elements had a chance to organize their forces, Hussein Pasha Sirry was asked to form a ministry, which he did. The new Premier, like his predecessor, is not a leader of any party, and has no political following of any kind. The Berlin and Bari radios found in the sudden death of the Premier an ideal opportunity for a bit of anti-British propaganda. Although the Minister of Health, who rushed to administer first aid to the stricken Premier, announced the cause of death as apoplexy, the Axis radios proclaimed that the hand of the diabolical British secret service may well have been active.

How long Farouk can continue this game is not easy to foretell. That he is playing with fire is certain: one crowned head of Egypt lost his throne during the First World War for engaging in similar intrigues. But Farouk, young and a stout advocate of Islam, is popular among the illiterate masses and can rely on the solid support of the priestly class. Yet the real test of Egyptian sentiment is still to come. Any approach of the Italians to the Nile delta might create so powerful an upsurge in nationalist senti-

ment that the King would have to bend before the storm. Even the Court-controlled Sabry cabinet was committed to fight if the Italians reached the populated part of the country. The successful British attack on the Italians in the second week of December is sure to impress Egyptians of all classes. And the heroic resistance of the Greeks cannot but have a further effect on public opinion.

VI

Conditions not essentially different from those in Egypt exist in 'Iraq, where strong army and pseudo-Fascist cliques, impelled by a thirst for power, have resisted the pro-British policies of the older generation of statesmen that has ruled the country since 1921. Anti-British propaganda has probably played a larger rôle in 'Iraq than in Egypt.

When the war broke out the Germans were already strongly entrenched among the more rabid Pan Arab circles in Baghdad and, odd to say, among some of the Christian intellectuals who were disappointed with the pro-Arab policy of the British. The shrewd and highly polished Dr. Grobba, who served as German Minister during the prewar decade, managed to be everything to all sections of the population; and during the late thirties a number of widely-read papers — *Al-Alam ul-Arabi*, for example — and the Baghdad radio came under his influence. This proselytizing has had fairly free rein, for, ever since the military rebellion of Bakr Sidky in 1936, 'Iraqi politics have been a tug-of-war between the politicians and the military — the latter being strongly under the influence of the Fascist ideology. Between these opposing forces the civil authorities have naturally pursued a policy of extreme caution.

If Egypt and 'Iraq have been very small assets in Britain's war effort, Syria has been a liability. Since the collapse of France, Axis agents have made Damascus and Beirut centers of anti-British propaganda, while valuable British troops have been detached to guard Palestine's northern frontier. Reports of extensive unrest in Syria have appeared periodically in the Near Eastern press. The nationalists grouped around the *Kislah Wataniya* (National Bloc), who declared a truce at the outbreak of the war, seem to have become active again. Their agitation has been stimulated by the deplorable economic conditions of the country as well as the activities of the Italian Armistice Commission. Thus far, the local French authorities have taken few, if any, steps to

grant the Italian demands. These are said to have been so extensive as to include not only demobilization of all armed forces and surrender of war material but the granting to Italy of a voice in the administration of the mandated territories. Very little love is lost on the Italians among any class of the Syrian population, and the threat of increased Italian pressure has had the effect of stimulating the demand for independence. On the whole, however, the French authorities, backed by the large military forces at their disposal, have been able to maintain order.

Somewhat better has been the situation in Palestine, where the British have the loyal Zionists to rely on. The disturbances which began in April 1936 came to end during the first part of 1939, and the British authorities were able to remove six battalions from the country. The collapse of the armed rebellion was not due — Mr. Malcolm MacDonald to the contrary notwithstanding — to the publication of the White Paper in May 1939, an act incidentally which in the opinion of the Mandates Commission was contrary to the terms of the mandate and therefore illegal. The fact of the matter is that the rebel bands began to disintegrate, many months before the publication of the White Paper, because London had finally untied the hands of the military and allowed it to go after the rebels in earnest. At the outbreak of European war the Zionists hastened to place their manpower and industrial plant at the service of the British. The Arabs have remained passively neutral.

Unfortunately, even in Palestine the situation is far from satisfactory. The country is bankrupt. Exports of citrus fruits — the main article of export — were cut in about half during the last season; the flow of foreign capital has declined; and unemployment has jumped to unprecedented heights. Yet the Government has done practically nothing to alleviate the deepening misery among either Jews or Arabs. The outbreak of war found the country with very small stocks of essential foodstuffs, for which it must rely largely on imports. The Zionists have attempted to obtain badly needed supplies via Basra, but with little success thus far. In addition, the flimsy credit structure on which the Jewish National Home was built has collapsed and the Zionist leaders have as yet found no remedy for the situation. Thus far, the exigencies of war have failed to bring together into some form of a united front the numerous parties which divide the 475,000 Jews in Palestine. Efforts by men like Pinchas Rutenberg, the

founder of the Palestine Electric Corporation, to effect a semblance of unity have proved futile. The National Home is today far more divided than even the Arabs.

VII

The Near East would have presented a different picture if far-sighted statesmen like Abdur Rahman Azzam, a Libyan refugee who has had first-hand experience with Italian imperialism, Nuri es-Said Pasha and others had succeeded in their efforts to form a solid bloc among the Arab states. Not one of the Near Eastern states, it is true, has a military machine capable of opposing the armies of the Axis for more than a few days. Yet a native force of some 100,000 men officered by Britons and stiffened with British troops could, for instance, have been of considerable value in harassing Graziani's line of desert communications.

But no Arab bloc has crystallized, even in face of the greatest threat to Arab existence in five centuries. Petty dynastic rivalries and personal feuds among the rulers have stood in the way. Pacts of friendship and brotherhood have gone overboard when they collided with political realities. What, for instance, has become of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance signed at Baghdad on April 2, 1936, once hailed as the dawn of a new era in the Near East? This agreement, providing for a limited unity between 'Iraq and Saudi Arabia, to which the Yemen adhered in 1937, has had few concrete results of any kind. Nor has there been any coöperation between Egypt, Trans Jordan and 'Iraq. Indeed, far from uniting their forces to help Britain fight the Fascist imperialists, some of the Arab states have actually exploited Britain's peril to blackmail her into territorial and other concessions. The Shah of Iran, who only in April 1933 forced the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to sign a new agreement, has used the present situation to extract fresh concessions. The latest agreement, announced in Teheran at the end of August, requires the company to pay the Iranian Government £4,000,000 annually, thereby absorbing virtually all the company's profits for 1939 and leaving nothing for shareholders.

The hostility between Ibn Saud and the Hashemite rulers of 'Iraq and Trans Jordan is one of old standing. Relations between Saudi Arabia and 'Iraq improved after King Feisal's death — not, however, to the point of bringing about effective coöperation. In fact, the two states compete for the privilege of conquering

the Emirate of Kuweit, against which Ibn Saud has taken economic steps and has threatened military ones. 'Iraq, more under British influence, has had to content itself with cultural propaganda in the Emirate. Ibn Saud likewise wants to absorb various islands in the Persian Gulf now under British protection, particularly the Bahrein Islands with their rich oil deposits. He has also lost no opportunity to press his claims for Aqaba, and his unbending attitude in this matter has frustrated every attempt to improve relations between him and the Emir Abdullah.

The relations between other Near Eastern capitals have not been much better. Farouk's ambition to revive the caliphate has not passed unnoticed at Riyadh. Between Cairo and Baghdad there has been a good deal of coming and going, but the exchange of courtesies has not led to any concrete coöperation. Towards Trans Jordan, Egypt has shown studied indifference. Even the two Hashemite branches in Trans Jordan and 'Iraq have not been on the best terms with each other. There was active hostility between Abdullah and Gazi until the latter's death, and public insults, protests and apologies flew thick between their two capitals. Of late, relations have improved somewhat, but there is still no sign of an agreement to pool military resources.

Characteristic is the fact that Abdullah's appeal to the Faithful to aid Britain was sufficient, well-informed sources report, to strengthen Ibn Saud's determination to retain his deadly silence; and all the efforts of Nuri es-Said last April to persuade him to adopt a more friendly attitude ended in failure. Thus, after fifteen months of diplomatic bargaining, during which the war has steadily come closer, the Near East remains as atomized as ever, and there are no signs of the dawn of a better era.

Symbolic of the chaotic conditions prevailing between the Near Eastern states is the failure of Moslem dignitaries to unite on a common platform of action. All talk of a Pan Islamic front has evaporated into thin air. Individual Moslem leaders have come out against the Fascist aggressors and in favor of Great Britain; but they have been unable to get together on a united appeal which alone might impress the Islamic world. Personal jealousies and ancient rivalries have again stood in the way. How can Ibn Saud coöperate with, let us say, Haj Amin el-Husseini or the Shia shaikh Kassif al-Gita, who only last year issued a *fetwah* forbidding the faithful to make the pilgrimage to Mecca? The shaikh of al-Azhar — a venerable gentleman — is convinced that he or his

king ought to lead Islam. Needless to say, no Moslem dignitary outside of Egypt holds a remotely similar view. It is not easy to see how these dynastic and personal rivalries can be surmounted, now or for many years to come.

The chaotic conditions here described are largely responsible, no doubt, for Britain's passive policy towards the Near Eastern peoples so far in the present war. Most competent British authorities, having despaired of the Arabs, now know that if imperial communications are to be safeguarded and the Fascist advance stopped, the job will have to be done by British Empire troops. Twenty years of close contact with the Arabs have produced a reaction against the romantic notions which remained as a legacy of Lawrence and his desert braves. Yet the fact remains that Britain could have obtained much more help in the Near East than she has had thus far. Does the vigor with which the British have given aid to Greece and, as I write, are pushing towards Libya augur the adoption of a more dynamic policy?

THE ENIGMA OF SOVIET PRODUCTION

By Freda Utley

THE rôle which the Soviet Government will play in the crucial months ahead is a principal question mark of international politics today. Among the determining factors none is more important, particularly as affecting Russo-German relations, than the state of the Soviet national economy.

The success of the first two Five Year Plans was so widely publicized by the great host of Communist fellow-travellers and liberal and socialist sympathizers outside of Russia that the U.S.S.R. was generally assumed to have become an industrial giant. This impression, strong during the early and middle thirties, has however been rapidly fading in recent years. The third and current Five Year Plan, covering the years 1938-42, has received much less attention in the outside world than did its two predecessors. This has been due not only to the exodus of Left intellectuals and journalists from the Communist fold following the signing of the Russo-German Pact, but also to the reticence of the Soviet authorities in giving facts and figures concerning the state of Russia's industrialization program. Since 1937 Soviet statistics have become more and more incomplete and obscure, and the natural conclusion is that there are serious failures to be hidden. This conclusion squares with the facts as we know them. The reports of the few foreigners who have recently come out of Russia tell of continuing, and even increased, hardships being endured by the mass of the people. Such a trustworthy observer as Mr. Spencer Williams, who lived ten years in the Soviet Union, has stated that conditions this last year were almost as hard as in the near-famine years of 1931-33. All witnesses agree that the Finnish War threw the Russian transport services into chaos and in general seriously set back the country's material condition.

Soviet statistics now usually give only figures of value, not quantity. Since no one can say what is the value of the ruble — because of the tremendous inflation of the past decade and because no cost of living figures are published — it becomes more and more difficult to gauge the state of Russia's national economy. Only by a careful perusal of the specialized trade journals, written for home consumption by experts in the various branches of production, may one come to an approximate estimate of pres-

RUSSIAN PRODUCTION IN TYPICAL YEARS

	1913	1932			1937		
		<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Percentage of Achievement</i>	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Percentage of Achievement</i>
Coal (million tons).....	29.1	75.0	64.7	86	152.2	127.1	84
Pig iron (million tons).....	4.2	10.0	6.2	62	16.0	14.5	91
Steel ingots (million tons).....	4.2	10.4	5.9	56	20.1	17.8	89
Oil (million tons).....	9.2	21.7	22.3	103	46.8	30.6	65
Locomotives.....	664	1,641	828	52	2,800	1,583	53
Freight cars (2-axle).....	14,832	12,600	20,152	184	118,000	66,100	56
Tractors.....	none	53,000	50,640	94	195,000	?	?
Automobiles.....	none	105,000	23,879	24	230,000	200,000	87
Cotton fabrics (million meters).....	2,224	4,588	2,417	53	5,100	3,450	68
Leather footwear (million pairs).....	8.3	80.0	84.7	106	180	164	90
Canned goods (million cans).....	93.0	550	906	164	2,000	874	44
Matches (million cases).....	3.8	12.2	5.6	47	12.0	?	?
Paper (1,000 tons).....	197.0	900.0	479	53	1,000	883	83
Electric current (million kw. hrs.).....	1,945	22,000	13,540	62	38,000	36,400	86

ent conditions in Soviet industry. Supplementing this information is the data printed in the daily papers during the recent campaign to increase "labor discipline." As I shall show later, the available information suggests that since 1937 production in the basic industries has either been stagnant or has declined. First, however, we must examine the published results of the first two Five Year Plans, covering the years 1928-37 when a supreme effort was made to industrialize the country at a rapid tempo.

II

The accompanying table shows both the planned figures and the actual results for the major industries. We must keep in mind, however, that the grandiose "control" figures upon which foreign estimates of Soviet achievements have frequently been based were much higher than the figures of the original Plan, which are the ones given in this table. The "control" figures were never more than aspirations, and insofar as the separate industries endeavored to reach them, they served to create confusion and dislocation in the Soviet's so-called "planned economy." For it is obvious that if one branch of industry were successful in increasing its production beyond the planned figure and up to the control figure, it could only be because some other branch of industry was thereby deprived of its due share of raw materials and power. How fantastic the "control" figures were can be demonstrated by citing the examples of the coal and oil industries. The 1932 control figure for coal was 90 million tons as against the planned figure of 75 million and the actual production of 64.7 million. The control figure for oil was 45 million tons as compared with the 22.3 million actually produced.

Gullible foreign tourists nevertheless continued to propagandize on the basis of these absurd "control" figures, and so little was known abroad about the true state of Russia's national economy that they were seldom contradicted. The Soviet Government has been eminently successful in duping the simple-minded "friends of the Soviet Union." When visitors to a government institution or a factory in the U.S.S.R. ask for production figures, they are usually given the *planned* rather than the actual ones. When I first visited the textile factories at Ivanovo-Vosnysensk as a "specialist," I was given production figures which I could not reconcile with what I had learned in the weaving sheds or from my experience at the Moscow export organization. Eventually,

however, after being catechized for half an hour, a light broke over the face of the manager as he exclaimed: "Oh I see now; you want the *facktichiskiye* figures, not those according to the Plan." Since I was a foreigner he had naturally assumed that I would be satisfied with the planned figures of production.

When, at the conclusion of the First Five Year Plan, Stalin computed that it had been 93.7 percent attained and stated that industrial production by the end of 1932 was three times the pre-war figure, it was assumed abroad that he was referring to volume of output, whereas in fact he was basing his claim on fictitious ruble values. No one knows how far the Plan as a whole fell short of fulfillment in quantity; but in those branches of industry for which quantitative figures were published the actual achievements were (as the table shows) a third or more below the planned figures. This was notably the case in the basic iron, steel and electric industries which in 1932 were producing respectively 38, 44 and 38 percent less than had been planned. Coal, which made a better showing, was only 14 percent below the Plan. Since the factories could have fulfilled their plans only if provided with the fuel and raw materials calculated as producible under the Plan, the failure of the coal, iron and steel industries obviously involved the failure of the plans for other industries for which quantitative figures were never published. Nevertheless, the Soviet officials claimed that the metal and machine building industries had overfulfilled their plans. If this were true, then the Plan never really was a plan since an economy in which there is so little coördination between the parts that the planned production of machinery and construction goods bears no relation to the planned production of iron, steel and coal, can hardly claim to be a planned economy. Either there was no real plan, or it failed.

But regardless of the unreliability of Soviet statistics, the fact remains that Russia today produces coal, iron, steel and electric power on a scale vastly greater than in Tsarist times. The output of these vital industries is today at least four times as great as in 1913 — in itself a very great achievement. The Soviet Union also manufactures a large quantity of machinery not produced at all under the Tsars. But what about the social cost of these "successes on the industrial front"? Only a country ruled by a ruthless and all-powerful despotism could ever pay so high a price in human misery as Russia has paid in order to become a large producer of iron, steel and machinery. The failure to increase sub-

stantially the production of food, clothing and housing has had a vitiating effect upon the efficiency and morale of the Russian worker and it is doubtful whether the industrial gains compensate, from the point of view of national strength, for the general decline in the standard of living and for the discontent among the mass of the people.

With regard to light industry the failure of the Plans has been obvious and marked. The production of cotton fabrics in 1932 — 2,417 million meters — was little more than half the planned figure and only slightly in excess of the 1913 output. By 1936 there had been some improvement, but not enough to compensate for the liquidation of the large handicraft industry that existed before the Revolution. This great household industry had been wiped out during the years of the First Five Year Plan as part of the drive against private enterprise in town and village. As regards the woolen industry, the 1933 production of 86,100,000 yards still lagged behind the prewar figure of 103,000,000; by 1936 the prewar figure had only just been reached. The output of paper fell nearly 50 percent short of the Plan. That of leather goods and canned goods exceeded the Plan; but since these were produced largely for export, this success in light industry was of little benefit to the Russian people.

Soviet statisticians seek to convince the world that the Plans have been fulfilled by discounting failures on one "front" with successes on another. But in reality this method of computation has little validity. For instance, the plan for consumer goods production cannot be said to have been fulfilled merely because the output of perfumery has been exceeded while essential goods such as textiles have been turned out in quantities far short of the plan. It used to be painfully ironic when I lived in Moscow that when there was no clothing or footwear to be bought one could indulge expensive tastes in scents, face creams and wines.

The figures in the table do not reveal anything as to quality, which deteriorated catastrophically during the period of "gigantic successes on the industrial front." In the cotton textile industry, where I worked as a so-called "foreign specialist" in 1931 and 1932, it was "normal" for 80 percent of the cloth turned out to be defective. We had the greatest difficulty in securing any plain bleached goods for export, for they show defects whereas printed goods hide them. Russian mothers seeking to buy material for their babies' layettes could secure only coarse prints.

The Second Five Year Plan came nearer to fulfillment than the First, both because it was less grandiose and because the workers were able to secure a little more food and a minimum of clothing between 1934 and 1936. But the huge investments made at such tremendous sacrifice from 1929 to 1932 bore fruit for only a few years. In 1937 the rapid deterioration of machinery again began to create acute shortages in necessities.

The real failure of both Plans was most clearly revealed in the figures showing the productivity and cost of labor. Actual investment under the First Five Year Plan was admitted to have been 120 billion rubles as against the estimated 86 billion; and whereas the Plan had provided for an increase of 1,250 million in the note issue (which had amounted to 1,774 million in October 1928), by October 1932 it had already been expanded by 4,626 million. This great inflation reflected the complete failure to perform the work under the Plan according to the estimate of labor and wage payments required. The output per worker had been planned to increase 100 percent; but the result showed that it can have increased little if at all, since the number of wage-earners, supposed to increase from 11.3 million to 15.8 million, actually increased to 22.8 million. Thus, 44 percent more workers than estimated were required to create an amount of goods and services far inferior to the planned production figures.

There was still enthusiasm and faith among the Russian workers during the First Five Year Plan, but it was impossible for them, undernourished, ill-housed and ill-clothed as they were, to speed up the tempo of their work. Nor could the drastic penalties imposed on "slackers" redress the shortcomings due to sheer physical inability to work more intensively on a diet of black bread, cabbage soup, mush and an occasional piece of herring. Moreover, the long hours spent standing in line in poor clothing in the winter cold to secure scanty rations further weakened them, increased their sickness rate and undermined their morale.

By the end of the First Five Year Plan the rise in prices had reduced the ruble to about one-tenth of its former value in relation to commercial prices. However, because of the rationing system and the "closed distributors" — from which the bureaucracy and the favored workers in heavy industry could obtain a kilo or two of meat and butter and other "luxuries" each month at comparatively low prices — the ruble had all sorts of values depending upon the status of both the recipient and the purchaser. When the

rationing system and the "closed distributors" were abolished in 1935, an attempt was made to stabilize the ruble and to introduce cost accounting into industrial enterprises. Some success has attended these efforts, but they are vitiated by the need to pretend that plans have been fulfilled whether they have or not. Inflation of the ruble has continued, but at a slower tempo.

Although the industrial plan fell far short of the estimates, there was at least something to show for all the sacrifices made by the Russian people. In agriculture, however, instead of progress there was a serious decline. Ten billion rubles had been invested in agriculture under the Plan, mainly in the form of tractors and other agricultural machinery. Yet, in 1932 the grain crop was 26 percent below the prewar level — 69.6 million tons as against 94.1 million in 1913. The production of industrial crops had decreased by as much as 50 percent. Soviet authorities admitted that of the 147,000 tractors supplied to the farms, 137,000 were already in need of repairs. Furthermore, in five years the livestock had been reduced from 276 million to 160 million.

I have dwelt at some length on the results of the First Five Year Plan because during those years an effort was made to industrialize the U.S.S.R. — an effort which once it had been made could never be repeated on the same scale. At no time after 1932 was it possible to arouse the enthusiasm of those first years among the workers, for from that year onwards they have felt cheated and have sunk into disillusioned apathy. Furthermore, the régime can no longer raise funds on the former scale for the import of machinery and for the payment of salaries to foreign specialists. The fleecing of the peasants, the draining of every bit of gold from the population through terror and the Torgsin shops,¹ the influx of foreign currency from the United States, Poland, Germany and elsewhere in the form of remittances to starving relatives — mainly to the Jews who formed the section of the Russian population which had relatives abroad — all these were expedients which could not be repeated after the liquidation of the kulaks, Hitler's rise to power and the world armament race.

III

The First Five Year Plan proved so disastrous and wasteful that Stalin knew he could not repeat it. Instead, its ravages had

¹ The special shops where food and manufactures could be bought for gold or foreign currency at prices not much higher than world prices. They were abolished in 1936.

to be repaired, popular discontent softened, and some inducement given to the peasants to produce. In short, the Russian people had to be allowed a little rest and a little nourishment if they were to continue to work at all. When the Second Five Year Plan came, it provided, as the table shows, for a somewhat more modest increase in production. The results in 1937, at the end of the Second Plan, accordingly came a lot closer to the planned figures than in 1932, and agricultural production reached the pre-Revolution level. Such essentials of mass consumption as textiles, however, continued to lag far behind the Plan, although its objectives were very modest as regards most consumption goods.

Nevertheless, the years 1934 to 1936 saw less misery than those either behind or ahead. When rationing of bread ceased in 1935 it was doubled in price; but herring, margarine, butter, meat and vegetables came gradually to appear in the shops in larger quantities and were sold at prices which, though much higher than the former rationed prices, were much lower than they had originally been in the "commercial shops." Since the majority of the workers had never obtained anything but bread, sugar and a pound or two of cereals and herring on their ration cards, and since the village population had never had bread or other ration cards, most Russians were a little better off after the "special distributors" had been abolished.

The productivity of labor also seems to have increased slightly during the Second Five Year Plan, due, at least temporarily, to the Stahkanov movement and to the various rewards and penalties which were instituted to ensure "labor discipline."

Nevertheless, the production figures for the years following 1936 indicate that what was won on the swings was soon lost on the roundabouts through the rapid depreciation of machinery and the neglect of repairs. Since a factory manager's position, very frequently his life, depended upon his fulfilling the Plan, he dared not stop machinery for necessary overhauling or repairing. The workers themselves, urged on by the shock workers and knowing that they would starve if they failed to produce the quantities required of them, had no scruples about working machinery to a premature breakdown. The eventual result, as revealed with increasing clearness since 1937, has been to decrease production in many enterprises. All available information indicates that the huge capital investments made from 1929 to 1937 have been very largely wasted through neglecting and overworking the industrial

machinery. The chaotic state of the Russian transport system today is due largely to the reckless overloading and to negligence in repairing rolling stock and permanent way during the first two Five Year Plans.

The reticence of the Soviet Government, not only concerning the Third Five Year Plan, but also concerning current figures of production suggests, as remarked above, that there have been failures. For such reticence is not characteristic of the "Socialist fatherland." No detailed program for the various industries under the Third Plan has ever been published. The only figures presented to the Party Congress by Molotov in 1939 concerned values and percentages. Stalin, having admitted that the U.S.S.R. was lagging behind the advanced capitalist countries with respect to *per capita* production, made the following ambiguous statement: "We have outstripped the principal capitalist countries as regards technique of production and rate of industrial development. We must outstrip them economically as well."

The press campaign for the "tightening of labor discipline" which began in the fall of 1939 lifted a corner of the veil hiding recent failures to attain the planned production. It was admitted, for instance, that the plans for the last quarter of 1938 had not been fulfilled and that quantitative production in the basic industries was no higher in 1939 than in 1938. On November 17, 1939, *Industriya* stated that the production of steel had steadily lagged behind the planned figures and had fallen below the 1938 figure. The same newspaper on December 12, 1939, disclosed the fact that in 1939 the production of coke had come to only 16.6 million tons, less than in either of the two preceding years. On December 12, 1939, and again on January 6, 1940, it revealed that the deep oil wells (which in the Baku district account for the major part of the total output) are so badly operated that 40 percent of them are permanently inactive. The Soviet press has also admitted that the Gorki automobile plant has failed to fulfill its plans and that critical conditions prevail in the factories producing tractors and spare parts. On April 4, 1940, *Industriya* published a report by the Commissar of the Coal Industry stating that the Donbas (the principal coal producing area of the U.S.S.R.), although constantly receiving new technical appliances, had increased its output by only a bare 3 percent during the previous three years.

Reports appearing in Soviet organs early in 1939 indicated that during the last quarter of 1938 production in the iron, steel and

coal industries had declined so catastrophically as to suggest that something in the nature of strikes must have taken place. The daily production of iron, which according to the Plan should have been 45,600 tons, had sunk to 34,500 on December 15, to 28,000 on December 17, and to 26,000 on December 19. On December 19, the daily output of steel had sunk to 32,600 tons as against the planned figures of 56,100. At the same time, coal production was 100,000 tons below the planned figure of 390,000 tons a day. In January 1939 production was still at a figure below that for 1935.

A hint of what had been happening was given in *Pravda* on January 15, 1939, in an article which thundered against "lax executives" who were "afraid to fire shirkers for fear of creating difficulties for themselves with the labor supply." The possibility that strikes, sitdown or otherwise, take place is, of course, not admitted in Soviet Russia; so "shirkers" may well have meant "strikers." The Soviet Government is more severe than the Nazis in dealing with labor troubles; nevertheless it cannot liquidate the workers — as a class — in the same way that it liquidated the kulaks and recalcitrant peasants. Someone must tend the machines. On occasion, then, factory managers must be "lax" if their whole labor force is not to be transferred by the OGPU to concentration camps as shirkers or wreckers or saboteurs. Hence in 1939 the original regulation forbidding the reemployment of dismissed workers was modified to permit rehiring after a six months interval. Presumably, a worker who has been starving and homeless for half a year will not soon rebel again.

But no amount of terrorism has been able to prevent serious failures in production. By 1938 the Kremlin should have learned that only by improving the material conditions of life for the Russian worker could he be made to work more efficiently. Yet, under the Third Five Year Plan, as under the previous ones, most of the new capital investment is allocated to heavy industry — 82 percent of it going to those producing capital goods. The production of consumers goods is scheduled to increase by only 38 percent. By 1942, the *planned* output of shoes is to be less than a pair and a half per person per year — and the quality is so poor that a pair will scarcely last a month without repairs. The output of cotton cloth is to be only 27 meters per person. But since the textile industry has in the past attained only half its quota, and since textiles are still being exported, the Russian people are likely to be as short of clothing as ever.

IV

Since the current Plan makes no attempt to ameliorate the acute maladjustment between the production of consumer goods and that of capital goods, we are safe in assuming that there is no prospect of stabilizing wages and prices in the near future. Outsiders cannot, of course, make exact statistical calculations concerning the conditions under which the Russian people are living so long as inflation continues and so long as the Soviet Government refuses to publish figures on the cost of living. Yet, even allowing for a wide margin of error, a comparison of wages and prices under the Soviet Government with those prevailing under the Tsar, shows that in 1937 the Russian workers were very much worse off than they had been in 1914; while since 1937 their standard of life has deteriorated even further, though this may in part be ascribed to war conditions. Reliable figures indicate that the cost of staple foods, for instance, was about fifteen times higher in 1937 than in 1914, whereas the increase in wages was only fivefold. In 1914 a worker of average qualifications could purchase 90 kilograms of beef with his monthly wage as against only 24 in 1937. Expressed in terms of black bread, which then as now constituted the staple diet of the Russian people, the worker's wage in Tsarist times was worth 24 kilos a day as against only nine kilos in 1937. With regard to clothing and other manufactured goods the decline in his standard of living was even more striking.

Soviet apologists, of course, never produce such figures as these; and when confronted with them, they argue that the Soviets' social services more than compensate for the decline in real wages. This claim is quite absurd. The social services afforded the Russian workers are not only very meagre and not to be compared to those available to the workers of Western Europe; since 1939 they have been severely curtailed. Today only those workers who have held a job in the same factory for six consecutive years are entitled to "full" social services, which in any case are poor compensation for the steep decline in real wages, the housing shortage, and the lack of food, clothing and fuel. The foreign tourist who has gone home to write glowing accounts of the hospitals, schools, *crèches* and rest homes in Soviet Russia did not know that he was being shown places accessible only to the high Party bureaucrats and to a few favored foremen and shock workers.

There is no unemployment pay in the U.S.S.R. A worker who loses his job for being a few minutes late must, with his family, go hungry until he secures other work — if he can with the black mark against him. The family of a man who has been arrested — even if he is later released as not guilty — must starve unless a relative or friend helps them. Since millions have been arrested in recent years without trial or without the formulation of any definite charge, one can readily understand why newly homeless children are always appearing in the streets of Russian cities.

All these miseries being endured by the Russian people must inevitably constitute an important factor in any appraisal of Russia's national strength. The material conditions described above have worsened since 1937, and in particular since the Finnish War. Early in 1940, the prices of all foodstuffs except bread were increased between 35 and 100 percent and food queues again became a normal feature of Soviet life. In December 1939 piece-rate wages were reduced 15 percent in most industries and penalties for slackness were stiffened still further. In June 1940, the working day was increased from seven to eight hours and the working week to six days instead of the previous five out of six. In October 1940, the price of bread was increased by 15 percent. A new law of July 10, 1940, classifies as "wrecking" the production of goods below standard, and those responsible are now liable to from five to eight years of imprisonment.

The available data suggest that the state of Soviet industry in 1940 is one in which the normal deficiencies arising out of poor or moderate harvests, industrial inefficiency, unduly rapid capital deterioration and a growing shortage of raw materials, have been intensified by the strain of the Finnish War and by the need of maintaining a large army in a state of constant preparedness. But even if there had been no general European war, the rapid deterioration of the machinery imported under the First Five Year Plan, and the liquidation or imprisonment of a large proportion of the technicians and skilled workers, would in any case have reduced the Soviet Union to a condition in which new imports of machinery and the assistance of foreign technicians could alone have halted the fall in production apparent since 1938. It is this fact which renders Soviet Russia dependent on Germany so long as she cannot obtain credit for new machinery in any other country.

v

The industrialization of the U.S.S.R. has been largely financed by an enormous tax on bread ² and by the hundred percent turnover tax on manufactured goods. These and other burdens on the peasantry are fundamentally responsible for the failure of the Plans, since it is the discontent of the peasants that causes the chronic food shortage, which in turn reduces the productivity of industrial labor. The forced collectivization of the peasantry, the investment of capital in agriculture in the form of tractors and other agricultural machinery, and the harsh laws designed to force the collective farmers to work harder, have not succeeded in raising the productivity of Soviet agriculture. Indeed, Russia's national economy has been greatly weakened by collectivization and the much advertised "mechanization of agriculture." Workers who might have been producing consumption goods that would have raised the general standard of living in town and country, have instead been making agricultural machinery, which owing to its poor quality and the lack of trained mechanics has failed to increase the yield of the land. Today a larger number of collectivized households with tractors are producing less food per capita than a smaller number of peasant households without machinery produced under the old system of private enterprise.

The situation with regard to meat, dairy produce and vegetables has become worse since 1939. The shortage of meat and butter — even in Moscow, most favored of the cities — has been acute since last winter. This would appear to be the result of the new drive against individual enterprise in the villages initiated in the summer of 1939. A decree of May 28, 1939, and another issued in July 1939, virtually annulled the Collective Farm Charter of 1935 which had permitted the collective farmers to own private livestock and allotments of land. The 1935 concessions to the individualistic instincts of the peasants had led to a rapid increase in the number of cows, sheep, pigs and poultry, and in the intensive cultivation of vegetables. This development had substantially ameliorated the food situation in the towns. According to the preambles of the 1939 decrees and to articles in the Soviet press, the right of private ownership over a small plot of land and

² The collective farms receive from the state between 1.10 and 1.50 rubles for a pood of rye. At the higher figure this equals 9 kopecks per kilogram. Prior to 1940 the state sold black (rye) bread to the people in its shops at 85 kopecks a kilogram. Today the price is 1 ruble per kilogram.

some livestock had come to be exercised to such an extent that many of the collective farmers had "virtually withdrawn from the *kolkhoz*, and were spending all their time working on their own land." The *kolkhoz* managers had apparently been allowing the peasants to take over a part of the collective farm lands for private cultivation, in return for a fixed rent in kind, thus ensuring for their master, the Soviet Government, a definite quantity of produce. The unwillingness of the Russian peasantry to work on the collective farms, because of the terrible mismanagement and the small return they received for their labor, had caused a relapse to private cultivation. The private plot, said the decree, had been losing its subsidiary character and in many cases had become the main source of income for the collective farmer.

The May 1939 decree inaugurated a new drive against the peasants to deprive them of both the allotments of extra land they had "illegally" acquired for private cultivation as well as of most of their privately-owned livestock. It severely curtailed the size of the allotments and declared the *kolkhoz* lands "inviolable." The practice of renting them out was made a criminal offense. It also forbade, on pain of severe penalties, the leasing of meadows and hayfields to individual collective farmers, thus making it impossible for the latter to feed their privately-owned livestock. The July decree laid down the minimum number of cattle, pigs, sheep or goats which each collective farm must possess; and provided that henceforth the amount of meat to be delivered to the state was to be based upon the area of arable land instead of on the number of livestock in the farm's possession. Since the only way in which the collective farms could acquire the livestock that they were required to possess was to confiscate the property of their members, the July 1939 decree in effect called for the expropriation of the privately-owned livestock of the collective farmers. The latter have been forced to "sell" their cows, pigs and sheep to the *kolkhoz* at one-tenth of their market price. The result has been an acute meat, butter and poultry shortage since the winter of 1939-40. Presumably the peasants, as in 1931-32, slaughtered many beasts rather than give them up to the collective farms.

VI

It is doubtful whether at this stage the Soviet Government could materially improve the conditions of the Russian workers and peasants except by such radical economic and political

changes as would deprive Stalin and his bureaucracy of their power and material privileges. The rot in the social system has already gone too far. The struggle for place and power and material advantage among the bureaucrats, coupled with the apathy, skepticism and despair of the mass of the people, would by now render any change in policy largely abortive. Above all, the liquidation of the trained personnel over the past ten years is a loss which cannot be replaced. Only the purge of 1936-38 received world-wide attention; yet the earlier quiet and continuous purging of non-party specialists was even more fatal to Russian economy than the later wholesale purge of the Party itself.

It had been Lenin's and Trotsky's policy to utilize the educated personnel trained under the Tsars — accountants, engineers, technicians, clerks — and to afford the best of them comparatively decent conditions of existence. During the era of the New Economic Policy which preceded collectivization and the Five Year Plans, the non-Party specialists with high qualifications actually earned more than the Party men who held the leading positions in industry and trade. Stalin, however, put an end to the privileged position of the experts, and at the same time bound the Party members to himself by granting them all sorts of privileges. The high Party members were able to buy food and clothing in "special distributors" for a fraction of what the workers, employees and specialists had to pay, and they were provided with free houses, automobiles and other luxuries. The Party rule against its members receiving more than a maximum of 300 or 350 rubles a month therefore lost all meaning. The specialists meanwhile found their income of 500 to 700 rubles reduced, in terms of purchasing power, to a fraction of its former value through the inflation.³ Further, they were made the scapegoats for all the failures under the fantastic plans drawn up without relation to actual potentialities. With power stations, blast furnaces and factories being built at great speed and at colossal sacrifice, the Government should have sought to secure the wholehearted coöperation of every man with technical experience. But Stalin, instead of continuing Lenin's policy of conciliating these non-Party experts, inaugurated a régime of terror against them and reduced their standard of life far below that of the Party bureaucracy.

³ Since the abolition of the "closed distributors" and the derationing of bread in 1935, the monthly salaries of the "Party bosses" have risen to as high as 5000 rubles, or even more, while specialists receive only 600 or 700 and in rare cases 1000.

The great tragedy of the educated and competent people in Russia during the years I worked there was that in their effort to do conscientious and honest work they endangered their existence. Specialists who pointed out that a plan could not be carried out without wrecking or fatally depreciating the means of production, were accused of sabotage, or of being counter-revolutionaries. Statisticians who made careful estimates based on intelligent surveys of materials available or of productive capacity were flung into concentration camps because they had not drawn up grandiose plans which could not be fulfilled. The Gosplan specialists who formulated the original Five Year Plan were shot for sabotage; yet in 1932 it was found that actual achievements under the Plan just about reached the figures they had estimated — only those achievements had been won at a cost infinitely higher than would have been the case if the whole national economy had not been dislocated by the attempt to carry out plans bearing no relation to actual potentialities. The only way in which the non-Party specialist could preserve his life was to kowtow to the all-powerful Party bosses and place the blame for failures on others. The most decent men who survived the purge were corrupted by this new social system based upon calumny instead of competition.

One very good reason for the far greater efficiency of the Nazi system is that Hitler has been wise enough not to liquidate the old possessing, administrative and professional classes. Instead, he has forced them to serve the interests of his new state. The Nazis, as he remarked to Rauschning, "could not afford to let Germany vegetate for years, as Russia had done, in famine and misery," but had "compelled the possessing classes to contribute by their ability toward the building of the new order." Stalin's remedy for all shortcomings is ever greater repression. Yet the more experts he arrests, the worse become the conditions of life for the masses. The 1930-32 purge dealt a fatal blow to Soviet economy; the great purge of 1936-38 shattered the morale of the Bolshevik Party. So long as Party members had felt safe, provided they toed the "Party Line," they formed a solid framework for upholding Stalin's government. But since 1936 no one has felt safe.

VII

Had it not been for the present war, Soviet economy might have stagnated indefinitely under the tyranny of Stalin and his henchmen. But the war poses new problems which Stalin cannot

solve merely by terror. This method of government can be successful only where there is no threat from abroad. A dictator who lacks popular support dare not risk a war in which weapons would be placed in the hands of subjects who might be more anxious to use them against him than against the foreign enemy.

Every Russian with a memory that stretches back twenty-five years knows that he is worse off now than before the Revolution. The younger workers and peasants know that they are worse off than before 1929, and that conditions in 1940 are worse than in 1936. But their Government continues to tell them that their conditions have improved and that the status of the working class in the capitalist world is much worse than in the Soviet Union. State-sponsored propaganda which runs directly counter to personal experience naturally induces skepticism. For example, the soldiers returning from the recently annexed areas in Finland, Poland and the Baltic Countries told the people at home that conditions in the capitalist world were "wonderful."

The apathetic and sullen Russian masses might perhaps be seduced by the promise of national glory, or at least by the prospect of more loot — such as the food supplies obtained in Bessarabia last year. Presumably the Red Army would fight to defend the frontiers of the Soviet Union. As for its power of attack, Hitler need have no fear of an assault from a Russia in which, as he knows from the German specialists who have been working in the U.S.S.R. since the signing of the Russo-Soviet Pact, industry and transport are in a state approaching chaos. Russia is much too weak economically and politically to challenge Germany.

In the final balance Stalin's fear of his own people must be weighed against his fear of Germany. So long as Hitler is content with the Kremlin as a vassal, and is not compelled by his need of food and raw materials to acquire direct control over the Soviet Union, Stalin will probably keep out of the war and carry out Hitler's orders. Yet the uncertainties of the situation are manifold. The Soviet rulers, canny as they are, have often shown themselves to be quite ignorant of the state of affairs in the outside world — a world which they never visit and which they view through the distorting spectacles of Marxist theory. It is this ignorance and miscalculation which may unwittingly lead Stalin to involve himself in the war — as he nearly did when he attacked Finland — in spite of all his efforts to end up as the non-combatant victor over both sides after they have become exhausted.

THE WAR IN THE AIR

SECOND PHASE

By J. M. Spaight

ONE lesson taught by the second phase of the air operations in the present European war¹ is that superior strength on the land and in the air can produce a decision far more quickly than in the days before the air was conquered. This was the lesson taught by the German triumphs in Norway, Holland, Belgium and France. It was taught, too, more clumsily, by the Russians in Finland. Even if a belligerent makes almost every possible tactical error in land operations, predominance in the air will enable him to blind and overwhelm an opponent whose air arm is inadequate and whose army, even though well directed and, indeed, superior in fighting quality, is numerically inferior. Such, at least, was the lesson of the mid-winter campaign in Finland.

In the air, as on land, Russia had an immense superiority of strength. Finland had probably less than 100 first-line planes; her total strength in serviceable aircraft can hardly have exceeded 150. What Russia's first-line strength was is uncertain, but it was undoubtedly immense. The estimate of "Max Werner,"² 10,000 to 12,000 first-line aircraft, was certainly excessive; that of M. Laurent Eynac,³ 3000 aircraft, was probably too low. M. Pierre Cot placed the figure at 4500-5000 machines, and General Sikorski at 5000, with an equal number in reserve.⁴ The figure of 4200 to 4500 was suggested in 1938 in a French publication⁵ and was probably not far wrong. In the fighting in the Karelian Isthmus on February 15, 1940, more than 500 machines were reported to have been in the air, and on a later day in February at least 1000 were flying in all the Finnish theatre.

The Russian machines were on the whole of poor quality. The I-16 single-seater fighter had a maximum speed of only 248 miles per hour and a comparatively poor armament. The standard

¹ *Editor's Note:* See "The War in the Air: First Phase," by J. M. Spaight, *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, January 1940.

² "The Military Strength of the Powers," New York, 1939, p. 61.

³ In *L'Air*, July 1939.

⁴ Articles in *Sunday Times*, April 8, 1939, and June 4, 1939.

⁵ "L'Aviation Soviétique," 1938, p. 7.

bomber, the S.B., had a top speed of no more than 250 miles per hour and a range of only 620 miles. Another bomber, the Ts.Kb.26, had a range of 1300 miles, with a similar maximum speed. Both would have been shot to pieces by modern fighters. The quality of the Finns' aircraft was not, however, much better. Their machines were a scratch collection. The fighters were largely Bristol Bulldogs, long discarded in Great Britain. Better machines were gradually acquired. Gladiator fighters and Blenheim bombers were obtained from Britain and a number of modern aircraft were also supplied from France and the United States. Altogether, 101 planes were sent from Britain during the war, as well as 15,700 aircraft bombs.⁶ By the end of the war Finland had probably more and certainly better aircraft than she had had at the beginning. She was still, however, woefully inferior to Russia in the air.

How ruthlessly Russia exploited her superior strength is notorious. It is true that the Red Army Command issued at the beginning of March 1940 a categorical denial of the charges that the air arm had bombed non-military objectives and machine-gunned civilians. The evidence in support of the charges is too strong. Photographs of the destruction wrought at Helsinki, Viipuri, Hanko and other places were published in many newspapers.⁷ The verdict of Sir Walter Citrine, who, with Mr. Philip Noel Baker and Mr. John Downie, visited Finland in January 1940, on behalf of the National Council of Labor, is quite uncompromising. He and his colleagues most certainly had no bias against Russia and their condemnation of her acts is accordingly the more impressive. Of Turku (Åbo) he wrote that "by far the vaster proportion of the damage was utterly without military importance" and that "it was certain that the bombing was indiscriminate."⁸ Of the destruction of Hanko he wrote: "It seemed diabolical to me that a country which only a couple of years ago was denouncing to the world the German and Italian bombing in Spain should now be resorting to this means of trying to terrorise the Finnish people."⁹

So flagrant were the Soviet attacks on hospitals that the Finnish medical authorities abandoned the use of the Red Cross as a protective emblem. Before they did so it was reported that a

⁶ Statement by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons, March 19, 1940.

⁷ See, e.g., *The Times*, December 8, 1939.

⁸ "My Finnish Diary," 1940, p. 42.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

couple of Russian prisoners captured in the Isthmus protested against being taken to a Red Cross hospital. "That," they said, "is the kind of house our airmen bomb."¹⁰ Some terrible photographs of the devastation caused by bombs in the hospital at Rovaniemi, where the operating theatre and a ward were hit, five nurses and many patients being killed, were published in a British newspaper.¹¹

The ruthless bombing undoubtedly had its effect. A well-known war correspondent, who followed the operations in Finland, has stated that "Russia's air supremacy was really the deciding factor." The advantages which it gave were, he states, that it prevented all counter-bombing by the Finnish air force; it allowed the Russian aircraft to observe all that occurred on the other side; it stopped the flow of Finnish munitions and food to the front; and, above all, it deprived the exhausted Finnish soldiers of rest.¹²

It is nevertheless open to question whether the Soviet authority in the air would have sufficed to quell the Finnish resistance except in combination with a vast superiority on the ground. It was the "Russian steam-roller" below that made the assault from above so effective. All that one can say as a result of the campaign in Finland is that predominant air power *plus* predominant land power is decisive today in war, in circumstances in which sea power cannot be brought into play. There is not sufficient evidence that the first without the second would have succeeded in forcing Finland to capitulate.

Meanwhile in the western theatre of war the strange lull in the air which marked the first phase of the conflict continued. The fact that no attempt was made on either side to carry the war into the enemy's country during the first eight months of hostilities was the cause of surprise and bewilderment alike in Britain and in Germany. In Britain, it had been expected that terrific attacks would be made on London. In Germany, it was expected that they would be made against Berlin. Referring to the British declaration of war, Dr. Goebbels said in a speech at Poznań on 19 January, 1940: "One would have expected that on the afternoon of that very day their much-vaunted bombers would have appeared over Berlin." In both capitals a measure of relief was felt that the bombing had not started at zero hour — or before it.

¹⁰ *The Times*, January 30, 1940, report from correspondent at Stockholm.

¹¹ See the *Daily Telegraph* of February 10, 1940.

¹² Article by G. L. Steer on "Looking Back on the Reasons for Finland's Heroic Failure," *Daily Telegraph*, February 8, 1940.

What was still more extraordinary was the failure of the *Luftwaffe*, on one side, and of the British and French air forces, on the other, to interfere with the great troop concentrations which took place in September 1939 and thereafter. As long ago as 1927 Lord Thomson, the former Secretary of State for Air, had written that "should such a calamity as another world war occur, hostilities will begin at once, there will be no breathing space of ten days or a fortnight for mobilization. . . . In these circumstances the embarkation of the British Expeditionary Force would have been hampered, if not prevented, and a number of our warships would have been disabled before they could put to sea."¹³ Yet the British Expeditionary Force of 1939 had been able to embark, to cross to France, to disembark there and to move up to the line, without let or hindrance. There might have been no German air force whatever for all that that great army, moving with its *impedimenta*, knew about it in September 1939, or in the following months when reënforcements for it crossed to France.

A still greater surprise, to the well-informed, was the abstention of the British and French bombers from interfering with the huge concentration of the German forces in the west. Britain had sent a strong "Advanced Air Striking Force" to France in the first days of the war; and the French had their striking force, too. Neither struck. Division after division moved from the east to the west of Germany. They did so in perfect peace. "The extraordinary thing," wrote Mr. E. Coleston Shephard, "is that while they held the initial command of the air in the west, the French and British Air Forces did not attempt to prevent the swift transfer of troops by concentrated bombing on railway junctions, roads and aerodromes up to a hundred miles or more behind the German lines. The bombing fleets had been built for just such a purpose."¹⁴

Not until after the end of the war shall we know, probably, the full reasons for the strange quiescence in the air in its early stages. *Prima facie* it appears as if each side lost a golden opportunity. It is evident that none of the belligerents was inclined to initiate air attack upon the enemy's territory. *Why* each of them held back is not entirely clear, though many different reasons could be suggested for the mutual restraint. At the back of all the reasons there was, one must surmise, the working of the balance of air power. Each feared the other's *riposte*.

¹³ "Air Facts and Problems," 1927, pp. 21-22.

¹⁴ *The Aeroplane*, October 5, 1939.

In a speech at the Rheinmetall-Borsig armament factory on September 9, 1939, Field Marshal Göring said: "If the British aeroplanes fly at tremendous heights at night and drop their ridiculous propaganda in German territory, I have nothing against it. But take care if the leaflets are replaced by one bomb. Then reprisals will follow as in Poland." (Later, the propaganda film, "Baptism of Fire," was made in Germany to show what this threat of frightfulness meant in practice.) "We shall return blow for blow," said M. Daladier on November 30. "If the destructive fury of the enemy falls upon our villages we shall strike back at him with the same harshness." When in a raid upon Scapa Flow on March 16, 1940, bombs were dropped on Orkney Mainland and one civilian was killed and seven were wounded, the Royal Air Force promptly retaliated, on March 19, by bombing the German air base at Hörnum in the island of Sylt. About three months earlier the German official news agency had alleged that bombs had been dropped on Hörnum and another small town in Sylt (Rantum). This was at once denied by the British Air Ministry, and a similar denial was issued on February 10, 1940, when it was again alleged in Germany that Hörnum and Rantum had been attacked. Not until after the invasion of Norway was Sylt again bombed; the aerodrome at Westerland was heavily raided on the night of April 23-24. That the raid was not intended to mark a departure from the general policy was implied in the Air Ministry's announcement that it (as well as the raid on Aalborg aerodrome in Denmark) was directed "against air bases available to the enemy for use in the invasion of Norway."

Norway itself was not included in the unexpressed ban, and that unfortunate country experienced the full measure of German *Schrecklichkeit* from the air. Not only towns like Namsos, Aandalsnes, Elverum and Stenkjer, but many villages were largely destroyed, and peaceable inhabitants were machine-gunned on various occasions. The Germans had a marked superiority in the air and exploited it to the full. It was, indeed, that superiority which forced the Allies to abandon the idea of capturing Trondheim. "Intense and continuous bombing of the bases at Aandalsnes and Namsos prevented the landing of any large reinforcements," said Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on May 8, 1940, "and even of artillery for the infantry already landed, and of many supplies. It was therefore necessary to withdraw the troops or leave them to be destroyed by overwhelming forces."

It was Germany's superiority in the air which brought Britain's intervention in Central Norway to a premature and unsatisfactory end, and it was the same superiority which deterred the Allies from taking the initiative in raiding military objectives in Germany. There were hundreds of objectives there simply shrieking for attention from their long-range bombers. There were the oil-fuel installations, for instance. Yet it was not until May 17 that any attempt was made to destroy these vital sources of Germany's armed strength. On that night British bombers attacked the petrol storage tanks at Hamburg and Bremen; they repeated the operation on later occasions and included the tanks at Hannover also, for luck, and by the end of September the oil refineries at Hamburg, Bremen and Hannover had been bombed no less than 36, 31 and 19 times respectively. The Germans at once complained that the Royal Air Force had killed 29 people and injured 51 in the raid on Hamburg. Possibly they had, but then civilians are likely to suffer if they are in the vicinity of military targets. In subsequent *communiqués* the German High Command charged the British Air Force with making "random attacks" on non-military objectives. That allegation was only to be expected; it was a good opening for propaganda. What is quite certain is that British airmen did not deliberately attack non-combatants. They aimed solely at military objectives.

The policy of waiting before carrying the war into Germany was defended by Mr. Churchill in a speech at Manchester on January 27, 1940. He asked, Ought we to have begun bombing? No, he said, our policy was right. We were not as well prepared as Germany. We were now much better organized and stronger in defences than at the beginning of the war. There had been, he said, a great advance in the protection of the civil population and in the punishment which would be inflicted upon the raiders. There were others who took a different view, but the question was a very difficult one.

Many prominent people were far from satisfied with Britain's policy of restraint. Mr. Amery and Mr. Duff Cooper, both out of office at the time but soon to become ministers again, pleaded in public for the adoption of much sterner methods. The view of the aeronautical world was reflected in *The Aeroplane*, which kept hammering away at the same point. Why on earth, the editor, Mr. Colston Shephard, asked in effect, were we not hitting at Germany's strength at its source and bombing Dessau, Bremen,

Rostock and Oranienburg, where dozens of new aeroplanes were being produced every week to be used against us? Lord Trenchard, the greatest figure in British military aviation, added his powerful support to their plea. In the House of Lords on May 8, 1940, he asked why we waited, and said that if it was because we had promised not to bomb "open towns," this meant that Germany need not retain any defences at home. Nobody, he added, wanted to kill civilians, but the British people would not shrink from facing whatever risk was necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. "Make no mistake about it," he said. "When it suits Germany's book she will hit open towns and all, mercilessly and thoroughly. Why should we await her convenience before striking at German military might in Germany?"

Lord Trenchard's words were prophetic. It suited Germany's book to begin bombing the homelands of the western Allies in the second week of May, when she attacked Holland, where a whole district of Rotterdam was practically wiped out, and Belgium, where the cities of Tournai, Louvain, Nivelles and Namur were savagely bombed. German bombers also attacked aerodromes and railway stations at a large number of French towns — Nancy, Lyon, Lille, Colmar, Luxeuil, Pontoise, Béthune, Lens, Hazebrouck, Abbeville and Laon. Some 44 bombs were dropped, too, by a German aircraft in a wood in Kent where they did no damage; they were probably jettisoned. The Allies on their side bombed aerodromes, troop concentrations, mechanized columns on the move, bridges, and roads behind the German lines. The war in the air was thus carried for the first time into the enemy's country.

Since then the incursions of the Royal Air Force into Germany and of the *Luftwaffe* into Britain have steadily increased in frequency and vigor. Those of the British airmen have been aimed exclusively at impairing Germany's military strength. Oil refineries, synthetic oil plants and petrol storage depots have been among the chief targets. Not only in western Germany but also as far away as at Leuna in central Germany, at Pölitz (near Stettin) on the Baltic, and at Regensburg on the Danube have Germany's oil fuel installations been raided with damaging effect. Other objectives of importance for the German war effort have also been attacked unremittingly. The aircraft factories in which the Focke-Wulf, Dornier, Fieseler, Junkers, Gotha and Messerschmitt machines are constructed or assembled have been bombed. So have

the aero-engine works of the B.M.W. and Daimler-Benz firms. The great Fokker factory at Amsterdam was heavily raided as soon as it had been brought into operation for German purposes. The rail and canal communications of western Germany have been repeatedly bombed. The great railway centre of Hamm, which serves as a clearing house for the whole of the goods traffic of western Germany, was attacked no less than sixty times in the three months which ended on September 30. The aqueduct of the Dortmund-Ems canal, which carries the equivalent of 400 train-loads daily and serves as the chief link between the Rhineland and northwest and central Germany, has been put out of action, repaired, and put out of action again. The naval dockyards and ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Wilhelmshaven, Kiel and Cuxhaven have been the objectives of recurrent attacks.

Indeed, the whole of Germany's industrial and economic system has been seriously affected by the incessant blows rained upon it by the Royal Air Force. These have ranged as far afield as Pilsen, in Czechoslovakia, where the great Skoda armament works were successfully bombed on the night of October 27 — a feat eclipsed by the British Bomber Command four days later, when oil plants and military objectives at Naples were attacked by aircraft starting from England.

So great, indeed, was the effect of those blows that the menace to the effectiveness of Germany's war machinery was already becoming evident in the summer. Something had to be done to bring the activities of the British bombers to an end. The obvious course was, if possible, to invade and overrun Britain just as France and the other victims of Germany's armed might had been invaded and overrun, or, if that was not possible, at least to drive the British Air Force out of the sky. Invasion was the solution — preferably by sea, land and air; but by air alone, if the other alternatives could not be achieved. So in the autumn of the year all the necessary preparations were put in hand for loosing a combined attack upon southeast England and, as a preliminary to that attack, for overwhelming the Royal Air Force in that corner of the country.

There is reason to believe that first one and then another date was fixed for the launching of the grand assault. The first was in mid-August. To gain command of the air, an essential condition for the success of the invasion by sea and land forces, a mass attack was launched against the air bases in southern England on

August 15. A veritable armada of bombers and fighters came over the coast. The bombers were largely Junkers 87 dive-bombers, "Stukas," as they are called, the machines which, in combination with mechanized columns and tanks, had enabled the Germans to smash their way through northern France in May and June. There were thousands of these machines in the *Luftwaffe*, and thousands more of the Junkers 52 troop-carrier, which had also played a prominent part in Germany's successes, notably in Norway and Holland. The stage was never reached at which the Ju-52's could be used against Britain. The Ju-87's *were* used — and the tale was a sorry one for their pilots and crews.

Already the dive-bombers had been handled roughly by the Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants of the Royal Air Force over the beaches of Dunkirk. When they ventured over the English coast they suffered more severely still. Nine of them were shot down in a few minutes by a Spitfire squadron near Southampton on August 13, but it was on August 15 that they were veritably massacred. On that day the *Luftwaffe* lost 180 aircraft over and around southern England; the slaughter of the Stukas really sealed the fate of the first project of invasion.

The August plan had come to naught. The next attempt was more carefully planned. It was fixed, apparently, for mid-September. Early in that month the Germans began to concentrate barges, shipping and light naval forces in the ports along the Dutch, Belgian and northern French coasts, with the intention of making a sudden dash across the English Channel. The Royal Air Force foiled that plan, too. It struck again and again at the concentrations of light craft, first at the mouth of the Scheldt and at Ostend, then, when they were moved westward, at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne and Le Havre, and finally even at Lorient in the Bay of Biscay. One particular onslaught was a veritable disaster for the would-be invaders. It coincided with a dress-rehearsal for the invasion; on that night the barges were packed with fully equipped troops, who were caught unawares by the British bombers. Many were killed, many drowned, others burnt by the blazing oil which covered the sea after incendiary bombs had been dropped and the tanks of the barges had been set on fire. To that disaster in the tidewater was added another, which befell the *Luftwaffe* about the same time. On September 15 a second mass attack was made on southern England in the air and routed even more decisively than that of a month before. The definitely

confirmed losses of German aircraft on that day amounted to 185; it is highly probable that in reality not less than 232 machines were destroyed. No such destruction of aircraft in one day has been known in the annals of war.

It was undoubtedly the inability of the German air force to penetrate the British defence by day which inspired the savage attacks by night upon London and other cities in Britain. Those attacks were a confession of failure. The *Luftwaffe* had not been trained for night operations. It was in this respect both technically and professionally far inferior to the Royal Air Force. The latter, as a result in part of the "leaflet raids" carried out during the winter of 1939-40, knew the darkened face of Germany as well as it knew that of England. Its personnel was highly skilled in night flying. Its matériel was, for this purpose, superior to Germany's. The pilots and bomb-aimers had been trained to a pitch not even approached by those of the *Luftwaffe*. Precision of aim was inculcated and practised. Long periods were spent in the search for and exact location of targets. If the designated objective could not be found, and if no alternative target could be bombed with reasonable precision, no attack was launched. Bombs cost money and it is folly to dump them where they can do no harm. Frequently a full bomb-load has been brought home because it could not be dropped on a military objective. There is nothing of blind or indiscriminate bombing in the work of the Royal Air Force. A similar statement cannot be made of the *Luftwaffe*, as those who, like the present writer, reside in the outskirts of London far from any military objective, and whose houses have suffered from the incompetence — it was that, probably, rather than malice — of the German airmen, have practical reason for affirming without any hesitation whatever.

While these words are being written, the callous, ham-fisted bombing of London continues. Defence in the air has proved to be more effective by day, less effective by night, than had been expected. In time, no doubt, a solution of the problem of the night bomber will be found. That time may possibly be soon. Meanwhile we have to grin and bear our adversity, and that is what in fact we are doing. There is no likelihood whatever that the random, indiscriminate attack to which the once-chivalrous German air force is subjecting the civilian population of London and other cities will break their spirit. Rather, it is steeling them to a grimmer determination to put an end to the régime which can

slaughter women and children as a mere incident of its march to world-domination, to stop the wheels of the Nazi juggernaut for all time. It will do something more, too: it will give British air power a freer hand when the day of reckoning comes. There will be little mercy then for the butchers of the air.

The day of reckoning is coming. The air strength of Britain and the Empire is being marshalled. The *Luftwaffe* is still numerically stronger than the Royal Air Force. Mr. Churchill stated, however, in his speech in the House of Commons on August 20, that the new production of aircraft in Britain is already considerably larger than Germany's, and, he added, the American production was then only beginning to flow in. Soon it will be a flood. Some 500 aircraft are believed to be coming each month from the United States. The number will increase to 700 by the end of the year and to 1000 by the early summer of 1941. Canada, we know from statements by two of her ministers, Mr. Power and Mr. Gibson, will be sending 360 aircraft a month by then. Britain expects to overtake the German lead in 1941, Mr. Churchill stated on October 8. In his broadcast to the French people on October 21 he was still more definite and said that in 1941 Britain would have command of the air.

The British Air Force, already qualitatively superior to the German, will soon be better still. Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert stated in a broadcast on October 24 that the new machines soon to come into operation will be as distinct an advance upon the existing ones as they were upon their predecessors. New American aircraft of very high performance are also under construction. The Bell, Brewster, Curtiss and Lockheed fighters, the Douglas, Boeing and Martin bombers, will be a most important supplement to the new and improved types of both classes now on the stocks in Great Britain. The Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force knows, from its experience with the Lockheed Hudson, about the quality of American machines; and the new Lockheed Vega is understood to be a *super*-Hudson. There will be advances in German quality, too, no doubt; but Britain, with American help, should be well able to keep her lead. When it is a quantitative lead also, then the end of this great struggle will be near at hand.

The first lesson of the second phase of the air warfare has been, as stated at the beginning of this article, the swiftness and decisiveness with which the combination of superior strength on the

ground and in the air became effective. What was involved there was the overrunning of a weaker belligerent whose land frontier marched with that of a more powerful neighbor. What of belligerents separated by the sea? Will sea power *plus* air power be able to bring about a decision? This lesson remains to be learned. Already it has been established that sea power has not been materially affected by the coming of the aeroplane. Destroyers, sloops, minesweepers have been sunk by air action. Larger war-ships have, in general, been immune. Usually, it has been the aircraft and not the ship which has had to lick its wounds after the encounter. What has not yet been proved is whether sea power and air power can overcome land power and air power. That is really the crux of the matter as between Britain and Germany.

There will be encounters, no doubt, on land. In the Middle East there will be a clash of armies. The war will not be decided there, however, though it appears probable that the result of Mussolini's attack on Greece will be to give British sea and air power alike footholds from which shattering blows can be aimed at Italy's naval and air bases and her maritime communications with her expeditionary forces. The success of the fleet air arm at Taranto may be the first of a series of strokes which will end in knocking Italy out of the ring. Unfortunately, Germany may not be the weaker on that account.

The vital theatre will still be in the west of Europe. No triumphs elsewhere will profit Germany — or Italy — if the island of Great Britain remains inviolate and defiant. If that outpost of the British Empire still holds out, and if British strength on the sea and in the air is unbroken and increases — as increase it will — the Axis cannot win this war, however far it extends its conquests elsewhere. Given the achievement of the task which the British nations have undertaken — to mass overwhelming strength in the air — the Axis must lose. It will be crushed in the grip of two mighty forces, sea power and air power, against which land power, backed by air power that is outmatched, will find it useless to struggle. That, one makes bold to predict, will be the lesson of the third phase of the war.

THE LANSING PAPERS

By Charles Seymour

PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. THE LANSING PAPERS. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939-1940, two volumes.

ONE evening in the spring of 1919, immediately after the plenary conference had approved the amended Covenant of the League of Nations, a member of the American Peace Commission walking home with a young French diplomat noted the lighted windows of the War Office on the Boulevard Saint Germain. "What are they doing so late?" he asked. "Working on the plans for the coming war with Germany," was the reply. "This is a repeat performance. Only next time we may not be so lucky." The pathetic irony of the remark, and its prophetic accuracy, will strike the student who, after immersing himself in the two volumes of the "Lansing Papers," lays them down to pick up the day's newspaper. Here is the story of how the United States came to appreciate the close relation between European turmoil and American interests; of the assumption by America of a responsibility for protecting and maintaining an international régime based upon respect for law rather than power; and of the promise, through victory, of a new international organization that would guarantee peace. We read the story at a moment when the German conquest of the European continent and the deadly threat to the British Empire have created a menace to American security more direct than any in our history as an independent nation, when law as a principle of intercourse among nations has all but disappeared, when the hope of peace through understanding has been eliminated and our only chance for security lies in the achievement of predominating power.

Yet a reading of these documents does not leave one with a sense of futility. They confirm the belief that, regardless of what the ultimate results of the last war may have been, the American effort was worth making; that indeed it would have been short-sighted cowardice had we evaded our responsibility for seeking to establish a new and better world order; and that the victory which we helped to bring about created an opportunity that would not have existed without our effort and that might have been capitalized. The results of victory may have been wasted

and transformed into elements of disaster by the mistakes of those who followed the peacemakers. Nevertheless, the courage and essential wisdom of those responsible for the American effort reflect credit upon our national history.

The documents now published by the Department of State consist of selections from the correspondence of Secretary Lansing which were obtained after his death and were thus not available when the volumes covering the World War were published. These documents, most of them now published for the first time, provide an invaluable amplification and clarification of the numerous official and personal documents which students have hitherto had at their disposal. Their scope is naturally broad, touching not only our relations with the belligerents, but affairs in the Far East and questions of Latin American policy.

The first volume covers the period of American neutrality. Its opening pages deal with technical questions relating to the rights and duties of a neutral; they are followed by documents which reflect the increasing realization of Americans that the vital interests of this country must be affected by the course of the European conflict. By the spring of 1915 it had become clear that the central problem facing Wilson, the one to which he could ultimately find no solution, was how to secure the maintenance of certain essential principles which everyone demanded, without actually going to war. The second volume, covering the period of American participation in the conflict, deals primarily with the processes, diplomatic and administrative, by which a general system of inter-Allied coördination was created and by which we provided the Allies with our material resources at the right moment and at the right place.

The two volumes contain a mass of information upon single topics not immediately connected with the problem of American neutrality or intervention. Considerable light is thrown upon the plan for a Pan American Pact which, at the suggestion of President Wilson, Colonel House discussed with the Ambassadors of the ABC Powers and which Mr. Lansing brought to a point not far from general approval. The Secretary's memoranda upon the Monroe Doctrine and the implications of a new policy to be found in Pan Americanism are of particular interest at this time. The telegrams from our diplomatic representatives in European capitals vividly picture wartime conditions and national policies. They are perhaps more useful to the historian than they were to

our government. President Wilson commented with some justice upon the reports of one of our ambassadors: "It is odd how his information seems never to point to any conclusions whatever; but in spite of that his letters are worth reading and do leave a certain impression." Of another he wrote: "His letters are singularly lacking in definiteness of impression, and yet, taken as wholes, they do serve to give one something of the atmosphere of the court at which he is living and of the politics that is stirring Europe just now."

Certain documents, now published for the first time, are of especial historical interest. Particular note should be made of Mr. Balfour's statement on foreign policy, which he had made to the Imperial War Council and a copy of which he gave to Mr. Lansing at the time of the visit of the British Mission, on May 18, 1917. The statement covers the entire range of the diplomatic problems of the war as they were faced by the British at that moment, with particular reference to territorial readjustments on the assumption of Allied victory. There is clear and detailed reference to the terms of the secret treaties as they affected Turkey, Italy, and Rumania. Mr. Balfour emphasized the "promises" that had been made to the Allies in order to win support. The document is of historical importance in view of the charges which have been made to the effect that the American Government was left in the dark by the British with regard to the content of the secret treaties and that President Wilson was derelict in failing to secure exact information as to Allied war aims. There has already been published a letter which Mr. Balfour wrote to President Wilson in January of 1918, in which he discussed specifically the Italian territorial claims under the Treaty of London. The comprehensive and detailed nature of the Balfour statement to the Imperial War Council corresponds with the tone of Colonel House's entry in his diary of April 28, detailing his conversation with Balfour which indicated the nature and scope of the secret treaties. It is possible, but historically inconceivable, that Mr. Lansing should not have communicated to the President the text of the Balfour statement now published. The mystery of Wilson's statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 1919, to the effect that he had no knowledge of the secret treaties as a whole, before he reached Paris, remains unsolved.

A single document of outstanding historical importance, now

published, is the report of General Bliss to the Secretary of State, on the Supreme War Council, dated February 6, 1920. No one was better qualified to write the story of Allied coördination than Bliss, both because of his personal experience and also because of the qualities of mind and soul that made him an outstanding leader in the cause of international coöperation. This report, composed immediately after the Peace Conference, terse, comprehensive, objective, and yet vivid, is one of the great documents of the war. In it he described the American Mission of 1917, concluding with the report which forecast the great military crisis of the following spring and the necessity of military assistance by the United States to the Allies if a German victory was to be prevented. He sets forth the conditions that led to setting up the Supreme War Council, its development as an organ of co-ordination, and the ultimate achievement of a unified command. He gives a detailed description of the organization and business methods of the Council and of the auxiliary Inter-Allied committees and councils and the establishment of the Executive War Board. He traces the results of the failure to accept the recommendations of the Executive War Board and describes the problems in the conduct of the war that were faced by the Supreme War Council during the spring and summer of 1918. He concludes with his report on the preparation and approval of the armistice terms. The development of a plan of international coöperation obviated many of the inevitable disadvantages of a coalition. It was a major contribution of the United States to Allied victory. Bliss's report is impersonal in the extreme, but the reader cannot but realize the importance of his remarks.

In considering the Lansing Papers as a whole, what the historical student will doubtless look for first of all — and will to some extent discover — is help in answering the question: "Why did the United States enter the war?" The question cannot be answered dogmatically, but the Papers are of great assistance in isolating the factors that finally led Wilson and Lansing to accept war with Germany as unavoidable.

We may emphasize the fact that nothing in these documents gives support to the thesis that American policy was directly affected by the influence of international bankers or by munitions manufacturers. In nearly eight hundred pages of confidential correspondence, such factors receive the scantiest notice. There are various references to the problem of American loans to bel-

ligerents. Such references appear only in the earlier stages of the neutrality period and simply illuminate, without altering, the sense of the comments made in Secretary Lansing's letter of September 6, 1915, to President Wilson.

It will be remembered that in this letter Mr. Lansing reviewed the reasons for Mr. Bryan's original statement of August 1914 to the effect that a loan to a belligerent "is inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality." With the sense of that declaration Mr. Lansing was apparently in agreement at the time it was made. Secretary Bryan reported to the President in the same month that Mr. Lansing had called attention to the fact that an American citizen "who goes abroad and voluntarily enlists in the army of a belligerent nation loses the protection of his citizenship while so engaged, and asks why dollars, going abroad and enlisting in war, should be more protected." By the early autumn of 1915 Lansing had changed his mind, and while confessing his embarrassment urged a change in the government's policy toward general loans. ". . . we are face to face with what appears to be a critical economic situation, which can be relieved apparently by the investment of American capital in foreign loans to be used in liquidating the enormous balance of trade in favor of the United States. Can we afford to let a declaration as to our conception of 'the true spirit of neutrality' made in the first days of the war stand in the way of our national interests which seem to be seriously threatened?"

In this matter, as in others, Lansing's conception of "national interest," providing it did not conflict with his understanding of the law, was for him the determining factor. But we should note that the change of policy had no relationship to the chances of our becoming involved as a belligerent. He did not believe that it would affect our attitude towards the warring powers. "Popular sympathy," he wrote, "has become crystallized in favor of one or another of the belligerents to such an extent that the purchase of bonds would in no way increase the bitterness of partisanship or cause a possibly serious situation." Whether Mr. Lansing was right or not in his estimate of the effect upon public opinion must be determined from other historical sources. But it is important to note that from these documents it is clear that so far as the President and the Secretary of State were concerned, national policy as relating to the belligerents was not in the least affected by the loans to France and Great

Britain. Nowhere in these papers is there the suggestion that it was a duty of the Government to protect American investments or that our diplomacy should be affected in the slightest by their existence. From the insinuations that characterized the investigations of the Nye Committee we should expect at least brief references to the danger that American bankers as well as small investors might incur tremendous losses in case of German victory. To any such danger, or to the need of American help for British credit on the eve of our entering the war, there is no allusion. Nor is there any document referring to the interests of munitions makers.

No one can read these volumes without appreciating the intense desire of both President Wilson and Secretary Lansing to avoid American participation in the European War. But rightly or wrongly, they placed the protection of what they regarded as essential national interests above the maintenance of peace. From the early spring of 1915 both were convinced that Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare involved "rights" that could not be surrendered, though they did not agree as to exactly what constituted these rights. The President was impressed primarily by humanitarian factors. He was willing to negotiate endlessly with the British over interference with cargoes; but the German submarine campaign involved human lives. As he wrote to Bryan on June 2, 1915, "It is interesting and significant how often the German Foreign Office goes over the same ground in different words, and always misses the essential point involved, that England's violation of neutral rights is different from Germany's violation of the rights of humanity."

Mr. Lansing's attitude was that of the honest lawyer. Despite the vigor of the notes which he wrote protesting British interference with our trade, he recognized the legal complexities which often rendered the issue uncertain. He recognized, also, that the precedents of our own historical policy weakened the legal strength of our case. In a memorandum to the President he notes that "As the Government of the United States has in the past placed 'all articles from which ammunition is manufactured' in its contraband list . . . it necessarily finds some embarrassment in dealing with the subject. The doctrine of 'ultimate destination' and of 'continuous voyage' . . . is an *American doctrine* supported by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court." In such matters negotiation was desirable and permissible. But the

claim of the German Government of a right to torpedo enemy ships without warning and without regard to the safety of passengers and crew, with the possibility that some of the passengers might be American citizens, seemed to him inadmissible.

Lansing was assiduous in seeking a course that might avoid a diplomatic rupture with Germany, but he was unwilling to make concessions that involved surrender of what he believed to be essential rights of a sovereign nation. Even before the sinking of the *Lusitania* Mr. Bryan had suggested that the Government ought not to carry responsibility for the safety of citizens travelling on belligerent ships. President Wilson, at the moment of drafting the second *Lusitania* note, apparently agreed in principle and went so far as to write the Secretary: "I am inclined to think that we ought to take steps, as you suggest, to prevent our citizens from travelling on ships carrying munitions of war, and I shall seek to find the legal way to do it." Mr. Johnson, Solicitor for the State Department, strongly supported the suggestion. "Is it of the essence of the right of an American citizen," he wrote in a memorandum upon the second German note on the *Lusitania*, "to travel in European waters that he be allowed to take passage on any and all of the ships of the belligerents, whatever may be their cargo or destination? I hardly think so." He went on to propose "an adequate number of ships upon which our people may take passage and travel unmolested in European waters, those ships not to carry mixed cargoes of babies and bullets."

President Wilson, however, was unwilling at the moment to take steps interfering with the travel rights of American citizens, lest it should appear that he was weakening in the diplomatic controversy with Germany. Referring to the Bryan proposal on June 5 he wrote, "I fear that, whatever it may be best to do about that, it is clearly impossible to act before the new note goes to Germany." Mr. Bryan protested in vain, urging the President to announce that, pending negotiations "and without any surrender of our rights," he felt "impelled to refuse clearance to belligerent ships carrying American passengers and to refuse clearance to American passenger ships carrying ammunition. I believe that the moral effect of such an announcement, coupled with the suggestion in regard to investigation, would, without in the least subtracting from the strength of the note, relieve the tension, deny to the jingoes foundation for their alarming statements and win the approval of our people." Mr. Lansing refused to admit

that such restrictive action by the President would not constitute surrender of an essential right. He believed that by the note of February 10, 1915, the American Government had declared that it would hold Germany to a "strict accountability" for the loss of American lives and property within the "war zone." "I do not see," he wrote, "how this Government can avoid responsibility now by asserting that an American in traveling by a British vessel took a risk, which he should not have taken. . . . It is my opinion . . . that it would cause general condemnation and indignant criticism in this country, if the Government should attempt now to avoid vigorous action by asserting that the Americans drowned by the torpedoing of the *Lusitania* were blamable in having taken passage on that vessel. They had the right to rely on the note of February 10th."

Mr. Lansing thus based his opposition to restrictions upon American travel largely on the principle that it would be dangerous for the Government to withdraw from the initial stand it had taken in February 1915, at the time of the declaration of the German war zone. Both he and Wilson were probably correct in believing that such a withdrawal from an established position would have encouraged Germany to proceed with other invasions of neutral rights, and would certainly destroy the position we had assumed against the submarine campaign as an inhuman form of warfare. In a memorandum prepared for Mr. Flood on the Gore-McLemore Resolution, the Secretary of State wrote on March 3, 1916: "to give up a right of travel as a matter of expediency is in a sense to approve the circumstances which force such an expedient act, namely, because submarines will sink merchant vessels without placing persons on board in safety. The consequence would be to take up a position in favor of this kind of inhuman warfare which the United States has denounced from the beginning and to assume a position against carrying out the well-known and fully established simple, practicable rules of naval warfare, which are based on the immutable principles of humanity, that human life is to be protected at sea when not engaged in resistance to belligerent right to warn and visit and search."

Not less important in Lansing's mind was the danger that by yielding on certain rights the United States would destroy the very basis of its neutral position. "To begin now in the midst of a war to give up a right as a matter of expediency is to open the door for similar concessions to either one of the other groups of

opposing belligerents. A concession to one side might immediately be called to the attention of the Government by the other side with the request for some sort of concession to that side in order to balance matters. The Government would thus be placed in a most embarrassing position, for it would be subject to the charge of having favored one of the belligerents and refusing to favor the other belligerent — a charge which amounts to saying that the United States had broken its obligation as a neutral in the present war." Such arguments President Wilson found unanswerable. To them he added his own subjective conviction that Germany was not to be trusted and that one concession to her would inevitably be followed by demands for another. "Once accept a single abatement of right," he wrote to Senator Stone, "and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation."

In the controversy over armed merchantmen Mr. Lansing was clear in his opinion that the altered conditions of naval warfare resulting from the use of the submarine made it logical that the status of armed merchant vessels should be changed so that they could no longer enjoy immunity from attack without warning. Such a change in the rules would have gone far towards preventing incidents that might bring us into the war and could have been made without the obvious concession of a clear American right. On September 12, 1915, while the *Arabic* crisis was still unsettled, he wrote to Wilson urging him to make a new declaration regarding the armament of merchantmen, "because an armament, which under previous conditions, was clearly defensive, may now be employed for offensive operations against so small and unarmored a craft as a submarine." He went on to suggest that "this Government will hereafter treat as a ship of war any merchant vessel of belligerent nationality which enters an American port with any armament." Wilson did not object; indeed, he was rather sympathetic. But he urged delay until the diplomatic crisis with Germany was liquidated. In January 1916, Lansing returned to the attack. "If some merchant vessels carry arms and others do not," he wrote Wilson, "how can a submarine determine this fact without exposing itself to great risk of being sunk? Unless the Entente Allies positively agree not to arm any of their

merchant vessels and notify the Central Powers to that effect, is there not strong reason why a submarine should not warn a vessel before launching an attack?" Wilson approved the argument and authorized the drafting of a letter presenting the proposal to the Allied Governments.

Lansing's enthusiasm did not blind him to the fact that his proposal did in reality involve a change in the rules that could be made only with the approval of all the belligerents. A sudden alteration in our treatment of Allied armed merchantmen without the agreement of the Allies might fairly be regarded by them as an unfair if not a hostile act. In making the suggestion he had evidently not determined whether, if the Allies refused, we should or should not go ahead anyway. Thus, on the eve of handing this proposal to the Allied Ambassadors he explained to Wilson that it "can be kept secret if it is refused by the Entente Governments and if it is considered inexpedient to make it public." Later, in reporting to the President on his interview with the Austrian chargé d'affaires, Zwiedenek, he emphasized the fact that the proposal was a request to the Allies "to modify the law," whereas we were merely asking the Central Powers to "abide by the law."

Such scruples, characteristic of a good lawyer's appreciation of points that tell against his own case, may have weakened Lansing's determination to proceed with the proposal after the Allies refused to accept it. He evidently made no strong effort to urge Wilson to go forward with it, and in sending to the President the text of the Allied refusal together with his own draft reply, he concluded, "I assume that it will close the incident." An important factor, affecting both Wilson's and Lansing's attitude toward the proposal, was the ill-advised haste of the Germans, who without waiting for a public declaration by the United States announced on February 8, 1916, that "within a short period" armed merchant vessels would be regarded as ships of war and treated accordingly. The President was evidently annoyed by what he regarded as an attempt to force his hand, and later, in two notes to Lansing, referred irritably to "Zweidenek's misrepresentation of your position," and to "the use the German representatives have tried to make of the proposal." Mr. Lansing himself was troubled by the fear that he might appear to have been used as an instrument of German policy. "I feel that the members of the Cabinet ought to know something of the difficulties which have we had to face," he wrote to Wilson on March

6, "and particularly the adroit efforts which have been made by the German Ambassador, for I consider Zwiedenek acting more or less under his direction, to cause embarrassment and place this Government in a false light." Unquestionably, both Wilson and Lansing were affected by the "sharpened submarine campaign" culminating in the sinking of the *Sussex* on March 24. Lansing made plain to Bernstorff on February 17, following the announcement of Germany's new submarine campaign, that the United States Government was in a less complaisant mood. Of equal importance were the delicate negotiations for peace which Colonel House was conducting and which on February 22 took form in the House-Grey Memorandum. On February 14, House telegraphed to Lansing from London regarding the discussion over armed merchantmen, "I sincerely hope you will leave it in abeyance until I return. I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of this." All these factors combined to postpone and finally to eliminate Mr. Lansing's suggestion of altering the status of armed merchantmen.

Various writers have assumed that, had the United States put the Lansing proposal into effect against Allied vessels entering our ports, our difficulties with Germany would have ended. The assumption is a broad one. Despite the Allies' complete distrust of a German promise not to attack unarmed vessels without warning, a distrust expressed in Balfour's comments on the proposal and shared by Wilson, they would probably have had to accept the change in American policy and disarm their ships entering our ports. But it is certain that the general course of the war during 1916 would have compelled Germany ultimately to embark upon the unrestricted submarine campaign as the only means for destroying Allied tonnage and thus starving the British. All the German naval experts were convinced, then and later, that an effective blockade of the British Isles could not be accomplished by restricted submarine warfare. British ships, whether armed or unarmed, had to be sunk if there was to be any hope of a German victory.

Against the unrestricted submarine campaign both Wilson and Lansing had from the beginning taken a firm stand on the basis of international law and of human rights. On every page of these two volumes relating to the submarine there is implied the necessity of using armed force in behalf of that position, if Germany persisted in her chosen course. The issue arose immediately upon

the declaration of the German "war zone" in February 1915, long before general loans were made to the Allies. The documents show Lansing as believing that we were on the verge of war in June 1915, not as the result of popular hysteria over the sinking of the *Lusitania* but because Germany had attacked a position from which we could not withdraw. On this occasion, as in the *Sussex* crisis, a diplomatic rupture was avoided only by Germany's promise not to renew the attack. It was assumed, and the German Ambassador accepted the assumption, that a renewal of the attack in the form of an unrestricted submarine campaign would inevitably lead to a diplomatic rupture and presumably to war.

That Wilson and Lansing as individuals sympathized with the cause of the Allies we know from other sources, and it is possible to find in these papers some trace of that sympathy. Lansing had early become convinced that a German victory would destroy the spread throughout the world of the democratic principle, a principle which he looked upon as offering a far better chance of fostering international peace than any League. But there is nothing to indicate that either he or Wilson believed that a German victory was so imminent, or that the resulting danger to the United States was so real, as to lead us to regard intervention in the war as a measure of national safety. Lansing comments critically upon Ambassador Page's pro-British sentiments, and there is no response to Gerard's warnings that if the Germans should win "we are next on the list — in some part of South or Central America which is the same thing." The tone of all the letters, throughout the period of neutrality, is colored by the assumption that the obvious interests of the nation demand that we remain neutral. But there is also the assumption that over and above these interests there is a higher principle, more important even than peace, which the United States must defend in its own behalf and in that of humanity. This principle was respect for international law and customs, without which civilization could not survive.

For the sake of this principle, Wilson and Lansing believed, we entered the war and made our contribution to victory. Who shall say that the decision was not inspired by the highest ideals and the highest wisdom? Who can escape realization of the awful consequences that come from the application of force without principle to international affairs?

IRELAND BETWEEN TWO STOOLS

By Ernest Boyd

POPULAR newspaper correspondents whose regular station is London are largely responsible for the misconception in this country of the position of Ireland in the present war. They have gone over to Dublin for a few days, stressed the absence of darkened streets and air raids, talked to a few very cautious officials, listened to ironical or jocular comments in bars and clubs, and have solemnly reported that the Irish are hopelessly, short-sightedly and incredibly irresponsible. The same story, more or less, was told during the last war, despite the fact that, without conscription, Ireland contributed some half a million men to the British army, afterwards organized a memorial to fifty thousand dead, and has today at least two hundred thousand ex-service survivors.

From these newspaper reports one rarely gathers that British troops *are* in Ireland — Northern Ireland — and that Britain is in complete control of that part of the island, where three famous Irish regiments have their headquarters. The six counties of Northern Ireland are actually at war with Germany. Yet, as in the previous war, although the Imperial Parliament is legally empowered to impose it, there is no conscription in these six counties. They were expressly excluded from the terms of the conscription act for the simple, if paradoxical, reason that Mr. de Valera objected. He pointed out that the 400,000 Catholics who compose one-third of the population of Northern Ireland would resist conscription. Thus once again was exposed the myth of the homogeneous loyal body in the North, the myth upon which the partition of Ireland was based.

However, while imperial defense is strictly within the province of the Imperial Parliament, local defense is a transferred power, controlled by the Belfast parliament. The late Lord Craigavon, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, decided to recruit the Ulster Defense Force, the equivalent of the Home Guard in the United Kingdom, as an auxiliary of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. This aroused criticism and complaints from all sections of opinion in Northern Ireland. The question at once arose as to where the powers of the R. U. C. Inspector-General began and those of the general in command of the British military garrison ended. There

was a clash between the police and the military over the allocation of arms and equipment. A better way of weakening home defense could not have been devised.

To complicate the situation further, the Ulster Defence Volunteers are attached to the notorious "B Specials," a subsidiary body of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, regarded by all Irish Catholics as a sort of Gestapo. Even when an ex-service, certified machine-gun instructor tried to join up he was refused on the ground that "we want no Papishers." The subject was hotly debated in the Belfast House of Commons, but under the strictly Protestant, totalitarian rule of Lord Craigavon, the Orange prejudice triumphed over home defense. So much so that an appeal was made to Mr. Winston Churchill to assert the statutory control of the Imperial Parliament over military matters in Northern Ireland. Twenty-four Anglo-Irish army officers, politicians and writers signed this remonstrance, among them General Gough, Colonel James Fitzmaurice, the Earl of Antrim, the Duke of St. Albans, the Earl of Ossory, Major General Charles Gwynn, Major General Hugh Montgomery, Mr. Sean Leslie, Mr. Robert Lynd and Mr. Stephen Gwynn. The diversity of politics and religion between the signers is plain. General Gough was an Ulster hero in 1914, when he refused to use the army against Ulstermen who had organized an armed revolt against Home Rule under the leadership of Lord Carson and Lord Craigavon. The Earl of Antrim, Clerk of the House of Commons, is now serving in the Royal Navy. Captain Stephen Gwynn, who served in the last war, was a member of the old Nationalist Party at Westminster and is one of a distinguished Protestant family in Dublin.

None of these people are either Orange bigots or irreconcilable Catholics. In their appeal they said that the Royal Ulster Constabulary had "incurred the odium attaching to a political police force of the type familiar on the Continent of Europe rather than the general popularity and respect possessed in the fullest measure by the Home Guard throughout the remainder of the United Kingdom." They warned that clashes on the border of Northern Ireland and Eire "may result from the activities of this large force directed by local civilian or police officials without regard to considerations of British policy as to external affairs, or to British military arrangements designed to conform to the requirements of that policy." In conclusion they said: "We deem it our duty to submit these facts in full confidence that in the realiza-

tion of them you will find instant cause for curative action for the sake of all the supreme interests entrusted to your keeping." Since 1921 the number of B Specials had been doubled, bringing them to 25,000, even before the question of a home defense force arose; in the past year they have again more than doubled and must now number at least 50,000.

The financial structure of Northern Ireland is not self-supporting. The British Exchequer has made itself liable for the budgetary deficiencies of the Six Counties. Therefore the Government of Eire maintains that the British Government is legally and actually responsible for Northern Ireland, its B Specials and the suppression of its very large Nationalist minority. But Lord Craigavon was sure of British support for the Orange lodges. When Mr. Winston Churchill once tried to address the Ulster Liberal Association in Belfast, he was illegally deprived of the use of the Ulster Hall by Lord Craigavon and his Orange cohorts and had to speak in a football field in the Catholic Nationalist quarter. Reminded of this recently, Lord Craigavon said: "I would do the same again if anyone came here to interfere with the rights of Ulster."

This division of Ireland is the crux of every Anglo-Irish problem. When the partition was made, for example, it was decided to gerrymander Ulster. So as to reduce the large Catholic minority, Donegal, the most northerly county in Ireland, was excluded. It is part of the Free State today. England is thereby deprived of the invaluable harbor of Lough Swilly which, with Bere Haven and Cobh in the south, are the three vital naval bases whose loss Mr. Churchill bemoans. When the Free State Treaty of 1921 was drawn up, control of these bases was reserved, and they were occupied by British naval and military forces. Finally Mr. Chamberlain agreed with Mr. de Valera to hand them over to Irish control, despite the protests of Mr. Churchill, whose arguments for preparedness were consistently ignored by both Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Chamberlain. Now, as seems inevitable in all such Anglo-Irish deals, the world is told that Eire is depriving England of essential bases. The fact that Lough Swilly would now be under British control, but for the anti-Catholic gerrymandering of Ulster, is not mentioned. Three million Irishmen must be wrong, if they are citizens of the Irish Free State, but one and a half million must be right, if they are the Protestant inhabitants of six out of Ulster's nine counties.

Naval strategists very well recall the importance in the last war of Bere Haven in Cork, commanding the seaways around Cape Clear and the south coast; of Cobh, the transatlantic port of call; and of Lough Swilly, commanding the route along the north of Ireland from Scotland to America. Mr. Churchill may describe the loss of these harbors as a "most heavy and grievous burden . . . which should never have been placed on our shoulders." But the Irish point of view is that nothing Irish is a burden on anybody's shoulders, since Ireland is a separate and independent country, which never wished for any connection with Britain, burdensome or otherwise. Unless this basic conviction of the vast majority of the Irish people is understood, the position of the Free State Government will always seem absurd and incomprehensible.

It is frequently asked how the Irish, depending as they do on Britain for their market for foodstuffs, on the British mercantile marine for shipping, on the British Navy for defense against invasion — how can they refuse to fall in line with the other Dominions? Have they not seen the fate of Denmark, also a small agricultural country? What of Poland, a fighting, Catholic country, whose history has so often paralleled that of Ireland? The Irish have a number of very simple answers. Poland has been partitioned, Ireland *is* partitioned. They do not notice the faults in the analogy. Racial and religious persecutions are matters of record in Ireland. Irish history is bestrewn with broken treaties and "scraps of paper." The result is that most Irish people have as deep a suspicion of British policy as any Briton has of Hitler. Aside from their own country, the Irish believe only in the United States. During the last war, America could have recruited every able-bodied Irishman. But the bulk of the population could not believe then, and cannot believe now, that the British Empire ever fought for any ideal other than the security of England.

Completely under clerical control today, Eire knows little about Nazism and Fascism. It knows that the Catholic Church favored Franco in Spain and turns a lenient eye on Mussolini. The only people behaving like fascists that the Irish Catholics have ever seen were British Black-and-Tans. And the Orangemen in the North are fascist in the sense that they believe in Protestantism and hate the Papists exactly as Hitler believes in Aryanism and hates the Jews. The Government of Northern Ireland wishes only to suppress Catholic thought, while the Free State Government tries to put down all liberal thought of any kind. As com-

pared with Great Britain or the United States, both are semi-fascist régimes. Proportional representation was abolished by Lord Craigavon; Mr. de Valera abolished the Dublin Senate. Both interfered with the totalitarian purposes of the respective leaders.

Ireland perfervidly believes in the rights of small nations and has been fighting for that right against England for seven hundred years. This does not mean that the people are interested in parliamentary democracy. Too many centuries of tutelage and government by an alien parliament have passed over their heads for them suddenly to believe in and practice something so long denied to them. They have always been devoted to the *Führerprinzip*, which made the conquest of Ireland possible by setting chief against chief, clan against clan. The Irish are socially and intellectually democratic, but they are contumacious individualists and love a leader, an individual, a man. Their record in American politics readily shows these deep-seated tendencies. Seven hundred years of government by England have left them a very different conception of politics from that gradually achieved by free, self-governing democratic nations.

The methods of Nazism and Fascism have surprised and horrified the democracies. But in Irish eyes Hitler seems to be doing only what Cromwell did at the Massacre of Drogheda in 1649, when he drove the "mere Irish" to "Hell or Connacht;" when he put them outside the pale in their own country; when they were deprived of all human rights until Catholic Emancipation was finally wrung from Queen Victoria's reluctant government. The question of course arises, Why always go back to the seventeenth century? Granted that the mistakes of England in Ireland were inexcusable, still here we are in the year 1940. Do the Irish really believe that Hitler would treat them better than Cromwell did, or Lloyd George? They frankly do not know, although they ought to. They see invaders only as invaders. Their present neutrality is based on their will to resist all invaders.

From the standpoint of world politics, in terms of the existing fight between totalitarianism and democracy, Ireland is heavily handicapped by her extremely self-conscious nationalism. The very modern notion of warfare between ideologies rather than nations has not yet begun to penetrate the Irish mind. This obtuseness derives from the fact that the Irish still envisage war as a struggle between nations for trade and power.

Mr. de Valera, like Mr. Chamberlain, upheld the notion of

appeasement at Geneva, where he was popularly admired as an advocate of peace. His sentiments, like those of Mr. Chamberlain, must have been very definitely affected by the disastrous consequences of the Munich policy. He has, however, like all other Irishmen, to take cognizance of the history of Ireland.

It is impossible for any liberal-minded Irishman to have any sympathy for the two semi-totalitarian régimes that govern partitioned Ulster and partitioned Ireland. It is obvious that the defense of the Six Counties should be taken out of the hands of the Orange lodges; there should be no Ulster "Gestapo." If the defense of Northern Ireland were in the hands of British military and naval authorities, whose names are above and beyond the eternal Protestant-Catholic intrigues of the old régime, a first step could be taken towards home defense. The idea of defending Ireland as a whole appeals to all citizens of Eire. As a united country, Ireland will fight. It is not too late to achieve this end. Even today the Irish admit it is better to deal with the devil you know than with the devil you don't know. But there can be no understanding between Northern Ireland and Eire so long as the Orange group that promoted mutiny in the British Army in 1914 is still in power. In order to get coöperation from Eire, Mr. Churchill would be better advised to find out what the Orange Gestapo, which ran him out of Belfast 26 years ago, is trying to do today, rather than fall back on the stereotyped argument that the Irish are impossible.

They are not impossible. They are a people that thoroughly appreciates freedom. They are a people that rather movingly believes in the United States, the country where half their eight million population emigrated. If the United States believes in help for Britain — every measure short of war — so does Ireland. The fact that Uncle Sam is on the side of the British battalions means more to Eire than any amount of propaganda about democracy. If the jinx of partition were removed, if it were even modified by the elimination of the Ulster B Specials, a united Ireland would stand with the United States to defeat Hitler.

In many important respects the relations between Britain and Ireland are very different from those that prevailed during the last war. Self-government for Eire has been achieved. Mr. de Valera coöperated with Mr. Chamberlain in that now discredited policy which was to give us peace. Mr. Chamberlain ceded the naval bases to Mr. de Valera, and the English garrisons departed

on the friendliest terms with their Irish successors; the relations between the two countries have never been better. Himself an ex-I.R.A. man, Mr. de Valera has denounced the I.R.A. fanatics and taken drastic measures to suppress them in Eire. While recruiting is not permitted in neutral Eire, men have been going to England to join the British army or navy (although they are not allowed to appear in uniform in any part of Ireland outside the Six Counties). All shipping between Britain and Ireland is under British control and most of it actually under the British flag. Freedom of the sea is vital to Irish exports, now of increased importance to England since the elimination of Denmark as a source of agricultural produce; and it is equally vital to Irish imports, which are now almost exclusively from Britain. Ireland has neither the will nor the power nor a motive for helping Germany. Is the neutrality of Eire, therefore, dangerous?

Sir Horace Plunkett once said that Irish history was for Englishmen to remember and Irishmen to forget. Unfortunately, only the Irish ever seem to be sufficiently interested in the history of Ireland to see the country in its true perspective. Have they ever contemplated the possibility of the conquest of England by Hitler and their fate under a Nazi régime? Before they had self-government they not only contemplated it, they actually tried to coöperate with those intent upon the conquest of England. Their efforts to support the Corsican Fuehrer came to no good. And even in the last war, Roger Casement got little encouragement from Germany and was captured as he landed with the message that Sinn Fein could not count on German support.

Last year the Free State Minister for Defensive Measures said that, from Britain's point of view, "it is of infinitely greater strategic importance that this island should be a strong and united neutral, with high morale and a firm purpose, than that it should be a weak and reluctant belligerent torn with doubt and division." This is the plain common sense of the problem. It is useless to speculate as to what a minority of I.R.A. fanatics may wish, or to doubt the sincerity of Mr. de Valera and his people when they strive to keep the horrors of war from their country. Hitler proceeds on the divide-and-conquer principle of all dictators. In Ireland the division stands ready made. To undo the evil work of partition is to unite Ireland. A united Ireland will be no help to Hitler.

SCIENCE IN THE TOTALITARIAN STATE

By *Waldemar Kaempffert*

IN THE good old days that preceded the Russian-German alliance Hitler railed at Marx and Communism, and Stalin at Fascism and Capitalism. Yet both dictators stood on common ground; for both insisted, as Marx had insisted long before them, that society is everything, that the individual citizen must submerge himself in the state and its destiny. It makes little difference that Stalin, following Marx and Lenin, still talks of "proletarian" science and art and philosophy and of their duty to the worker, while Hitler talks of Nordic superiority and of what he regards as the manifest destiny of the Nordic stock to rule the earth. Both agree that the university professor must serve the state, accept the tenets of the official ideology and eschew any excursions into the metaphysical or the theoretical. The artist, philosopher and scientist must not only believe what he is told to believe by his rulers; he must practise that belief. Objectivity is derided in both the Soviet Union and Germany as unattainable and as anti-social.

If this insistence on the crushing of individuality assumes different aspects in Russia and in Germany it is because of different economic needs and social conditions. Despite the greatness of Mendelyev and Pavlov, despite the eminence of some Russian mathematicians and physicians, the Tsars did little to encourage science. In Germany, on the other hand, science was officially cultivated, and the chemist or engineer who had earned an international name became a *Geheimrat*, an *Exzellenz*, even a *Freiherr* or *Graf*, with the right to precede his family name with a *von*, though he might be a Jew. The Herr Professor was outranked in the salons and at court only by higher state dignitaries and army officers. There were universities in nearly all the important towns, and each of them was preëminent in some *Fach*, such as mathematics, as at Göttingen, or medicine, as at Tübingen, or philosophy, as at Berlin.

Today the academic rôles of Germany and Russia are changed. The Germans have closed most of their universities; the professor has so completely lost his old status that students covet membership in the "party" or the position of *Gauleiter* rather than that

of *Dozent*. In Russia, on the other hand, there are over 700 universities and colleges with over 600,000 students. For 1942 the plans call for thirty-four times as many students in various Russian schools as there were before the revolution. There are now over eight hundred scientific research institutions, with 24,246 full-time researchers and a budget of well over a billion rubles. The explanation of this rapid growth of the university and the laboratory is that the Soviet Union needs scientists and engineers to develop vast but still unsurveyed natural resources.

"The old idea of science based on belief in the supremacy of the intellect is dead," Bernhard Rust, Minister of Culture, declared at the Jubilee celebration of Heidelberg, a university which in supposedly benighted times had invited that powerful intellect, Spinoza, to join its faculty. Frank, Minister of Justice, was similarly explicit when he told the Association of University Professors that the old objectivity was nonsense and that "today the German university professor must ask himself one question: Does my scientific work serve the welfare of National Socialism?" This contempt for independent thought explains the closing of Göttingen's school of mathematics, once the finest institution of its kind in the world, and the disappearance of the entire cancer-research staff of Heidelberg. Lectures on scientific theory and philosophy have given place largely to lectures on such subjects as "Nazi Philosophy and Race Theory," "Folk and Race," "Medical Outlook on Physical Culture," "First Aid with Special Reference to Military Sport and Gas Defense."

If we substitute "the Proletarian State and the Communist Party" for "National Socialism" we have the Soviet argument. At the International Congress of the History of Science and Technology held in London in 1931, Nikolai Bukharin, like Rust and Frank, flatly denied that any scientist should try to be impersonal. In Soviet Russia the only basis of scientific and artistic creation is Marxism, with the result that in meetings of the Soviet Academy of Sciences the discussions dwell on proletarian science. As in Germany, "the Party" dominates. Dismissal from it amounts to academic ostracism.

Curious rejections of scientific doctrines which are accepted in Great Britain, France and the United States follow as a matter of course. And there are equally curious variations in the reasons given for the rejections. Relativity was denounced in Nazi Germany before the Hitler-Stalin alliance as a piece of "Jewish

communism;" since the alliance it has become an example of characteristically perverse Jewish thinking. In Soviet Russia relativity is likewise scorned, but as an expression of "bourgeois idealism." Because it believes so fervently in race and blood, Nazi Germany accepts the Mendelian principles of heredity. Soviet Russia repudiates them because they conflict with Marx — conflict with the communistic doctrine that environment is everything and heredity is of secondary importance, that good food, good schools and a good proletarian atmosphere can overcome hereditary disease and physical defect.

Nazi and Soviet officials and professors go to incredible lengths in following their rulers. Professor Philipp Lenard, a Nobel prize winner after whom a physical institute at Heidelberg has been named, asserts that only Nordics have made fundamentally important contributions to science. Professor Johannes Stark, head of the Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt, is of like mind. "It can be adduced from the history of physics that the great discoverers from Galileo and Newton to the physical pioneers of our time were almost exclusively Aryans, predominantly of the Nordic race," he observed in an article contributed to *Nature*. Professor Bieberbach of the University of Berlin writes diatribes on the Jewish approach in mathematics, of which relativity is a flagrant example, and heads a group of Berlin professors who maintain that Germans conceived mathematical infinity; that mathematics is a heroic science with a mission precisely like that of National Socialism, namely the reduction of chaos to order; and that German mathematics must remain Faustian so that it may serve the new German system effectively. These views are popularized by C. J. Tietjen in a pamphlet, "Raum oder Zahl?", which has the support of the Ministry of Culture and in which it is maintained that the Nordic race has a unique feeling for space which it is the duty of every teacher to foster, so that German children may be protected from the logic that curses the mathematics of Latin and Semitic peoples. (The pamphlet was written before the creation of the Axis.) Soviet mathematicians are equally mystical. Sharp distinctions are drawn between "bourgeois mathematics" and "proletarian mathematics." At the International Congress for the History of Science and Technology, Professor Colman rose to expound the "present crisis in the mathematical sciences" as it is conceived in Russia and to assert that if it is to be dealt with properly "we must take into consideration the crisis

in the bourgeois natural sciences, especially physics," and bear in mind that both crises are part and parcel of "the crisis within capitalism as a whole." French, British and American mathematicians and physicists seem to have remained strangely unaware of any economic "crisis" in their sciences.

The totalitarian conception of the relation of science to the state is remarkably elastic. When political expediency so determines, the whole concept is modified. At the time Hitler came to power we heard much about the blue-eyed, blond, long-headed "Aryan," the born ruler of men. When it turned out that round-headed, swarthy Bavarians could not qualify physically as "Aryans" in this sense, and when the Japanese, whom Hitler soon began to cultivate, resented the German implication that they were inferior because they were obviously not "Aryans," the concept was changed. Early in 1939 the German Law Academy announced that the terms "Aryan" and "German blooded" and "of German and cognate blood" were to be supplanted by the term "European-racial." As the Polish issue became acute, it was impossible to regard Poles as "German blooded" or even as a people of "cognate blood," despite the ethnological connection of the Germans with the Slavs and the manifestly blue eyes and blond hair of many Poles. In popular German writings more is now made of the "German soul" than of physical characteristics.

The Soviet régime demands equal flexibility. When Stalin and Trotsky clashed, Soviet laboratories, research institutes and universities were combed for Trotskyites. Many scholars who had been respected alike for their attainments and for their adherence to Marxism became suspect politically and were arraigned as "unscientific." Even to have a book praised by a supposed Trotskyite or Fascist was enough. When Zelenin fell into disgrace much was made of the fact that a book of his had been published in pre-Hitler Germany. Because Tscherni had received the approval of German professors of psychology his disciples, Zeitlin and Katsnelson, were persecuted. Motorin and Busygin were denounced for attempting to "liquidate ethnography as a science," though before Trotsky's downfall their writings had been entirely acceptable. A school of which Bogayevsky, another alleged Trotsky adherent, was a prominent representative offended because it pictured ancient Crete as a scene of class struggle, contrary to the Marxist gospel. When it was suspected that Bukharin, official philosopher and interpreter of Marx

and Lenin, was leaning toward Trotsky, he at once became "a kulak ideologist and a restorer of capitalism."

This Nazi and Soviet pursuit of "rebels" may seem absurd, but actually it is logical. An artist or a scientist in Germany and in Russia serves the state. He therefore cannot separate his politics from his strictly professional activities. If he departs from the prevailing official ideology he automatically becomes an anti-Nazi in Germany and a counter-revolutionary in the Soviet Union. If Vavilov, an outstanding geneticist, is still at large it is because the Soviet Academy of Sciences has not yet made up its mind about the social merit of the theories of his rival, Lysenko. The extraordinary claim is made by Lysenko that by changing the environment it is possible to change the hereditary characteristics of plants—a claim which, if proved, would reinstate Lamarck's discredited theory that acquired characteristics are transmissible and would mean, for instance, that a blacksmith can pass along his trained strength to his offspring.

In sheer vehemence of denunciation the Soviet zealots far outshine their Nazi counterparts. "Bandit," "traitor," "fascist agent," are among the milder epithets hurled at scientists who, though fanatic followers of Marx and Lenin, have failed to toe the most recently chalked professional line. "We demand ruthless punishment for the vile betrayers of our great country," was the opening phrase of a remarkable document published in the first issue of Vol. 14 of the *Astronomical Journal of the Soviet Union*, an official organ of the astronomical division of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Scientists suspected of following Trotsky were branded as "this despicable gang of human degenerates" who "were selling our socialistic country and its riches to the worst enemies of human progress." "A complete investigation into the participation of the right-wing renegades Bukharin, Rykov and Uglanov" was demanded. The same official journal published—in Vol. 16, No. 2—an extraordinary deliverance on relativity. "Modern bourgeois cosmogony is in a state of deep ideological confusion resulting from its refusal to accept the only true dialectic materialistic concept, namely the infinity of the universe with respect to space as well as time," we read. "The hostile work of the agents of fascism, who at one time managed to penetrate to leading positions in certain astronomical and other institutions as well as in the press, has led to revolting propaganda of counter-revolutionary bourgeois ideology in the

literature." It was also charged that Soviet materialistic works on cosmology "have been suppressed by the enemies of the people." In other words, because Marx and Engels were saturated in Victorian materialism, which followed Newton in picturing the universe as a colossal machine instead of a problem in higher geometry, all the experimental and observational evidence that supports relativity must be rejected.

How does science like this tyranny? A few bold spirits still survive in Germany and Russia, but, on the whole, there is a remarkable pliancy of the scientific mind in both countries. Professor Fischer, who with Bauer and Lenz wrote a standard work on genetics in which he showed that some Hottentot-Dutch hybrids are often better men than their "pure" parents, recanted nobly by explaining that the superiority of such mongrels must be attributed to an indefinable something that flowed into them with Nordic-Dutch blood. Soviet scientists are equally adroit side-steppers. When the *New York Times* reported the bitter debate on genetics in which Vavilov and Lysenko engaged (a debate in which a belief in heredity was excoriated by Lysenko as a belief in "racialism"), Vavilov cabled a reply in which he praised Soviet science. Vavilov also declined to serve as the president of the last International Congress of Genetics (1939), evidently under orders, though he knew of his election months before. Serebrovsky, another geneticist, who saw how the wind was blowing, promptly repudiated his own views, particularly those which favored eugenics by means of sterilization, as "counter-revolutionary" and "unscientific." The Russian gift of recantation, which marked the trials of Party members accused of adherence to Trotsky, manifests itself in science as well as in politics.

Back of the ideologies of the dictators, back of the professional pliancy, is something more than political expediency, something more than blind obedience. Long before the world ever heard of Mussolini and Stalin and Hitler it was in a state of social unrest. The revolutions that overthrew the Romanoffs and the Hohenzollerns, the upheavals that gave British labor new rights and privileges, were expressions of dissatisfaction with the social structure. To say that the dictators emerged because science and technology had taken possession of society and stamped it with a pattern utterly different from that which the *égalitarians* of the eighteenth century knew is an over-simplification. There are psychic factors that cannot be ignored — inner drives, national

traditions, habits of life. Yet if the dictators are to be overthrown, if democracy is to be preserved, the part that science and technology played in the rise of democracy cannot be ignored. Research produces not only change within science itself but social change. The democratic method is to adapt social change to technological change. The dictators are trying to do the contrary.

In considering the relation of science to the dictators we must bear in mind that the human mind is intrinsically no better than it was 10,000 years ago. It simply has acquired new interests under social tension. In the Middle Ages social tension expressed itself so strongly in religion that there were 110 holy days in the year; a new ecclesiastical architecture was evolved; all Europe rose to the spiritual need of wresting Jerusalem from the "infidel." Today, however, it means more to our society to discover how the atom is constituted than that a new ecclesiastical architecture is developed, more that the mechanism of heredity is revealed than that savages in Africa are converted to Christianity. Perhaps its pragmatic attitude has led science to ignore essential ethical values. But the point is that science dominates our society, and that if our society wants science it must choose between totalitarianism and democracy. There can be no compromise.

No self-respecting anthropologist or social scientist now believes in the "great man" theory of culture expounded by Carlyle in "Heroes and Hero Worship." Great men do not of themselves produce cultures; nor do cultures necessarily produce great men. Lincoln is credited with the remark, "I have not made events, events have made me." And so it was with Bach and Beethoven, Newton and Einstein, Edison and Bell. Progress in art, science, politics is not made merely by waiting for a unique genius to appear. In every people there are strong, gifted personalities that respond sensitively to social tension. Their works, whether they be poems or scientific discoveries, paintings or machines, have a way of appearing "when the time is ripe," as we say.

Why was it that invention lagged before the liberal movement of the eighteenth century? Because it involved experimentation, work with the hands, dirty work. Also it was useful — and anything that was useful or commercial was held in contempt by the nobility. When the business man and the inventor were freed from this aristocratic fetishism, machine after machine appeared, and with the machines came mass production and mass consumption of identical goods. Without standardization mass production

is impossible. To have cheap, good clothes we must all dress more or less alike. To bring automobiles within the reach of millions we must have the assembly line. To live inexpensively in cities we must eat packaged foods, dwell in more or less standardized homes, bathe in standardized bath tubs, and draw water and gas from common reservoirs. Mass production has brought it about that the average life in New York is hardly different from the average life in Wichita. The same motion pictures brighten the screen, the same voices and music well out of loud-speakers in every town, identical cans of tomatoes and packages of cereals are to be found on all grocers' shelves, identical electric toasters brown identical slices of bread everywhere, identical refrigerators freeze identical ice cubes in a million kitchens. If gunpowder made all men the same height, in Carlyle's classic phrase, mass production has standardized behavior, pleasures, tastes, comforts, life itself.

Mass production and labor-saving devices have created a social crisis. We cannot have mass production and mechanization without planning. Engineers and their financial backers are planners. Dictators are planners. Whether they know it or not, most corporation executives and engineers are necessary totalitarians in practice. Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin clearly have the instincts of engineers. Their states are designed social structures.

Often enough we hear it said that mechanical invention has outstripped social invention — that new social forms must be devised if we are to forestall the economic crises that are brought about by what is called the "impact of science" on society. Communism and Fascism are social inventions, intended among other things to solve the economic problems created by technological change under the influence of capitalism. They attempt to answer a question: Are the technical experts and their financial backers to shape the course of society unrestrained, and even to rule nations directly and indirectly, as they did in France, and as they do in part in Great Britain and the United States? The totalitarians say that a capitalistic democratic government cannot control the experts, the inventors, the creators of this evolving mechanical culture. They therefore have decided to take control of thinking, above all scientific thinking, out of which flow the manufacturing processes and the machines which change life.

But science is more than coal-tar dyes and drugs, electric lamps, airplanes, radio, television, relativity and astrophysics. It is an

attitude of mind — what Professor Whitehead has called “the most intimate change in outlook that the human race has yet experienced.” If Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin are to rule, that scientific attitude will have to be abandoned when it conflicts with the official social philosophy. But if it is abandoned there can be no Newtons, no Darwins, no Einsteins. Science will be unable to make discoveries which will change the human outlook and, with the outlook, the social order. If the world wants to preserve science as a powerful social force for good the research physicist, chemist and biologist must be permitted to work without intellectual restraint, *i.e.* to enjoy the fundamental freedom of democracy.

The Marxists are right in maintaining that science has never achieved perfect objectivity. No scientist has yet performed an experiment without injecting himself into it. Yet there has been a brave and determined and continuous and on the whole successful effort to strip scientific investigation and theorizing of emotion, of personal predilection. From animism science passed to Newton’s abstract “forces,” and from forces (still anthropomorphic), to a mathematical conception of the cosmos and atomic structure. An essential to this progress has been that the scientist has not demanded that his theory be considered “true.” He does not profess to know what the truth is. A theory must *work*. It is an expedient. When it ceases to work it is thrown overboard or modified. This method of merciless self-examination cannot be followed in a society where the result of each investigation is predetermined for extraneous reasons. Democracy flounders before it arrives at satisfactory solutions of its social problems. But it is better to flounder and progress than to follow the philosophy of a dictator and to remain socially and scientifically static.

It does not follow that under the Nazi or the Marx-Lenin dispensation there can be *no* science. What is likely to happen to science if totalitarianism prevails is revealed by the course of Egyptian art. In its earliest phases that art was fairly free; hence there was much experimenting, much striving for realistic modes of expression. When the priests took control of Egyptian life a dramatic change occurred. The ways of portraying the human being became stylized. For centuries the style hardly changed. Art had been frozen. And so must it be with research. There can be science and engineering under dictation; but it will be stylized science, engineering which does not progress.

THE CANADIAN ECONOMY IN TWO WARS

By Grant Dexter

CANADA enters the second winter of war with her economic policy meeting its first crucial test. Until now the Canadian Government has not found any great difficulty in adhering to its declared policy of pay-as-you-go. In September 1939 there was unused factory capacity and there were reserves of labor and raw materials. Indeed, a mildly inflationary policy was adopted during the early months to stimulate production. Now, after more than a year of war, full employment is clearly in sight; immense extensions of plant are under way; and expenditures are approaching 30 percent of the national income. These developments reveal that a critical moment in economic policy is at hand. The next few months will demonstrate whether or not the Government has the courage to impose the taxation and controls necessary to avoid inflation, and whether or not the people will accept a parallel reduction in the standard of living. What can be said today is that the Government shows no sign of faltering in its policy of pay-as-you-go and that the people of Canada have thus far revealed a truly heroic eagerness to sacrifice now to attain ultimate victory.

That Canada is already in a critical phase of her war economy reveals the extent of her war effort. This effort has two objectives — to give all possible aid to Britain, and to strengthen Canadian home defense. Every last impulse of Canada's power in men and resources is being given to these ends. There is no disposition to rely upon the United States for the defense of Canadian territory. On the contrary, the Canadian Government, with the full approval of parliament and the people, is making a supreme effort to achieve Canada's own salvation. Some of the gravest weaknesses in the war program arise out of this new manifestation of nationalism. Canada is trying to do so much, she is spreading her limited resources over so wide an area, that there is some reason to doubt if she can carry the present program through in its entirety.

In the First World War the Canadian war effort was comparatively simple. Canada put 600,000 men in khaki and sent an army to France. At home, she enormously expanded her acreage and concentrated on the production of foodstuffs. In addition, she de-

veloped a great munitions industry, concentrating chiefly on shells. The value of her munition production totalled approximately \$1,000 millions, and it is estimated that one-third of all the shells used in the British armies in 1918 were made in Canada. Canada's expeditionary force, the production of foodstuffs and shells were the features of her 1914-18 effort. The Dominion had no air force at that time and the Canadian navy was negligible.

War came in 1914 at a moment when Canada was uniquely fitted to meet British demands. The great era of expansion was just ending. During the previous seventeen years, Canada had been developing her West. Transcontinental railways had been built, vast agricultural areas had been made available for settlement, floods of immigrants had poured in, cities and towns had sprung up on the virgin prairie. All this entailed heavy capital imports, which in 1913 exceeded \$500,000,000,000, or nearly one-fourth the national income. By the eve of the World War, Canada's problem was to take people out of construction or development (in 1912-13 about one-fourth of the country's labor and productive facilities were directly or indirectly engaged in construction) and to get them into production. Jack Canuck had to quit being a railway builder and become a farmer. Ordinarily this adjustment would have been long and painful. But war demands for wheat and other raw materials eased the problem of readjustment.

It is easy to look back on the first war experience and say that problems were simpler then than now. Perhaps this is true for production; it distinctly is not so in the realm of finance. Twenty-five years ago Canada had no broad tax structure to build on and there was no domestic money market from which to borrow. There was no machinery by which surplus purchasing power — the propelling force in inflation — could be siphoned back into the war treasury. There was no central bank to control and co-ordinate the economy of the country. In fact, the Canadian Government had never raised as much as \$5,000,000 in Canada by a public loan; and it is estimated that less than \$1,000,000 of Canada's funded debt in 1914 was held by Canadians. Canada had always borrowed from London. The tax structure was a primitive thing of import duties and excise duties on such commodities as spirits and tobacco. The national peacetime budget barely exceeded \$100,000,000 and the national income was estimated at \$2,200,000,000.

Between 1914 and 1920 Canada's war expenditure rarely exceeded 10 percent of the national income. What proportion of the war expenditure the Dominion raised by war taxation is a matter of dispute. The outlay on the fighting services in those years was \$1,672,000,000 and war taxation covered an insignificant part of it. If the increase in revenues due to war prosperity is included, the total becomes larger but still is unimportant. Although the British Government did take over the financing of Canada's army abroad, London was unable to finance purchases of foodstuffs and munitions in Canada. Ottawa had to find this money. All told, Canada as a result of the war added \$2,200,000,000 to her debt. Despite the fact that the national money income rose from \$2,250,000,000 to \$4,408,000,000, no real effort was made to pay-as-you-go. It is doubtful if such a policy would have been possible with such a primitive financial and tax machinery.

In the early stages, Canada financed the war by borrowing from London and by outright additions to the note circulation. Then the pound fell to a discount and Britain was no longer able to finance either Canada or her purchases in Canada. In desperation, Canada turned to New York, and the first Canadian loan (\$45,000,000) was sold there in 1915. But the best alternative was borrowing at home. This was done with unexpected success. The Government first asked for \$50,000,000 and was amazed to get \$100,000,000. Thereafter domestic loans were issued in rapidly rising amounts until in the final years of the war period loans of \$600,000,000 were raised without difficulty. British purchases of munitions and foodstuffs were financed in a different and more inflationary way, *i.e.*, by establishing bank credits for the British purchasing authorities.

In the early years, the inflationary effects of this policy were checked by the fact that there was a surplus of labor and plant. But full employment was reached by 1917; and thereafter there existed no unused resources of labor, plant or materials which could be tapped to meet the increasing demand for war supplies. Increased war production had to come at the expense of consumption and out of maintenance of plant and longer hours of labor. It is a matter of controversy whether or not the government of the day consciously or unconsciously allowed inflation to diminish consumption. In any event, inflation had that effect. More important, it redistributed the national income in such a way as to concentrate wealth in the hands of relatively few men

— the war profiteers — from whom, in turn, the Government succeeded in borrowing the very large sums required to finance the war. While war loans were sold to great numbers of people, the evidence is fairly conclusive that 80 percent of the amounts subscribed came from the small group that benefited from inflation. There were in Canada, in Lloyd George's phrase, many men whose hands were dripping with the fat of sacrifice.

The responsibility for this inflationary policy rests on the government of the day. The evidence shows that the chartered banks were dubious and hesitant partners. Professor J. J. Deutsch, of Queen's University, one of the advisers on the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations of 1937-40, has stated: "It is clear that the war-time price inflation in Canada was more the result of domestic policies than the result of forces operating from abroad."¹ However, it is doubtful if the Government, having few if any economic and financial controls at its disposal, could have followed any other course. Inasmuch as practically all borrowing was done at home, it is true in a sense that the nation-at-large paid for the war as it proceeded. Food, equipment and munitions came out of current production. But the cost was distributed most unjustly and unevenly. The inevitable results were tension, pressure groups, and sectional disputes which shook the Dominion to its foundations and were still unsolved when the second World War began. Indeed, the Royal Commission mentioned above was the first courageous effort to solve the problems created by the last war.

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Obviously Canada cannot repeat in the present war the doing economic policy pursued in the last one. A nation may get away with inflation when war costs do not exceed 10 percent of the national income in any one year; but it becomes impossible when war costs exceed 30 percent and may well reach 50 percent. Moreover, the demands in this war are different from those of twenty-five years ago. Then it was men, foodstuffs, and munitions. Now the cry is for airplanes, tanks, guns, mechanized equipment — all requiring specialized capacity and skilled workmen. The Canadian economy is not so well geared to meet these demands as it was the demands of 1914-18. Canada can only

¹ J. J. Deutsch, "War Finance and the Canadian Economy," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, November 1940, p. 534.

reach her real stride in this war if she plans, directs and controls her economy in such a way as to make the utmost use of her resources. Meanwhile great industries — like the wheat industry — though not needed at the moment must be maintained.

The danger of inflation was recognized at the outbreak of the present war. The Government announced its financial policy in the first war budget of September 12, 1939. The mistakes of 1914-18 were to be avoided — specifically, the Government planned for a long war, not a short war as it did in 1914. In the early months, while production was getting under way, a mildly inflationary policy would be followed and heavy taxation avoided. Later, after full employment had been reached, the Government would enforce as rigorous a pay-as-you-go policy as possible. On this the acting Minister of Finance spoke as follows:

Because we believe it is the part of wisdom, we shall follow as far as may be practicable a pay-as-you-go policy. In imposing the new tax burdens which this policy will require we shall be guided by the belief that all our citizens will be ready to bear some share of the cost of the war, but we shall insist on the principle of equality of sacrifice on the basis of ability to pay. We shall not of course be able to meet all war costs by taxation, because . . . there is a limit to the taxes that can be imposed without producing inefficiency, a lack of enterprise, and serious discontent. . . . We cannot carry taxes beyond the point where they seriously interfere with production. But we are not prepared to be timid or lighthearted in judging where this point lies. . . . What we cannot meet by taxation we shall finance by means of borrowing from the Canadian public at rates as low as possible.

The general features of the budget have already been summarized. From the outbreak of war to the beginning of 1940 the policy was deliberately inflationary, the principal means of pump priming being a \$200 million short-term note issue to the banks. In January 1940 the pool of savings was judged deep enough to be tapped. A \$200,000,000 bond issue at $3\frac{1}{4}$ percent was sold at popular subscription. In September a \$300,000,000 issue at $3\frac{1}{8}$ percent was also taken by the public. Tax increases have been imposed which will bring in \$342,000,000 per year. Since national income is estimated to have risen from \$3,800,000,000 in 1939 to \$4,500,000,000 in 1940, it is obvious that by borrowing and taxing the Government has taken back the increase in purchasing power.

Beyond doubt the Government has applied its war policy with great courage. But any complacency regarding the future will be chilled by the rate at which war expenditures have increased. For

the fiscal year ending March 31, 1940, Canada's war expenditure was \$118,000,000; for the current fiscal year it is estimated at \$940,000,000; and for 1941-42 it will be at least \$1,250,000,000. (Multiply these figures by ten and you have something meaningful in terms of United States standards.) In addition, Britain's purchases in Canada will have to be financed and the ordinary costs of government must be met. The coming budget therefore will run to \$2,200,000,000, or 48 percent of the 1940 national income, and the gap between tax revenue and expenditure will exceed \$1,000,000,000.

It is true that these figures demonstrate Canada's determination to play her full part in the war in Europe and provide defenses at home. But the threat to the Canadian economic structure is none the less real. Further and drastic tax increases will be inevitable if inflation is to be avoided. To be sure, prices have thus far been held down and the increase in national income represents an actual increase in production. The cost of living in the first year of war advanced hardly 6 percent, due in part to the measures applied by the Foreign Exchange Control Board, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board and the commodity controllers (steel, timber, power, etc.) of the Munitions and Supply department. But all along the line prices are tending to rise in response to real or prospective shortages and as time goes on control will become increasingly difficult.

The most serious problem at the moment is the shortage of manpower. The basic facts are not available, except in rudimentary form, and will not be until the national registration of last August can be analyzed. But the following indices (1926 = 100) on the increase of business activity pretty clearly tell the story:

	<i>Sept. 1939</i>	<i>Sept. 1940</i>
Physical volume of business.....	125.8	155.4
Industrial production.....	128.3	167.
Manufacturing production.....	121.3	159.7
Iron and Steel production.....	98.2	242.9
Textile production.....	150.	182.9
Construction.....	48.6	127.

Full employment is only a month or two away. The total estimated reserve of workers last July was 238,000. Since then the fighting services have taken 57,000 men and ordinary employment has absorbed another 114,389. In addition, the services will

need approximately 100,000 men to complete the military establishment now envisaged; and apart from the demands of non-war industry, the war plant now being built will require about 100,000 workers. Existing bottlenecks in the skilled trades have already compelled the Government to prohibit employers from competing for each other's employees. The penalty for "enticing" is \$500, and newspaper advertisements for skilled labor have been banned.

A series of strikes in war industries — chiefly in shipbuilding — has brought fairly generous increases in wages. They are significant because they proclaim labor's dissent from the economic policy of the Government. Labor prefers the British policy of allowing wages to rise and of preventing inflation by rationing and price fixing. The government, on the other hand, has implicitly rejected this alternative. In September 1939 it outlined three possible policies of war economy, each of which would have a different effect on the wage scale: 1, an inflationary policy similar to that of the last war (allowing wages and prices to rise without control); 2, avoidance of inflation by rigid and comprehensive price fixing and by rationing essential commodities (the present British policy); 3, siphoning back to the Federal treasury, by taxation and loans, the increased purchasing power created by the war boom. The Government, as already noted, rejected the first and second policies and chose the third. The reasons for rejecting the second policy were never given in detail until November 21, 1940, when Mr. Ilsley, the Minister of Finance, explained the Government's choice to the House of Commons. The core of his detailed argument was that universal price fixing cannot stand alone — it *ipso facto* entails universal rationing and regimentation. Although the German people have accepted such a discipline, he was quite sure it would not work in Canada.

The problem of manpower would not have arisen in such acute form if the demands of the fighting services had been held down — or at least coördinated — and if a large-scale program for training labor had been launched early in the year. But labor was overlooked and neglected in the first year of the war, and thus there unexpectedly developed the first serious challenge to the Government's economic policy. Back of the labor problem there is considerable confusion in general war policy. Many Canadians have been shocked to learn that the army alone absorbs more than half of the war appropriations. There are some

167,000 men in the army (ignoring the 30,000 men per month being trained under the home defense plan), some 13,000 in the navy, and 31,000 in the air force. The latter was expected last year to take two-thirds of all the money Canada spent on the services. There is a feeling in some quarters that Canada should have avoided a big army and specialized in an air force. Britain has more men in her army than she can equip, but sorely needs airmen. Thus far Ottawa has failed to coördinate the three services — its policy has been one of indiscriminate expansion. The public at large is curiously indifferent to this weakness. The indifference may perhaps be explained by the fact that the average Canadian is still thinking in terms of the last war, when Canada had no air force and only a negligible navy.

There remain two other economic matters of great importance to the war effort. Britain's purchases from Canada far exceed her sales, and the adverse balance is being met largely by the repatriation of Canadian securities. This adds greatly to Canada's difficulties in meeting exchange requirements in the United States. In normal times Canada transferred large favorable balances in sterling to the United States and thus was able to meet the normal adverse balance in United States funds. When the war broke out this transfer was no longer possible. A part of the favorable balance in sterling is being made available to Canada in gold, but we can assume that it is a very small part. Meanwhile Canada needs United States dollars more than ever before. Imports from south of the border have increased, due to purchases of essential war materials and equipment. The adverse balance has grown rapidly, as the following table shows (in millions of Canadian dollars):

Debits	1939	1940
Merchandise balance.....	161	300
Interest, dividends, profits.....	250	250
Freight, films, etc.....	35	45
	<hr/> 446	<hr/> 595
Credits		
Gold.....	185	205
Tourist Trade.....	167	150
	<hr/> 352	<hr/> 355
<i>Net drain</i>	94	240

The figures for receipts from tourist trade given above are the estimates of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. The 1940 figure is commonly believed, however, to be considerably too high. More probably, then, the net drain in 1940 will be \$300,000,000. This is a figure which Canada cannot sustain indefinitely. The most obvious way to reduce it is to eliminate unessential imports such as citrus fruits, gasoline, etc. This would not mean a reduction in total trade, inasmuch as Canada would still be buying more from the United States than in prewar years; but it would mean a great shift in the items of trade and a consequent dislocation for certain American exporters. Alternatively, the United States might amend the Neutrality Act and permit Canada to borrow the money to buy such materials and equipment for home defense as were certified by the Joint Board on Defense. Or Canada's investments in the United States could be liquidated.

During the coming months, the financial burdens will be very great. But they can be borne. The Government adheres to the maxim that whatever is physically possible is financially possible. There will be difficulties, however, in dividing the financial burden fairly among the people — in keeping with the express pledge of the Government — unless the scope of Dominion taxation is greatly extended. Theoretically the Dominion possesses unrestricted powers of taxation. But thus far, as in times of peace, the Dominion has not seriously encroached on Provincial sources of income. A settlement with the Provinces on this issue is essential if war taxation is to be equitable; and the only available means of obtaining such a settlement is that recommended by the Royal Commission. A conference between the Dominion and the Provincial authorities to consider the Report has been called for mid-January.

A more fundamental problem, which only now is beginning to attract attention, concerns the extent of Canada's war production. Is too much being attempted?

Most Canadians have no idea of the size of the war industry that is being created in their country. War orders of \$540 millions have been placed on Canadian account and \$309 millions on British account. Aside from this, \$255 millions is being invested in factory expansion and \$89 millions in military construction projects. Upwards of 146 new factories or extensions to existing plants are being built, and of this new construction 70 percent is on British account. Nor do Canadians realize the diversity of the

new war industry. Already shells are being produced in eight plants, while nineteen others are producing component parts; thirteen new shell plants are under construction. Canada is manufacturing the following types of shells: 40 millimeter, 18-pounder, 25-pounder, 3.7-inch, 4.5-howitzer, 4.5-quick firing, 4.5-inch 60-pounder, 4-inch, 6-inch howitzer, 9.2-inch. Existing and planned production calls for an output of two million shells per month. In guns, the production present and planned includes: Bren, 40 millimeter, Bofors barrels and guns, 3.7-inch AA, 25-pounders and carriages, Colt-Browning aircraft, Colt-Browning tank, 6-pounders, 2-pounders, 4-inch guns and mountings, 12-pounder guns and mountings, 4-inch naval guns and Lee-Enfield rifles. The Government announced on November 20 that "Canada will shortly be making practically every type of gun in use in the present war." In addition Canada is producing — or preparing to produce — small warships (181 delivered) and cargo vessels, motor trucks and cars, tanks and universal carriers, air frames, chemicals and explosives. Initial steps have been taken to launch an aëro-engine industry.

Might it not be wiser to concentrate on fewer kinds of equipment and materials, as was done in 1914-18, and produce them in large quantities? The Canadian nationalists have already answered this question with a decisive "no." Since Dunkirk they have insisted that Canada have a self-sufficient and well-rounded military establishment. They favor, of course, all possible aid to Britain; but fear has prompted them to demand a well-equipped force for home defense. Likewise they favor military collaboration with the United States, but pride has caused them to insist on an adequate defense force so that Canada can defend herself. It is largely at the insistence of this group that Canada has adopted a big-army policy (proportionately, her army is equivalent to one of nearly two million men for the United States) as well as diversity rather than specialization in her war production. Parenthetically it is interesting to note that a big-army, and all that such a policy implies, has traditionally been associated with the Imperialists. Now it has become the banner of the nationalists, the Imperialists tending to favor more specialized aid to Britain. Thus far the Canadian nationalists have had their way and there are plenty of indications that they will wage a last-ditch fight rather than see their program curtailed.

The growing diversity in Canadian war industry has received

stimulus from another direction. On numerous occasions in recent years we have heard statements that Canada might become the arsenal of the Empire, that repeated bombings of British industrial areas would result in a migration of vital war industries to other parts of the world. That migration has already begun. Britain, who is financing 70 percent of all plant construction in Canada, does not seem adverse to the mushrooming of a diversified munitions industry there. To be sure, all this is still on a small scale. Whether it increases and whether this kind of industry becomes a permanent part of the Canadian scene, rests on a number of circumstances which cannot be foreseen. It is sufficient to record that the first steps in making Canada the arsenal of the Empire have begun.

The honeymoon period in Canada's war effort is definitely over. Problems of real magnitude are rapidly reaching the point where a showdown is inevitable. First, and most pressing, is labor. Will the Government acquiesce in letting wages rise or will it stabilize wage rates? And quite apart from wage rates, how will it correct the ever-increasing labor shortage? If the Government endeavors to divert the stream of manpower which in recent months has gone to the army, there is likely to be opposition from the nationalists. From whatever source the spark may come, in one form or another Canada will have to decide which of her two war efforts will take priority in manpower, industrial resources, and raw materials. Will she produce enormous amounts of certain types of matériel for Britain, or will she spread herself — spread herself thin, perhaps — by curtailing volume so that she can produce as many different kinds of equipment as are necessary for a well-rounded home defense force? For the conclusion is inescapable that a small country such as Canada cannot produce highly fabricated equipment in both quantity and diversity.

As for the financial problem, it is not serious by itself. But in attempting to divide the burden of taxation equally among all the people, the ripples have already reached the farthest shores of the Dominion. For a more equal division of the burden presupposes a new division in the balance of power between the Dominion and the Provinces. The respective leaders will assemble in Ottawa early in the new year to debate this course. If reform is carried, it will be the greatest constitutional change in the balance of power in Canada since Confederation in 1867.

THE ANZACS MARCH AGAIN

By Donald Cowie

FIVE years ago "pure" or Christian pacifism flourished in the sheltered environment of New Zealand. The Geneva representative of the Dominion's Labor Government voted with Litvinov against Eden. In Australia, the government was conservative, but the important trades unions went on record as opposed to sending troops overseas under any circumstances. They argued particularly that every man would be needed at home to ward off invaders. And yet both extremes of opinion in each Dominion were consistently critical of the Chamberlain policy of appeasement, and hotly anxious for Czechoslovakia.

The fact was that Australians and New Zealanders did not consider, until the last moment, that there would be a war. Hitler seemed to have everything against him. Like so many others, these isolated peoples consistently underrated the European menace. But their revulsion of opinion was no less complete when Hitler did go to war.

The expressions of united loyalty and full support by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, and by the opposition parties, when Britain declared war against Germany in September 1939, were only qualified by the stipulation that "there must be no second Munich, and the present crisis must at all costs end crises" — to quote a leading newspaper. The *volte face* was complete. Everyone knew that if Hitler were not stopped, there would be an end to everything, including the British export market and the protective arm of the Fleet. It was a simple matter of self-defense, with no 1914 shouts of "Good Old England" or "Advance Australia."

Perhaps some Australians and New Zealanders, representative of vested interests, remembered that the First German War had greatly stimulated local industries and calculated that another one might mean more profits for farmers and manufacturers. When war broke out New Zealand was financially embarrassed by the expensive schemes of social reform introduced by her Labor Government, and was heading for an economic crisis. Both Dominions were finding it increasingly difficult to meet interest charges on their London debts. The war, some may have felt, might at least solve these problems. But the previous war had also left Australia and New Zealand with heavily overcapitalized industries and greatly increased internal debts, not to mention a grim gap in the ranks of their young manhood and a legacy of social unrest. It is doubtful if very many Antipodeans really welcomed the opportunity to hazard their fortunes again.

Curiously enough, however, the preliminary character of the new hostilities at first seemed to play right into the hands of those with furtive thoughts of making money from the war. The British Government expressly requested that the effort of the two Dominions be primarily an economic one. "If Britain were asked whether she preferred an infantry division or adequate arrangements for sending supplies, I know what her answer would be," said the Prime Minister of Australia. Thus arrangements were made at once for the sale to the

British Government — at good prices “for the duration” — of practically the entire Antipodean production of such items as wool, butter, meat, sugar, copper, zinc, tungsten and lead. With the assurance that all their output would be absorbed, Australia began feverishly to build factories for the production of aircraft, guns and ammunition, and shipyards for the building of small naval vessels. New Zealand was soon relieved from anxiety about financial solvency by the large payments made into her London account for the first shipments of produce to Britain. Marginal lands were brought into cultivation. There was even a little boom in business.

Both Dominions were encouraged by the British Government to think of their own defense before sending contingents overseas. Conscription for early age-groups was introduced in Australia, but the men were not to be sent out of the country unless they volunteered. New Zealand relied on voluntary recruitment, and did not make strenuous efforts to encourage even that. The British Government gave the official seal to procrastination by declaring that it was planning for a three-year war. Antipodeans cheerfully agreed that the French Army and the Maginot Line were quite strong enough to hold Hitler on land, while the mounting economic, naval and air arms of the British Commonwealth would slowly strangle him in any case. Both Dominions subscribed to the scheme for training airmen in Canada, but even this had such a long-term aspect that Australia felt free to make certain reservations and for a while to obstruct a unified effort.

As for the preliminary strategy adopted when the first military contingents were sent overseas (Christmas 1939), it had a similar convenience. The new Anzacs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) were sent to Egypt and Palestine again. They would be defending, said the pundits, their natural frontier. In the same way, those troops kept at home might be called upon to reinforce British garrisons at points round the Western Pacific such as Hong Kong and Singapore — another “first Australasian line of defense.” But Australians and New Zealanders were probably as surprised as any when their first real war shock came to them from just this sacrosanct neighborhood. When Hitler invaded Holland, it was suddenly remembered that the Dutch East Indies might prove a sore temptation to a neighboring country tacitly allied to the Axis. There was a great scare in the Antipodes, only relieved by a general chorus demanding that the *status quo* in the Indies must at all costs be preserved. For this scare succeeded in arousing Australians and New Zealanders to a keener consciousness of belligerent realities. The long period of comparative inactivity gave way to widespread criticism of all aspects of the war effort.

Recruiting in New Zealand had continued to languish. The Norwegian failure had begun to turn active criticism against the Allied war leaders. “The British Government has failed to demonstrate its competence to handle such a great and dangerous problem,” said one Australian newspaper. “Chamberlain’s complacent outlook evokes the gravest doubts throughout the Empire of the Government’s capacity to put the necessary drive into the war effort,” said another. And it is possible that such expressions of overseas opinion may have contributed the final push to Britain’s toppling Prime Minister.

After the Dutch East Indian scare, events came thick and fast: the British

Expeditionary Force was isolated in northern France and had to be evacuated; the French Army was rolled back; the Channel ports were irrevocably lost and England open to short-range bombardment; Italy came in; Paris fell; France surrendered — and Australia and New Zealand were belligerent at last.

The British people are dull and even apathetic until roused by a tangible danger. Such a rousing had brought the hitherto isolationist Dominions into the war; this new consciousness of real danger now brought them into the fight. The Labor Government of New Zealand, which had firmly pledged itself never to introduce conscription, now adopted it at once, without so much as a preliminary test of public feeling. In the same way, they set up a Council of War to conscript wealth, industry and labor, and assumed sweeping powers to requisition premises, plants and services.

Similarly the Australian labor movement, which had been dead against not only participation in an overseas war but also any form of authoritarian mobilization even for purposes of local defense, now changed its attitude completely. The Australian Amalgamated Engineering Union, one of the strongest in the country, and previously much opposed to any lowering in working standards, approached the Government with an urgent plan for fully utilizing the resources of the trades unions and mobilizing industrial man-power immediately. A few days later the Australian Government took advantage of this remarkable change to pass an Emergency Powers Act. This removed all checks on the administration's wartime initiative, gave unlimited powers to tax and take property, to direct employers and employees, and to call up and train men for the services. "I am not afraid of what the Government may do with these powers," said the Federal Labor Leader, Mr. Curtin, "I am only afraid of what the enemy may do if we do not vote with the Government." Both Dominions voted vast appropriations for increasing the number of men under arms and the number of arms factories. Brigadier-General Street, Minister for Defense, declared: "We give the mother country an open cheque to draw on Australia's man-power."

Another deceptive period of calm succeeded the fall of France. True, Japan was making ominous moves towards Indo-China; Britain herself might be invaded any day; while Italy was already marching into the desert. But fundamentally there was again no war for Australia and New Zealand to fight — save against their own dissatisfaction with themselves. Thus, for the moment, internal politics again became important. Trying to capitalize on Labor's emotional gesture of coöperation, the Prime Minister asked that party to enter his government, for production could not reach maximum pitch without the worker's help. Moreover, law required that a general election be held in September, and the Prime Minister was not altogether sure of himself and the talkative country.

But the Labor Party refused to play ball on these terms. It had a clear memory of what had happened to other Labor Parties in British countries when they had entered coalition governments. It was shortly confirmed in this attitude by an unfortunate accident which befell a plane-load of Cabinet Ministers just outside the Federal capital one day in August. Mr. Fairbairn, the energetic Air Minister, Brigadier Street, Minister for the Army, and Sir Henry Gullett, Minister for External Affairs, were among those killed; and the

Government's fighting team was sadly reduced as a result. The forthcoming elections, thought the Opposition covertly, now offered it a great chance.

Meanwhile there were some sparks of martial news to keep the war interest alive. A small number of Australian and New Zealand soldiers had arrived in England, presumably as a token payment and to give them something to write home about. Others were sent to reinforce the army waiting in the Middle East, where its strategy had been thrown out of gear by the defection of the French in Syria and North Africa. Australians and New Zealanders alike were performing great deeds of valor with the Royal Air Force, first over the English Channel, then above the balloons of London. An Australian cruiser, the *Sydney*, old and slow, won a brilliant victory in the Mediterranean by sinking the newer and faster *Bartolommeo Colleoni*. A liner struck a mine in the Tasman Sea, between Australia and New Zealand, sank, and started all kinds of rumors.

But the growing menace of Japan should have dominated the stage. That it did not is a final testimony to the pachydermatous quality of well-fed democracies. In Australia the leaders appreciated the danger; but the people were getting tired of scares, and were more exercised over the introduction of petrol rationing. They clearly were in a mood for a general election, even though an electoral appeal at that moment must inevitably embarrass the Government's foreign policy. When the Australian people began to realize their mistake, it was too late, with the result that the election itself was an inconclusive farce. The Government was left with just sufficient strength to keep it alive and the Opposition was given just enough hope to maintain its obduracy. Obviously the electorate had gone so far, then wavered — or else had decided at the last moment that it was not interested and would prefer to have no government at all.

All the indications point to an anxious future for Australia and New Zealand. They have the flower of their young and sparse manhood in the direct path of Hitler and Mussolini. Of Australia's 190,000 men under arms, over two divisions are now overseas. Within a year approximately 100,000 Australians are expected to be fighting away from home. The Dominion could eventually mobilize about a million men from its total population of seven million. The air force is now some 11,000 strong and the navy about 11,600. New Zealand has approximately 81,000 men under arms, of whom about 23,000 are overseas. Her military capacity is about 250,000 men. Her air and naval forces are negligible in quantity but important in quality, as was shown by the performance of the New Zealanders on the cruiser *Achilles* in the Battle of the River Plate.

The dictators must strike towards Suez if they are to break away from the British death-grapple. The Antipodes may thus at any moment be fighting desperately at the spearhead of a war many thousands of miles away, and desperately reinforcing their fighting elements there. Yet the real danger to Australia and New Zealand is Japan's steady penetration southward towards those East Indian supplies over which it must sooner or later gain control. Once established in Malaya, Java, Madura, Sumatra, the Japanese would be able to consolidate against all eventualities. And to the more clear-thinking of Australians and New Zealanders there seems to be no reason why Japan should not conquer all the East Indies — no reason, that is, except the United States of America.

The fact is that Britain could not, by the naval and military textbook, prevent Japan from doing that without sending very strong naval and air forces from Europe. She cannot spare such forces now, and it is doubtful whether she can do so for a long time. Therefore, the only hope for the East Indies if Japan sails south — and the only hope for Australia and New Zealand in the long run — is that the United States may intervene promptly with its strong navy. If an agreement were to be made by which the United States would be permitted to use the bases at Auckland, Sydney, Darwin, Singapore and perhaps certain Pacific islands, Japan might think again. Such arrangements are indeed said now to be under discussion.

It may hearten the friends of all good pachyderms to know that even in the midst of this rather desperate bid for American support in the Pacific, some Australians and New Zealanders are thinking in terms of a wider future. They see, perhaps, an eventual world of regional as opposed to national groupings, and the germ of a plan for their own region in the present hurried effort to effect coöperation with America. As for the short-term effects of the war upon their young countries, they can already foresee what some of them will be.

Many of these effects, particularly the really short-term ones, may not appear bad. Both Australia and New Zealand may to a certain extent be released from the economic thralldom of London. To pay for Antipodean products Britain may, in effect, have to remit some of the debts that have saddled these young countries from the beginning. They will also have fine new industries. The extent of the arms drive in Australasia is already considerable. This year Australia alone is spending about 440 million dollars on defense, compared with the annual average of about 30 million before 1937. Most of the money is earmarked for equipment, and most of that is being produced in local factories. Already the big munitions works are planning to supply British forces in other parts of the Southern Hemisphere. Last fall representatives of Australia and New Zealand attended a conference in India to arrange a mutual exchange of such products. After the war, shrewd men see, the former agricultural annexes of Britain will need Manchester, Birmingham and Glasgow no longer; indeed, they will be sturdy and well-equipped world competitors of those chastened towns.

Not a few Australians and New Zealanders today, at the threshold of a decisive struggle for existence, have the audacity to wonder if their present parlous situation may not itself contain the seeds of hope. Should the United States collaborate with them for defense, why should she not coöperate later in peaceful reconstruction? In the past, Australia and New Zealand have found their market in a little country on the opposite side of the world. But their natural economic sphere is nearer home. Does not this fact offer a firm basis on which to build close collaboration, economic and political, with other countries on the Pacific?

SOUTH AFRICA AT WAR

By G. H. Calpin

IN South Africa we have two great problems of a racial nature. There is the conflict between the Boer and the Briton, or if you prefer, between the Afrikaans-speaking and the English-speaking South Africans. Then there is the conflict between white and black, the problem of two million Europeans seeking to postpone equality for eight million natives and a quarter million Indians.

The Afrikaner, the lineal descendant of the Dutch pioneers, differs essentially from the Englishman, whether of early stock or recently arrived. In character and outlook he resembles a member of some Old Testament tribe. He comes of pastoral stock, he has relied upon religious leadership through many generations, and he looks upon politics as almost synonymous with religion. In their isolation from the rest of the world the Afrikaners have developed an almost fanatical determination not to allow others to share in the formulation or direction of their race policy. Only reluctantly can they bring themselves to coöperate with the British. But it would be a mistake to assume that this conflict is merely an expression of racial differences or of resentment at hardships suffered at British hands. After all, the victors in the Boer War exercised their authority with remarkable restraint, as most Boers now freely admit; and less than eight years after the close of the struggle South Africa had already become a self-governing Dominion. We must therefore seek other causes if we are to explain the deep antagonism between the two peoples.

There is, for instance, the wide difference in their attitude towards the natives and other non-Europeans. The mentality of the Afrikaners allows no room for liberalism towards colored peoples. In their eyes white supremacy is the touchstone of all action, and from early times they have looked with grave suspicion upon the more liberal tendencies of the British in native affairs. This fundamental difference dominates South African politics. It also has acute economic and social implications. The Union's labor problem, for instance, is complicated by the presence of a reservoir of eight million blacks who can be drawn upon by agriculture, mining, and the country's growing industries.

Another important factor is the strong attraction which political life has for the Afrikaner. In his defense, it must be said that he shows a considerable facility for politics. For its size, South Africa has thrown up quite a number of statesmen of wide reputation; and with the exception of Cecil Rhodes they have all been Afrikaners — Kruger, Botha, Smuts, Hertzog. The British have made their contribution in South Africa almost wholly in commerce, industry, banking and the like. These are only two of the lines of cleavage between the two branches of the white race in South Africa. There are others in language, religion, cultural background. The dual nature of the nation is also reflected in the insistence upon two official languages, the two songs that serve as national anthems, and the two flags that express respective loyalties.

By 1932, when the depression was reaching its very bottom, the conflict between Afrikaner and Britisher had to give way to immediate coöperation in order to save the country from economic collapse. Necessity and political realism called for the institution of a coalition government and for the crea-

tion of a new party which the overwhelming majority of the country, Boer and Briton, could support. The Hertzog Government which issued from this coalition — or Fusion as it was called — rewarded the country's confidence by the enactment of a spate of social and economic legislation.

General Hertzog became Prime Minister of the Fusion Government in the year Hitler acquired power in Germany. Under him South Africa pursued a policy emphasizing the Union's independent sovereignty within the Empire. The urgency of the European situation was not yet so imperative as to create dissension within the ranks of the coalition. Furthermore, the rising tide of world prosperity in the early thirties served as an impetus to coöperation among Cabinet Ministers as divergent in outlook as J. H. Hofmeyr, a utopian liberal, and Oswald Pirow, a "realist" conservative. Nevertheless, from each of the parties that had joined to form the Fusion Party, small blocs broke away to organize groups of their own. A few British diehards from the fringe of General Smuts' South African Party constituted themselves the Dominion Party under Colonel Stallard. The remnants of the Nationalist Party accepted the leadership of Dr. Malan, one of General Hertzog's former lieutenants, and proclaimed a policy of republicanism and rabid nationalism.

In the field of foreign relations the policy of the Union coincided with that of Britain in 1938 and early 1939. The Hertzog Government supported Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. This policy was reënforced as a result of the European trip of Mr. Pirow, Minister of Defense, a purposeful person of German extraction with a sympathy for the totalitarian order. On this trip, he met among others Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini.

However, the steady deterioration of the European situation, without any satisfactory statement from General Hertzog as to his attitude towards it, created doubts among many of his own supporters and in the Dominion Party; while among the purified Nationalists it gave rise to suspicions that the General was now an instrument of British policy. The coincidence of the Hertzog policy and the Chamberlain policy vanished when Britain guaranteed Poland. This was interpreted in South Africa as handing British destinies over to the decision of Warsaw and brought about a distinct change in the Union's foreign relations. Thenceforward General Hertzog answered questions in the Legislative Assembly by declaring that, when the question of peace and war arose "Parliament will decide," and that in the meantime "South Africa's interests are not affected by happenings in Europe."

The slogan "Parliament will decide" failed to placate the ultra-British section or to allay the suspicions of the purified Nationalists. There was a tendency for people to return to their racial allegiances. The approaching crisis found no helpful guidance from the Prime Minister, and uncertainty was the keynote of public comment after Mr. Chamberlain announced that Britain was at war. The Union Parliament hastily reassembled in entire ignorance of the General's intentions. "It is the greatest of libels to say that General Hertzog is out for neutrality," said one Minister three days before his leader rose in Parliament to advise it. The moment for Parliament to decide had arrived. It would decide on the basis of whether the war affected South African interests so vitally that they could only be defended by entering it.

General Hertzog insisted that South Africa, as an independent sovereign

state, possessed the inviolate right of decision. The Afrikaner nation, he argued, had no linguistic, racial or sentimental ties with Britain. This war was a war in which another nation was trying to break the shackles of a treaty ("that monster Versailles"). The Afrikaner sympathized with that desire, even though he had no concern with the details involved. The Union of South Africa, General Hertzog continued, lacked maturity in the sense that the vast majority of its English-speaking people voted, not on the basis of an allegiance to South Africa, but out of a devotion to their homeland, Britain.

General Smuts recalled Parliament to the realities of the situation and it decided by a majority of thirteen to turn Hertzog out and put Smuts in. South Africa stood by Britain. The great experiment of "Fusion" was ended.

General Smuts immediately had to face the problem of what was to be the extent of South Africa's participation in the war. In armament, materials and equipment the country was far below the level required for safety, and prolonged debates on various war measures served only to emphasize the natural weaknesses of South Africa and its total inability to send expeditionary forces overseas. The question naturally arose as to whether the Union's strategic frontier lies on the Limpopo, the Zambezi, or the Nile. At present many oppositionists are against even sending troops to the defense of Rhodesia or Kenya. They simply have not yet grasped the realities of a total war.

Not since the Boer War has there been a greater determination among the Afrikaners to uphold their independence and maintain their national traditions. In forwarding this resolve, the *predikant* of the Dutch Reformed Church interprets God's command as Paul Kruger did a half century ago. Isolationist societies among the Afrikaners are also taking on a deeper significance. One of these is the Ossewa Brandwag (Sentinels of the Ox Wagon), an organization of military complexion designed to sustain and extend Voortrekker ideals of liberty and independence. To religious fervor and political zeal it has added economic action: it seeks to persuade its members to buy only from approved traders having the Ossewa Brandwag sign and to boycott "foreign" merchants. Such organizations are the outward signs of an inner conflict, not only with Britain but with the whole world. In weighing their import we must remember that sixty percent of the Union's European population of two millions is of Afrikaans descent, and that not only is the English stock in the minority, but its birthrate is lower.

The immediate future may be secure enough in the hands of General Smuts, who finds an ally in the return of prosperity, particularly in the gold mining districts of the Rand. But no amount of prosperity or industrial expansion is likely to erase from the mind of the Nationalist Party the conviction that South Africa was dragged into war at the heels of British jingos.

Despite the intensity of division — and it is present even between the Loyal Dutch, as the Afrikaner supporters of General Smuts are called, and the extreme Nationalists — one distinct advance in method can be recorded. In 1914 the extremists went into open rebellion to shake off the British yoke and establish a republic. In 1939 their leaders decided to rely on constitutional means. They are supported by a strong Afrikaner press and there are indications that shortly they will establish an English newspaper.

No account of the South African scene can neglect to mention the awakening

Bantu. The political conflict passes him by; yet all the time he is there, in his millions, strangely loyal to the British Crown, working out an unknown destiny as the hewer of wood and the drawer of water for his European overlord.

From the start of the present war General Smuts probably had the support of 60 percent of the population. This figure was materially increased by the invasion of Holland. The war moved still nearer to Africa when Mussolini took a hand in it directly. In this connection the support which the Hertzog Ministry had given to the League effort to halt Italian aggression in Ethiopia was recalled, and the arguments used at that time by the Republican Nationalists were now turned back upon themselves. As the only sovereign state in Africa, the Union evidently has a special interest in the future of all the African colonies. It was immediately recognized that Mussolini's declaration of war carried a threat to the Union's continental position.

Today the Union has upwards of 100,000 men under arms. About half of these are stationed in Kenya, ready either for embarkation or to meet any offshoot of the main Italian drive into Egypt. The Air Force, which is growing rapidly, has been sharing honors with the British squadrons in attacks upon Ethiopia and British Somaliland, now under Italian occupation. The question of conscription has not yet been raised in Parliament. In view of the political division, it is not likely to be; nor is there any need that it should. Men are coming forward under the various voluntary schemes projected by the Government for the fighting forces and for industry. It is in the production field that the Government has to put forth its greatest efforts.

South Africa has but recently engaged in the manufacture of pursuit planes and cannot claim to be even approximately self-sufficient in the production of armaments. Previous sources of supply in France are now denied her. Britain needs her own production herself. In this situation the manufacture of armored cars, guns and the other paraphernalia of modern war has been rapidly extended in South Africa under the direction of a most efficiently directed National Supplies Board. As a result, the advance guard of South Africa's army in Kenya is efficiently equipped. Further, thanks to the British Navy the seaways between Cape Town and America remain free of major dangers. This is of special importance because South Africa lies outside the zone forbidden to American shipping. At the time of writing, a South African purchasing mission is visiting the United States.

Thus it can be said that many of the earlier difficulties due to the political divisions in the country and its state of unpreparedness are disappearing. The Government has recently been granted extensive emergency powers by Parliament. The Prime Minister has been able to disarm his opponents by ordering the collection of all privately owned rifles. His enemies may continue "to writhe like a toad under the harrow," but it is doubtful whether they will be able to obstruct the purposes of the majority of the nation. Not long ago General Smuts said that the world had given him "all he wished for." In 1900 he had led a Boer Commando against the British; in 1914 he was "the handyman of the British Empire." In 1940 he again upholds the cause of Britain. A statesman of international stature, he is yet a man without honor among many of his own people.

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By Robert Gale Woolbert

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This up-to-date version of Ploetz's "Epitome," a classic work of reference, represents a vast improvement over previous editions. Fifteen other scholars assisted the general editor, all but two of them connected with Harvard University.

SPIRITUAL VALUES AND WORLD AFFAIRS. BY SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 177 p. \$3.00.

Lectures delivered at Oxford a year ago in which the author examines the place of religious and moral issues in the contemporary world. He does not believe that religion and politics can be put into separate compartments.

THE CLASH OF POLITICAL IDEALS. BY ALBERT R. CHANDLER. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 273 p. \$2.50.

Selected and annotated readings on "democracy, Communism and the totalitarian states."

GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNED. BY R. H. S. CROSSMAN. New York: Putnam, 1940, 306 p. \$3.00.

A readable treatise on the rise of the nation-state and on the movements which aim at reforming or destroying it, by a former Fellow of New College at Oxford.

THE THREE DICTATORS: MUSSOLINI, STALIN, HITLER. BY FRANK OWEN. London: Allen and Unwin, 1940, 266 p. 7/6.

Well-written but not profound.

RULERS OF THE WORLD. BY MAURICE CRAIN. New York: Crowell, 1940, 335 p. \$2.50.

Short biographies of fifteen of the world's most prominent rulers and statesmen, with special attention to their boyhoods.

REVOLUTION: WHY, HOW, WHEN? BY ROBERT HUNTER. New York: Harper, 1940, 385 p. \$3.00.

An inquiry into the causes, economic and political, of revolutions and an analysis of their current manifestations.

WHAT'S DEMOCRACY TO YOU? BY JOSEPH GOLLOMB. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 118 p. \$1.75.

A hard-hitting tract for the times.

INTERNATIONAL NEWS AND THE PRESS. COMPILED BY RALPH O. NAFZIGER. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1940, 193 p. \$3.75.

An annotated bibliography of documents, books, pamphlets, articles and studies concerning the organization of news gathering services and the foreign press.

PUBLICITY AND DIPLOMACY. BY ORON JAMES HALE. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 486 p. \$4.00.

A painstaking historical monograph "with special reference to England and Germany 1890-1914," by an associate professor of history in the University of Virginia. **PEACEFUL CHANGE AND THE COLONIAL PROBLEM.** By BRYCE WOOD. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 166 p. \$2.00.

Written before the outbreak of war, this book examines the nature and limits of the method of peaceful change and discusses at some length British reactions to Germany's colonial claims.

LES EMPIRES COLONIAUX. By M. PERNOT, A. SIEGFRIED, AND OTHERS. Paris: Alcan, 1940, 220 p. Fr. 20.

Lectures on the German, British, French and Italian colonial empires.

SUEZ AND PANAMA. By ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 400 p. \$3.00.

The history and present significance of the two great canals vividly set forth by a well-known French authority.

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES. By S. WHITTEMORE BOGGS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 272 p. \$3.25.

An authoritative treatise on the classification of boundaries, their function in the life of nations, and the various problems they create or solve. The author is Geographer to the Department of State. There are numerous illustrations and maps, three appendices and a bibliography.

ISLANDS OF ADVENTURE. By KARL BAARSLAG. New York: Farrar, 1940, 338 p. \$3.00.

A fascinating book full of useful information about many out-of-the-way islands, some of which in the present world conflict have taken on considerable strategic importance.

1940 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR. EDITED BY WALTER YUST. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1940, 748 p. \$10.00.

An illustrated, cross-indexed record of world events during 1939.

THE PENGUIN POLITICAL DICTIONARY. COMPILED BY WALTER THEIMER. New York: Penguin, 1940, 127 p. 25 cents.

A handy little reference book, with maps.

HISTORICAL TABLES. By S. H. STEINBERG. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 256 p. \$3.50.

World history organized in six parallel chronological columns.

THE WORLD SINCE 1914. By WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 1,024 p. \$5.00.

A standard reference text brought up to date.

CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By WALTER R. SHARP AND GRAYSON KIRK. New York: Farrar, 1940, 840 p. \$4.00.

A textbook, less cut and dried than the average.

THE WORLD OVER IN 1939. EDITED BY LEON BRYCE BLOCH AND CHARLES ANGOFF. New York: Harrison-Hilton Books, 1940, 918 p. \$4.00.

To prepare a detailed and reliable chronology for such a momentous year as 1939 and publish it early in 1940 would be to accomplish the almost impossible. This book, the second in a series prepared by the editors of "The Living Age," is an attempt to perform this miracle. The authors would have been more successful, perhaps, if they had either correlated their interpretative commentary more closely with their chronology, or better still, had welded the two together.

PUBLIC POLICY. EDITED BY C. J. FRIEDRICH AND EDWARD S. MASON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 404 p. \$3.50.

This first yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard contains eleven scholarly essays on a variety of subjects.

DECISIVE BATTLES. BY J. F. C. FULLER. New York: Scribner, 1940, 1060 p. \$4.50.

Thirty-seven crucial battles and campaigns from 331 B.C. to 1938 A.D. reenacted and analyzed by a British officer.

ROOTS OF STRATEGY. EDITED BY MAJOR THOMAS R. PHILLIPS. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 448 p. \$2.50.

Five famous classics on strategy with comments by a leading American military writer.

TECHNIQUE OF MODERN ARMS. BY COLONEL HOLLIS LER. MULLER. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 448 p. \$3.00.

A well-organized manual full of useful information.

MANEUVER IN WAR. BY LIEUT. COL. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1939, 286 p. \$3.00.

An analytical and historical study, illustrated by numerous sketches.

AIRPOWER. BY MAJOR AL WILLIAMS. New York: Coward-McCann, 1940, 433 p. \$3.50.

A passionate believer in the supremacy of modern air power argues his case on the basis of the lessons of the present war.

CHEMISTRY IN WARFARE: ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. BY F. A. HESSEL AND OTHERS. New York: Hastings House, 1940, 164 p. \$2.00.

A not-too-technical description of the chemist's rôle.

General: Economic and Social

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. BY HERBERT FEIS. New York: Harper, 1940, 132 p. \$2.00.

From many years of everyday contact with the economic aspects of American foreign policy Dr. Feis has distilled his well-balanced judgments. He finds the causes of the breakdown of nineteenth century patterns of international trade and finance in: (1) the uncertain swings of the business cycle; (2) the resistance of vested interests in this and other countries to liberal policies; and (3) the shock of violent political changes. Until security returns to the international scene, American trade policy must take on the character of a weapon of national defense. Long-run ideals, although not discarded, must give way for the moment to realistic opportunism. In a style always interesting, and at times eloquent, Dr. Feis has clarified the present position of the United States in world affairs, and furnishes guideposts to help the discerning reader in charting the probable future course of American policy.

REPARATION AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. BY PHILIP MASON BURNETT. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 2 v. \$15.00.

An historical monograph of fundamental importance. Over four-fifths of the work consists of documents — the majority hitherto unpublished.

IDLE MONEY, IDLE MEN. BY STUART CHASE. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 252 p. \$2.00.

Essays on current economic problems, national and international.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE PRACTICE AND POLICY. BY FRANK A. SOUTHARD, JR., AND OTHERS. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1940, 215 p. \$2.50.

An introduction to the mechanics of foreign exchange, by a professor of economics at Cornell University.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE. BY F. J. DOCKER. New York: Chemical Publishing Company, 1940, 326 p. \$6.00.

An introduction to the complexities of international monetary problems intended for general reference.

CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. BY HEINRICH HEUSER. Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1939, 282 p. \$3.50.

The problem viewed both theoretically and practically.

WORLD WHEAT PLANNING AND ECONOMIC PLANNING IN GENERAL. BY PAUL DE HEVESY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 912 p. \$12.00.

A Hungarian diplomat proposes a detailed scheme for bringing wheat production and consumption into balance.

WHALE OIL. BY KARL BRANDT. Stanford University: Food Research Institute, 1940, 264 p. \$3.00.

An economic analysis of an international industry of strategic importance.

POPULATION: POLICIES AND MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE. BY D. V. GLASS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 490 p. \$6.00.

Policies and trends subjected to technical analysis by an English expert.

POPULATION: A PROBLEM FOR DEMOCRACY. BY GUNNAR MYRDAL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 237 p. \$2.00.

The 1938 Godkin lectures at Harvard University.

THE RAPE OF THE MASSES. BY SERGE CHAKOTIN. New York: Alliance, 1940, 310 p. \$3.00.

A follower of Pavlov outlines a social psychology in which biological processes are emphasized.

CAN CHRISTIANITY SAVE CIVILIZATION? BY WALTER MARSHALL HORTON. New York: Harper, 1940, 271 p. \$2.00.

A forthright book challenging Christianity and its churches to bring about a moral rebirth of the world.

THE JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO CIVILIZATION. BY CECIL ROTH. New York: Harper, 1940, 420 p. \$2.00.

The historic rôle of the Jews in the various arts and professions.

REFUGEES: A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION SINCE SEPTEMBER 1938. BY SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 114 p. \$1.25.

A continuation of the author's previous report, "The Refugee Problem."

RACE, LANGUAGE AND CULTURE. BY FRANZ BOAS. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 647 p. \$5.00.

Sixty-three essays published between 1887 and 1937 on a variety of topics by an outstanding American anthropologist.

RADIO AND THE PRINTED PAGE. BY PAUL F. LAZARSFELD. New York: Duell, 1940, 354 p. \$4.00.

A summary of recent investigations, by the Director of the Office of Radio Research at Columbia University.

THE INVASION FROM MARS. BY HADLEY CANTRIL. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940, 228 p. \$2.50.

A case study in mass psychology based on Orson Welles' broadcast of a radio adaptation of H. G. Wells' "The War of the Worlds." The author is an associate professor of psychology at Princeton.

The Second World War

COMMENT LA GUERRE A ÉCLATÉ. BY GEORGES BATAULT. Paris: Union Latine d'Éditions, 1940, 380 p. Fr. 70.

This work, consisting largely of quotations from the French Yellow Book, in no way contributes to our knowledge.

THE WAR: FIRST YEAR. BY EDGAR MCINNIS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 312 p. \$1.50.

A lively, balanced, chronological narrative, by a member of the history department at New York University.

HITLER'S WAR AND EASTERN EUROPE. BY M. PHILIPS PRICE. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 160 p. \$1.25.

A brief survey of the rôle of Eastern Europe in recent history.

POLISH PROFILE. BY VIRGILIA SAPIEHA. New York: Carrick and Evans, 1940, 319 p. \$2.50.

The American wife of a Polish aristocrat portrays her life in her adopted country before the present war and during her escape from the combined Nazi-Soviet invasion.

JOURNAL D'UN DÉFENSEUR DE VARSOVIE. BY CDT. SOWINSKI. Paris: Grasset, 1940, 167 p. Fr. 15.

A graphic day-by-day account of the siege by a Polish officer.

LE OPERAZIONI MILITARI IN POLONIA E IN OCCIDENTE. BY GENERAL OTTAVIO ZOPPI. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1940, 170 p. L. 13.

An analysis of the military phases of the first month of war (September 1939).

MUST THE WAR SPREAD? BY D. N. PRITT. New York: Penguin, 1940, 256 p. 25 cents.

A Labor M. P. "exposes" the deep desire of the British ruling class to switch the war against Hitler into one against Soviet Russia, with the Nazis as Britain's ally. Mr. Pritt upholds Russia's "crusade" to free the Finns from the "Fascist yoke."

THIS PECULIAR WAR. BY A. W. ZELOMEK. New York: International Statistical Bureau, 1940, 143 p. \$2.00.

An economist explains the early stages of the war.

I SAW IT HAPPEN IN NORWAY. BY CARL J. HAMBRO. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 219 p. \$2.50.

A circumstantial eyewitness account of the Nazi invasion of Norway, by the President of the Norwegian Parliament.

L'ALLEMAGNE FACE A LA GUERRE TOTALE. BY GENERAL SERRIGNY. Paris: Grasset, 1940, 245 p. Fr. 21.

Written during the Finnish War but before the Blitzkrieg in the West, this book is interesting proof of the way Germany's striking and holding power was underestimated in France.

TRAGEDY IN FRANCE. BY ANDRÉ MAUROIS. New York: Harper, 1940, 255 p. \$2.00.

Dramatic episodes in the conflict poignantly narrated by one of France's outstanding literary men.

CHRONOLOGY OF FAILURE. BY HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 202 p. \$1.50.

A revised version of the author's day-by-day story of "The Downfall of France," which appeared in the October 1940 issue of *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, together with new chapters analyzing the causes of the catastrophe and pointing out American lessons.

I SAW FRANCE FALL: WILL SHE RISE AGAIN? BY RENÉ DE CHAMBRUN. New York: Morrow, 1940, 216 p. \$2.50.

A vivid account of the Allied advance into Belgium and of the subsequent fighting, down to Dunkirk, rather marred by biased political comments.

WHY FRANCE LOST THE WAR. BY A. REITHINGER. New York: Veritas, 1940, 75 p. \$1.25.

"A biologic and economic survey" written before the collapse of France with the apparent intent of persuading Americans not to support that country.

DE GAULLE AND THE COMING INVASION OF GERMANY. BY JAMES MARLOW. New York: Dutton, 1940, 95 p. \$1.00.

A hasty summary of De Gaulle's career, emphasizing his foresight in predicting the mechanized nature of the present war and concluding with an optimistic prophecy of eventual victory for "Free France."

JAPAN SURVEYS THE EUROPEAN WAR. Tokyo: Tokyo Press Club, 1940, 88 p.

A representative collection of opinions of Japanese writers and of newspaper editorials.

VON DER EIDGENÖSSISCHEN ZUR EUROPÄISCHEN FÖDERATION. BY HANS BAUER AND H. G. RITZEL. New York: Europa Verlag, 1940, 157 p. Swiss Frs. 4.50.

A pattern for a peaceful and federated Europe, drawn largely from Swiss experience.

The United States

DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY. EDITED BY JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS AND A. V. COLEMAN. New York: Scribner, 1940, 6 v. \$60.00.

The publication of this comprehensive work answers a long-felt want of both specialists and general readers. A distinguished list of editorial advisers and over one thousand competent contributors insure that the best of American historical scholarship has gone into these volumes. Readers will find that questions of foreign policy are well represented among the items. The sixth (index) volume is promised for the near future.

THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT. BY RALPH H. GABRIEL. New York: Ronald, 1940, 452 p. \$4.00.

A record and interpretation of the metamorphosis of American ideas, beliefs, philosophies — economic, social and otherwise — since 1815, by the Larned Professor of American History at Yale University.

NEW WORLD CHALLENGE TO IMPERIALISM. BY M. E. TRACY. New York: Coward-McCann, 1940, 395 p. \$3.50.

The first part of this book contains an elementary, and at times naïve, interpretation of the rise of modern European colonial empires; the second is devoted to a description of the internal and foreign policies of the American republics. Mr. Tracy finds that the Old and New Worlds are divided by their antithetical ideas on imperialism.

THE AMERICAN CHOICE. BY HENRY A. WALLACE. New York: Reynal, 1940, 145 p. \$1.00.

Rather hastily composed but nonetheless clear-sighted comments on America's economic position in a world where free trade and free men are rapidly disappearing.

THE DYNAMICS OF WAR AND REVOLUTION. BY LAWRENCE DENNIS. New York: Weekly Foreign Letter, 1940, 259 p. \$3.00.

An American Fascist, formerly in the diplomatic service, paints a highly unconventional picture of this country's rôle in contemporary world politics.

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF HERBERT HOOVER, 1929-1933. BY WILLIAM STARR MYERS. New York: Scribner, 1940, 259 p. \$2.50.

A sympathetic review, by a professor of politics at Princeton University, based partially on hitherto unpublished papers in Mr. Hoover's possession.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA. EDITED BY PAUL HIBBERT CLYDE. Durham: Duke University Press, 1940, 321 p. \$3.50.

Documents, with brief commentaries, covering the period 1839-1939.

REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. BY WILLIAM C. BULLITT. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 29 p. 50 cents.

The text of Ambassador Bullitt's address before the American Philosophical Society in August 1940 calling upon the American people to awake to the danger of a Nazi invasion before it is too late. He draws upon the experience of France to drive his point home.

DEMOCRACY AND THE THIRD TERM. BY FRED RODELL. New York: Howell, Soskin, 1940, 129 p. \$1.50.

An objective exploration into the history of the issue.

COUNTRY SQUIRE IN THE WHITE HOUSE. BY JOHN T. FLYNN. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 131 p. \$1.00.

Mr. Flynn acquired his reputation as a critic of capitalist economics. When he expands into the field of politics, and especially international politics — as he does in this sketchy survey of President Roosevelt's career — he displays considerable naïveté and prejudice.

ACROSS THE BUSY YEARS. BY NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER. New York: Scribner, 1939-40, 2 v. \$7.50.

As President of Columbia University, as Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and as a man of wide political interests both in America and abroad, Dr. Butler has been intimately associated with the leading movements and personages of the world during the last half century. In these two readable volumes he gives us a delightful account of his multifarious activities.

M-DAY AND WHAT IT MEANS TO YOU. BY LEO M. CHERNE. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 103 p. \$1.00.

Practical advice to the individual and the business man, some of it already outmoded by recent legislation.

CONSCRIPTION AND AMERICA. BY EDWARD A. FITZPATRICK. Milwaukee: Richard Publishing Company, 1940, 153 p. \$1.80.

Lessons to be learned from the First World War.

THE FIFTH COLUMN IS HERE. BY GEORGE BRITT. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1940, 124 p. \$1.00.

A disturbing exposé of the methods and aims of the Nazi and Fascist organizations which the author, a special writer for the *New York World-Telegram*, finds are honeycombing America.

S-2 IN ACTION. BY SHIPLEY THOMAS. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 128 p. \$1.50.

A reserve officer in the Military Intelligence service explains its function and operation.

THE TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM. BY LOUIS M. HACKER. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 460 p. \$3.00.

An interpretation of American economic history by a professor in Columbia University.

TRADE AGREEMENTS. BY JOHN DAY LARKIN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 135 p. \$1.00.

An able and scholarly defense of the Trade Agreements Act against the charge that it is unconstitutional and undemocratic.

GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE. BY LEVERETT S. LYON AND OTHERS. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1939-40, 2 v. \$6.50.

These two scholarly, closely-packed volumes provide detailed and objective answers to most of the questions now being raised in regard to the relation of the United States Government towards private business, labor and the individual citizen.

FEDERAL REGULATORY ACTION AND CONTROL. BY FREDERICK F. BLACHLY AND MIRIAM E. OATMAN. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940, 356 p. \$3.00.

A thorough and objective study in administrative law and judicial procedure.

GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION. BY ARTHUR E. BURNS AND DONALD S. WATSON. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940, 176 p. \$2.50.

The authors believe that even larger expenditures are now called for as a result of the war.

THE FAT YEARS AND THE LEAN. BY BRUCE MINTON AND JOHN STUART. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 454 p. \$3.75.

A weird but orthodox Communist interpretation of American history since the First World War.

TOO BIG. BY MORRIS L. ERNST. Boston: Little, Brown, 1940, 314 p. \$2.75.

A well-known New York lawyer finds our big corporations, our big cities and the Federal Government too big to be economically or socially useful.

THE AVIATION BUSINESS, FROM KITTY HAWK TO WALL STREET. BY ELSBETH E. FREUDENTHAL. New York: Vanguard, 1940, 342 p. \$3.00.

A breezy history of commercial flying and airplane manufacturing in the United States.

ARCTIC GATEWAY. BY FLORENCE HAYES. New York: Friendship Press, 1940, 132 p. \$1.00.

Word pictures of our Alaskan outpost.

THE AMERICAN EMPIRE. EDITED BY WILLIAM H. HAAS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940, 408 p. \$4.00.

Informative essays on the historical, political and economic aspects of American "colonial policy." A very useful book that will answer a real need.

Western Europe

FASI DI STORIA EUROPEA. BY PIETRO SILVA. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1940, 300 p. L. 21.

Essays on various phases of modern European history by a recognized Italian authority.

FRANCE UNDER THE REPUBLIC. BY D. W. BROGAN. New York: Harper, 1940, 744 p. \$5.00.

For many years scholars and general readers have felt the serious lack of a sound and intelligible history of the Third Republic. Their prayers have now been answered to a large extent by Professor Brogan's authoritative book. Though written before the French collapse, this volume clearly exposes the weaknesses in France's public structure that helped produce the fall.

CLEMENCEAU. BY LÉON DAUDET. London: Hodge, 1940, 296 p. 12/6.

A Royalist, long editor of *L'Action Française*, chooses to forget the Clemenceau who loved freedom and the Republic and to remember only the dictatorial Clemenceau who saved France in 1917-18.

LA BARRIÈRE DU RHIN ET LES DROITS DE LA FRANCE. BY RAYMOND RECOULY. Paris: Éditions de France, 1940, 110 p. Fr. 10.

Chapters on Franco-German history, well written but not particularly revelatory.

DIE FRANZÖSISCHE SCHULE IM DIENSTE DER VÖLKERVERHETZUNG. BY MATTHIAS SCHWABE. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1940, 82 p. M. 1.80.

Typical Nazi "scholarship" in the service of propaganda.

BELGIAN RURAL COOPERATION. BY EVA J. ROSS. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1940, 194 p. \$4.50.

A scholarly study based upon personal investigation into the social and economic life of the Belgian people.

HOUSING IN SCANDINAVIA. BY JOHN GRAHAM, JR. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940, 223 p. \$2.50.

What America can learn from Scandinavian experience.

THEY WANTED WAR. BY OTTO D. TOLISCHUS. New York: Reynal, 1940, 340 p. \$3.00.

No one is better informed about the real nature of Nazi Germany than Otto Tolischus, as readers of his dispatches in the *New York Times* are well aware. This book, consisting largely of passages from these dispatches, is the most convincing work on Germany that has appeared in recent years.

GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. BY F. J. C. HEARNshaw. London: Chambers, 1940, 288 p. 7/6.

An English historian shows that the German people have a consistent record for supporting leaders and adventurers who promise to lead them to conquest.

CAESARS IN GOOSE STEP. BY WILLIAM D. BAYLES. New York: Harper, 1940, 262 p. \$3.00.

Candid pen portraits of Hitler and his principal collaborators and generals, in which new light is thrown on the inner workings and objectives of the Nazi régime.

INTO THE DARKNESS. BY LOTHROP STODDARD. New York: Duell, 1940, 311 p. \$2.75.

Mr. Stoddard visited Germany during the "phony" stage of the war last winter and came away tremendously impressed with the efficiency, organization and driving power of the "New Sparta" — qualities which he thinks the American people might well imitate.

THE GERMAN PEOPLE VERSUS HITLER. BY HEINRICH FRAENKEL. London: Allen and Unwin, 1940, 370 p. 10/6.

An anti-Nazi exile describes, somewhat optimistically, the forces opposing Hitler in Germany.

THE OTHER GERMANY. BY ERIKA AND KLAUS MANN. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 318 p. \$2.75.

A daughter and son of Thomas Mann describe the civilized Germany which is now submerged but which the authors believe will rise again.

THE TWO GERMANYs. BY KURT VON STUTTERHEIM. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1939, 296 p. 10/6.

The not particularly revealing memoirs of a German of the old school who represented the *Berliner Tageblatt* in London for many years.

GERMAN SECRET SERVICE AT WORK. BY BERNARD NEWMAN. New York: McBride, 1940, 264 p. \$2.75.

The exploits of Nazi spies, saboteurs and Fifth Columns.

HITLER AND I. BY OTTO STRASSER. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 248 p. \$2.50.

The amazing story of one of the Fuehrer's early collaborators who later turned against him and led an underground anti-Nazi movement from abroad.

MY PART IN GERMANY'S FIGHT. BY DR. JOSEPH GOEBBELS. London: Hurst, 1940, 253 p. 7/6.

The personal diary of Hitler's propaganda chief from January 1, 1932, to May 1, 1933.

ERGEBNISSE DEUTSCHER WISSENSCHAFT. BY ADOLF JÜRGENS. New York: Veritas, 1939, 782 p.

An extensive bibliography containing a selection of what the editor regards as the more important books published in Germany between 1933 and 1938.

DIPLOMAT OF DESTINY. BY SIR GEORGE FRANCKENSTEIN. New York: Alliance, 1940, 342 p. \$3.00.

The author of these engaging memoirs served as Austrian Ambassador in London from 1920 until the Anschluss in March 1938. One half of the book, however, deals with his earlier diplomatic career in various parts of the world.

LA SUISSE DANS LE MONDE. BY ALFRED CHAPUIS. Paris: Payot, 1940, 307 p. Fr. 40.

A readable summary of Swiss history, economic life and culture.

L'AZIONE DELL'ITALIA NEI RAPPORTI INTERNAZIONALI DAL 1861 A OGGI. BY LATINUS. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1940, 587 p. L. 31.50.

A rapid survey of eighty years of Italian foreign policy that may be regarded as the official Fascist interpretation.

ITALIA E FRANCIA. BY VIRGINIO GAYDA. Rome: Edizioni del *Giornale d'Italia*, 1939, 178 p. L. 5.

Fiery essays on such questions as the Suez Canal, Tunisia, Jibuti, etc., by Mussolini's journalistic spokesman on foreign affairs.

RAZZA E FASCISMO. BY GIUSEPPE MAGGIORE. Palermo: Libreria Agate, 1939, 278 p. L. 14.

A justification of Fascist anti-Semitic policies.

TEN YEARS OF INTEGRAL LAND-RECLAMATION UNDER THE MUS-SOLINI ACT. BY GIUSEPPE TASSINARI. New York: Italian Library of Information, 1940, 165 p. \$1.50.

A statistical, illustrated survey in which the considerable achievements of pre-Fascist Italy are naturally minimized.

PUNTOS CARDINALES DE LA POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL ESPAÑOLA. BY CAMILO BARCIA TRELLES. Barcelona: Ediciones Fe, 1939, 500 p. Ptas. 8.

A systematic, historical treatise on Spain's foreign policy since the World War. The author has divided his subject into four large divisions: the Arab world, the Philip-pines, the Western Hemisphere, and the Mediterranean Question.

LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC. BY HENRY BUCKLEY. Lon-don: Hamish Hamilton, 1940, 432 p. 12/6.

A British journalist who passed considerable time in Spain during the last decade throws some new light on the background of the Civil War; his account of the latter, however, is apparently based largely on Republican sources.

PALABRAS DEL CAUDILLO. Barcelona: Ediciones Fe, 1939, 319 p. Ptas. 8.

Franco's speeches, messages and interviews between April 1937 and December 1938.

STORIA DEL PORTOGALLO. BY A. R. FERRARIN. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1940, 306 p. L. 17.

A semi-popular summary from the Fascist slant.

Eastern Europe

CHURCH AND STATE IN RUSSIA. BY JOHN SHELTON CURTISS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 442 p. \$4.00.

A scholarly, critical history covering the last years of the Empire (1900-1917), based largely on archival material.

LE TRIOMPHE DES BOLCHÉVIKS ET LA PAIX DE BREST-LITOVSK. BY GENERAL NIESSL. Paris: Plon, 1940, 381 p. Fr. 40.

An account of the author's sojourn in Russia where he headed the French military mission. General Niessel does not like the Soviets.

FELIKS EDMUNDOVICH DZERZHINSKY. BIOGRAFISHESKY OCHERK. BY F. KON. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1939, 109 p. 30 cents.

A biographical sketch of the founder of the Cheka, by a fellow revolutionary.

THE GUILLOTINE AT WORK. BY G. P. MAXIMOFF. Chicago: Alexander Berkman Fund, Chicago Section, 2422 North Halsted St., 1940, 627 p. \$3.50.

A documented exposé of Soviet terrorism, published under anarchist auspices.

THE DREAM WE LOST. BY FRED A. UTLEY. New York: Day, 1940, 371 p. \$2.75.

Miss Utley went to the Soviet Union some years ago as an English Socialist converted to Communism. In Russia she worked in several political and industrial agencies and thus came to know how the Soviet machine operates. She tells in this book of her disillusioning experiences and describes the present state of the Soviet experiment. Readers will find the last part of the book — on the international situation created by the war — to be less interesting.

MY FINNISH DIARY. BY SIR WALTER CITRINE. New York: Penguin, 1940, 192 p. 25 cents.

A report on a visit to Finland in January and February 1940 by a member of a British Labor delegation.

L'HÉROÏQUE FINLANDE. BY HENRI DANJOU. Paris: Plon, 1940, 249 p. Fr. 21.

Vivid eyewitness snapshots of Finland at war.

"I BUILT A TEMPLE FOR PEACE." THE LIFE OF EDUARD BENEŠ. BY EDWARD B. HITCHCOCK. New York: Harper, 1940, 364 p. \$3.50.

This is an authorized biography of the Czech statesman. Mr. Hitchcock, an American newspaperman, is a confidant of Dr. Beneš and in the preparation of this book enjoyed the latter's close collaboration. The first part of the book is fuller than the section dealing with the last few years, perhaps because the passage of time has lent perspective to Beneš' early career.

TEN MILLION PRISONERS. BY VOJTA BENEŠ AND R. A. GINSBURG. Chicago: Czech-American National Alliance, 1940, 180 p. 60 cents.

An account of the downfall of Czechoslovakia. One of the authors is a brother of the former President.

THE SLOVAK QUESTION. Geneva (Switzerland): Slovak Council, 1940, 82 p.

A memorandum attacking the Tiso government.

BALKAN UNION. BY THEODORE I. GESHKOFF. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 345 p. \$5.00.

A former Bulgarian diplomat, after examining the attempts that have been made to bring the Balkan countries together, especially in the "Balkan Conference," during the last decade, concludes that those nations can preserve their independence only through a close federation.

ROUMANIA UNDER KING CAROL. BY HECTOR BOLITHO. New York: Longmans, 1940, 175 p. \$2.75.

A friendly picture by a warm admirer of the ex-King.

ALBANIA FASCISTA. ANNO XVIII. Florence: Marzocco, 1940, 164 p. L. 7.

A profusely illustrated survey of the mineral and agricultural resources of Albania and of the public works undertaken there by the Italians.

ALBANIA. Milan: Consociazione Turistica Italiana, 1940, 221 p. L. 15.

A description of, and guide through, Fascist Albania.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

GUILTY MEN. BY "CATO." New York: Stokes, 1940, 144 p. \$1.50.

The anonymous author bitterly condemns the men who, before and during the early part of the war, were responsible for Britain's lack of military preparations and demands that they retire from public office entirely.

WHY ENGLAND SLEPT. BY JOHN F. KENNEDY. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1940, 252 p. \$2.00.

The son of the recently resigned American Ambassador to England seeks to show that the responsibility for the policies which have led Britain to its present parlous

state — appeasement, pacifism, undue optimism and general muddleheadedness — rests on the British people as a whole, not on any one class or group.

HITLER'S WAR. BY HUGH DALTON. New York: Penguin, 1940, 191 p. 25 cents.

A Labour M. P. condemns Chamberlain's foreign policy and presents the program of his own party.

FROM ENGLAND TO AMERICA. BY H. N. BRAILSFORD. New York: Whittlesey, 1940, 130 p. \$1.00.

A frank appeal by a British journalist for the United States to enter the war against Hitler and send over a large expeditionary force.

THE RIGHTS OF MAN. BY H. G. WELLS. New York: Penguin, 1940, 128 p. 25 cents.

Mr. Wells states what Britain's war aims, in his opinion, should be.

BRITAIN GOES TO WAR. BY N. SCARLYN WILSON. New York: Revell, 1940, 120 p. \$1.00.

How the British people accepted the call to war.

THE ENGLISH CABINET SYSTEM. BY WANGTEH YU. London: King, 1939, 408 p. 18/.

How the cabinet is organized, what its functions are, and how it works, described in painstaking detail.

THE CHOSEN FEW. BY WILLIAM GALLACHER. London: Lawrence, 1940, 228 p. 5/.

The lone Communist M. P. subjects Parliament and its leading men to his critical scrutiny.

PILGRIM'S WAY. BY JOHN BUCHAN (LORD TWEEDSMUIR). Boston: Houghton, 1940, 336 p. \$3.00.

The captivating memoirs of the late Governor General of Canada — historian, novelist, poet and politician.

SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS: PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 1918-1939. BY W. K. HANCOCK. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 324 p. \$4.50.

An investigation into the economic relations between the various parts of the Empire, particularly as regards migration, finance and preferential trading.

CENTRAL BANKING IN THE BRITISH DOMINIONS. BY A. F. W. PLUMPTRE. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1940, 462 p. \$4.00.

A technical study, by a professor of economics in Toronto University, in which the subject is treated topically rather than by country.

SEA OF DESTINY. BY H. DYSON CARTER. New York: Greenberg, 1940, 236 p. \$3.00.

The somewhat alarmist nature of this book is evident from its subtitle, "The Story of Hudson Bay — Our Undefended Back Door."

THE CONTROL OF COMPETITION IN CANADA. BY LLOYD G. REYNOLDS. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 324 p. \$3.50.

A technical monograph by an associate in political economy at Johns Hopkins University.

INDIA INK. BY PHILIP STEEGMAN. New York: Morrow, 1940, 246 p. \$3.00.

An unconventional view of India, with an interesting chapter on the seldom-visited kingdom of Nepal.

The Near East

LAND POLICY IN PALESTINE. BY ABRAHAM GRANOVSKY. New York: Bloch, 1940, 208 p. \$2.00.

The history, economics and political aspects of the problem that lies at the roots of the whole Zionist movement.

Africa

THE SUEZ CANAL. BY HUGH J. SCHONFIELD. New York: Penguin, 1940, 179 p. 25 cents.

A summary of useful information.

ROMAN EAGLES OVER ETHIOPIA. BY P. A. DEL VALLE. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 201 p. \$2.50.

A history of the recent Ethiopian War, by a colonel in the United States Marine Corps who followed it on the spot as the official American observer.

EUROPE AND WEST AFRICA. BY C. K. MEEK AND OTHERS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 143 p. \$3.00.

Lectures on colonial administration.

SEARCHLIGHT ON GERMAN AFRICA. BY F. W. PICK. New York: Norton, 1940, 178 p. \$1.50.

New light on Germany's colonial ambitions.

IL CONGO BELGA. BY AMBROGIO BOLLATI. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 350 p. L. 19.

A useful handbook of information. There are several maps and numerous documents.

The Far East

WARNING LIGHTS OF ASIA. BY GERALD SAMSON. London: Hale, 1940, 317 p. 15/.

A newspaperman who has travelled widely in the Far East interprets recent events.

JAPAN AMONG THE GREAT POWERS. BY SEIJI HISHIDA. New York: Longmans, 1940, 405 p. \$3.50.

The latter part of this treatise by a recognized Japanese authority does not carry out the promise of its early pages and degenerates into special pleading.

JAPAN'S CASE EXAMINED. BY WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940, 237 p. \$2.50.

A statement of Japan's expansionist policy as indicated by her official declarations and a critical examination of them by an authority on the Far East, now professor emeritus of political science in Johns Hopkins University.

RAZGROM YAPONSKOY INTERVENTSII NA DALNEM VOSTOKE (1918-1922). BY G. REIKHBERG; Edited by B. Rubtsov. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 210 p. 60 cents.

A treatise on the defeat of Japan's intervention in the Russian Far East.

YAPONSKY PROLETARIAT I VOINA V KITAYE. BY YU LIVISHITS. Moscow: Profizdat, 1940, 138 p. 50 cents.

A study on the Japanese proletariat and the war in China, sponsored by the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

TWIN STARS OF CHINA. BY EVANS FORDYCE CARLSON. New York: Dodd, 1940, 331 p. \$3.00.

The author served as an official United States observer with the Chinese forces, particularly the so-called Communist armies. His book is an account of these experiences and a sympathetic appraisal of China's military strength.

BURMA ROAD. BY NICOL SMITH. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940, 333 p. \$3.50.

A chatty but immensely revealing narrative concerning China's "life-line" and the state of affairs in Yunnan Province.

CHINA REDISCOVERS HER WEST. EDITED BY YI-FANG WU AND FRANK W. PRICE. New York: Friendship Press, 1940, 210 p. \$1.00.

This coöperative work describes the transformation wrought by the migration from the coastal zones of "free" China to the far interior.

TURKISTAN TUMULT. BY AITCHEN K. WU. London: Methuen, 1940, 279 p. 12/6.

A Chinese official's urbane account of his mission to Sinkiang during very stirring times in the early thirties.

KITAL. ECONOMIKO-GEOGRAFICHESKY OCHERK. BY P. GLUSHAKOV. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 112 p. 40 cents.

A survey of the economic geography of China, by a Soviet geographer.

EMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN SOUTH CHINA. BY TA CHEN. New York: Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 287 p. \$2.50.

A study of overseas migration and its influence on standards of living and social change in China, by a professor of sociology in the National Tsinghua University.

INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL AND CHINESE PEASANTS. BY CHEN HAN-SENG. New York: Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1939, 97 p. \$1.00.

A case study on tobacco cultivators.

V BORBE ZA RASKREPOSHCHENIE KITAYSKOGO NARODA. GG. BY M. PASHKOVA. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1939, 144 p. 30 cents.

A review of the working class movement in China since 1925.

PACIFIC ISLANDS UNDER JAPANESE MANDATE. BY TADAO YANAIHARA. New York: Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 312 p. \$2.00.

A factual report on the government and the economic and social life of Japan's Pacific wards, by a former professor of economics in the Tokyo Imperial University.

FIJIAN FRONTIER. BY LAURA THOMPSON. New York: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 153 p. \$2.00.

A scientific investigation into a primitive culture and how contact with the white man has changed it.

LATITUDE EIGHTEEN SOUTH. BY MRS. IRENE DWEN ANDREWS. Cedar Rapids, (Iowa): Torch Press, 1940, 372 p. \$2.50.

Life in Tahiti, entertainingly described.

Latin America

TOTAL DEFENSE. BY CLARK FOREMAN AND JOAN RAUSHENBUSH. New York: Doubleday, 1940, unpag. \$1.25.

This is probably the most realistic work so far written about the pressing problems involved in hemisphere defense. The authors have treated their subject in the form of two memoranda: a hypothetical one to Hitler from his Bureau of Political Economy; the other to the President, the Congress and people of the United States. The authors show a comprehensive grasp of the complexities of Nazi tactics, and a proper appreciation of the far-reaching steps — political and economic — which the United States must take immediately if it is not to lose its advantageous position in Latin America. Unfortunately, the "book" appears as a memo typewritten on one side of pages without numbers. In view of the importance of the subject and the soundness of its treatment one can only hope that it will be published in a more durable form with an index.

CONCERNING LATIN AMERICAN CULTURE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 234 p. \$2.00.

Papers on a variety of subjects by twelve authorities, Spanish, Latin American and American.

AS OUR NEIGHBORS SEE US. EDITED BY T. H. REYNOLDS. Stillwater (Okla.): The Author, 1940, 317 p. \$2.50.

Translations of some three score statements made by representative Latin Americans in recent decades concerning the relations of their countries with the United States.

THE CARIBBEAN DANGER ZONE. By J. FRED RIPPY. New York: Putnam, 1940, 296 p. \$3.00.

The geographic, economic and historical backgrounds of present problems in the Caribbean are explained by an American authority on Latin America.

THE CARIBBEAN: THE STORY OF OUR SEA OF DESTINY. By W. ADOLPHE ROBERTS. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940, 361 p. \$3.50.

A native of Jamaica who has traveled extensively around the Caribbean gives a rapid survey of the history of that area.

THE PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY. By HARRY A. FRANCK AND HERBERT C. LANKS. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 249 p. \$5.00.

A lavishly illustrated description of a leisurely journey along the route of the highway in Central America, as yet only partially completed.

EXPROPRIATION IN MEXICO: THE FACTS AND THE LAW. By ROSCOE B. GAITHER. New York: Morrow, 1940, 204 p. \$2.00.

A lawyer holds the seizure illegal and dangerous.

INFLATION AND REVOLUTION. By EDWIN W. KEMMERER. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940, 173 p. \$2.50.

A history of Mexico's monetary experiments from 1912 to 1917.

FUERA EL IMPERIALISMO Y SUS AGENTES! By D. ENCINA. Mexico: Editorial Popular, 1940, 168 p. 50 cents.

A statement on behalf of the Mexican Communist Party.

THE MEXICAN EARTH. By TODD DOWNING. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 345 p. \$3.00.

The past and present of our southern neighbor colorfully presented.

GUATEMALA, ANCIENT AND MODERN. By JOAQUIN MUÑOZ AND ANNA BELL WARD. New York: Pyramid Press, 1940, 318 p. \$2.50.

An introduction to the country and its people.

THE POCKET GUIDE TO THE WEST INDIES. By SIR ALGERNON ASPINALL. New York: Chemical Publishing Company, 1940, 525 p. \$3.75.

Handy and reliable data about islands on some of which the United States has recently acquired sites for naval and air bases.

HAITI AND THE UNITED STATES, 1714-1938. By LUDWELL LEE MONTAGUE. Durham: Duke University Press, 1940, 308 p. \$3.00.

A scholarly and readable history of our relations with the Negro Republic based on a thorough analysis of the sources, both published and manuscript.

INTRODUCCIÓN AL ESTUDIO DEL PROBLEMA IMMIGRATORIO EN COLOMBIA. By LUIS ESGUERRA CAMARGO. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1940, 151 p.

A comprehensive historical, legal and social study by a high Colombian official.

BUSINESS LAW OF COLOMBIA. By JAMES WALLACE RAISBECK, JR. Charleston (W. Va.): Jarrett, 1940, 448 p. \$10.00.

An authoritative compendium and commentary.

HACIA LA DEMOCRACIA. By CARLOS IRAZABAL. Mexico: Morelos, 1939, 240 p.

Essays by a Venezuelan exile on the political and social history of his country.

O PAN-AMERICANISMO E O BRASIL. By HELIO LOBO. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1939, 150 p.

The development of Pan Americanism, in particular as manifested at the periodic Conferences, interpreted by a Brazilian diplomat.

THE EAST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. By SYDNEY A. CLARK. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940, 315 p. \$3.00.

An illustrated descriptive guide.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

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Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain*: British Library of Information, 50 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. *League of Nations*, *Perm. Court of Int. Justice*, *Int. Institute of Intellectual Cooperation*: Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office*: 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

ARMAMENT

ARMAMENTS Year-Book 1939-40. General and statistical information. Geneva, June 1940. 396 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.228.M.155. 1940. IX. 1.) "The present (fifteenth) edition of the Armaments Year-Book closes a series of volumes which have been regularly published since 1924." Preface, p. 3.

AVIATION

AN ACT relating to transportation of foreign mail by aircraft. Approved August 27, 1940. Washington, 1940. 2 p. 23½ cm. (Public, No. 774, 76th Cong.; S. 4137.)

CERTIFICATES of airworthiness for export; arrangement between the United States of America and New Zealand. Effected by exchange of notes signed January 30 and February 28, 1940. Washington, 1940. 17 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 167.) 5c.

EXCHANGE of notes between the governments of Canada and the United States of America relating to air transport services. Ottawa, August 18, 1939. London, 1940. 5 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 16 (1940); [reprint of Canadian Treaty Series No. 10 (1939)]; Cmd. 6210.) 1d.

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

BANK for international settlements; tenth annual report 1st April 1939 - 31st March 1940. Basle, 27th May 1940. 159 p. 29½ cm.

BOLIVIA-PARAGUAY

THE CHACO PEACE conference; report of the delegation of the United States of America to the Peace Conference held at Buenos Aires July 1, 1935-January 23, 1939. Washington, 1940. 198 p. 23½ cm. (Conference Series No. 46.) \$1.00.

PARAGUAY. La paz con Bolivia ante el poder legislativo. Asuncion, Imprenta nacional, 1939. 99 p.

BRAZIL

BRAZIL, 1938; a new survey of Brazilian life, economic, financial, labour and social conditions from a general point of view. Rio de Janeiro, Serviço gráfico do instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 1939. 424 p. 26½ cm.

RELATÓRIO apresentado ao Dr. Getulio Vargas, presidente de República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo Dr. Mario de Pimentel Brandao, ministro de estado das relações exteriores. Ano de 1937. Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa nacional, 1939. 2 v. 27 cm.

CLAIMS

SPECIAL Mexican claims commission. Report to Secretary of State, with decisions showing reasons for allowance or disallowance of the claims. Washington, 1940. iii, 712 p. 23½ cm. (Arbitration Series No. 7.) \$1.25.

MIXED CLAIMS commission United States and Germany. Decisions and opinions from January 1, 1933, to October 30, 1939 (excepting decisions in the sabotage claims of June 15 and October 30, 1939) and appendix 1933-39. Washington [1940?]. 1178 p., xiv p. 23½ cm. 20c.

COMMERCE

COMÉRCIO exterior do Brasil no ano de 1939; resumo por mercadorias. Rio de Janeiro, Tip. do Serviço de estatística econômica e financeira, 1940. 65 p. 26½ cm. (Ministério da fazenda, Serviço de estatística econômica e financeira do Tesouro nacional.)

COMMERCE and navigation. Treaty between the United States of America and Iraq. Signed at Baghdad December 3, 1938. . . . Washington, 1940. 10 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series No. 960.) 5c.

COMMERCIAL relations; agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics continuing in force until August 6, 1941, the Agreement of August 4, 1937 (Executive Agreement Series No. 105). Washington, 1940. 10 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 179).

EXCHANGE of notes between the government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Brazilian Government regarding commercial relations. London, July 19, 1939. London, 1940. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 17 (1940); Cmd. 6214.) 1d.

COMMERCIAL TRAVELER'S guide to Latin America. Washington, 1939. 3 parts. 19½ cm. Pt. I: West coast of South America. Pt. II: East coast of South America. Pt. III: Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean countries.

U. S. TARIFF Commission. Transportation costs and value of principal imports. Washington, 1940. 55 p. 20½ cm.

DEBTS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL

MEMORANDUM covering the indebtedness of foreign governments to the United States and showing the total amounts paid by Germany under the Dawes and Young Plans. Revised July 1, 1940. Treasury Department, Fiscal Service, Bureau of Accounts, 1940. 44 p. 26½ cm. Mimeographed.

ECUADOR — PERU

LAS NEGOCIACIONES Ecuatoriano-Peruanas en Washington. Agosto 1937. — Octubre 1938. Volumen segundo. Quito, Imp. del Mtro. de Gobierno, 1938. 328 p. 20½ cm. (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Sección de límites.)

HEMISPHERE DEFENSE

ACHIEVEMENTS of the second meeting of the foreign ministers of the American republics. Statement of the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, at the close of the meeting, Habana, July 30, 1940. Washington, 1940. 8 p. 22 cm.

ACQUIRING certain naval and air bases in exchange for certain over-age destroyers. Message from the President of the United States transmitting notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Washington and the Secretary of State under which this government has acquired the right to lease certain naval and air bases, also a copy of an opinion of the Attorney General dated August 27, 1940, regarding authority to consummate this arrangement. September 3, 1940. Washington, 1940. 12 p. 23½ cm. (H. Doc. No. 943, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.)

EXCHANGE of notes regarding United States destroyers and naval and air facilities for the United States in British transatlantic territories, Washington, September 2, 1940. London, 1940. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 21 (1940), Cmd. 6224.) 1d.

PROVISIONAL administration of European colonies and possessions in the Americas. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a convention entitled "Convention on the provisional administration of European colonies and possessions in the Americas," signed at Habana on July 30, 1940. September 13, 1940. Washington, 1940. 8 p. 23½ cm. (Senate Executive O, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.)

Advice and consent of the Senate, September 27; ratification by the President, October 10, 1940.

REPORT on the second meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the American Republics, Habana, July 21-30, 1940; submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the director general. Washington, Pan American Union, 1940. 43 p. 23 cm. (Congress and Conference Series No. 32.)

INDIA

INDIA. I. India and the war. Statement by the Governor General of India, The Most Hon. The Marquess of Linlithgow. Simla, 8 August 1940. II. India in the Commonwealth. Speech by the Secretary of State for India The Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S. Amery before the House of Commons, August 14, 1940. New York, British Library of Information, [1940]. 8 p. 23 cm.

JAPAN

THE THIRTY-NINTH financial and economic annual of Japan 1939. The department of finance. Japan, G. P. O., 1939. 271 p. 26 cm.

MILITARY AND NAVAL MISSIONS

MILITARY aviation mission. Agreement between the United States of America and Chile. Signed April 23, 1940. Effective April 23, 1940. Washington, 1940. 8 p. 23½ cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 169.)

MILITARY aviation instructors. Agreement between the United States of America and Argentina. Signed June 29, 1940. Effective June 29, 1940. Washington, 1940. 10 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 175.)

NAVAL aviation mission. Agreement between the United States of America and Peru. Signed July 31, 1940. Effective July 31, 1940. Washington, 1940. 12 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 178.) 5c.

NAVAL mission. Agreement between the United States of America and Peru. Signed July 31,

1940. Effective July 31, 1940. Washington, 1940. 12 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 177.) 5c.

MINERALS, STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL

AN ACT to authorize the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make loans for the development of deposits of strategic and critical minerals which in the opinion of the corporation would be of value to the United States in time of war, and to authorize the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make more adequate loans for mineral developmental purposes. Approved, September 16, 1940. Washington, 1940. 1 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 784, 76th Cong.; S. 4008.)

DEVELOPMENT of strategic and critical minerals. Hearing before the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, 76th Cong. 3d sess. on S. 4008 . . . and S. 4013. . . . May 28, 1940. Washington, 1940. 17 p. 23½ cm.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

AN ACT making supplemental appropriations for the national defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, and for other purposes. Approved, October 8, 1940. Washington, 1940. 10 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 800, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10572.)

AN ACT making supplemental appropriations for the support of the government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, and for other purposes. Approved, October 9, 1940. Washington, 1940. 31 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 812, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10539.)

AN ACT to authorize the President to requisition certain articles and materials for the use of the United States, and for other purposes. Approved, October 10, 1940. Washington, 1940. 1 p. 23½ cm. (Public, No. 829, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10339.)

AN ACT to require the registration of certain organizations carrying on activities within the United States, and for other purposes. Approved October 17, 1940. Washington, 1940. 4 p. 23½ cm. (Public, No. 870, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10094.)

NATIONALITY LAWS — CODIFICATION

AN ACT to revise and codify the nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality code. Approved October 14, 1940. Washington, 1940. 42 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 853, 76th Cong.; H. R. 9980.)

This act has been in preparation since 1933. The studies and reports on which it is based have been previously noticed. House Report 2396, Senate Report 2150 and House (conference) Report 3019 complete its legislative history.

OPIUM

TRAFFIC in opium and other dangerous drugs for the year ended December 31, 1939. Report by the Government of the United States of America. Washington, 1940. 116 p. 23½ cm. (U. S. Treasury department, Bureau of Narcotics) 20c.

ADVISORY Committee on traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. Report to the Council on the work of the twenty-fifth session held at Geneva from May 13th to 17th, 1940. Geneva, 1940. 29 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.125.M.114.1940. XI. 3.)

PROTECTION against habit-forming drugs. A survey of law enforcement and other activities of the United States Treasury department in dealing with the narcotic problem. May 1940. Washington, 1940. 14 p. 23½ cm. (U. S. Treasury Department.)

REFUGEE CHILDREN

AN ACT to permit American vessels to assist in the evacuation from the war zones of certain refugee children. Approved, August 27, 1940. Washington, 1940. 1 p. 23½ cm. (Public, No. 776, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10213.)

EUROPEAN children. Hearings before the Immigration and Naturalization Committee, House of Representatives, 76th Cong. 3d sess., on H. R. 8497, H. R. 8502, H. R. 10083, H. R. 10150, H. J. Res. 580, H. J. Res. 581, superseded by H. R. 10323, to provide a temporary haven from the dangers or effects of war for European children under the age of 16. August 8 and 9, 1940. Washington, 1940. 38 p. 23½ cm. 10.

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL committee on the reception of children overseas. Report. London, 1940. 8 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 6213.) 2d.

SECOND WORLD WAR

DOCUMENTS concerning the Anglo-French policy of extending the war. Berlin, Greve, 1940. 17+74 p. (Auswärtiges Amt, 1940, No. 4.)

ALLIED INTRIGUE in the Low Countries; full text of White Book No. 5, published by the German Foreign Office. New York, German Library of Information, 1940. 46+48 p.

NETHERLANDS ORANGE BOOK; summary of the principal matters dealt with by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the state of war up to November 1939 and suitable for

publication. Issued with the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at The Hague. Leyden, Sijthoff, 1940. 31 p.

WAR AND PEACE in Finland; a documented survey. Prepared and edited by Alter Brody, Theodore M. Bayer, Isidor Schneider, Jessica Smith. New York, Soviet Russia Today, 1940. 128 p. 23 cm.

A Communist argument, with selected diplomatic papers.

MEMORANDUM du comité national tchécoslovaque relatif aux persécutions de l'enseignement universitaire et à la suppression de l'activité scientifique en Bohême et en Moravie. Paris, 1940. 30 p. 24 cm.

UNITED KINGDOM

ADDRESS by the British Ambassador to the United States, the Most Hon. the Marquess of Lothian, C. H., at Yale University Alumni luncheon on Wednesday, June 19th, 1940. [New York, British Library of Information, 1940.] [4 p.] 22½ cm.

BRITISH war aims; a collection of extracts from speeches delivered by H. M. Ministers in the United Kingdom between 3rd September, 1939, and 31st March, 1940. [London, 1940.] 45 p. 24½ cm.

DEFENCE REGULATIONS (being regulations made under the emergency powers (defence) acts, 1939 and 1940, printed as amended up to and including 24th July, 1940) to which is prefaced a table of acts of Parliament amended, suspended or applied by defence regulations and orders made thereunder, by orders in council made under the chartered and other bodies (temporary provisions) act, 1939, and by orders made under the import, export and customs powers (defence) act, 1939. 5th edition — 24th July, 1940. London, 1940. 286 p. 24½ cm.

SPEECH broadcast by the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, July 14, 1940. New York, The British Library of Information, 1940. [3p.] 24 cm.

EXCHANGE of letters between the Prime Minister and General de Gaulle concerning the organisation, employment and conditions of service of the French volunteer force, London, August 7, 1940. London, 1940. 9 p. 24½ cm. (France No. 2 (1940), Cmd. 6220.) 2d.

SHIPPING — GREAT LAKES

RECIPROCAL recognition of load line regulations for vessels engaged in international voyages on the Great Lakes. Arrangement between the United States of America and Canada. Effected by exchanges of notes signed April 29, 1938, August 24, 1938, October 22, 1938, September 2, 1939, October 18, 1939, January 10, 1940, and March 4, 1940. Washington, 1940. 9 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 172.)

TEA

REPORT of the international tea committee, 1st April 1939, to 31st March 1940. London, International tea committee [1940] 36 p. 21½ cm.

TRADE AGREEMENTS

AGREEMENT between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Roumanian Government terminating the agreement of July 12, 1939, regarding trade and payments, London, June 6, 1940. London, 1940. 1 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 18 (1940), Cmd. 6215.) 1d.

UNITED STATES imports and trade agreements concessions: statistics of United States imports in selected years from 1931-39 for each product upon which the United States has granted concession in trade agreements, together with rates of tariff duty before and after concession. February 1940. Washington, Tariff Commission, 1940. 8 v., processed. Free from Tariff Commission.

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UNITED STATES — EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

AN ACT to provide for increasing the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, and for other purposes. Approved, September 26, 1940. Washington, 1940. 1 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 792, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10361.)

Raises the authorized capital from \$200,000,000 to \$500,000,000 with a view to increasing loan transactions with the American Republics.

TO INCREASE the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank of Washington. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 3 Sess., on S. 3069 (H. R. 8477). . . . February 16, 19, 20, 1940. Washington, 1940. 87 p. 23½ cm.

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