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SOVEREIGNTY AND PEACE

By Ezequiel Padilla

Angels only, not men, could live in freedom, tranquillity and happiness, if they all exercised the sovereign power. — *Simón Bolívar*.

AT THE present stage of the world's development the principle of the sovereignty of states constitutes the firmest groundwork of international organization. Sovereignty is to the community as liberty is to man: a fundamental right which may not, because of its very nature, emanate from an alien will. Exercising its sovereignty, a nation adopts the institutions its people want. By virtue of that sovereignty it enacts its own laws, defends its territory, declares and wages war, concludes alliances, signs treaties, accredits and receives diplomatic and consular representatives. In a word, it orders its own existence and coördinates it with that of others on a footing of juridical equality, mutual respect and harmonious creative collaboration. In this broadest sense sovereignty is indispensable.

The present stage of dwelling together of the nations may thus be defined as "the degree of balance between sovereignties." An upset of this balance implies the appearance of disorder, sooner or later ending in violence. It follows that whoever aims to eliminate war as a means of settling controversies between peoples must begin by strengthening the safeguards surrounding the sovereign, free and independent action of their governments.

This is the classic thesis. On it the political life of the American democracies has rested. To uphold it we have not only made incalculable moral sacrifices, but also have endured a whole succession of struggles and privations and have put forth efforts which are an index to the majestic nature of our destinies. In some cases they have led us to participate in conflicts which apparently had no connection with our own future.

It must, however, be pointed out that this crystal clear concept,

which today seems incontrovertible, has not existed at all times in the past. The very word "sovereignty" as understood today was not included in the vocabulary of political theories until quite recently. So far as is known, it was Bodin who first used it, in 1577, in his treatise on "Republics." He then broadened the meaning which the word carried during the Middle Ages, when its sole connotation was to define the capacities of a monarch, or of some great lord who recognized no higher authority in his field of action than his own.

Concepts, like peoples, are subject to change. They are the fruits of creative imagination, which adapts the thinking machinery of the individual or of the human group to the temporary and variable reality of events. If they become fixed and rigid, paralysis ensues. Immobility is an admission of automatism. This permanent metamorphosis explains the modifications which the principle of the sovereignty of states has undergone through the centuries.

Pufendorf, in "*De Jure Naturae et Gentium*," laid down the rule that sovereignty is not an all-embracing and unrestricted power. In fact, the sovereignty of a nation must, if it is active, be limited to itself. This limitation is contained in the political institutions of the peoples.

But there is more to it than this. During the eighteenth century sovereignty admittedly was neither uniform nor homogeneous. Confederations of states stressed the need of distinguishing between the total sovereignty of the whole and the relative sovereignty of the component members. Throughout the nineteenth century, moreover, and still more after the First World War, statesmen gradually adopted a more flexible and human interpretation.

In 1932, a distinguished former Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Titulescu, asked: "Does the sovereignty of states constitute an obstacle to peace?" His answer was in the affirmative. In point of fact, unlimited sovereignty must necessarily lead to wars. The whole of international law is founded on the doctrine of sovereignty; but it would automatically cease to exist if sovereignty were not voluntarily confined within certain limits. Such limits do exist, and are called treaties. Thanks to them, two or more governments are able to subordinate their own individual rights in order to obtain a balance, either economic or political. Examples are commercial agreements, agreements regulating arma-

ments, agreements for the common use of streams which serve as boundaries, etc. Every such agreement specifically results in some curtailment of freedom of action.

We thus find ourselves in the presence of a situation which outwardly is paradoxical: without sovereignty there can be no international law; yet in practice the notion of unrestricted sovereignty would overthrow order in the world. Alive to the seriousness of this, a French jurist, Le Fur, wrote: "To reconcile the sovereignty of the state with the rights of the international community is the crucial problem of Foreign Public Law."

The solution lies in a happy mean, similar to that which has made life within each country possible. The independence of the individual is indispensable to the welfare of the community; but the community would disappear if that individual independence were not organized in accordance with a system of legal and moral restrictions. Similarly, the sovereignty of every member is a basic requirement of international society, yet collective peace and progress require a partial relinquishment of separate national rights. The secret does not lie either in absolute independence or in complete submission, but in the reciprocity of mutual dependence.

The history of the nations has heretofore been nothing but an endless series of cruel struggles and deceptive and transitory appeasements. Sovereignty, appealed to by the weak in the hour of defense, is seized upon by the powerful as a weapon when they launch their onslaught. We find a similar phenomenon in natural history. The same substance which makes the defensive armor of the tortoise serves also for the lion's claw.

Man has a natural proclivity to consider every matter from the standpoint exclusively of its advantage to him. The result is that he instinctively tends to stress his rights, which are a benefit, and to neglect his duties, which imply an obligation. However, both ethically and politically there is not a single right that does not involve an immediate and accompanying duty. Social facts are like coins which bear on their obverse the effigy of something pleasant — skill, security, abundance — while on the reverse we see the austere figure of duty. Each side justifies and supplements the other. Even the most celebrated of all democratic proclamations — the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen — is largely conceived in the form of prohibitions, constituting a defensive safeguard for the individual against the power of the community.

Man is free, not because of the truth of Rousseau's romantic theory based on an erroneous assumption as to the original liberty of the "happy savage," but because society — without which the life of the individual is inconceivable — grants him that liberty in exchange for a series of checks and curbs that subordinate his actions to a common ideal.

In the "state of nature" spoken of in the "Contrat Social," each one was entitled to possess whatever he could win by his own strength. Even under a collective scheme of existence we have not wholly succeeded in emancipating ourselves from that situation of disorder and uncertainty. Might is right. And when the stronger does not gain his end by force of arms, he resorts to the artifices of diplomacy or achieves it by means of economic imperialism, bringing to bear the weight of his superior wealth.

Only one legitimate means of remedying this evil occurs to the mind of the investigator: to limit and coördinate sovereignties. Such limitation may be effected in one of two ways. It may be done by main force, the method advocated by the totalitarians. Or it may be done through the acceptance of an international superstructure, like that aimed at by the free nations united under the glorious canopy of democracy.

II

History teaches us that both these procedures have up to the present time failed. But while greed for power has failed because of congenital and natural incapacity, there is nothing to prove that humanity is fundamentally unable to achieve through collaboration and justice that which no empire has yet succeeded in gaining enduringly through arbitrary power and violence. In contrast, the repeated defeats suffered by imperialism are clear proof that peoples cannot be coördinated by a conqueror.

The cohesion which Hitler dreams of imposing on Europe as a basis for the general servitude of all the continents is neither new nor original. Before the wizard of Berchtesgaden embarked upon that adventure other men much more logically minded than he — Alexander, Caesar and Charlemagne, to say nothing of Charles the Fifth and Napoleon — attempted to unify the known world by force.

Three of these rulers, Alexander the Great, Caesar and Napoleon, started from a clearly Mediterranean conception of culture. The universe, in their opinion, ought to revolve around

the idea which Greece or Rome or Paris (the latter as a synopsis of Græco-Latin evolution) had formed of civilization and of the rôle of man. In the case of the other two — Charlemagne and, centuries later, Charles the Fifth — their aspirations after unity were from the outset vitiated by a somber Gothic frenzy. In it the historian may, without undue effort, detect the stifling moral foggiess of the Germanic way of being. All five of them, however, left the same ruin behind them. And their action, which was directed at forging a powerful union of territories and institutions, ended by promoting a vast process of dissolution. Alexander's career signals the end of the Hellenic period. The exploits of Julius Caesar mark the peak of Rome's upward course; after it came the decline that paved the way for the barbarian invasion. Charlemagne's empire disintegrated at Verdun; Charles the Fifth's in Westphalia. And Napoleon's was wrecked in the flames of Moscow, the snows of the Berezina and the shell-scarred walls of Saragossa.

Hitler's adventure is still under way. But who doubts the eventual fate of this latest megalomaniac? However imposing the victories won so far by the Nazi armies may seem, their defeat is only a matter of time. The beast of the Apocalypse already bears in its flank the fatal arrow.

Imperialistic efforts, often tried, have invariably ended disastrously. Per contra, we may assert that world conciliation has never yet been tried in a properly integrated way. Even the League of Nations was not participated in by all the countries. Its failure to achieve the expected degree of success was certainly not because the fundamental idea was vague or impracticable. It was designed for universal action, but very soon, by the force of events, it became a European association. Some few states in the Americas, Asia and Africa were also present, but symbolically rather than otherwise.

The fact that the decline of the League of Nations coincided in point of time with the rise of Nazism and Fascism goes to prove that the course recommended by those statesmen who were erroneously criticized as "Versailles idealists" was after all the right and practical path — the only path, in fact. Further proof is that the purposes defined now by the democracies in the midst of their struggle square absolutely with the ideals of the League, as witness the Atlantic Charter, signed on August 14, 1941, by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

But we would be making a fatal mistake if we thought that peace, when the hour of victory comes, is going to be any less difficult to win than the war itself. The world will then be in an utterly exhausted and famished condition. Reconstruction will be imperative. On the wreckage we shall have to set to work to erect the splendid new world of tomorrow. The task will be long and hard. We shall have to put forth the maximum possible energy, without pause or indecision. Trade, industry and agriculture will have to be organized on a basis entirely different from that which kept the world in unbalance in the period after the last war.

To undertake the task successfully, to overcome all the incalculable material difficulties in the way, it will be essential that every nation sacrifice some of that aggressive pride which has distorted the notion of sovereignty. The new order which will arise from this terrible conflagration will not be, of course, Hitler's vandal and sterile "new order," but one based on law, more elastic yet stronger. All the states will have to collaborate in it by curbing their individual ambitions, cutting down their armies, and building up a system in which war is outlawed, in which differences between nations may be settled without the idiotic resort to force.

Some kind of a universal structure will have to be created, including a coördinating council on which all the nations are represented. This body will act as a board of arbitration, as an international court of justice and as an official mediator in every conflict. But aside from this, it will be indispensable to give a new meaning to what we today term national sovereignty. In future, no country may, as a function of its own independence, endanger the independence of others. The liberty of each shall be respected to the extent that it does not injure any other. But license to work evil will be curbed by moral, commercial, economic and legal sanctions which will render impossible the hegemony of any one state. Machinery will have to be constituted to put such sanctions into effect. In a world where sovereignties are unrestricted the weak are at the mercy of the strong. So long as equality of rights is not coupled with equality of opportunities and equal access to resources, the arbitrary dictum of unlimited sovereignty — like that of absolute liberty of the individual in domestic life — will benefit the powerful and give an advantage to the aggressive. Now in reality there is no

such thing as natural equality. States, therefore, if abandoned to the dialectical play of action and reaction, will invariably revert to inequality so long as there does not exist a higher agency which is able to curb the stronger in favor of the weaker, and further, as between the powerful themselves, establish a clear and equitable balance. In enforcing international law, that agency would not curtail any sovereignty; it only would coördinate it with other sovereignties, just as in the democratic balance within a republic the liberty of citizens is not reduced merely because they entrust the exercise of some of their rights to a central authority which acts on their behalf and sees to it that order is observed by all.

No disarmament, whether of armies or of the spirit, can be attained so long as the exaggerated notion of national sovereignty which prevailed throughout the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth is still entertained. Nor should we overlook the fact that it was by virtue of the inordinate notion of sovereignty that Germany restored military service and reoccupied the Rhineland, that Mussolini took the diplomatic steps which preceded the invasion of Ethiopia, and that the three dictatorships of Germany, Italy and Japan betrayed their international commitments and, breaking away from Geneva, combined to attack the whole of peace-loving humanity. Such cases must never be repeated.

III

The Americas, because of their history, their nature, their common worship of liberty, are called upon to play a leading part in the work of conciliation necessary to the future interdependence of the nations. The experience gained by inter-American conferences shows that continental understanding can be achieved without pressure from outside. The settlement of the controversy between Colombia and Peru, from 1932 to 1935; of the conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay, which lasted from 1928 to 1935; and, more recently, of the difficulties between Ecuador and Peru, are evidence of the spirit of coördination which distinguishes our hemisphere. They recall Bolívar's happy phrase: "*The New World should be constituted by free and independent nations, united among themselves by a body of law common to all of them, to govern their foreign relations.*"

That control of which the Liberator speaks is not a step back-

ward but forward, along the road which will lead the nations to dwell together in a civilized community. We have seen how rights and duties supplement one another. In future a higher principle will prevail over the idea of national sovereignty — the idea of international solidarity. "In the notion of solidarity," wrote Léon Duguit, "the idea of liberty as a right will disappear, to yield its place to liberty as a duty, liberty as a function of society." A century before Duguit stated his proposition, Auguste Comte had already outlined this fundamental principle: "The word *right* must be discarded from the genuine language of politics, just as the word *cause* should be dropped from the genuine language of philosophy. Every one has duties towards every one else and nobody has more than a single right: fully to perform his duty."

The American peoples understood this from the very hour of their emancipation. In his draft for a Declaration of the Rights of the People of Chile, Mariano Egaña, a patriot of that nation, stated in 1810 that it is exceedingly difficult for any nation, even by dint of great sacrifices, to maintain by itself its own isolated sovereignty. In the same vein, the Colombian Government in 1823 announced that the time had come to set up a Pan American confederation which would serve as a point of contact in the face of common danger, as well as interpret public treaties and act as a court of arbitration and conciliation of differences. This Colombian message was imbued with the prevailing spirit of the period. While providing for an alliance and political confederation of the American states, both in peace and war, it expressly stated that the confederation should not in any way interfere with the exercise of the sovereignty of the contracting parties. In theory this condition placed certain bounds on Simón Bolívar's original conception.

The scruple against contracting strictly juridical ties, and the idea that the union of the Americas should above all be the result of historical and cultural assimilation, also inspired a Brazilian, Oliveira Lima, when he said that such a union would in reality be "a natural manifestation of the cordiality existing between the different political members of a group of nations destined to integrate an association *lacking legal ties*, but bound by ethical duties all the stronger in that they flowed from a sense of collective responsibility emanating in turn from a sane and broad interpretation of human duties."

President Wilson also insisted this was the proper way to interpret inter-continental ties. He defined Pan Americanism as a union of the American Republics in their capacity of spiritual allies, "that march in accord because they think alike and are animated by common sympathies and ideals."

Since the First World War, and more especially since the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held at Buenos Aires in 1936, this purely moral quality of Pan Americanism has been made stronger and more efficient by practical commitments. Two factors in particular helped make the evolution very rapid: the policy of the Good Neighbor, advocated and carried into effect by the Administration of President Roosevelt, and the growing threat of the totalitarian Powers.

Danger is a great teacher in the life of states. Centuries ago, when the Greek states were threatened by invasion, they constituted the General Assembly of Ancient Greece, effected by the system known to us as "amphictyony."

In accordance with a similar principle, although ostensibly for purposes of trade, expansion and navigation only, the northern cities of Europe founded the Hanseatic League in 1241. They wished to resist the Kingdom of Denmark and to protect themselves from the attacks of pirates, the blackmail levied by freebooters and the tyrannous aggression of princes. The League grew remarkably in a very short time, enrolling such flourishing cities as Hamburg, Cologne, Riga, Lübeck and Danzig. The Hansa not only founded factories at Bruges, Bergen and Novgorod, but also, in 1367, adopted a true political constitution of its own, the Confederation of Cologne. Thanks to this it organized a common army and economic system. This strengthened it to such a degree that in the fifteenth century it defeated more than one monarch and concluded treaties with England. It thus managed to achieve rank as a state, in a manner until then unknown to the Western World.

Of lesser importance, and more temporary in character, was the coalition concluded in 1511 by Pope Julius the Second, Venice, Switzerland, Ferdinand the Fifth of Aragon, Henry the Eighth of England and the Emperor Maximilian to oppose the growing power of the King of France, Louis XII. Associations of this kind, of frequent occurrence in the course of history, are not properly to be compared to the preceding. They are by nature merely a response to a passing need and represent the personal

will of a group of monarchs. But the associations mentioned in the first group were — like the Pan American Union and the League of Nations — the result of a widespread aspiration deeply rooted in public opinion and having practical and permanent aims. In a mere coalition the autonomy of the parties is not abridged. But in organic aggregations of broader scope the sovereignty of each individual entity must conform to the conditions required by the coördination of the whole.

The peoples of the New World aspire to form an association of this kind. It may properly be pointed out, in this connection, that the outstanding difference between the earlier Pan American hope and the present-day reality lies in one main fact. The politicians of the days of independence sought by achieving continental unity to counteract European action; while the politicians of today realize clearly that Pan Americanism must not and cannot be thought of solely as a bulwark for isolation but as a road leading to more efficient universal coöperation.

“The peace of Europe,” said a Cuban internationalist, Orestes Ferrara, only a short while ago, “is the peace of the Americas.” The converse proposition also holds true. No merely local settlement can be stable or final. Whether we like it or not, the modern world constitutes a single compact whole. This being so, any formulas that we may adopt in this hemisphere, however valuable from the standpoint of defense, will yield their full fruits only when the other continents likewise organize on a basis of close interdependence. They must associate in vast amphictyonies governed by the same law as that advocated by the Americas: the exaltation of liberty within a juridical system in which the sovereignty of the states shall at no time conflict with the general solidarity of the human race.

UNIFIED COMMAND:
LESSONS FROM THE PAST

By George Fielding Eliot

ON THE evening of November 4, 1917, the unhappy and anxious leaders of Britain, France and Italy were arriving at the little town of Rapallo on the Italian Riviera to discuss the situation created by the crushing defeat of the Italian armies in the battle of Caporetto, and the position in which, as a consequence of this and other disasters, the Allied Powers found themselves as the long year 1917 drew to its close. They had every reason to view their situation with the gravest anxiety. Allied fortunes were at their lowest ebb since the German advance on Paris in the summer of 1914.

On the Western Front, the year had seen the crushing of Nivelle's great offensive in Champagne, followed by the series of mutinies which had shaken the military spirit of the French Army to its foundation and from which, under the fatherly guidance of Pétain, it was in November only beginning to recover. Meanwhile, time for its reconstitution was being bought in Flanders by the British Army at the price of 300,000 casualties and the Prime Minister's loss of confidence in the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Sir Douglas Haig was almost ready to say that his men could do nothing more for that year. Pétain was "waiting for the Americans and the tanks." As yet there were but 100,000 American troops in France, none of them fully fit for combat, and men were saying that the United States could never put an army on the Western Front.

At Saloniki, inaction and confusion prevailed under the leadership of General Sarrail, partly through that officer's fault but largely because the various Powers whose units composed his army could arrive at no unity of policy as to what they wanted him to accomplish.

In Palestine there was a single gleam of light. Allenby, the new Allied commander on that front, had just taken Beersheba and was preparing to attack Gaza; but there were plenty of voices to say that he would never do it in view of the last two futile assaults upon that Turkish stronghold.

As for Russia, that great ally upon whose inexhaustible resources of men and material so many hopes had been based, she

obviously was withdrawing from the war. Already Trotsky's Military Revolutionary Committee had received the adherence of the troops of the Petrograd garrison and the days of Kerensky's Provisional Government only too plainly were numbered.

And now, with one great ally all but gone, another had suffered the most crushing defeat of the war as the Austro-German armies hurled the broken troops of Italy back over all the hard-won ground of two years of fighting — back, and back, to the line of the Piave. It was uncertain at the moment whether even that line could be held.

The cause of all of these failures and disasters was not lack of ability on the part of either statesmen or generals, it was not lack of means, it was not lack of courage or address at arms on the part of the troops. In most of these matters, indeed, the Allies on the average were superior to the Central Powers. The cause was rather to be sought, as General Bliss wrote afterwards in the pages of this review, in "the manifest absence of unity of purpose on the part of the Entente Powers." General Bliss continued:

They were allied little more than in the sense that each found itself fighting, at the same time with the others, its own war against one enemy, and too largely for separate ultimate ends. The governments apparently had no conception that a war of such magnitude required political as well as military strategy. . . . The main efforts of the governments were individual, meeting the insatiable requirements of their commanders for munitions and men. Their attitude was reflected in that of the commanders in the field. These sometimes met together and thought that they had formed broad, comprehensive plans. But their real responsibility was limited to their own front. Naturally, their perspective of the war was largely limited by that front. There, it was hoped, the war would be won. On that front lay the essential objective of the nation behind it. . . . During the entire war no Allied plan was ever attempted under such conditions that did not result in dismal failure.¹

The futility of these methods, indeed their danger to the whole Allied cause, had not gone unperceived by Allied leaders. There had been a great deal of talk about the need for unified control of the Allied war effort. Unfortunately much of this discussion had centered around a unified military command for the Western Front and this conception had received a serious setback at the time of the Nivelle offensive. For that operation the British Government had consented to place Sir Douglas Haig's army under the strategic direction of General Nivelle. Only friction and

¹ General Tasker H. Bliss, "The Evolution of the Unified Command," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, December 15, 1922.

misunderstanding had been the result, with a poisonous residue of feeling on the part of the British soldiers that they had been sacrificed by the ineptitude of a French commander, and an increased prejudice on the part of many British military and political leaders, notably the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, against unity of command in any form. Thus the need for unity in the higher direction of the war was being lost sight of because of the difficulties of a unified command in one particular theater. The real need was for political unity to begin with; for a unified plan; and for the machinery to keep the plan in being and to adapt it to the ever changing current of events, thus providing a consistent though flexible policy from which an effective strategy might naturally flow.

To the conception of political unity some lip service had been given. Little had been done toward its accomplishment, however, save for a series of inter-Allied conferences at which there had been a great deal of talk and very little concrete accomplishment. "Theoretically and rhetorically," as Lloyd George observes, "the united front was boomed; in practice it was ignored."²

It remained for Lloyd George himself, desperately resolved upon victory and face to face with the necessity for inter-Allied unity, to force the project forward into the realm of action. In so doing, he may have drawn heavily upon the ideas of others — notably those of the French Premier, Paul Painlevé, and of General Sir Henry Wilson. It is unlikely that the idea of an agency for the political coördination of the Allied war effort was original with Lloyd George but certainly it was through his efforts that it began to take form. He was aware that he would face the opposition of his Chief of Staff and possibly that of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig; and although he was certain of French coöperation so long as Painlevé remained Premier, the Painlevé government was already tottering under the accusation of "defeatism" and the attitude of its successor was uncertain.

Lloyd George's own tenure of office was not too secure. There was an active and watchful opposition which had, on this issue, the powerful support of Britain's ablest military writer, Colonel Repington, who was devoted to Robertson and regarded unity of command as a dangerous illusion — "a way to make sure of losing the war."

Lloyd George had therefore to proceed with the greatest care.

² "War Memoirs of David Lloyd George." Boston: Little, Brown, 1934, v. 4, p. 511.

He began by the rather unusual step of seeking independent military advice. He asked Lord French, formerly Commander-in-Chief in France and then Commander of the Home Forces, and Sir Henry Wilson, then holding the Eastern Command, to submit their views on the military situation. These reports, differing greatly in content and viewpoint, nevertheless arrived at identical conclusions. Lord French, after exhaustively reviewing the course of the war, and the many Allied failures, said:

I would therefore emphasise the extreme desirability of establishing at once a Superior Council of the Allies. It is only such a body that can thoroughly examine a joint scheme of action in all its bearings. The weight and influence of such a council must carry conviction to the minds of the several Allied Governments. . . . I think this body should be composed of the Prime Ministers or their selected representatives, and one or more Generals from each Allied country.³

Sir Henry Wilson, taking a somewhat wider view of the course of the war, and attempting to estimate the situation from the enemy's as well as from the Allied point of view, expressed his conclusions in the following terms:

The superior direction of this war, has, in my opinion, been gravely at fault from the very commencement — in fact, it is inside the truth to say that there has never been any superior direction at all. . . .

We have tried many expedients but always with most disappointing, sometimes even with disastrous, results. We have had frequent meetings of Ministers, constant conversations between Chiefs of Staff, deliberations of Commanders-in-Chief, mass meetings of all these high officials in London, in Paris, in Rome. . . . All these endeavours have failed to attain any real concerted coördinated effort in diplomacy, in strategy, in fighting, or in the production of war material. . . . I do not wish to exaggerate, but human nature being what it is and our Commanders-in-Chief and Chiefs of Staff being what they are — all men of strong and decided views, all men whose whole energies are devoted to their own fronts, and their own national concerns, we get as a natural and inevitable result a war conducted not as a whole, but as a war on sections of the whole, *i.e.*, a war on the British Front, a war on the French Front, a war on the Italian Front; and the stronger and the better the various Chiefs, the more isolated and detached the plans.

It seems to me that all this confusion, overlapping and loss of collective effort are due to the same causes which throughout the whole war have led to a narrow vision, and too limited outlook over the whole colossal struggle. . . .

The net result seems to me to be that we take short views instead of long views, we look for decisions today instead of laying out plans for tomorrow, and as a sequence we have constant change of plans, with growing and increasing irritation and inefficiency. . . .

³ "War Memoirs of David Lloyd George." Boston: Little, Brown, 1934, v. 4, p. 539-40.

What can be done to remedy a state of affairs which is undoubtedly prolonging the War to an unnecessary, even to a dangerous extent?

The answer to this question lies in the establishment of an intelligent, effective and powerful superior direction. And by this I mean a small War Council of the Allies so well-informed, and above all, entrusted with such power that its opinion on all the larger issues of the War will carry the weight of conviction and be accepted by each of the Allies as final. . . .

Such a Body will be above all Sectional Fronts, it would view the War as a whole . . . and it would allot to each of the Allies the part which it would play. . . .

Such a Superior Direction would *now* lay out the broad line of action for the next twelve or twenty-four months. It would show when and under what conditions and in which part of the main theatre the final decision should be attempted and reached. . . .

It would lay out the broad policy for our joint aeroplane campaign of the future, and would adjust construction to obtain the end in view, allotting to each Ally the task for the future.

In short, such a Superior Direction would take over the Superior Direction of the War—a thing which has not yet been done, and for the lack of which we have suffered so grievously in the past and without which we shall, as certainly, suffer even more in the future.

The strain of this war increases day by day, and as the strain increases, so any mistakes that are made become increasingly dangerous, and the tendency for each of the Allies to fight for its own hand becomes more and more marked. I see no other way of drawing the Allies together and of keeping them together, of gradually enlarging the outlook and of showing the crying necessity for long views instead of short views, except by the creation of such a body. I see no other way by which a real plan of campaign for the future can be drawn up. Such a plan of campaign must be based on all the factors which go to make up this gigantic war. The greater part of these are unknown and necessarily and rightly unknown, to the Commanders-in-Chief in the field who, up till now, have dictated the strategy of the campaign, each on his own front.

Without such a body the tendency for the Allies will be to concentrate each on his own front, each on his own production, each on his own war, each thus drifting further and further from his neighbor, while all the time the enemy, under one governing authority, will be able to concentrate and to defeat each of the local efforts.

We (the Allies) hold all the cards in our hands—men, munitions, guns, aeroplanes, food, money *and* the High Seas—there remains only the question of how to play them and when to play them, and my absolute conviction is that there is no other way than by the creation of a Superior Direction.⁴

After digesting these reports, and in pursuance of previous conversations, Mr. Lloyd George wrote on October 30, 1917, to Premier Painlevé as follows:

I am convinced from my experience of the last three years that the fact that the result of the third year's war is a definite military success for Germany

⁴“War Memoirs of David Lloyd George.” Boston: Little, Brown, 1934, v. 4, p. 541-544.

and a definite military reverse for the Allies is in great measure also due to defects in their mutual arrangements for conducting the War.

As compared to the enemy, the fundamental weakness of the Allies is that the direction of their military operations lacks real unity. At a very early stage of the War Germany established a practically despotic dominion over all her allies. She not only reorganised their armies and assumed direction of the military strategy, but she took control also over their economic resources, so that the Central Empires and Turkey are today, to all intents and purposes, a military Empire with one command and one front. The Allies, on the other hand, have never followed suit. The direction of the War on their side has remained in the hands of four separate Governments and four separate General Staffs, each of which is possessed of complete knowledge only of its own front and of its own national resources, and which draws up a plan of campaign which is designed to produce results mainly on its own section of front. Attempts have been made to remedy the defects of this system by means of Inter-Allied Conferences, which have lately been of increased frequency. But up to the present these conferences have never been fully representative, and at best have done little more than attempt to synchronise what are in reality four separate plans of campaign. There has never been an Allied body which had the knowledge of the resources of all the Allies, which could prepare a single coördinated plan for utilising those resources in the most decisive manner, taking into account the political, economic, and diplomatic as well as the military weaknesses of the Central Powers.

The crushing of Serbia and the opening of the road to the East in 1915, the total defeat of Roumania in 1916, and now the break-through in Italy in 1917, may be largely, although not entirely, traced to the attempt to conduct the War in a series of water-tight compartments. It is very remarkable that each winter the Central Powers have been able to make a crushing attack on the weakest member of the Entente with complete success while no adequate counter-preparation has been made by the Allies to meet the danger, and that during these same winters, no corresponding serious efforts have been made by the Allies to weaken Germany by concentrating against her weaker allies and so destroying the props upon which her power depends. These results, which mean that the enemy has steadily deprived us of the preponderance of men and resources we would otherwise have possessed, while compelling us to squander our resources all over the globe without achieving decisive results anywhere, would probably never have happened, had there been any such unity of direction on the Allied side as exists in the case of the Germanic Alliance. If we are to win the War, it will only be because the Allied nations are willing to subordinate everything else to the supreme purpose of bringing to bear upon the Central Empires in the most effective manner possible, the maximum pressure military, economic, and political which the Allies can command.

There is, I am sure, only one way in which this can be done, and that is by creating a joint council — a kind of Inter-Allied General Staff — to work out the plans and watch continuously the course of events, for the Allies as a whole. This council would not, of course, supersede the several Governments. It would simply be advisory to them, the final decisions, and the orders necessary to give effect to them, being given by the Governments concerned. But it

would be a council possessed of full knowledge of the resources of all the Allies, not only in men and munitions, but in shipping, railway material and so forth, which would act as a kind of General Staff to the Alliance to advise as to the best methods of winning the War, looking at the fronts and the resources available as a whole. Its composition might be settled later. But provisionally I would suggest that it should consist of one, or perhaps two, political representatives of first-rate authority from each of the Allies, with a military staff of its own and possibly naval and economic staffs as well.⁵

The foregoing three quotations, written a quarter of a century ago, abundantly repay the most careful reading and re-reading today. For they were written in a situation which was strikingly similar to the military situation in which the United Nations now find themselves. The present situation is the same in principle even though it is somewhat more complicated and has wider geographical limits.

Twenty-five years ago the leaders of the Allied Powers had learned by defeat and cruel disappointment, at the price of the lives of thousands of brave men and the untold suffering entailed by the unnecessary prolongation of the war, the fact that a coalition cannot successfully make war unless and until it possesses an authoritative inter-allied agency for the unified direction of the war. It is a sad commentary on human intelligence that this lesson, bought so dearly at the price of blood and treasure, has now apparently to be re-learned all over again at the same price before it can be applied to conditions almost precisely identical to those of 1917.

In 1917 Russia was lost to the Allies very largely because of conditions brought about by a military defeat. That military defeat in turn was due to many causes but chiefly to the Russian lack of munitions and equipment. To supply this lack would have been the first aim of any really closely coördinated Allied policy.

The one serious attempt to open a direct line of communications with Russia, undertaken in the campaign in the Dardanelles, had failed. On three separate occasions it had been within a maddening inch of success. It had failed because the British and French Governments and staffs could not make up their minds to send to the Dardanelles sufficient forces to insure success. They preferred to waste these forces in bloody failures at Neuve Chapelle and Loos. A reinforcement consisting merely of the casualties of these two useless battles and of the ammunition

⁵ "War Memoirs of David Lloyd George," v. 4, p. 545-547.

fired away in them without result would, in April, in May, or even in August of 1915, have made the Allies a present of Constantinople and the gateway to the Black Sea.

The Allies had been too late at Saloniki to save Serbia from being overrun, because London and Paris could not make up their minds to act in sufficient force together and in time. And so the war had gone. Chance after chance had been thrown away. No substitute had been found for the lost opportunities save the mounting butcher's bill in the blood-soaked trenches of the West.

Even there the situation had tended to deteriorate. In late 1917 a friend said to General Weygand, then Foch's Chief of Staff: "However bad our situation may seem now, it was worse for you and General Foch at the Marne; for you were then heavily outnumbered and we will still be superior until the month of April." Weygand answered: "Our situation is much worse now; for then we had the magnificent plan of Marshal Joffre and now we have no plan at all."⁶

But at long last the lesson was being learned and steps were being taken to fulfill the need which so many had appreciated "theoretically and rhetorically" but about which so little had been done. Yet there was opposition in high quarters to any plan for any type of unified command or direction of the war — not to the *idea*, to which most leaders gave lip service, but to *any definite and practical step toward its realization*. Some quotations from the diaries of Colonel Repington will give an idea of the nature and origin of these objections:

Monday, Nov. 5 [1917]. Lunched with Evelyn FitzGerald at his rooms. Jack Cowans and Sutherland, the P.M.'s secretary, also there. I attacked the latter at once about the beastly things that were being said about the General Staff and told him how it was alienating many of L. G.'s friends. We told him that the Army was greatly under establishment, that the Allied War Council was eye-wash and that the only thing that mattered was to raise fresh divisions and make up the deficit. . . .

Tuesday, Nov. 6. Went to see a friend at the F. O. . . . He is very sarcastic about the Inter-Allied Staff, and asks whom will they advise, and will they have any executive power?

Wednesday, Nov. 7. Went to see Winston [Churchill] in the afternoon. . . . He is as much for the Inter-Allied Staff as I am against it. . . . I saw a lot of leading soldiers home from France. They all hate the Inter-Allied Staff like the devil.

Monday, Nov. 12. Lunched with [Sir William] Robertson, just back from Italy. He had written to say that I needed no telling of the meaning of the new

⁶ Peter E. Wright. "At the Supreme War Council." London: Eveleigh Nash, 1921, p. 63.

Paris Military Committee. He says that he had nothing whatever to do with setting up the new machinery . . . we are both contemptuous of making war by committee. He assures me that Haig saw the P. M. Sunday week and was asked what he thought of it. Haig criticized it severely. Some very crisp remarks on each side followed. I can take it that the G.H.Q. are as much opposed to the Versailles Military Committee as we are. R. is sure that Eric Geddes and the Admiralty would not allow a naval officer to act as Wilson is to act. . . . It appears that Pétain dislikes the scheme as much as we do.

Friday, Nov. 16. . . . Lucas described to me the fury of Haig's generals about the Rapallo agreement, and said that they were all unanimous. Robertson has not resigned, nor has Haig. But . . . the new plan is riddled with criticism.⁷

The opposition in Great Britain was so strong that Mr. Lloyd George had to proceed with great care. He himself divides the progress which he made into two parts. Aiming at securing a single inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief for the Western Front, he began by getting a Supreme War Council composed of political leaders, with military advisers, and went on to the unified command later.

It was plain then, as it is plain now, that no inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief could serve four separate political superiors. The need was first for political unity of direction, upon which military unity of command would easily and naturally follow. The Supreme War Council as established by the conference at Rapallo consisted of the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy, with one additional minister for each country. Each country appointed a military representative to provide the Council with adequate professional advice. Afterwards Colonel House sat with the Supreme War Council as a representative of the President of the United States and General Bliss became the American military member.

Thus, under the pressure of almost continuous disaster, an organized superior direction for the Allies was at last achieved. Unity of command had yet to be attained. It did not come until the imminent presence of final and complete defeat compelled it in the following spring. It was resisted by the same parochial and narrow interests and points of view which resisted the creation of the Supreme War Council, and which will always resist any arrangement in a war of coalition which seems to lessen in the least degree the complete local authority of any national government or commander.

⁷ Colonel Charles à Court Repington, "The First World War." Boston: Houghton, 1920, v. 2, p. 128-134.

Yet from the very moment that the Supreme War Council began to function, the fortunes of the Allies began slowly but sensibly to improve; and from the moment that unity of command was achieved, they rose skyward with almost the velocity of a rocket.

Today we face the same problems and we shall find their solution by the same means. It is useless to discuss the separate component problems which go to make up the central problem of how to beat our enemies — the need to increase production, or the virtues of bombing as contrasted to land operations, or the respective values of battleships and aircraft carriers — until we have made up our collective mind as to how we are going to use our strength and until we have created a machinery for making our plan effective in the various theaters of operations where our joint efforts must strike down our joint enemies. Until that time comes, those enemies will continue to enjoy the inestimable advantage of complete unity not only of strategic direction but of military command.

“The conduct of war by a coalition really poses two fundamental problems,” wrote General Réquin — “a problem of command in the most general sense of the term, which requires the appointment of inter-Allied Commanders-in-Chief and a unified strategic and political direction of the war; a problem of inter-Allied organization, seeking to place in a common pool the economic forces of the coalition in order to obtain from them the highest possible efficiency.” *

The more total the war we fight, the more total must be the measures we take for common action in the common cause. Let us overcome our disinclination to think that men have never before faced problems of the same desperate sort and the same enormous magnitude that we face. Let us force our minds back to the times when they did face the same problems. Let us learn by their costly delays and mistakes. Let us profit by their eventual success. Let us strain every nerve to win the elusive spirit of coalition based on mutual confidence which is the soul of effective action by nations allied in war. “Its attainment,” in the words of General Réquin, “is difficult, but it is the price of victory.”

* “La Direction des Opérations Militaires dans une Guerre de Coalition.” General Edouard Réquin, *Revue des Questions de Défense Nationale*, June 1939.

IS GERMANY EXHAUSTING HER MAN POWER?

By Karl Brandt

AT the beginning of the fourth year of the Second World War, Germany still holds the initiative on land and sea. Her legions are scattered from the North Cape to the Sahara, and from Brittany to the Caucasus, while her subsurface navy preys along the American coasts. The fundamental questions are still unanswered. How long can the German people and the Nazi economy stand the tremendous and ever-increasing strain? Where and when will the system begin to crack?

Once it was widely assumed that the deterioration of the European food economy would break German stamina and morale. So far this expectation has not been fulfilled. A host of analysts has long insisted that lack of motor fuel and high-grade lubricants would sooner or later halt Germany's mechanized divisions and air forces. The writer is convinced that she has solved her motor-fuel problems to such a degree that she is not in desperate need of the oil of the Caucasus. More recently it has been suggested that man power has become the most crucial commodity in Germany, that human reserves are more or less exhausted, and that as a result the production of war materials has passed its peak and must begin to decline. Let us see.

II

In the First World War the Central Powers actually did exhaust their man power resources within four years, or one year less than had been estimated by the United States Army. By the spring of 1918 Germany was forced to reduce the training period of recruits to six weeks and to lower the physical requirements so greatly that the quality of the troops was seriously impaired. In 1916 the army conscripted 1,443,000 men; but in 1917 it could get no more than 662,000 and in ten months of 1918 only 405,000, because the war industries claimed more and more draftees. The labor force, largely supplemented by women, aged people, and prisoners, was increasingly listless and tired from 1917 on, and efficiency fell off steadily toward the end of the war.

In 1914 Germany had a population of 68 million people, the Austro-Hungarian Empire 50 million, Bulgaria 4.5 million and

Turkey 12.5 million. That made a total peacetime population for the Central Powers of no more than 135 million. Excluding Turkey, they mobilized for their armies during the four years of war approximately 30 million men. Germany and Austria-Hungary alone drafted 22 million men. On November 11, 1918, the German army had 8 million soldiers, 5,300,000 of them at the front and in occupied territories. Austria's army must have reached a strength of 6 or 7 million men.

From 1914 to 1918, 1,865,000 members of Germany's armed forces were killed. There also were 1,089,000 soldiers listed as "missing," that is, taken prisoners or died without being reported killed in action. It is probable that total deaths amounted to about 2,100,000. In other words, nearly 3 percent of the total German population, or 15 percent of the male population between the ages of 18 and 45, lost their lives in military service. Austro-Hungarian losses in killed, died of wounds and died of disease have been estimated at about 1,530,000, while 1,130,000 more were taken prisoner. Germany and Austria-Hungary combined lost nearly 3.5 million dead.¹

In addition to these absolute losses, the wounded constituted a serious drain on the available man power. The two Central Empires had between 6 and 7 million casualties due to wounds. Even if from 40 to 50 percent of these recovered entirely and returned to active duty or replaced men on the home front, the aggregate total of lost man-days in the fighting forces was very great, especially if one considers the extent to which additional man power is absorbed by the care of the wounded and convalescent. The Reich paid disability awards to 1,537,000 soldiers, of whom some 400,000 were seriously disabled.

In addition to all these drains on her man power, Germany lost about 1 percent of her population due to increased mortality of civilians as a result of war conditions and the influenza epidemic.

Germany employed up to a million prisoners of war in agriculture and industries, Austria-Hungary nearly 2 million. Germany also employed many women, children and aged people; by the end of 1916 about half a million more women were employed than in prewar years. Yet, in spite of this, the volume and quality of man power of various kinds available for war industries never

¹ See Samuel Dumas and K. O. Vedel-Petersen, "Losses of Life Caused by War." London: Milford, 1923, p. 142; "Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1921-22." Berlin: Hobbing, 1922, p. 28-30; and Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler, "The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary." New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, p. 77.

sufficed to keep industrial production at prewar levels. Even the output of coal and iron was much lower in the peak year of war activity, 1917, than it had been in 1912-13. The index of industrial production shows clearly what the shortage of man power and the other effects of the war did to Germany's war economy. Taking 1913 as 100, we find that in 1914 it was 74; in 1915, 63; in 1916, 73; in 1917, 74; and in 1918, 73. These figures correspond closely to the number of persons employed, as shown by the last peacetime census (1907) and the only wartime census (1916):

	1907			1916		
	(in millions)			(in millions)		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Mining and industries	8.7	1.8	10.5	5.1	2.5	7.6
Trade and traffic	2.4	.7	3.1	1.6	1.0	2.6
<i>Total</i>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>13.6</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>10.2</u>

It is probable that employment in 1913 was considerably higher than in 1907, so that the real difference between 1913 and the war years was undoubtedly much greater than these figures indicate.

The increasing loss in efficiency of the labor force also contributed to the decline in industrial output. The coal output per shift and per worker in the Ruhr basin fell from .97 tons in 1913 to .70 tons in October 1918; in Upper Silesia it dropped from 1.18 to .83 in the same period.²

It should not be forgotten, however, that, in spite of reduced industrial production, the Central Powers reached the peak of their military striking power in the spring of 1918 and lost the war only when the Allies wrested the initiative from them in the great battles on the Western Front in the summer of the same year. It was the ever-increasing production and flow of war materials to the Western Front, plus the growing reserves of well-equipped, well-fed and fresh American soldiers, that overcame the depleted human and material resources of the tired and battered Central Powers.

III

The present situation differs greatly from that of 1914-18. At the opening of the fourth year of war Germany has control of most of the European continent and its human and industrial

² The decline in total industrial output did not mean a decline in armament production. However, the drastic curtailment of production of civilian goods and services did its part in undermining public morale.

resources. Holland, Denmark and Norway, all neutrals in the last war, are conquered territories. Belgium and France, which fought through four years, have been defeated. Italy, which fought with the Allies, is in the German camp this time. So is Finland, which was a part of Russia. Germany, with Austria, Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig, Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine, the annexed western part of Poland, Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia, has a population of about 102 million people. Her allies, Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Finland, are some 80 million strong. Hence the bloc from which Germany can draft man power for military purposes, even if Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia are omitted, has a population of more than 170 million people as against 136 million in the First World War. Germany also benefits from the coöperation of Japan, a nation of approximately 100 million people, which ties up large forces and great quantities of matériel of the United Nations.

The countries and territories which have been occupied but not annexed are inhabited by 148 million people.³ Of these, France and the Low Countries harbor the most valuable reservoirs of skilled and intelligent industrial labor. Finally, there are 34 million more people living within the German orbit — either still free, like Switzerland and Sweden; or defeated but not occupied, like unoccupied France; or coöperating but not allied in combat, like Bulgaria.⁴ From Switzerland, Sweden and unoccupied France, all of which have modern war industries, Germany can obtain much of what she wants by means of foreign trade; from Bulgaria she will be able to get soldiers in case of war with Turkey.⁵

These are the reserves of man power upon which Germany can draw to fill the ranks of her armed forces and the labor force for her war industries. According to available information, the German armed forces in 1941-42 included between 8 and 9 million men, as compared with an average of over 14 million in the German-Austro-Hungarian forces during the First World War. It is probable, however, that the Italians, Rumanians, Hungarians and Finns are supplying forces at least equal in number to those which Austria-Hungary put into the field.

³ Holland, 7.9 million; Belgium, 6.1; occupied France, 25.0; Denmark, 3.8; Norway, 2.8; Poland, 25.0; Lithuania, 2.4; Latvia, 2.0; Esthonia, 1.1; occupied Russia, 50.0; Jugoslavia, 15.7; Greece, 7.2.

⁴ Switzerland, 4.2 million; Sweden, 6.3; unoccupied France, 17.0; Bulgaria, 6.4.

⁵ She already has the use of considerable Bulgarian forces for occupation purposes in Jugoslav territory and for operations against General Mihailovitch's guerrillas.

Up to the attack on Russia, the German casualties did not exceed 200,000. Compare this with the period from August through November 1914, when the German Army lost 225,000 killed, missing or taken prisoner, plus 453,000 men wounded on the Western Front alone. German losses on the Western Front from 1914 to 1918 amounted to 1.8 million soldiers killed, missing or captured and 3.1 million wounded. In comparison, the losses incurred this time in defeating Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France, or the total losses up to June 1941, were negligible.

Germany's real man power problem during the opening phases of their war was that of replacing men drafted from agriculture and industry, traffic and commerce, the professions and the civil service. This presented no insurmountable difficulties. During the periods of blitzkrieg the German Army operated with relatively few divisions. Only 2.5 million German soldiers were used in the Polish campaign, while at the height of the Battle of France the Army strength rose only to 6.5 million. Between the big campaigns the Army granted furloughs generously to millions of soldiers, lending them to their former employers until they were needed again. Indeed, it was possible to replace the total quota of 4 million men which had been added to the prewar strength of the Army by employing a million more women, 1.5 million foreign workers, and 1.5 million prisoners.⁶ As a result, production was kept at a high level.

From 1933 to the time of the invasion of Poland, Germany had steadily increased her production and employment. The index of total production (1929 = 100) rose from 69 in June 1933 to 123 in March 1938. Up to September 1, 1939, it continued to rise steadily. Employment rose during the same period from 13,300,000 to 18,800,000. The national money income of the Reich rose from 46.6 billion marks in 1933 to 85 billion marks in 1939, or 10 billion more than the 1928 peak. And the trend did not change when war began. From 1939 through 1941, the national income of Greater Germany (the Reich plus Austria, Sudetenland, Danzig, Memel, and the annexed parts of Poland and France) rose from 95 to 115 billion marks, or 21 percent. Coal output in 1942 is still at 1938 peak level. Iron and steel output rose in 1939 and 1940 and was maintained in 1941.⁷ This affords a remarkable

⁶ See Fritz Sternberg, "German Man Power, the Crucial Factor." Washington: Brookings Institution, Pamphlet No. 36, 1942.

⁷ Cf. *The Economist*, July 18, 1942.

contrast with the First World War when, during the first three years, an initial slump in business and employment was followed by an acute shortage of labor, coal output fell to 88 percent and pig iron output to 70 percent of 1913, while production in general remained 15 to 20 percent below the prewar level.

There is nothing miraculous, however, about the production records of the Nazi economy. Industrial output increased in 1940 and 1941 because the resources of the annexed territories were fully utilized. At the same time the 4 million new workers within the Reich completely replaced the men drafted into the Army. The practical cessation of hostilities on land between August 1940 and the spring of 1941 also released many of the skilled laborers in the Army for war industry.

IV

The invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941, opened a new phase of the war. In it Germany's man power problem became for the first time really serious. This war, which Hitler and the German High Command supposed would repeat the 16-day Polish campaign on an enlarged scale, made a much larger army inevitable. From a peak of 6.5 million men in the spring and summer of 1940, the German Army rose to 8 and perhaps 9 million men. Not only was there need for from 100 to 150 new divisions; they had to be on the job continuously. For the first time in this war the German Army met a well-prepared and surprisingly well-equipped enemy of equal or superior numerical strength, with good leadership and excellent morale. The methods of lightning war succeeded initially; but they failed to prevent the development of stationary combat, which is much the most costly form of warfare both in men and matériel. The Russian venture began to take a heavy toll in man power. Up to midsummer of 1942, according to German military sources and the most conservative foreign estimates, German losses in Russia and the preceding campaigns in killed, missing and wounded soldiers surpassed 1.5 million and were probably higher. Frostbite and all sorts of diseases also reduced German strength. At the same time, the war in Russia has taxed German resources of war matériel and transport much more heavily than all the previous campaigns combined.

The economic capacity of Greater Germany and her dependencies must be completely utilized in order to continue the Russian campaign successfully, and at the same time keep the

Battle of the Atlantic going, replenish and remodel the *Luftwaffe* and strengthen the defenses of the Continent against invasion. The economic general staff must keep the machines and assembly lines of industry manned without neglecting agriculture. Transportation, administration of occupied territories, protection against sabotage all require German personnel. There can be no doubt that by now the Nazi régime is put to it to keep production in high gear without loosening its grip on Europe.

A brief calculation will show the magnitude of the task. At the present time the strength of the Army is at least 7.5 million greater than it was before the war. In addition, total net losses by the end of 1942 will amount to a minimum of 1.5 million. Hence, recruitment for all the armed forces will have eliminated about 9 million men from non-military employment. Approximately 2.2 million recruits will have been drawn from among high school graduates. That leaves from 6.8 to 7.0 million men to be replaced. Employment of women may be increased slightly, but no sizable reserves are left. To make up the bulk of the deficit, amounting to between 5.6 and 6.0 million workers, the alternatives are to obtain foreign labor or to shift workers from civilian production and distribution to war industries. Foreigners are available in relative abundance. Germany had 1.7 million French prisoners, of whom only 400,000 were conditionally released. The rest are working in Germany. Polish prisoners are available in larger numbers than the French. Russian prisoners number from 3 to 4 millions.

If it were merely a question of numbers, Germany could fill the whole gap in man power by prisoners alone. The common assumption that prisoners are dangerous workers because they tend to commit sabotage is contrary to experience in the last war as well as in this one. The real difficulty is that they are likely to be deficient in the necessary occupational skill and familiarity with modern industrial processes, in intelligence and education and in ability to learn a foreign language. The employment of prisoners is a makeshift solution, adopted only when all other possibilities have been exhausted. This is best illustrated by the deal announced by Pierre Laval on August 11, 1942, by which Germany offered to release 50,000 French prisoners in exchange for 15,000 French "specialists" to work in German factories. In fact, Germany relies heavily on mobilization of the last reserves of her own man power and in hiring skilled labor from foreign countries.

As regards the mobilization of German reserves, the law of

diminishing returns is beginning to operate. It is especially doubtful if many more German women can be induced or compelled to work. Other methods, to be mentioned later, continue to bring small additions to the labor force. But the main resort must be to the greater use of every kind of foreign labor.

The labor dictator, Gauleiter Sauckel, as well as his predecessors Dr. Mansfeld and Dr. Syrup, are well aware that voluntary workers, whether foreign or German, make much better laborers than people who are conscripted or otherwise coerced into jobs. Hence, work in Germany is being made attractive to foreign volunteers by offers of high wages, extra food rations, permits for transfer of money to families, and many other special features. In addition to these inducements, methods of "persuasion" are applied, such as denying ration cards or work-books in the homeland, forcing employers to dismiss men, shutting down plants by denying them raw materials, and shanghaiing men and women by the train-load, as has been done in Poland. Large numbers of foreigners of practically every European nationality are now employed in Germany. By September 25, 1941, the number exceeded 2.1 million.⁸ They included 29,000 Danes, 93,000 Dutch, 122,000 Belgians, 49,000 French, 220,000 Bohemians, Moravians and Slovaks, 272,000 Italians, 35,000 Hungarians, 109,000 Jugoslavs, 15,000 Bulgarians and 190,000 others. These included 472,000 women and 1,667,000 men. *The Economist* estimated that up to February 1942, besides at least 1.5 million prisoners, the number of foreign workers had probably increased to 2.5 million.⁹ The total number of foreigners may rise to 4 or 5½ million if the plans of Dr. Mansfeld — including conscription of more than a million Russian workers, especially Ukrainian coal miners, and the hiring of foreign labor elsewhere — should succeed.¹⁰ By the fall of 1942 this estimate will likely have been surpassed.

This means that out of about 24.5 million insured workers, 22 percent are foreigners. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* complained that 1.2 million agricultural workers out of 2,130,000 were foreigners in the spring of 1942; that it was "not a rare occurrence to see on a large farm the manager and his family do the work with the help of one German and seven or eight foreign helpers, and that one must not overlook the friction caused by the employ-

⁸ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Handelsblatt, April 24, 1942, No. 211.

⁹ *The Economist*, London, February 21, 1942, p. 259.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, February 14, 1942.

ment of so many aliens," who require re-training because they are not used to German methods of work. The necessity for re-training and adjustment arises with particular urgency in industry, except in the case of the skilled mechanics and metal workers from the Lowlands, France, northern Italy and Czechoslovakia.

Another effective and common device for using foreign labor is to let foreign industries work on armament contracts for Germany. If raw materials are available and the plants are out of bombing range this is often the easiest way out, since it eliminates all the problems connected with the housing, feeding, and policing of millions of foreigners in Germany proper. Moreover, it utilizes foreign plant capacity, management and research facilities. Of course, either method puts a heavy burden upon German supervisors. Germany is so short of qualified personnel for these jobs that more and more women are being used as managers.

v

Clearly Germany's problem of man power is far more complex and the available labor reserve is much smaller today than was the case during the seven years used to prepare for the assault and during the 22 months of blitzkrieg which preceded the attack on Russia. Nevertheless, Germany today, on the threshold of her fourth year of war, is in a far better condition as regards man power than she was in the First World War. In spite of all the existing difficulties, and in spite of the possibility of much heavier losses than assumed by the writer, it is most unwise to conclude that these will lead soon and automatically to a serious deterioration of Germany's war production, and that her military might will crumble in turn as a result of economic collapse. The chief reason for skepticism is the efficient way in which Germany employs her available labor supply.

Economic planning, centralized control of war production and supplies and allocation of labor were not contemplated before the last war, and under the compulsions of the conflict they were improvised poorly. Most of them never were fully mastered. This time the Nazis spent seven years in perfecting their streamlined war economy. The Government today has complete functional control over the total labor market. It treats the man-power supply for the fighting forces and the war economy as one integrated and indivisible whole. No unforeseen labor bottlenecks

arise; shortages are anticipated by a completely unified command under the military and economic general staffs.

Labor statistics are made up differently in Germany than in most countries. They cover all working people, numbering 41 million in 1941 out of a total population of 79.4 million. Only 24.5 of these 41 million are insured wage earners; the total includes independent farmers, artisans, and other self-employed workers and working members of their families. The advantage of this sort of statistical count lies in its comprehensiveness; it reveals most of the existing adjustment reserves among the gainfully employed. By 1935, Germany had introduced compulsory work registration, together with military draft registration. The work-book made possible the control of the labor supply through labor exchanges and the labor front. Restrictions on shifts to other types of employment, restriction of the right to unemployment relief or other social insurance and compulsory re-training for more essential types of work are also part of the control of labor markets. Except in a few occupations, everyone who changes his job must be examined as to his qualifications as a trainee for such vital fields as the metal trades. This system covers young people, men and women, employed and unemployed, civilians and wounded veterans. Disabled soldiers begin re-training while they are still hospitalized.

Every possible means of control is used: patriotic appeals, higher wages and other rewards, various sorts of pressure, and finally conscription or other direct methods.¹¹ Young girls, as well as all boys, must do compulsory labor service; the original period of six months for girls has been extended to one year. The age limit for workers has been raised from 65 to 68 years, and pensioners of all ages have been induced to return to part-time or even full-time work by continuing their pensions in addition to paying them wages. Under pressure of necessity, the Nazis have not hesitated to reverse some of their original policies. The drive to reduce the employment of women and send them back to the home has given way to a policy of maximum employment of women. All sorts of pressures are exerted in order to bring them into offices and factories. Late shopping hours, and other shopping facilities, supervision of children by the *Deutsche Frauen-*

¹¹ Cf. Herbert Block, "German Methods of Allocating Labor," a report of the Research Project on Social and Economic Controls in Germany and Russia, New School for Social Research, New York.

schaft, paid furloughs for soldiers' wives when their husbands are on leave, and more and more public canteens, all enable married women and mothers to accept jobs.

Other features of the control system insure the greatest economy in the utilization of labor. Strikes and lockouts are eliminated, political disputes are impossible, and wage disputes are settled by official arbitrators. Moreover, the labor office introduces and speeds up rationalization in industries where it yields the greatest saving of labor, such as coal mining. New processes and labor-saving machinery are introduced by decree, and special rationalization shock troops rove through the plants and determine changes to be made in methods and equipment in accordance with the principles of scientific management. Another widely-applied method of civilian mobilization is to remove labor from non-essential, inefficient, or over-supplied segments of the economy or from individual enterprises. Hundreds of thousands of men and women are being combed out of the distributive trades, minor crafts, and other small enterprises.

The food situation in Germany, since it must affect morale and efficiency, is also a factor in the problem of man power. Conditions in this respect are in no way comparable to those of 1917. Despite restrictions in rations introduced in the spring of 1942, the food situation in Germany is probably slightly better, by and large, than it is in England. This is not the result of chance. Food supplies are as carefully planned and controlled as, for example, the supply of raw materials or the labor market. Nothing similar to the very real food shortage of 1917 now exists in Germany. In so far as there are malnutrition or famine in occupied territories, it is an advantage for the Nazi labor economy, because it induces foreign laborers to "collaborate" in order to get food.

In one respect, however, the situation is much worse than it was in the First World War. Destruction and death have been carried into Germany proper. Bombing of individual areas has had some effect upon the efficiency and the mood of labor.

VI

In conclusion, we may say that, according to Germany's own controlled press and the statements of her high officials, she faces increasingly more serious labor problems at home as well as in the occupied countries. These problems, however, arise from the greater need for highly skilled personnel in the metal trades and

specialists in various fields, including management, rather than from any shortage of unskilled or semi-skilled workers. Since most of the domestic reserves have been absorbed, still more employment of foreigners seems inevitable. Probably this will lead to a reduction in efficiency and output per hour of work. Probably, also, the presence of so many millions of foreigners in Germany and the necessity of spreading German control more thinly over industries abroad will cause increased friction throughout the industrial system.

Whether the German war effort will be hampered to any serious extent, however, will depend primarily upon the development of military events and the course followed by the United Nations rather than upon any economic factor within the "new order." If the Nazis are not interfered with they will, no doubt, be able to cope with the situation one way or another. The people in the conquered nations will have no choice but to assist their oppressors in solving whatever problems arise. But the situation may change if the United Nations are able to increase Germany's difficulties. There are five ways in which this might be done: 1. By encouraging and organizing slow-downs and sabotage in the occupied countries and in Germany. 2. By bombing factories and military targets. 3. By bombing the transportation system. 4. By opening new fronts outside Europe. 5. By invasion.

Sabotage, which is carried on in all the occupied countries, differs from one to another in accordance with national temperament and the treatment meted out by the conqueror. It is more widespread and serious in Czechoslovakia than in Denmark, and more violent in occupied France than in Holland. The total effect upon industrial output is, however, greatly overestimated. Lack of enthusiasm for efficient and full-speed work, and the general slow-down, are probably more effective in the aggregate than are acts of sabotage, although the latter do tend to poison the relations between the occupation authorities and the working population. Slow-downs are harder to counteract than sabotage. It is well-nigh impossible to enforce standards of efficiency; and revenge in the form of sabotage follows attempts to do so. The governments in exile and the ministries of economic warfare of the United Nations should, therefore, do all they can to encourage workers in Germany and in the countries which are working for Germany to reduce their output to the lowest possible level. Passive resistance, non-coöperation and slow-down could,

theoretically, have decisive results. At the least they will pour a little sand into the Nazi economic machine.

The quantitative effect of bombing is a controversial subject. Nuisance raids which send crews to shelter and rob them of sleep fall into the same category as slow-downs. They reduce efficiency slightly. Large-scale target bombing promises greater damage to production because it consumes materials which have to be replaced and necessitates repairs and adjustments. The frequency of the raids is, of course, as important as their size. So far the most extensive raids have come at such long intervals that their effects have usually been wasted. It is likely that the spread of nervousness among laborers will do more harm in the long run than the actual loss in hours of work. Destruction of residential sections close to war plants probably has more effect than does the damage to the productive machinery. But here again it is easy to overestimate the total effect of bombing on the scale and frequency attained so far.

Greater results might perhaps be obtained by tying up the railroad system in vital areas for days or weeks at a time. The writer is of the opinion that if the bombing attacks were shifted from the industrial centers to the railroads and highways leading to such centers, and if they took place at the critical peak-load periods of late fall and early spring, greater strains and stresses would be created in the German labor situation, food supply and industrial output than by all other bombing methods combined. Whether or not this idea (shared by certain exiled German and Fighting French railroad experts) is practicable can be determined only by trying it out.

The best way of bringing about a serious man-power crisis in Germany is, of course, by large-scale attack on land. The opening of a new front in North Africa or in the southwestern corner of the Continent would put a tremendous burden on transportation, men and materials. Only by denying the Germans the use of industries in conquered territories, by depleting the strength of their divisions in actual combat, and by forcing them to consume equipment and munitions more and more heavily, is there real hope of exhausting Germany's reserves of man power.

EDUCATION FOR CONQUEST: THE JAPANESE WAY

By C. Burnell Olds

THE ideals of a people's culture are not the result of chance. They are the product of a continuous educational process consciously directed toward definite ends. At least it has been so in Japan, and that too from the very beginning. Even before education as such can be said to have begun there, the entire national life must have been focused on one common endeavor: to instill into the rising generation the consciousness of their own individual and national importance. Given, long before the dawn of history, a lore that asserted that importance, there remained for future generations only to pass on the tradition, expand it, and build on it such a superstructure as the times seemed to demand. The original mythological matrix was crude enough. But since in essence it was exactly what was wanted, it has been retained through all the centuries unchanged except as it has been interpreted and glorified. It is the basis of Japan's educational system.

Education as a conscious formal process must have begun in Japan long before any record was made of it. We know of the existence as early as the latter half of the seventh century A.D. of a full-fledged college established and functioning in the capital, and of Prince Shotoku's school in his monastery at Horyuji, which was built in 607. Also it seems fairly certain that schools chiefly for the training of officials were soon afterwards in operation in nearly every province.

The first approach to a general public school system is seen in what was called the *tera koya*, or "temple children's-house" schools, established by Buddhist priests in their temples at their own initiative. At the beginning of the Meiji era 15,862 of them were in existence. Gradually these schools passed out of the hands of the priests, as others caught the idea and established similar schools of their own in other buildings. From earliest years it seems to have been the approved thing for public-spirited men of means and ability to establish such schools voluntarily for the benefit of their communities, with no thought of personal advantage other than to secure popular esteem. They usually were attended by two or three hundred children, all under the care of the one man to whom the school belonged.

Of the subjects taught in these schools, ethics, or the inculcation of moral principles, was always put first. This meant pre-eminently the expounding and passing on of such cultural ideals as those set forth in the *Kojiki*. The objective in education, therefore, was character formation, and this was called "the drilling of the abdomen," the *hara* or abdomen being regarded as the seat of the soul. Education in the sense of the acquisition of knowledge for utilitarian ends was left for development until the modern age. Other subjects taught in these early schools were Japanese and Chinese literature, penmanship, the composition of poems, flower arrangement, the tea ceremony and the use of the abacus,¹ all of which helped to reinforce the developing ideology.

Modern education cannot be said to have begun in Japan until 1872, when the first emissaries were sent around the world to study whatever might be of advantage. They brought back the French educational system as likely, in the main, to be the best model to follow. On it as a basis was organized the present compulsory system, which requires of every child that he be in school from the age of six until he is at least twelve years old. The Imperial Message promulgating the system said: "We expect that hereafter throughout our land there shall be no illiterate family in a village, and no illiterate person in a household." To accomplish this, and at the same time to provide facilities for higher education, the country was divided into seven university districts, each to contain 32 middle school districts, in each of which, in turn, there were 210 primary school districts. This provided one primary school for every 600 of the population.

"As regards higher learning," the Imperial Message went on to say, "it shall be left to individual choice according to one's talent, but it shall be unlawful not to send one's children, without distinction of sex, to the elementary school." The objective in view seems to have been accomplished, at any rate as regards the education of children, for a recent five-year average gives a total of somewhat more than eleven million children in primary schools, which is 99.57 percent of the total number of children of school age. Only those are excluded who are physically or mentally unfit or are the victims of extreme poverty. That is why foreign students visiting Japan were quite apt to find the humblest coolies reading, with evident intelligence, newspapers which were far beyond their own powers of comprehension.

¹ A mechanical device for facilitating arithmetical calculations, used universally in the Orient.

Since 1939, furthermore, a plan has gone into operation requiring all children to spend two years more, beyond the first six years, in higher schools recently established to give instruction of a somewhat more practical nature than is permitted in the primary grades. This in turn may be supplemented by optional courses of five years for boys and three years for girls. Evidently the Government feels that it has not yet done its full duty in training all its children for effective citizenship.

Beyond the system of compulsory primary education there has been established a thoroughly efficient system of secondary and higher schools. For boys there is the middle school, with a five year course, and for girls the corresponding Higher Girls' School, as well as various technical and special schools for each sex. After those schools there is, for boys only, the *Koto Gakko*, or High School, which gives a three or a four years' course, followed, in turn, by the *Daigaku*, or University, with a course of three or four years and offering its graduates the Bachelor's degree and, after two years more of study, the Doctor's degree. Side by side with the other secondary schools are the normal schools for both sexes. These carefully train those who are to enter upon what is, in the Government's eyes, the most important of all professions: teaching, or the inculcation of Japan's cherished ideals in the minds of its children and youth.

The system thus carefully organized is certainly efficient and every effort is made to keep it so by thorough supervision and administration. The Government makes itself responsible for everything, even in the case of the private schools, and sees to it that uniformity is maintained and that only its ideals are inculcated. Each local community, however, is at least permitted to share in the burden of supporting its schools. The fact that this often involves the expenditure of a half or more of all revenues received, gives some indication of the importance the Japanese attach to education.

Some variety is permitted in the private schools, provided all the Government's essential requirements are met. For instance, whereas government schools have no option but to exclude religion in every form, a private school may crowd some religious instruction into its curriculum, though if it does so it forfeits two privileges—that of having its graduates admitted into higher government schools without the ordinary rigid examination, and that of deferring their military training until after they

have completed their courses of study. But whether this military training is deferred or not, every boys' school all through the course requires a daily regimen of vigorous physical drill which becomes more and more definitely military until, at the age of 20, the student begins his technical military training.

As between elementary schools and higher schools, the Government puts its strength into the former. It may permit private agencies to organize the institutions of higher learning, but it practically monopolizes the education of young children. And why not? Is it not in the early years that ideals are formed and habits of thought and action become set? On that theory, the fact that only 18 out of the 45 institutions of university grade are conducted under government auspices is of no consequence. The impressions which the Government desired to be made have long since been made, even before the student is obliged to consider whether or where he will pursue a higher education. Furthermore, the Government knows that its schools are preferred by all students, partly because of the privileges offered and the high character of the work done, but chiefly because of the prestige which the graduates of government schools enjoy. They get the cream of the students, while private schools are obliged to put up with what is left after rigid competitive examinations have sorted out those whom the Government wants to educate itself. The authorities, indeed, seem deliberately to have planned it in this way, so that the upper intellectual crust of Japanese society, consisting of about 17 percent of the whole, shall be trained to uphold meticulously the officially recognized ideals and standards, while the rest, whether or not educated beyond the elementary requirements, shall be regarded as available for the humbler tasks of life.

Judged by the standard of the United States, where one out of every 90 of the population has been to college, there should be room for more college facilities in a country which can boast of but one college graduate in every 300. But when it is realized that even as things are a large number out of many graduating classes have to be dumped on the labor market and will receive only the lowest kind of employment, or none at all, one wonders whether the Government is not wise in trying to limit the output.

As for women's education, it is an interesting fact that though in the pre-Meiji era higher education (or indeed any kind of education) was practically non-existent, at the present time there is a

larger number of students in the secondary schools for girls than in those for boys. Christian missionaries are chiefly to be thanked for this improvement in the condition of girls. Until Ferris Seminary for girls was founded in Yokohama in 1870 there was not a girls' school in the empire; but 20 years later there were 43 others in operation, among them government schools of high character. The Government still has not seen fit, however, to establish a single women's university or college on a par with those provided for men, though there are a number of excellent private institutions.

Among universities in general, the Imperial University of Tokyo is generally recognized as *facile princeps*, though it is neither the oldest nor the largest. The work done in all the great universities, whether governmental or private, is certainly of a high order, even if the methods employed are somewhat different from our own. For instance, the lecture system almost universally obtains. Often the student is subjected to 35 hours of lectures a week; adding the hours needed for directed study, this leaves practically no time for private reading. The examination is ever in view. If the student is not prepared to express himself in that and in every other way just as officialdom requires, so much the worse for him. There is a set of approved principles and ideals, and on these he is spoon fed. Accept them, give utterance to them, think in accordance with them, and all goes well. But break away from them, repudiate the mass-production requirement, think independently, and all will go badly. Students are herded through their courses in batches. Originality of thought is not only not desired, it is not tolerated. "The aim of the educational system," says G. C. Allen, "is not to develop exceptional ability or character, but to create a general high-level of attainment and to provide a supply of well-trained instruments of national policy."²

II

Japanese education may thus be said to proceed on the assumption that every man, woman and child is first of all a member of the State, and that the State has rightful and absolute power over him, body and soul. Each child, therefore, must at the earliest possible moment be fitted into the system. He is not to find his own place but to occupy the one assigned him.

The moment school begins discipline begins. First the child is

² "Modern Japan and its Problems." New York: Dutton, 1928, p. 77.

taught that he must get and keep his body under strict control. This is done by the rigors of the daily calisthenic exercise. Then he is put through the daily and long-continued wrestling bout with the writing brush, so that he may teach his fingers to co-ordinate with his brain. His thinking power, the while, is being subjected to, and is exhausting itself in, the mechanical memorization of innumerable ideograms; while his soul is stultified by being compelled to bow to the inexorable standard set by his daily lesson in what is called "morals."

Is the mere mastering of 4,000 complicated Chinese characters that originated as many years ago, and coming to understand their multifarious usages, education? Certainly it is discipline, rigorous and unending. Every day is filled full and vacations are few and far between. The best Japanese educators themselves admit that the nation's secondary schools do not fit their students well for practical life. Even blind men who cannot see at all may be better educated than those who can, if for no other reason than that they do not have to spend the best part of their days learning an interminable number of complicated ideographs. As Dr. Nitobe said: "It is really to be questioned whether the many hours devoted in elementary and secondary education to the mastery of words and letters are not partly responsible for the passive literary and humanistic taste of the pupils, and for the enfeeblement of their reasoning power and practical ability."³

It used to be that as the student went on to the higher grades his increasing concentration on foreign languages would tend to make him think a bit for himself. In recent years, however, the emphasis has begun to be away from English and every other foreign language; and even at its best the rote system in vogue seldom led to proficiency, no matter how many years of grilling effort were expended. When Japan finally decided on isolation and self-sufficiency, even this slight fertilizing process was lost. The result was not only to accentuate the Japanese student's tendency to Japaneseness, but to increase his superficiality as well. Generally speaking he is quick to become interested in a subject and seize upon its external aspects; but his intellectual habits render him largely incapable of concentrating on it so as to bring forth original results of value. A number of outstanding Japanese achievements in the field of applied science, however, give evidence of a vast amount of natural talent. If only the Government

³ Inazo Nitobe, "Lectures on Japan." Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. 298.

had been interested in developing genius rather than in forcing all into the common mold of uniformity, what might not Japan have been able to add to the sum of human knowledge and achievement?

Doubtless it is in order to concentrate on the one thing which the Government wishes to have inculcated, that teachers, as representatives of the system, make the student's life one constant grind of hard work. He is allowed only the minimum of recreation required for health, no social life, no dandyism, no theatricals, no opportunity for any display of emotion. His hours of study must be long, so that he will have no time for the harboring of disturbing or dangerous thought. His hair must be shaved or cropped close so as to make him conspicuously unattractive to those of the opposite sex. If, however, an eccentric individual wishes to let his hair fall unkempt to his shoulders, above a tattered and filthy coat and trousers, nobody will object, for at least it effectually keeps him away from girls.

As for sports, if they are developed to the point of enjoyment they become taboo. Baseball, fortunately or unfortunately, has become popular and may be played, but not to the extent of one college team being permitted to meet another. Again, the intimacy of students with anyone outside their own circle is frowned upon. No interest in politics is permitted. There must be no frequenting of amusement halls, no connections with women. Yet after students are 20, if they smoke and drink and swagger nobody would care or dare to say a word. Between teachers and students there is almost nothing of camaraderie. Rather, a military relationship obtains. "Those of our teachers who adopt a friendly attitude towards us," said one student, "are too familiar; those who attempt to preserve their dignity are too distant." It is a hard life. Yet anyone who does not accept the education which is imposed has no chance. Desirable positions are plums that fall into the mouths only of the system's most thoroughly regimented favorites.

If a student begins to wonder what his education is leading to he need only remind himself that on reaching his twentieth year he is eligible for conscription, and that this means grilling military drill in camp for one year, surely, and probably for two. After this he will be counted as a first reservist, and then, until he is 40, as a second reservist. Thus the goal which he must always keep in view throughout the educational process is efficient and unprotesting soldiership. To that end all his instruction and all his

discipline lead and all his activities and ambitions must bend. Only so can the State be served supremely. A Japanese boy is never permitted to forget in his study of morals, the classics, geography, history, his own and foreign languages, that his chief glory is to have been born Japanese and his sole destiny is to live and if need be die for his Emperor.

Girls are effectually geared into the system by being taught that they can fulfill their chief function in life only by becoming the mothers of soldiers. Only as they hold rigidly to this ideal can they be regarded as worthy of having any part at all in the process of education.

To impress upon him the fact that he is nothing if he is not, every step of the way, an embryonic soldier, the student is required not only to take hard knocks as they come; he must make life hard for himself. Even in the dead of winter he must not think of going to school clad in anything but the flimsiest kind of fiber garments, with no underwear and no overcoat. He must not think of spending his day anywhere but in an unwarmed room, even when the thermometer outside falls below freezing. He must look forward to the coldest part of the winter, when he is expected to sally forth from his dormitory long before dawn every morning, and, clad only in his night clothes, make his way barefoot through the snow to some distant point where he is to practise *judo* or *jujitsu*, and perhaps end the morning with a plunge in the river before he returns to his quarters.

That they may not become effeminate, students must also accept barrenness in their rooms — no pennants, no pictures, no approved lighting fixtures, no comfortable chairs. A student's room must be "a bare and frosty cell," with nothing in it but a roll of bedding, a hanging scroll, a single flower in a vase, and a little table a foot high. Before that table the student sits hour after hour, looking like a stoop-shouldered vagabond, cramming for an eternal examination. His wardrobe is but one worn kimono. He must eat little and that as fast as possible, even though he knows that the mortality among students is 400 percent greater than among non-students. He must crush down any natural romanticism or melancholy, his tendency to fanaticism, and his despair.

He is the victim of his circumstances, and he knows it. He has no alternative than to accept his rôle and coöperate. Not only must he curb his own passion for free speech and free thought; he

must see to it that it is curbed in others also. He must laugh at others as he is laughed at by them when he breaks over, and so see to it that all individualism is checked, in himself and in others, and that all alike are kept down to the level of drab uniformity. He thus has no need for the teacher's authority, either to keep down his comrades or himself. The student group are a law unto themselves, and theirs is the final authority. Let no teacher by uncautious words dare to assume that function. If he does he will be quickly made to realize his mistake. He can say or do nothing for *his* pleasure; he must please *them*. He must do what is expected of him — assign tasks, carry out his instruction methodically, maintain his attitude of frozen nonchalance. If he does not, the inevitable happens; he is laughed at, a student strike ensues, and he is ousted.

Yet all this makes for a sort of democracy, or rather equality. There is no snobbery of class. A student is a student whether from a rich man's home or a poor man's, the premier's or the school janitor's. Brains alone tell. If he has them, he passes; if he does not, he is nothing, but is weeded out and sent to join the great majority — the ineffectual 83 percent that society needs as its drudges.

Every student, while he is a student, consoles himself with the happy thought that some day his time will come. And so, though he is a young tiger, and knows it, he submits to his lamb's training. Little does he dream that when he gets out he will find himself not a man-eater but a full-grown sheep, with a sheep's destiny. He must fit into his niche, be the slave of the system, repressing his opinions, abandon honest thought. He will move forward only with bent neck.

Yet in spite of everything, he chooses. He will be a Japanese still. If he is sent abroad to complete his education — and if he possesses the consummate Japanese quality he probably will — he will go to observe only, not to imbibe or absorb. He will strive to learn, merely, how Occidentals think and act; not how *he* should. Presumably he has decided beforehand that he will learn nothing from Western religion and Western philosophy, just as most Westerners do decide, in fact, on coming to his land. Why should he learn from them? They do not appeal. It is his business to go, observe, return and report — nothing more.

Spiritually, students conform. They have to. Not only must they accept the teaching regarding their divine ancestors; they

must worship them also — the ancestors and the fact of their divinity — whenever it may please the school authorities to round them up and march them to the shrines. What is done at the shrines? A bell is pulled, the hands are clasped, the head is bowed. Then the suppliant stands for a moment, thinking — thinking patriotic and reverential thoughts — only that and nothing more. "Worship at the shrines has no other purpose," the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Tokyo was told by the governmental authorities, "than to manifest visibly sentiments of fidelity to, and love of, country." All that is desired, in other words, is unquestioning obedience to the laws of the living present and to the spirit of the dead past, that is, to be a true Japanese.

But if the simple glory of being a Japanese, and so a member of the blessed Emperor's family, is not sufficient reward, there is forever held up before him a vision of the greater glory of helping to bring the rest of the world into the family, the Japanese family, which, he is led to believe, is to include the entire world. If that ideal were only accepted by the rest of the world, he is instructed, it would mean the salvation of the entire human race. Armaments then could be abolished, tariffs would not be needed, disputes would cease, courts and treaties would disappear, and "even the wind would blow quietly and the rain fall gently."

This gives the Japanese nation a mission, sacred and all-compelling: to *make* the world over into a family, "integrated in all its activities, social, political, economic, and cultural, in one august center." What matter if the method for accomplishing the objective be force in cases where compliance is lacking? Let force be accepted as a sacred means, and war glorified, and death courted. Afterwards there should be no bitterness left behind, not even in China, for all that has been done there and is being done is for the good of Asia, and as a step toward the establishment of the great all-inclusive human family. So continue the fight — for justice, for country, for Emperor, for ancestors, for humanity. To learn that that is the mission, and to find out how it is to be accomplished, is to be educated. On, then, on into Asia and beyond, for the accomplishment of the mission, the glorious mission that Japan owes to Asia and the world, of bringing all into the great and blessed family.

Such is the animus of education in Japan. Is it powerful? Yes, unbelievably so, and the world has it to reckon with, not only now but in the coming years.

THE FORCES OF COLLABORATION

By Louis R. Franck

THE overwhelming majority of the French people hope for the victory of the United Nations. Many express that hope openly, especially in the occupied zone, regardless of fears of German punishment. Some hold the hope because the victory of the United Nations will mean the triumph of democracy, of the free way of living and thinking; others simply desire to be free from German oppression, to have normal conditions of life restored, to get home the war prisoners, to get more food. The hope, then, though it is widespread, varies in degree and is based upon contrasting desires. But let me say once more at the start: the overwhelming majority of the French people hope for the victory of the United Nations.

In spite of this immense *consensus omnium*, France as a national entity collaborates with Germany. Not merely the Government at Vichy, but a relatively important part of what might be called the French élite collaborates. The majority which opposes collaboration lacks weapons; it also lacks leadership — at any rate inside of France. At no time in French history has there been such a deep abyss between the French people and their government; at no time such a gap between the real France and the legal France. This abyss is not merely the result of the military defeat. Indeed, it is much more a cause of the defeat than its result. Probably it is the most important cause.

II

What are the basic economic and social reasons why the policy of collaboration was adopted by a considerable number of French leaders?

To understand the spirit of collaboration, we must understand, first of all, the psychology of the French bureaucrats. Collaboration would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, without the silent consent of the highest French officials.

As a result of the First World War, state intervention in the economic field became steadily more pronounced. But the French Parliament proved to be very badly equipped to solve

difficult political and economic problems by itself. As a result, government by qualified experts gradually superseded the normal procedure. These experts were either high officials or former high officials who had become leaders in industry, banking or commerce. This political evolution began when the difficult problems connected with reparations and war debts were being solved, but it quickly spread through the whole economic field. After 1934, because of the continuing financial crisis, the Executive was empowered to issue decree-laws to solve the most urgent problems without parliamentary debate.

This trend quickly gave the French bureaucracy extraordinary importance, and this importance was never balanced by any increase in its political responsibility. French Premiers fell one after the other; but high officials never fell, and they came to look with scorn on officials who were at the mercy of shifting political majorities. In the thirties, the high civil bureaucracy had really become a caste, somewhat similar to the Prussian Junkers. This caste was highly competent in its own narrow field, but it remained, on the whole, absolutely ignorant of the real aspirations of the country. Naturally it inclined to be reactionary. The bureaucrats hated public debate; they hated to unveil the mysteries of the various bureaux through which they administered the country in accordance with a set daily routine. They actually liked to be misunderstood by Deputies and Senators; they laughed when Ministers published wrong facts and figures or were flouted by Parliament.

This psychology was chiefly exemplified by the administration of the Treasury, and especially the powerful Secretariat General and Inspection General of Finances. Following Munich, the overwhelmingly important task was to get the country mobilized industrially. But the officials of the financial administration were too much occupied with the task of curtailing postmen's and school teachers' salaries to face and deal with such vital problems as the supply of machine tools, of light metals like aluminum and magnesium, and of special steels. They consistently refused to solve those vital problems, just as they all along had steadily refused to adopt a broad policy of slum clearance which would have made France even more dear to even more of her people.

The military bureaucracy, which was despised by the high civilian authorities, was no better. It was overtired after years of administrative chicanery and allowed things to go their way with-

out real resistance. It had failed to take any serious measure to decentralize the industry of the country; the most important war factories still were grouped along the northeastern frontier or in the immediate suburbs of Paris. The construction of the Maginot Line itself revealed a complete absence of a comprehensive grasp of the whole problem by the technicians. Most people still do not know, for example, that a large portion of the French steel production (in the Longwy basin) was outside the Maginot Line and hence was not protected by it.

Parliament, I must repeat, took practically no action either for or against the national mobilization. For a long time it voted without a murmur, and indeed without much real discussion, the enormous credits demanded by the Executive. If Parliament was guilty, its fault certainly was not to have imposed too much supervision but rather not to have exercised any supervision at all. If high military and civilian officials had been forced to appear at Senatorial hearings of the American type, France would have had both more tanks and better morale on September 4, 1939.

After the defeat and the armistice of June 1940 the bureaucrats were ripe for collaboration. They never had had any clear idea of the French mission. The Germans came and told them that the French mission was to help create "the new European order;" that was a marvellous discovery. They learned also that in Germany there was no Parliament and no public opinion to bother about; this was another great discovery. French high officials did not stop to discuss whether the new order was bad or good. They simply began immediately to rule once more in their own little fields in accordance with the requirements of that new order. And as they are very clever, very open-minded, and as above everything they like jobs and power, they do it pretty well.

The second point to be noted is that there were new trends in the field of heavy industry which helped pave the way towards collaboration.

Partly as a result of the re-incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine into France in 1919, partly because of the rise of such new industries as that based on aluminum, France in twenty years had grown into a great industrial country. Its iron ore, potash, bauxite and textile manufactures were especially important. But the French domestic market was fairly small; in order to dispose of their surplus, French industrialists entered international combines and became partners in almost every European cartel.

The contrast between the natural wealth of the country and its demographic weakness, between its economic potential and the Malthusian theories of its leaders, profoundly modified the political psychology of leading French men of business. The very men that Leftist leaders pointed to as "war mongers" became in fact the staunchest supporters of European collaboration, of a "continental order." Daily contact with their German colleagues and a somewhat justifiable admiration for German economic organization, output and efficiency, induced them to think favorably of the idea that Europe should be unified under German leadership and to look forward to the resulting opportunities for developing backward countries, especially the Balkans and western Russia.

This tendency found expression in the weekly *Les Nouveaux Cahiers*, published during the Popular Front period by prominent business leaders. Pioneers in the movement were MM. Barnaud and Baudoin for the bankers, M. Detoeuf for industry, and MM. de Tarde and Dayras for the high administrative and economic bureaucracy. In foreign policy it was internationalist and "appeasing" — *Munichois* was the French expression; in the domestic field, simultaneously, it was liberal and vaguely socialistic.¹

On the eve of the outbreak of war in 1914 the great French Socialist, Jean Jaurès, a champion of popular rights, recalled the phrase of Leibnitz, "Bodies prevent, but minds do not." He meant that individuals of good will might always come to agreement, whereas material and economic antagonisms would prevent. Just before the Second World War many important French business leaders adopted the opposite view, feeling that economic interests could always agree and that this agreement would inevitably lead to the "demobilization" of minds.

An anecdote which I heard from a friend who was a French representative on the international cartel for railway rolling stock will serve to illustrate this new psychology. A meeting of this cartel, held in Germany at the height of the Czech crisis, ended in general agreement and satisfaction. My friend got up and, addressing his colleagues from the various interested countries, said: "Gentlemen, we have just concluded an excellent technical and economic agreement. Let us offer our joint services

¹ I do not mean, of course, that all French industrialists formerly interested in European cartels have become enthusiastic supporters of collaboration. Many members of the *Nouveaux Cahiers* group have proved to be devoted to freedom. But the general attitude was as I have described it.

to the Great Powers to solve the Sudeten problem. Doubtless it is difficult; but we have just proved that there is no problem without a solution, and anything is better than war." These words were received with great applause.

The story strangely recalls the desperate efforts which the French Socialists made on the eve of the First World War. Both denote a complete lack of political understanding, the absence of any real knowledge of what Pan Germanism means and how it acts.

On the French political scene, at the same time, M. Marcel Déat championed similar theories. In the two tendencies, one in the economic realm, the other in the political, we discover the tap roots of the spirit of collaboration.

Let me now mention a third influential factor. The business leaders in question had their own special conception of the world, a real *Weltanschauung*. Some of them, like MM. Baudoin or Barnaud, usually related it to what they conceived of as Catholic order, Catholic unity. At the time of the Czech crisis they often referred to the "Czech heresy" or the "Hussite heresy." Usually the motives which really dominated them were purely materialistic; but they pushed those into the background, and covered their dubious acts with the noble and idealistic arguments of their broad humanistic culture.

Other leaders, however, did not bother to indulge in idealism. For them, from 1934 on, the question was very simple: was France to become a Communist country or not? To avoid the social revolution which they saw threatening they were ready for anything, even for adherence or submission to Hitler. There were sharp social differences between these people and the business leaders described above.

The French anti-Bolshevists were usually *petits bourgeois*: small shopkeepers or middle class industrialists, with a few great industrialists included. They were anti-Syndicalist, anti-Popular Front; whereas the business intelligentsia used to lunch with "open-minded" labor leaders and talk with them in fashionable drawing-rooms, indeed often subsidized their papers. The anti-Bolshevists were susceptible to any form of demagogic argument provided it was anti-Communist. They were ripe for civil war — though not for too bloody a one! Their man was Doriot; their political system was Fascism. They were anti-imperialists; in international affairs they were definitely cowards. Since the

armistice, they have accepted with enthusiasm the anti-Semitism and the "corporative" anti-capitalism offered by Vichy.

Just as the business intelligentsia flirted with open-minded labor leaders so it flirted also with the despised *petits bourgeois*. The *petits bourgeois* did not like banks and trusts. Therefore, to keep the peace, ties had to be created between them and the upper bourgeoisie which operated the banks and trusts. To maintain these ties the intelligentsia had to find clever and cynical intermediaries, men who had a keen understanding of the social set-up and were physically aggressive. MM. Pucheu and Marion were born for this work.

M. Pucheu was educated at the Superior Normal School, the French temple of higher culture where college and university professors are trained. But after the last war professors were badly paid and some pupils of the School developed a sudden interest in international politics or big business. Those who felt a call to politics gravitated to Geneva, and especially to the International Labor Office, whose first director, Albert Thomas, himself came from the Normal School. The *Comité des Forges*, under the leadership of M. François-Poncet, also from the Normal School, and later French Ambassador to Germany, attracted the others. Pucheu was one of them. Eventually he was entrusted with the international relations department of the *Comité des Forges*. Much later, he became one of the followers of Jacques Doriot and is said to have taken on the rôle of financial intermediary between Doriot's French Popular Party and the great interests which secretly subsidized it. Just before the war broke out, the Worms Bank had asked him to reorganize the Japy plants at Beaucourt.

Marion was merely a Communist who in 1934 left the Communist Party with Doriot. He became chief of the Propaganda and Press Services of the Popular Party.

There was constant social and political unrest in France from the end of 1933 on. Politico-financial scandals raised up violent rival factions, most of them strongly anti-parliamentarian in feeling. Convulsions of this sort are not rare in the lives of nations. They evidence a maladjustment between the inefficiency and consequent unpopularity of existing political bodies and the skill and competence of technical and economic forces. When the political powers prove unable to integrate the rising social forces and to canalize them within the traditional political frame, the

maladjustment leads inevitably to revolution or tyranny. England furnishes examples of such epochs, under men like Bolingbroke at the beginning of the eighteenth century and Beaconsfield in the nineteenth. But neither Bolingbroke nor Beaconsfield seceded; both of them were absorbed into the traditional system, another proof of English political wisdom.

In France, on the contrary, such processes of absorption have always been extremely difficult. Clemenceau offers perhaps the only example of a violent and individualistic personality who never played anything but the parliamentary game. On the eve of the great crisis which led to the present war the traditional French parties could not absorb and discipline the various rebels. The Unified Socialist Party could not absorb Marcel Déat, Adrien Marquet and their companions; nor could the Right absorb Doriot, Pucheu and their friends. Here is surely an historical factor of great importance, even though the reasons for it are difficult to untangle.

On the eve of Munich, all the definitely pro-Fascist factions in France were working under cover of darkness; and, also in darkness, the business intelligentsia were trying to lay down the new rules for the government of tomorrow. In this projected government MM. Gabriel Leroy-Ladurie, Barnaud, Baudoin, Pucheu were to be the foremost leaders. None of these men wished for the defeat of France, nor did they work for it; but they could not help knowing that the political convulsions which would follow defeat would finally make a clean sweep of the past and give them the possibility of realizing their program. In a way they were 1940 followers of Saint-Simon.

Still another kind of crisis was in process among the leaders of the labor unions and of French anti-Fascism. Here Communism and the Spanish Civil War were the agents of dissolution.

The reunification of the Socialist and Communist Workers' Confederations, decided upon at Toulouse in July 1935, had paved the way for the covenant of the Popular Front. But it did not smooth away the mistrust and anger felt by moderate labor leaders who belonged to the Second International for their Communist comrades. Younger Socialist and Communist workers might frankly decide to go along together hand-in-hand; but the same could not be said of the leaders of the trade unions. Among them the prevailing feeling was hatred — hatred mixed with fear on the part of the "Reformists" (moderates), hatred

mixed with condescension among the Communists. Coöperation with the French bureaucracy, both at home and at Geneva, had taught the "Reformists" the easy way of compromise and quiet accommodation; but they knew that on this very account they eventually would be absorbed by their Communist companions, who were more audacious, more active, more numerous and above all absolutely free from any scruple. Between them, they knew, there was bound to be a struggle to the finish for the union dues of the workers — and for power.

Later on in this article I shall pay a tribute to the courage which the Communists displayed in France after the start of the German-Russian war in June 1941. In view of that I can all the more properly criticize their attitude during the five preceding years. Their behavior was doubtless coherent from Stalin's point of view; but from the French point of view it was entirely inadmissible. The Communist Party, which did everything in its power to drag France into the war and everything, at the same time, to prevent her rearmament, carries a crushing share of the responsibility for her defeat. The climax of its subservience to Moscow was reached when it greeted the signature of the German-Russian agreement in August 1939 as a guarantee of peace, thus completely confusing the French workers at a crucial moment.

From the foregoing we are able to understand the psychology of the "Reformist" labor union leaders during the Spanish Civil War, at the time of Munich, and immediately after the Armistice with Germany. It can be summed up in one word: anti-Communism.

Several other circumstances also help explain the anti-Communist feeling of many Socialist and labor leaders. The French Socialist movement had been traditionally pacifist — indeed, pacifist at any price. This pacifism was colored by a rather marked friendliness for Germany. Jean Jaurès before 1914 and Léon Blum after 1918 were its greatest exponents. Prior to 1914, Jean Jaurès had feared that France might become the champion of "English imperialism" against "German imperialism." He did not want England to "dispose of" France. In those days he and his colleagues were very open-minded towards the country of Karl Marx, Bebel and Liebknecht, and suspicious not only of Saint Petersburg but also of London.

The Socialist tendency to put faith in Germany revived after

the war. Obviously Hitler's intrusion onto the scene was bound to upset the traditional position — but it did not do so completely. The true internationalism and sense of democracy of men like Léon Blum and Léon Jouhaux outweighed their desire for peace and their anti-Communism. But a large minority secretly or openly believed that Hitler was not worth a war and that the "pluto-democratic" government of the City of London was not very much better than the regimentation of the Gestapo. Let us put it another way. The Marxian idea that any war is essentially only a clash between economic antagonisms gave moral support for their attitude of complete selfishness. That was the case with Paul Faure, Charles Spinasse, Paul Rives, René Belin and others.

This spirit of abdication was rife in the ranks of militant anti-Fascism from the time of the Spanish Civil War on. The struggle, it was said, was only a fight between Stalin's imperialism and Hitler's and as such was not of interest to French workers. The powerful unions of school teachers and postmen were both ardently pro-Munich and their attitude symbolized the degradation of French patriotism. Because pseudo-patriots in the past had identified their business interests with national interests, these misguided persons came to believe that any form of patriotism was only a cloak for reactionary selfishness, that the old words liberty, equality, fraternity no longer had any meaning. Why struggle for a political democracy which had not been able to achieve social democracy? Slavery was better than death; Nazism did not endanger public liberties any more than did the laws that accompanied a state of war.

It was in this nauseous climate of intellectual and moral decomposition, when so many normal leaders of public opinion questioned the elementary ideas which ordinarily cement national solidarity and are above question, that the war broke out. And the defeat, instead of providing the fiery furnace in which all the sophisms of yesterday might have melted together, made it worse.

Such are the elements of political psychology which have combined to produce the spirit of collaboration in France today. Once more let me say that only a certain so-called élite is concerned. My remarks do not apply to the obscure crowd which this élite was supposed to lead. But it is this very élite which today rules Vichy France.

It is apparent, from the above, that Franco-German political collaboration is supported by very different types of men, and for very different reasons. Let me now give some more precise details of trends in the different social strata.

First as to the upper civilian and military bureaucracy. The former Minister of Finance, M. Yves Bouthilher, and generally speaking the higher Treasury officials, have been definitely in favor of collaboration. Most of them belong to the Franco-German economic bodies headed by M. Jacques Barnaud, a former Treasury official. All the new prefects are of course subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, formerly under M. Pierre Pucheu and now under M. Pierre Laval. They are among the most fanatical collaborationists; hunting out Communists and baiting Jews are their daily pursuits.

In the academic field the situation is more intricate. Teachers and research workers are not really either pro-collaboration or anti-collaboration, but for the most part adopt a passive attitude. With some exceptions, they have not reacted openly against the racial laws. At the top of the academic hierarchy, rectors, deans and administrative officials are more frankly collaborationist.

The behavior of the French diplomats has been, on the whole, much more courageous. The pro-British tradition had deep roots in the French Foreign Office and this tradition still persists. For example, the resignation of M. Basdevant, formerly legal adviser at the Quai d'Orsay, created much commotion in Vichy France.

Army officers, for the most part, and especially the young ones, hope for revenge on Germany. This does not mean that they have democratic leanings. But they have been beaten, their sense of honor has been wounded. A number of older officers have been placed by the Vichy Government in positions which carry great prestige but little real responsibility, for example, as inspectors for the execution of economic regulations, super-inspectors of police, regional food advisers, etc. Navy men have been especially favored in the same way by Admiral Darlan and so in general are more collaborationist than the army.

There is another group which favors Franco-German economic coöperation because its members admire "German organization." Among them are MM. Paul Baudoin, Jacques Barnaud, Jean Bichelonne, now Minister of Production, Jacques Leroy-Ladurie,

now Minister of Agriculture,² and René Lehideux, former Minister of Production, Director of the Renault plant. The key position held by the Worms Bank in these circles is now well known.

Before the defeat and the armistice these men believed in a compromise peace; since the armistice they believe in a German victory. They were profoundly surprised by the Russian resistance, but even at the end of 1941 they still thought that Germany would finally absorb Russia and reorganize it in the course of a few years. They probably still hope for a German victory, for the economic unification of Europe under German aegis, and for a "deal" with America. It must be clearly understood that these men are absolutely unconscious of the ideological aspects of the present struggle. They are not shocked by the absurdity of the idea that democracies and dictatorships can exist side by side in the postwar world. For them the war is only a clash between conflicting economic imperialisms. Despite their social origins they are unconscious Marxists of the most benighted type.

Around these men are grouped the members of the new French economic bureaucracy, especially of the Office for the Allocation of Raw Materials, which handles the details of Franco-German industrial collaboration. This bureaucracy is not to be confused with the newly created Committees of Industrial Organization, which have charge of what remains of French industry and do not participate in schemes for industrial collaboration with Germany. In fact, many leaders of the Committees of Industrial Organization have proved very reluctant collaborationists.

Then there are the French reactionaries with Nazi leanings, most of them grouped in the Doriot, Deloncle and Costantini organizations. They have no popularity or prestige in either the occupied or the unoccupied zone.

The case of Marcel Déat is obviously different. He is a man of energy and some intelligence. During the First World War he proved to be a very brave soldier. Moreover, he has a certain political philosophy; for the last two years he has fought not only for close coöperation with Germany and against England but also against Vichy clericalism and reactionary social measures. In a Nazi France, he would become the leader of the left wing; he would probably be a bitter opponent of the kind of financial interests represented by the Worms Bank, as well as of Catholic influence. Under a purely National Socialist rule he would

² His brother, Gabriel Leroy-Ladurie, is head of the Worms Bank.

stress, at least for a time, the "Socialism" more than the "Nationalism."³

Still another group is formed of the politicians of the Left and Extreme Left who have gone over to collaboration. These, it will be generally agreed, are among the most despicable elements in French politics. I have tried to explain above some of the personal reasons for their attitude. Admiral Darlan endeavored to use them at times to rally the Radical peasants and the Socialist workers to Vichy. Charles Spinasse, Paul Rives and Paul Faure lent themselves to this manœuvre. It failed definitely and completely.

Collaborationist leaders in the labor unions were recruited among the friends of former Labor Minister René Belin, including Francis Million, Georges Dumoulin and Kleber Legay. Delmas, leader of the teachers' union, has also been a prominent advocate of Franco-German friendship. Many of these labor leaders have been invited to visit Germany, have come back quite enthusiastic and have been sent out through the country on extensive propaganda tours during which they have contrasted the Hitler paradise with the Stalinist hell. The same must be said of some of the former Socialist mayors in the suburbs of Paris, such as Pierre Morizet and others, who have celebrated German urban achievements. Paradoxically enough, it is precisely in the coal and steel regions of Flanders and in Paris industrial suburbs that workers have proved to be mostly in favor of de Gaulle and most determined to help bring about Germany's defeat.

A few intellectuals of the Emery type are also included among the collaborationists.⁴ They are mainly followers of Alain, whose pacifist doctrine was a first step towards collaboration. Finally, there is the inevitable crop of needy journalists such as Francis Delaisi and Achille Dauphin-Meunier. For them, writing about collaboration is just a new way to earn a living.

IV

France thus is confronted with a frightful depreciation in intellectual and moral values among its traditional leaders. As a result, perhaps the most essential postwar problem of French politi-

³ Déat, who before the war signed a manifesto urging the Polish Government to be less anti-Semitic, is now a bitter anti-Semite. A curious fact which must be mentioned is the strong influence exercised on him by Werner Sombart's works on the evolution of capitalism.

⁴ Emery, an anarcho-syndicalist leader, favored peace at any price and headed various anti-Fascist committees.

cal reorganization will be to find a new leadership, to discover a new élite in every field of activity, but particularly in administrative, educational and social life. I do not say that the constitutional problem of the new France will not be of importance. All that I say is that the form of government in itself will be of less importance than the quality and intrinsic worth of the leaders in each field.

Will these leaders be found? If so, where and how? My answer to the first question is a definite "yes." To the second my answer is that they will be found in four sectors, as follows:

(1) Among the limited but still considerable number of business leaders and high officials who have refused to bow to the invader.

(2) Among the Frenchmen who have left France momentarily in order to continue the fight. This raises the whole problem of the relationship between the Fighting France of General de Gaulle and France proper; also the subsidiary problem of the relationship of the Fighting French movement with foreign governments, as well as of its relationship with French politicians who have left France but have not definitely joined the movement.

(3) Among the new groups and strata which have formed spontaneously in France as a result of the resistance against defeat and collaboration. I refer particularly to the Catholic youth.

(4) Finally, among the old social groups which at present are stifled and persecuted either by the Nazis, or by Vichy, or by both. Here I mean chiefly the Communist organizations, but also those leaders of the Socialist trade unions who have refused to collaborate.

I shall not discuss here the first two groups. Obviously it would be absurd to identify by name the leading anti-collaborationist industrialists and officials. I also prefer not to pass judgment, in the pages of a foreign review, on the polemics which have sometimes occurred inside the Fighting French organization or on differences which have arisen between it and foreign governments. But I must comment briefly on the two other sections.

First, there are the new French youth, the young Frenchmen who do not accept unquestioningly the orders given by Vichy, who ponder the future of France and who try to establish new rules of action for themselves in their own minds.

It is a well-known fact that since the Armistice there is no

longer a national army in France but only a professional army of about 100,000 recruited volunteers. But young men are required, when twenty years old, to spend eight months in the Youth Camps, where they undertake a variety of rural and public works, under commissioned supervisors who give them some civic and moral training. Here is probably the best opportunity for the building up of a new national leadership. The different social strata in the Youth Camps do not amalgamate completely, since the supervisors generally are of bourgeois origin, whereas the rank and file of the boys are either workers or peasants. However, contacts are much more intimate in the camps than they were between officers and men in the regular French Army.

The new élite which is being created in the Youth Camps tends to be rather anti-collaborationist. They have not adopted racial ideas; if they seem to accept the commands of the Government, that is largely out of reverence for the person of Marshal Pétain. They often debate whether or not the new order is in the French tradition. On the whole, they seem to be largely under the influence of social and liberal Catholicism — that is to say, the prewar tradition of the Young Christian Workers' Movement. Many outstanding figures in the Church are in close contact with them. Obviously the Church sees that the defeat gives it a marvellous opportunity to take the French youth in hand once more, and it is performing its task with tact and intelligence.

A few words now about the Communists and trade union leaders. For a whole year, from June 1940 to June 1941, the German authorities officially took no interest in Communist activities. Whenever the Préfet de Police in Paris complained about them the usual German answer was that it was a purely French domestic affair and that the French authorities could do what they liked about it. A new daily paper, *La France au Travail*, was started in occupied France with German money; its economic and social tendencies were purely Communist, but mixed with attacks on Britain and the normal sort of anti-Semitism. It proved, however, to be a complete failure. Meanwhile, the old Communist daily, *L'Humanité*, was printed underground.

Things changed with the German attack on Russia at the end of June 1941. Since that time the Communist Party has become the main focus of French resistance. Some of its former leaders, such as Semard and Gabriel Peri, former editors of *L'Humanité*, have been shot by the Germans. They died bravely.

Many leaders of the "Reformist" trade unions who had not been corrupted by the daily routine of bureaucracy and political compromises have taken an equally fine stand. Recently in Nantes four such leaders — Granet, of the paper union, Michels, of the leather union, Poulmarch, of the seamen's union, and Timbaud, of the steel union — were shot by the Germans after having refused to collaborate along the lines urged by their former comrade, Froideval, a man of Vichy.

Obviously a real movement of reunification is in process among French workers. Some of the new young leaders in the underground Socialist trade union movement seem to maintain a resolute attitude toward the Communist organizations, and probably they will find more difficulty in collaborating with Communist leaders than with the liberal Catholics. But there is a sense of common interest, based on an equality of suffering and on an equality of hatred against former Communists of the Gitton and Clamamus type and former Socialists of the Spinasse and Belin and Froideval types. It is of course much more deeply rooted than the artificial political movement of 1935-1936 which paved the way for the Popular Front.

In my opinion, the most arduous political task in France after the victory of the United Nations will be to establish the basis of collaboration between these two new rising forces — the young Catholic bourgeoisie of liberal and Socialist leanings, and the Communists and the Socialist trade union leaders who have learned once again the great lessons of national consciousness and patriotism.

THE SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE

By Victor Vinde

THE masses of the French people simply did not understand what was happening to them when the German military machine rolled across the Loire and, with hardly a pause, down to Bordeaux and the Pyrenees. In those horrifying days of June 1940 there was almost no news either on the radio or in the press. Almost nobody tried to analyze the causes of the disaster. The pain of the moment was too acute, the catastrophe was too brutal, to permit generalizations or long views; immediate personal worries monopolized the thoughts of almost everyone. France fell, and lay in a kind of stupor.

When people did think, it was not old Marshal Pétain alone who imagined that a new world was about to be born, and that it might not be such a bad one after all. The Marshal told the French people — and each one of them in his heart wished to believe it — that the Germans were, after all, men like other men; that peace could not at any rate be harsher or more terrible than war; and that the sacrifices which the Germans would exact would be only temporary. Sooner or later there would be a resurgence of French life and what had been lost would be regained. So the peasant returned to the land, ready to work to earn that peace which the armistice had brought dimly into view.

Only slowly and gradually, when it became apparent that the Germans had no intention of treating France as a free and independent country, did French resistance begin to take shape. The peasants in the occupied territory were the first to realize the fact. They had seen the Germans arrive, smiling and with hands outstretched; they had read the posters on the walls of the town halls inviting "the abandoned population to trust the German soldier;" they had been prepared to believe them. But the day after the entry of the German troops, the mayor of each community was summoned before the *Kreiskommandant*, usually a haughty reserve officer, to hear a lecture in broken French. While the mayor stood, the *Kommandant* told him that the Germans and the Führer wished the French no ill, but that from now on they would have to change their way of living. French-

men were lazy and dirty; this had to stop. In future, the roads and villages were to be kept spick and span. France was to be put on a rational basis of production, under German supervision. It was fallow ground; the Germans were going to see to it that it became fertile and productive.

This first contact with the occupation authorities brought a feeling of disillusionment to all the peasants in the occupied territory, and this grew into antagonism as the Germans started to interfere with their daily life. German time was imposed — two hours ahead of the sun — and a system of requisition and control established. The French peasant, always resentful of any interference either from above or from outside, began to hate the invader profoundly. Appeals from Vichy urging him to collaborate fell on deaf ears. The Germans had humiliated him, had intruded on his personal domain. This he would not accept and could not forget.

One or two German companies of troops settled down in each of a thousand little French villages. The town hall became the *Orts-Kommandantur*, the best buildings were used as barracks, and everywhere the nicest rooms were requisitioned for the officers and non-coms. Before dawn each morning the village would be wakened by the strident call of the bugle and, peering from behind their window curtains, the inhabitants could see the small garrison lined up on the main square of the village and could hear the shouted commands of the little Nazi lieutenant and watch the jerky motions of the soldiers. The peasant clenched his fists in silence. Later, when it was dark, he repaired to the nearby woods to oil the automatic gun which he miraculously had found on the road one evening in June and which he now was keeping for a better day.

The hostility between the French peasants and the occupying forces took on a new character as soon as the troops were withdrawn from the little villages and concentrated at strategic points throughout the country. This happened early in 1941, when fresh troops were needed for the Russian campaign, then already in preparation. From that time on the resistance of the peasants almost everywhere in occupied France took on the form of sabotage of agricultural production. It has continued and increased. Each farmer plants and cultivates only enough for his own immediate needs because he knows with absolute certainty that any surplus would be used to feed, not his starving compatriots,

but the German Army. The repeated appeals of the old Marshal and of his associates for increased agricultural production have been in vain. Now that the French peasant has seen the enemy at close range he will never assist him in any way to dominate France.

The people of the cities took much longer than the peasants to realize that the Germans were oppressors and not collaborators. When the workers returned to their factories and found that their old labor organizations had ceased to exist they blamed the fact on some of their union leaders and on the former Socialist and Communist politicians who had betrayed them — or so they thought, for they had no newspapers of their own to give them the facts. “Why resist?” many of them said. “The first thing is to live.” Soon, however, they learned who it was that was responsible for the way things were. It was the Germans who had ordered that wages should remain at the prewar level notwithstanding the great increase in the cost of living. It was the Germans who seized the cattle arriving at slaughter-houses in the cities and the vegetables and potatoes which were shipped to the central market in Paris. But the Germans ruthlessly suppressed any and every attempt at organization in the plants, and soon most of these were under complete German control: the French worker had no choice but to submit.

Businessmen and the well-to-do bourgeoisie were the slowest to comprehend and to react. Many of them regarded the defeat as punishment for those who had toyed with democratic ideas and had strayed from the traditional ways of healthy conservative politics. Others felt that France no longer was able to stand on her own feet and that she could recover her prosperity and greatness only by fitting herself into a new Europe under German leadership. They had lost all real faith in their country. The insidious semi-Fascist propaganda which much of the French press — and especially poisonous weeklies like *Gringoire* and *Candide* — had been spreading long before the war, had led many to believe that National Socialism was a doctrine which defended private property and promoted social order, and hence one which they might be able to accept, even welcome. Numerous business people, then, hoped to find some *modus vivendi* with the Germans.

This illusion did not last long except in a limited number of cases. Immediately after the armistice, the Germans began put-

ting into effect a plan by which all French industry was transferred into German hands. The general procedure hardly was varied. When a French industrialist or merchant needed to transport merchandise or to obtain raw materials he got in touch with the proper German authorities. Within a short time a representative of some German business group was sent to see him. This group agreed to collaborate with him in exchange for a participation in the business. Those who refused were simply dispossessed. Thus all the most important French firms — chemical, metallurgical, textile, automobile, as well as the railroads and the Paris subway — passed under the control of the Germans. The great German trusts, beginning with the I. G. Farben, simply helped themselves to what they wanted. But the looting did not stop there. Small plants or business firms which were not worth bothering about in the eyes of German big business nevertheless aroused the greed of medium-sized German industrialists, and a swarm of “buyers” representing the latter descended upon occupied France as well as the unoccupied zone. The occupation authorities strongly encouraged this raid, and few concerns escaped. Today, almost half of the capital invested in French industry is “legally” held by the Germans. In case of a German victory it would remain in their hands. No German peace, however lenient, could ever be expected to free French business from this hold.

In consequence, nearly all French industry is at present working for Germany, turning out all sorts of equipment as well as arms and munitions. Uniformed German comptrollers direct and supervise the workers in every factory. The French industrialist is merely a partner in his own business, often not much more than an employee. The factory owners and other business people who in the autumn of 1940 expected to get on with the Germans have had to abandon their hopes. The immense majority of them collaborate with the Germans because they cannot do otherwise. Of course there are some who believe in a German victory and think Franco-German collaboration is the only possible foundation for profitable business. Some actually desire a German victory. But these really are few. Most resent collaboration and regard it as simply a makeshift arrangement to be endured somehow until events take a better turn.

Most of the middle class quite early joined the anti-collaborationist ranks. This was especially true of the school teachers —

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both of primary and secondary schools — and of large numbers of university professors. Efforts have been made by the Marshal's friends, of course, and particularly by M. Abel Bonnard, the present Minister of Education, to remove those who were pronouncedly hostile to the policy of collaboration. In spite of these efforts the majority of the school teachers and professors, especially those belonging to the lower middle class, have continued to resist. The same cannot be said of some of the upper university professors, especially in the Faculté de Droit at Paris.

Churchmen were on the whole slow to reach a decision. The Catholic Church did not need to oppose Vichy; indeed, the French Government, far from trying to diminish the power or influence of the Church, solicited its support.¹ On their side, German authorities were wise enough not to interfere directly with the Church in France. But the neutral attitude which as a result the Church has adopted towards personalities and events since the armistice must not be mistaken for active approval of Vichy's policies, or even for friendly complicity in them. It must be said, however, that in the main the high clergy have remained personally loyal to the Marshal, even though some of them in private condemn M. Pierre Laval and his henchmen. The small clergy, on the other hand, and especially the country priests who live in close contact with their rural parishioners, appear to be decidedly hostile towards collaboration, even though at times they accept some of Pétain's political tenets.

The attitude of the Protestant Churches in France is harder to appraise correctly. As recently as a year ago, ardent supporters of Marshal Pétain could be found among members of the Reformed Church. Laval's rise to power, however, seems to have produced a change in those quarters. As for the French Lutherans, they could hardly remain indifferent to the Nazi attacks on their church in Norway and its fierce struggle for existence; this in turn developed and reinforced their own spirit of resistance.

At the beginning, French resistance sought rather timidly for means to express itself and undertake active work. The example of General de Gaulle and the information supplied in the French broadcasts from London certainly played an important rôle in

¹ Attempts were made by some Vichy ministers, among them M. Jean Jacques Chevalier, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Grenoble, to reintroduce religious teaching into the primary schools. The Church apparently feared that a return to clericalism might provoke a strong reaction in the opposite direction later on, and refrained from giving the proposal open support.

crystallizing the determination of those at home not to accept Hitler's new order and not to be won over by Vichy to collaboration. I remember many evenings spent in little French farmhouses in occupied territory, listening with a group of peasants to the French voice coming over the air. Those who have not had that experience will never be able to grasp the enormous psychological influence of these voices. General de Gaulle soon became a kind of deity, to whom people listened almost religiously. The Germans naturally made intense efforts to jam the foreign broadcasts, but they were unsuccessful except in the large centers; and by means of them Frenchmen remained in constant contact with the outside world. Indeed, it is a usual experience to find that in the countryside the peasants know of some event in a distant part of the world 24 hours before the Berlin or Vichy press publishes the news of it.

Vichy has done everything it can think of to discredit the exiled General. Sometimes de Gaulle is pictured as a Free Mason and an enemy of labor; at others he is described as a mouthpiece for the royalists; at others he is called a Communist; and at others he is said to have joined with Jews and demagogues to plan the destruction of the French social hierarchy. The Germans naturally have given strong support in this campaign. They covered walls with posters in which General de Gaulle was accused of starving the French people because he did not protest against the British blockade. All sorts of absurd calumnies were directed against him in the German-controlled newspapers and in pamphlets. Yet no amount of slander could alter the fact that it was de Gaulle who had organized the continuation of French military resistance to the Nazis and who was fighting alongside of Great Britain and the United States. As such he was, and increasingly is, the symbol of eventual liberation.

It is interesting to note, by the way, that people show little interest in politics as such in either the occupied or the unoccupied zone. The one thing upon which they all agree is that they do not want to see the return of the men who ran French politics before the war. Men of all the parties — Socialists and Royalists, Communists and Conservatives — follow the Marshal and sing the praises of the invaders, just as men from all the parties fill the concentration camps and face the firing squads. Frenchmen who risk their lives every day to help liberate their country care little whether this man or that is a Communist or a Free Mason, a Jew

or a Breton, a bourgeois or a laborer, a priest or an officer. They may worry about it later, when they have regained their freedom. But when German propaganda spreads rumors from London or New York of misunderstandings within the Fighting French movement, or tries to work up party feelings, the average Frenchman only smiles sadly.

Politics have been put aside; they simply do not exist. The one important thing is that the United Nations shall win the war and save the world. Whether a man is for that or against it is the sole criterion by which he is judged.

Such is the general tenor of French reactions to the German occupation and to Vichy collaboration. Let us now look more closely at some of the groups which support resistance on the one hand, collaboration on the other. The most active resistance is to be found among the labor organizations and groups of former army officers. The only political party which survived the catastrophe is the Communist Party. Having been forced to work clandestinely even before the defeat of France, it possessed an underground machine ready to function immediately even if not quite smoothly. In spite of the fact that the Germans and the Vichy Government are constantly on their track, the Communists have developed their activity to a considerable degree. They have revived the slogans of 1789 and, as numerous Socialists have joined them in their struggle, they seek to present the picture of a common patriotic front under their aegis. This does not mean that such a front exists on a nationwide scale, or that it will ever exist, for Frenchmen on the whole have no leaning towards Communism. But for the time being local contacts have certainly been established throughout the country between the Communist cells and various patriotic groups. Many of these groups publish their own papers. The underground press is extremely active and has an ever-widening circulation despite ruthless repression by the Gestapo and the police agents of the Vichy Government. The repression is somewhat eased by the fact that many postal employees, and even some of the Vichy administrative personnel, resent collaboration and are either indifferent or hostile towards the régime they serve.

At first the army officers stood behind Marshal Pétain. But the lengthening series of humiliations imposed on the French people as a result of the Vichy policy, and the stories told by escaped officers, brought about a decided change. Today a number of

former officers head small resistance groups in the occupied zone. It is these officers, the Communists and the heads of labor groups in touch with de Gaulle who issue the orders for all acts of sabotage committed in the war factories, on the roads and in the arsenals of the German army of occupation.

Such prisoners of war as have been sent back to France are decidedly anti-collaborationist. The same is true of escaped prisoners. These manifest not merely hostility but a real hatred for the Vichy Government and for Marshal Pétain personally. This seems to indicate that the same state of mind prevails in the prison camps in Germany. I happen to have talked with many of these escaped prisoners — with some of them as late as May 1942. From them, too, I got the impression that the men in the camps in Germany stand uncompromisingly for continued French resistance and that the return of them *en masse* would certainly have grave consequences for the Vichy régime. This is why the Pétain Government prefers to see them come back gradually; it is easier to handle and watch a few at a time. The Germans also have something to fear from the returning prisoners, for they tell their countrymen not only how badly they were treated in captivity but how weary and discouraged the Germans are, especially the civilian population. They speak of the huge losses on the eastern front and of the shortage of food. The few contacts that the prisoners in Germany have had with the representatives of the Vichy Government, either M. de Brinon or the blind war veteran Scapini, an unofficial French envoy to Germany, have confirmed them in their distrust of Vichy. When the million Frenchmen who are still prisoners return to their native country, they will seek any available means to avenge themselves on the men of Vichy whom they hold responsible for their misfortune.²

In addition to the innumerable open revolts that have been occurring for more than a year in occupied France, and apart from the undisciplined behavior of the people of the other zone, about which the Vichy administration frequently complains, there is also a general passive resistance which creates many difficulties for the occupation authorities.

Even the attitude of the French towards German attempts to recruit labor is a form of resistance. In answer to Germany's demands, the Vichy Government has tried unsuccessfully for

² Some of the high-ranking French officers in the prison camps, even though anti-German in their feelings, may perhaps be more favorable to Pétain than are the prisoners in general.

two years to supply French workers for the German war factories. The favorite instrument of compulsion is the withdrawal of food cards. In spite of using or threatening to use this method, Vichy has not been able to send more than one hundred thousand French workers to Germany. Those who come back refuse to return to the Reich; and those who go today do so only because their families are starving and they have no other choice left. It is certainly the most ignoble slave-trading seen in modern times.

People coming from France in recent months have not always agreed concerning the extent of French resistance. It depends on which part of France they saw. Some who stayed either in Vichy itself, or in a city of unoccupied France like Clermont-Ferrand, where the Vichy influence is strongly felt, have been in contact mainly with personalities who have emerged since the so-called National Revolution and who depend on it for their livelihood. All they saw was the confusion, the compromise, the cowardice. On the contrary, those who were able to travel through the country, even in unoccupied France, noticed that the London broadcasts penetrate almost everywhere, that the prestige of the Marshal is on the wane, that de Gaulle's is rising, and that collaboration is coming to be considered "bad politics." In the large centers like Paris, Nancy, Le Havre, the temper of the masses seems to be almost unanimous. Resistance, even when not aggressive, is widespread.

Only certain sections of the people, of course, take part in sabotage, in the distribution of underground papers or in street demonstrations; but the vast majority are at heart with those who make the decisions and carry on the active struggle. A "popular movement" never includes the entire population of a country. But it can be said nevertheless that all of the French people achieved the French Revolution even though not all of them actively participated in it. In that same sense the French people will achieve the overthrow of the present transitory régime. In every profession, in every class, in every area, a small group organizes and leads the resistance. The mass follows, and will do no more than follow. But the general trend of its thinking and feeling is unmistakable, and it will, as a whole, have its way.

One thing is sure, and that is that Frenchmen who are now living under German occupation forces have returned to their traditional feeling about the Boches. On the eve of the war they had begun to doubt even their own memories. They had been

told by propagandists that they must not believe the "propaganda" of "war mongers" and "nationalists." They wanted to believe in peace, and succeeded. When the Germans arrived they of course were somewhat anxious, but still were rather prejudiced in their favor. All this is gone. To the Frenchman of 1942 the German is again the hated Prussian; and the abyss separating France and Germany is deeper than it ever was before.

Of course, attempts have been made on both sides of the demarcation line to destroy resistance by grouping the public in various organizations which support collaboration, or, at least, support Marshal Pétain. In the occupied zone these attempts have failed completely. The phantom organizations created by Déat, Doriot and various traitors to the labor union movement have a total membership of only a few tens of thousands, and most of these joined only because it promised to bring them some personal profit, because it was one way to earn a living.

In the unoccupied zone, the attempts have been partially successful. Laval brought together all the faithful supporters of collaboration and of the National Revolution in the so-called Tricolor Legion. The Legion numbers several hundred thousands, recruited as a result of official pressure and the offer of innumerable advantages to its members. Each member acts, in his own little sphere, as the personal representative of the Marshal; and many municipal jobs or honorary positions are open to him. Before the war most of the Legionnaires belonged to the old pro-Fascist organizations, and many were or still are members of the Croix de Feu and the Action Française. In all likelihood most of them do not believe in Franco-German collaboration, even though they are in favor of the National Revolution. Both the Marshal and M. Laval look upon the Legion as the structural framework of the new France, the shock troops of Vichy if the day comes when the régime has to defend itself against the angry French masses. I do not believe that the importance of the Legion should be too much emphasized. The pro-Fascist organizations were unable to seize power in France before the war. In order to achieve a semblance of power they had to wait until the arrival of the Germans. The departure of the Germans will deprive them of that power. The Legion will probably prove of little use at the moment the Vichy Government really needs its support — unless, of course, the United Nations victory is so long delayed that more able reactionary leaders come to the fore than ever

did in the past, and that these begin to indoctrinate the French youth more intensively than has so far been the case.

The small clique of genuine collaborators so far counts for remarkably little. It is composed mostly of those who decided immediately after the armistice that the British would soon be defeated and who rushed to identify themselves with the new order. Today, unable to reverse their position, they are forced to go on. A few second-grade journalists, mostly in the occupied territory, and a handful of well-known personalities in the theatrical and artistic worlds of Paris, swell the list of collaborators whose names are known abroad. But out of the total population of France they are really a very small group. In the unoccupied zone, contrary to the general belief abroad, the number of out-and-out collaborators is very small. Even in the entourage of the Marshal, many are at least as anti-German as they are anti-Communist. The author, who lived in both zones for more than a year, has often heard it said in circles close to Pétain that, at heart, he "is for de Gaulle." This is probably only a joke. On the other hand, there can be not much doubt that the Marshal does not really wish to see a German victory. The truth probably is that he thinks — and most of his associates with him, except for men like Laval, Bonnard, Paul Marion, Benoit-Méchin and a few others — that he is pursuing a "policy of minimum risks," and that through it he will save what remains of France. It is the riskiest policy of all.

The general attitude towards collaboration reveals clearly how the French people feel about Germany. It is more difficult to know what they think of the United Nations. The unfortunate incident at Oran is now forgotten, but at the time it did shock the French people profoundly. On the other hand, the British occupation of Madagascars was generally greeted with satisfaction. Any doubt which remained concerning the real feeling of public opinion in France towards Britain was swept away by the reception given the British bombardments of the Renault factory in Billancourt and the Matford plant in Poissy. Even the unfortunate families which lost near relatives had not a single word of reproach for the British, and all the propaganda spread by Radio-Paris to stir up hatred remained without effect. On the contrary, the bombardments aroused real enthusiasm in all the factories of the Paris region and were looked upon as harbingers of the eventual allied victory. The same attitude is apparent among the populations

living under the constant British bombings along the Atlantic coast. Every bomb which falls on occupied French territory fortifies the people in their belief in the final German defeat.

How will French resistance evolve? Will it some day reach the point of armed revolt or at least guerrilla warfare? There certainly are millions of Frenchmen ready to pick up arms once more, and it is true that there are many weapons of all sorts in French hands. But it seems doubtful whether they could accomplish anything effective against a modern army, even if that army were depleted. Probably French resistance will be able to change its present subterranean or passive character only when the troops of Great Britain and the United States have gained a foothold on the Continent or when Germany collapses from the inside. Then the French masses will doubtless attempt to seize power in large cities like Paris, Bordeaux, Lille and Le Havre before the Vichy Government — if it still is extant — has time to take any action. Everything will depend upon how much confidence the United Nations have shown in General de Gaulle and whether, in turn, he deserves their confidence. The degree of his prestige when he reaches French territory is highly important. If he arrives as the respected leader of all the Fighting French forces, recognized as such not only by Britain and the Soviet Union but also by the United States, Vichy will collapse quickly and effortlessly; and those who have conducted French resistance inside France through these times of peril will have someone about whom to rally. Without such a leader, even if only a temporary one, the disorder will be greater and the internal struggle will be much more prolonged.

THE PACIFIC AFTER THE WAR

By S. R. Chow

WHAT shall we do to secure lasting peace in the Far East after the United Nations have won the war and the Japanese have been driven out of China and the other countries which they have invaded? This raises the complicated question as to what are the essential conditions for a permanent order in the Pacific. It is so urgent that we must begin to give it serious consideration even while the fighting is still going on.

In his radio address on December 9, 1941, two days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt enumerated a series of acts of aggression committed during the past ten years by Japan and her Axis partners, beginning with Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. The significance of this enumeration was apparent. It was Japan which actually started the Second World War ten years ago; and it was the failure of the League of Nations — and, to a lesser extent, of the United States — to curb Japanese aggression in the Far East which encouraged the European aggressors to go ahead with their audacious design for world domination.

Farsighted persons, both in government and out, are now planning seriously for a better world order after the war. In doing this we must recognize that no lasting peace is possible without achieving a permanent order in the Pacific. The reason is clear. Peace, like war, is indivisible. The problem of peace in the Pacific is complicated by special political, economic, racial and national issues which the war has either raised or aggravated. Settlement of these issues in a manner to promote the interests of the Pacific region as a whole will probably require a regional understanding; and one must consider the relationship of this regional arrangement to the world order. Moreover, from the viewpoint of political strategy, the fact that the United Nations were laying plans for a permanent order for the Pacific area once victory is won would serve to counteract Japanese propaganda for a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and rally the natives of the region to fight the common battle for freedom.

It is my belief that four essential requirements must be met before a permanent order can be built in the Far East. First,

Japan must be beaten and completely disarmed. Second, there must be a fundamental adjustment in the relationship of China with foreign Powers. Third, the racial and national problems of the region must be solved equitably. Fourth, a regional organization must be formed to establish security and maintain peace.

II

It almost goes without saying that Japan, the age-long aggressor in the Pacific region, should be disarmed after her military defeat. The principle of the disarmament of aggressor nations has already been proclaimed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in the Atlantic Charter, whose eighth point states that, pending the establishment of a permanent system of general security, such disarmament is essential. In a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York on December 31, 1941, Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador in the United States, applied this principle specifically to the Far East by stating that his Government would give full support to the disarming of Japan as one of the necessary factors in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific area. The way in which the Far Eastern crisis has developed during the past ten years should have convinced the world that Japan's aggressive policy is a constant menace to the security of neighboring countries. Her military caste is so powerful that it exercises full control over national policy, and its spirit is so extremely nationalistic and chauvinistic that national policy, in turn, is bound to take the form of aggressive territorial expansion. If Japan retains her military superiority there will be little possibility of lasting peace in the Pacific region.

The only effective way to hold Japanese militarism in check is to disarm the country completely. Japan's air and naval forces should be liquidated except for a limited number of small warships which she might be allowed to retain for use by her police and customs services. Naval shipbuilding works and munitions factories should either be closed down altogether or reduced in number and size to the point at which they will be just sufficient to fulfill ordinary peacetime purposes. Her land forces should be strictly limited to the number necessary to maintain internal order. Details of the extent and process of Japanese disarmament must be left for experts to work out when the armistice comes. What is essential is that it should be thorough and effective and

that any limited armament allowed Japan should be closely supervised by a permanent international commission.

To prevent Japan from rearming, such an international commission should, at least temporarily, set up agencies to inspect and investigate Japanese armaments continuously on the spot. Naval and air bases in Japan which are apparently designed for offense should be demolished forthwith. At least until a general plan of world disarmament is adopted, the importation of arms and ammunition, including military planes, should be completely banned. Severe penalties should be set for the violation of any of the disarmament clauses prescribed by the United Nations as a condition of armistice. During the armistice period, or for as long as is necessary to insure Japan's strict observance, the United Nations or whatever world association may be established by them should police Japan by stationing a strong international force at a few strategic points in the Japanese homeland. Prolonged and strict observance of the disarmament clauses by Japan should be a basic condition for her admission into a regional or world association of nations.

It may be contended that the Japanese are a proud and patriotic people who will never bear national humiliation or submit to harsh terms imposed by foreign powers without proportionately increasing their chauvinism and their hostility towards foreigners; and it may be argued as a result that it would be unwise and impolitic for the United Nations to impose disarmament on a defeated Japan, to set up an international commission in Japan to supervise her armaments or to assign an international force to police the country. It might be argued that, on the contrary, a policy of moderation and generosity would help to pacify the Japanese and reconcile them with their former enemies. In my opinion, this viewpoint is erroneous and dangerous.

Events have fully demonstrated the futility of an appeasement policy such as the United States followed towards Japan up to the outbreak of war. The Japanese, although capable of extreme fanaticism in individual actions, are complete realists in their point of view in international relations. A big stick counts with them more than lofty principles, good faith and soft words. It is a mistake to think that one could make the Japanese quiet, reasonable or peace-loving by treating them generously after the war. Their long series of military successes, their great territorial conquests and the consequent rapid growth of their na-

tional power in the past fifty years have developed among them a legend of invincibility. This forms the psychological background of their extreme militarism and ruthlessness. Only thoroughgoing disarmament after a crushing military defeat can smash that false legend and so help to loosen the traditional grip of the military caste upon the Japanese people.

Ever since the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Western democracies have hoped that a rise of liberal elements in Japanese politics might effect a change in Japanese foreign policy. The hope has not been realized. If it still is cherished after the war, then there should be a clear understanding that only by means of complete disarmament under vigilant supervision can the military clique be removed from control over the country and its liberal leaders, if any, given the power to guide its national policy in the direction of peaceful development and coöperation with neighboring states. No doubt there would be many difficulties in disarming so chauvinistic a nation as Japan. Those difficulties simply must be faced in view of what is at stake for the world at large as well as for the Pacific region in particular.

Great changes will also have to be made in the territorial limits of Japan. This will be as important as disarmament in reducing Japan's capacity for aggression. In deciding on her new territorial limits, we shall have to take into account both the legitimate claims of interested parties and the offensive value of the territories in question in Japanese hands.

It goes without saying that Japan must withdraw completely from Manchuria, which would automatically return to Chinese sovereignty. Japan should also be made to relinquish all the territories, both on the continent and scattered across the sea, which she has acquired since 1894 — the year in which her career of conquest started. It does not matter whether such territories shall have been seized during the present war or previously. She should be permitted to retain only those which she had before 1894.¹ The most important of the territories acquired between that date and the outbreak of the Second World War are Korea, Formosa and the Pacific Mandated Islands. The case of Korea will be discussed below. Formosa, a former Chinese province

¹ An exception to the above procedures should be made of the Luchu Islands. Although Japan annexed them before 1894, they earlier had been tributary to China for 500 years. That, and the fact of the strategic importance of the islands, makes the problem of their disposal a matter for special consideration. At the least the native people of the islands should be given an opportunity to exercise the right of self-determination.

with an almost purely Chinese population, which Japan extorted from China as a condition of peace in 1895, should be restored to China unconditionally. The Mandated Islands, the offensive value of which in Japanese hands has been fully demonstrated, should be placed either under a new mandatory power or under international administration. It goes without saying, too, that Japan should also be required to give up all the territory which she has seized since the outbreak of the present war — parts of mainland China, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Hainan, the Dutch East Indies, Indo-China, Malaya, Burma and other areas.

III

The second problem to be solved as a prerequisite to a Pacific settlement is that of China's relations with foreign Powers. The abrogation of unequal treaties has been one of the outstanding diplomatic issues between China and the Great Powers ever since the Chinese nationalist revolution began. By means of these treaties as well as through political influence the foreign Powers acquired extraterritorial rights and special privileges of various kinds which have been seriously detrimental to China's sovereignty and national welfare. If such an anomalous state of affairs were allowed to continue after the war it would be a constant cause of international friction and a disturbing factor to any order that might be set up in the Far East. It is no exaggeration to say that in agitating for the abolition of the unequal treaties China has been seeking to achieve international harmony and justice as well as national freedom. Many farsighted westerners have recognized the desirability of a fundamental change in their countries' treaty relations with China. Unfortunately, the foreign Powers have been slow to relinquish the privileged positions which they enjoy.

The Second World War has simplified this problem. Not even the staunchest die-hards expect to see the old order restored in China's foreign relations, no matter what the outcome of the war. Indeed, responsible leaders of Great Britain and the United States have already announced or pledged in principle the eventual relinquishment of their extraterritorial rights in China. It goes without saying that the special rights or interests claimed by Japan or imposed upon China by that country should be the first to be wiped out. In the postwar relations between China and foreign Powers, the principles of equality and reciprocity should

be followed in concluding treaties as well as in all other transactions. All extraterritorial rights should be abolished. There should be no more foreign consular jurisdictions and no more foreign concessions or settlements in China. All the leased territories should be returned unconditionally to Chinese jurisdiction. Foreign nations should no longer be permitted to station troops or gunboats within Chinese territory.

Only by such a fundamental readjustment of her relations with foreign Powers could China really be freed from foreign domination and set firmly on the course of political and economic progress. At the same time the development of a normal, free relationship between China and the nations of the West would help create a more friendly atmosphere for international coöperation. The Western democracies need not fear that China will ever become too strong. The Chinese are essentially a peace-loving people who would never seek territorial expansion or political dominance. On the contrary, a free, strong, prosperous and democratic China would be the greatest stabilizing factor of a new order in the Pacific region.

IV

Not less important — though certainly more delicate — are the issues raised by the great variety of races and nations which exist in the Pacific region. Most of them are related to the problem of the future status of colonies or possessions heretofore ruled by the Great Powers. It is of paramount concern to the Pacific countries that these issues should be settled in a just and practicable manner.

The Japanese slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" is no doubt pure political propaganda and will be dismissed as such by most intelligent Asiatics. Many and various racial and national problems do exist, nevertheless, and the hope of building up a lasting peace in the Pacific depends to a large extent on their correct solution. Almost all the subject peoples in this region have age-old grievances against their rulers. Those of them who are politically mature cherish aspirations for political or national freedom and have actually been striving for its realization. Since the United Nations are committed to an all-out fight for world freedom, it would be both illogical and impolitic, from either the long-term or the short-term view, for them not to help realize such legitimate aspirations.

The case of Korea is perhaps the simplest. Korea was forcibly and fraudulently annexed by Japan, and the Korean people have never ceased to show their opposition to Japanese rule. Increasing numbers of Koreans have been fighting or working in China against the common enemy. There is no reason why this once independent kingdom, with a population of 22 million and a civilization even more ancient than that of the Japanese, should not be given political freedom after the defeat of Japan. It is fitting that a representative of China, Dr. Hu-shih, should have been the first man in public life to remind the world of Korea's claim for freedom by saying (in the paper referred to above) that at the coming peace conference "the wishes of the 22 million people in Korea should be given a fair hearing and just consideration and steps should be taken to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to these people." President Roosevelt has also specifically mentioned "the people of Korea" as one of those whose future freedom depends upon a victory of the United Nations.

The most urgent case is that of India. Her population of 389 million is the second largest in the world, and she has all the characteristics of a distinct civilization. Today she has become one of the most important factors in world politics. In the right circumstances, the people of India could play a major rôle both in the present fight for world freedom and in the shaping of a post-war order in the Pacific. For the sake of freedom and peace, farsighted and fair-minded persons everywhere want to see India's national aspirations fully realized after the war. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was simply voicing the general sentiment of the free world when, after a series of conferences with Indian leaders, he urged the British to give India real political power, declaring: "I sincerely hope and confidently believe that Britain, without waiting for any demand on the part of the people of India, will, as speedily as possible, give them real political power so that they may be in a position to further develop their spiritual and material strength, and thus realize that their participation in the war is not merely aid to the anti-aggression nations for victory, but also the turning point in their struggle for India's freedom."

Lord Cranborne, who had then been recently appointed British Colonial Secretary, stated on February 24, 1942, that the British Government was "in favor of India's political freedom,"

although he qualified this by adding that "if the Indian leaders would get together and devise some scheme which would be satisfactory to all, the Indian problem would be satisfactorily solved." Prime Minister Churchill's announcement of a definite British offer of dominion status and Sir Stafford Cripps' subsequent mission raised hopes of an early realization of Indian aspiration. Although the Cripps mission failed to achieve its immediate objective, due to the rejection of the British proposals by Indian leaders, this was a real turning point in Indian affairs.

The postwar fate of Indo-China cannot be settled yet. But one thing should be made clear: the conditions which existed in that country under French rule should not be restored after the Japanese have withdrawn. Good government, at least, should be guaranteed to the native people, and they should be given a fair chance to prepare themselves for self-government. Other subject peoples in the Pacific area, such as those of Malaya and the Netherlands Indies, come in a different category. But their interests should be given fair consideration in the postwar reconstruction, with the realization by stages of progressive self-government as the goal.

A few guiding ideas for the solution of these colonial problems may be submitted. The ultimate status of most of the large colonies or dependencies might be either complete political independence or full self-government in the form of dominion status or home rule. At the same time, one must admit that, with the exception of India, hardly any of them has reached a stage of political maturity which would ensure a successful exercise of immediate freedom. It is pretty well agreed that the subject peoples of the Pacific region should not be returned to the position they occupied before the war. Yet it would be premature and even dangerous to leave them to themselves immediately after the war in a region where international relations as well as racial problems are so complicated. To do this might create chaos instead of order.

There should be a period of tutelage, then, during which the native peoples would have an opportunity to prepare themselves for self-government. The best way to promote this would be to give the natives more education, to hasten their economic emancipation, and to allow them to acquire political training by participating more and more in local administration. In the meantime, each colonial government, whether in charge of an inter-

national commission or under a colonial or mandatory Power, should adjust its educational, financial and administrative systems to serve the best interests of the natives. The policy which was so successfully pursued by the United States in the Philippines should be widely followed as a model for colonial administration in the whole Pacific area.

It is impossible to stipulate a uniform system of administration for all the colonies and dependencies in question. Different régimes would have to be used in different circumstances. Some writers have advocated a federation called the Indonesian Union, to be composed of British Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, Burma, and, later on, Thailand and Indo-China. The idea of binding such heterogeneous human groups and geographical units into a federation must be ruled out as impracticable. The people of these countries do not have enough common interests and mutual understanding to support a federal union, nor do they have sufficient political experience to operate one. The scheme is called a federation, but in practice it would be government through an international commission exercising its rule over a vast area. Such an international régime would hardly work, in view of the serious conflicts of interests and policies which might arise among the Powers forming it.

As a matter of fact, responsibility for the administration of the large colonies and dependencies will probably be resumed after the war by the original ruling Powers, except perhaps in the case of Indo-China, whose relationship to France will depend upon the outcome of the war and the standing of that country at the end of hostilities. The Power should, of course, discharge that responsibility under adequate international supervision and control. Actually, it is of no material importance whether a ruling power administers a colonial government in its own right or under an international mandate; the essential thing is that the administration be conducted in the spirit of trusteeship. The exceptional case of Indo-China requires, as said above, special consideration. If the Vichy régime continues its policy of collaboration with the Axis, and yet manages to survive the war, then Indo-China is likely to be taken from France entirely and put under an international administration or a mandatory régime. In case a mandatory system is adopted, China, for obvious reasons, would have a good claim to the mandate.

Administration by an international commission under the

authority of a regional or world organization would be the proper program for other territories in the region, such as the Japanese Mandated Islands. Their importance is strategic rather than economic or political, and they have no possible chance of ever standing by themselves because of their small size, the sparseness of their population and a variety of other circumstances.

Finally, if it should appear that the Korean people, after liberation from the Japanese yoke, still needed friendly advice and assistance in the initial stages of their political freedom, the United States would be in the best position to assume this responsibility. This is true not only because of American disinterestedness and the traditional friendship which exists between the United States and Korea, but also because American financial resources would be needed to help the newly freed country in its effort to rebuild a national life.

Another racial problem may be mentioned. There are millions of Chinese living in various parts of the Pacific region, particularly in the South Seas, where for years they have engaged in trade and other peaceful activities. But in spite of the important contributions which they have made to the economic development and prosperity of the countries where they reside, they have not acquired political rights. In many cases they suffer from harsh and discriminatory measures imposed by local legislative or administrative authorities. The worst situation is in Thailand, where about three million Chinese residents, constituting almost one-fifth of the whole population, are being oppressed in various ways by the Thai Government.² A number of anti-Chinese measures have been taken in the fields of immigration, industry, education and politics. It was to prevent the Chinese community from seeking diplomatic protection against oppression by the local government that Thailand for many years has followed a policy of non-intercourse with the Chinese Government.

The continued existence of such a state of affairs cannot be tolerated by China after a war in which Thailand chose to be on the side of the enemy. Would it not be in conformity with justice and peace to give these Chinese at least such political and civil

² The number of Chinese residing in Thailand has been variously estimated between 524,062 according to the 1937 Thai census, and 3,000,000, the figure given by the "Chinese Year Book" for 1938-1939. A moderate estimate by the latest authority is 2,500,000. For details, see K. P. Landon, "The Chinese in Thailand" (New York: Oxford, 1941), p. 21-23; and Virginia Thompson, "Thailand: The New Siam" (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 321-322.

rights as were usually guaranteed to national and racial groups under the prewar minorities treaties?

All these long-standing racial grievances, national aspirations and other political issues concerning subject peoples or national minorities in the Pacific region must be settled fairly in the postwar political reconstruction. If this is not done, the presence of large discontented groups constantly threatening revolt will make it difficult to build up a permanent order for the region. Meanwhile, it would be well, perhaps, if the United Nations were to make an early announcement of a general policy or principle which would be applied to the postwar government of colonies and the treatment of subject peoples and national minorities. As stated, the object would be to promote self-government and establish greater freedom. This would help to increase the enthusiasm and effort of the native peoples for the great common cause of freedom and democracy and would nullify the malicious political propaganda of the Japanese, with its specious promises of the "liberation of the Asiatic peoples from the white man's yoke." In the words of Paul van Zeeland at the 1941 conference of the International Labor Organization in New York, "In so far as we express clearly what we shall do with our victory, we are helping to win that victory."

There have been signs of late that the political winds are beginning to blow in this direction. In his address to the nation on February 23, 1942, President Roosevelt seemed indirectly to promise postwar freedom to all the conquered and subject peoples of the Pacific region by saying that "the people of Asia know that if there is to be an honorable and decent future for any of them or for us, that future depends on victory by the United Nations over the forces of Axis enslavement." He also declared that "the Atlantic Charter applies not only to the parts of the world that border the Atlantic, but to the whole world." The farsighted leaders of the United Nations should start planning how to put such promises and declared principles into effect in the postwar period of reconstruction, and should say now that they are doing it.

v

Three basic problems, at least, must be given consideration in any planning for a regional organization of the Pacific area. First, what countries should be members of such an organization?

Second, what functions should it have? Third, what agencies should be set up to carry out those functions?

The first problem is simple. The membership of the organization, which might be called the Pacific Association of Nations, should include China, Soviet Russia, India, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Japan and Thailand. Japan and Thailand, however, should not be admitted to membership until after peace has been concluded and until the other member nations have satisfied themselves that their former enemies are able and willing to fulfill their duties. Should Korea succeed in recovering her national freedom, as she will do unless the United Nations betray their common cause, she would certainly be entitled to membership. New members should be admitted by agreement of two-thirds of the original member nations.

The proper functions of the Pacific Association may be grouped in two distinct but related categories.

Since its main object would be to assure peace and security in the region, its chief functions naturally should be to avert war by exercising joint influence or taking joint preventive measures, and, in case war does occur, to help the victim and to enforce sanctions against the aggressor.

First of all, the member nations of the Association should bind themselves by a pact of non-aggression, arbitration and mutual assistance. Disputes between them should be submitted to arbitration, judicial decision or conciliation. Any act of war by one member against another should be met immediately by collective economic or military sanctions. A permanent international military force should be formed and placed under the control of the organization. Each member nation should contribute a definite quota to this force, which should be stationed permanently in strategic posts and be held in readiness to move anywhere within the region in case of emergency. Economic and military sanctions of the regional organization might be reinforced by the coöperation and support of a wider world organization, should one come into being. After a regional system of general security is established, the regional organization, taking account of the world armament situation, should adopt a regional plan for the reduction and limitation of armaments.

The Association should also perform certain positive functions, for peace can be lasting only if it is constructive. The Association

therefore should promote such progressive measures as the common interests of the region require. In economic and social matters, member nations should be obligated to coöperate through international agencies. Problems related to trade opportunities, raw materials and immigration, which are peculiarly complicated in this region, should be solved in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity, due consideration, of course, being given to the national interests of others as well as to the legitimate needs of the countries concerned. Both in the interests of the natives and for the sake of peace, the Association should supervise and control the administration of colonies and dependencies in the region. Member nations should have the right to present any proposal or grievance to the Association for discussion and investigation.

To carry out its various functions the Pacific Association should be provided with the following agencies:

1. A General Conference, composed of representatives of the member nations, meeting regularly once a year and, if necessary, in extraordinary session. It should have power to discuss and decide upon policies and problems of general interest to the region as well as controversial issues between member nations.

2. A Pacific Council, composed of five members elected at the annual General Conference for a term of one year. It should have the duty of seeing that the decisions and resolutions of the General Conference are carried out by the appropriate agencies. It should also take any action that might be deemed wise and effectual to meet an emergency or crisis during the recess of the General Conference.

3. A Pacific Court, composed of from five to seven judges elected by the General Conference for a term of five years from a list of jurists recommended in equal number by each of the member nations. This court should have compulsory jurisdiction over all justiciable disputes. It should also be competent to deal with any other matter referred to it by the parties concerned or by the General Conference or the Pacific Council. The Pacific Court might be dispensed with should a World Court be established.

4. An International Military Staff, appointed by the General Conference. It should command an international force and should, if necessary, formulate and execute military sanctions under the authority of the General Conference or of the Pacific Council during the recess of the Conference.

5. A Permanent Secretariat, appointed by the Council with the approval of the General Conference and acting under the general direction of both these bodies. It should serve as an information and research center on the economic, social and other problems of the region.

Member nations should not be represented equally in the General Conference. The relative sizes of the delegations might be fixed according to the areas and populations of the respective countries, their economic resources and other political or cultural factors.

A unanimous vote should not be required to make a decision of the Conference or the Council valid. In both cases a two-thirds majority should suffice. The necessity of unanimity would seriously handicap the organization in taking effective action in a crisis; on the other hand, decision by a simple majority would be too risky, in view of the gravity and importance of the issues which might be involved.

The General Conference should meet in extraordinary session at the request of a majority of the member nations or on the initiative of the Council. The Council should be required to submit regular reports to the meetings of the General Conference and should be responsible to the Conference for the discharge of its duties.

Each member nation should be entitled to put forward a candidate for election to the Council by the General Conference, but not more than one person of the same nationality should be eligible for membership on the Council or the Pacific Court at the same time. This would prevent any single nation from dominating either of these basic institutions of the Association. The organization of the International Military Staff and the Permanent Secretariat would present more delicate problems and would probably require more elaborate planning. But the basic principle to be followed can be stated simply: these executive agencies should be so organized as to insure professional competence and efficiency as well as loyalty to the Association.

The seat of the Pacific Association should be at an internationalized place where the Secretariat, the Pacific Court and the International Military Staff could be located permanently. Meetings of the General Conference and the Council should be held at this place or at such other places as might be selected on occasion. A rational solution of the problem of financing the organization

would be to divide its cost among the member nations in proportion to the number of representatives allotted to each in the General Conference.

The regional organization in the Pacific should be started immediately at the end of the war, regardless of whether there is a long period of armistice or whether a world organization is set up simultaneously. If a wider world organization does come into existence, the Pacific Association, like other regional organizations, should be subordinated to the more inclusive body. At the same time, the world organization could coördinate the related activities of the regional organizations and extend to them any aid which might be necessary. Thus the Pacific Association would in the long run gain moral and material strength from the world organization.

No hard and fast rules can be laid down regarding the exact relationship between the regional organization and the world organization; much would depend upon the character and scope of the latter. Observance of one simple principle might, however, avert serious conflicts of jurisdiction and ensure better coördination of the common efforts of the two organizations. Matters of purely local concern should be left entirely in the hands of the regional organization except for such special advice and assistance as it might formally request. Regarding matters which by their nature tend to affect the interests of the world as a whole, such as access to key raw materials, problems of national or racial freedom, and sanctions against aggressors, the world organization should have the last word. Before taking any decisive action on such questions, therefore, the Pacific Association should, except for necessary precautionary measures, seek the approval and coöperation of the world organization.

VI

What specific part would a victorious and fully restored China, freed from all juridical and extraterritorial restrictions and from foreign economic and political dominance, be able and willing to play in the new Pacific order outlined above?

In the first place, China could lead the way to democracy in Asia. After she has won the war in close association with the Western democracies China seems most likely to direct her political reconstruction towards the goal of constitutional democracy. The successful inauguration of political democracy in a

country of 450 million people and possessing an ancient and distinguished civilization could not fail to have a tremendous effect on the political trends of other Asiatic countries.

Secondly, China could use her growing influence, moral as well as political, to help build up a better order in the Pacific. No one can deny that a free China, with growing power and yet maintaining its old traditions of peace, would be a great moral force for peace and justice throughout the whole region. Especially would this be true if China were able to coöperate with a free India, whose people have manifested a striking confidence in the Chinese people as well as warm friendship for them. Further, China could help to assure a progressive and orderly development of political life in the Pacific region by exercising a moderating influence on the postwar relationship between the Western colonial nations and Asiatic peoples which aspire to be free from foreign rule.

Thirdly, from the military point of view, China could make an important contribution to the enforcement of peace. Victorious China must be made militarily strong for defense. Because of her great resources in man power, as well as because of her geographic position, a strong China would be able to share with other Great Powers the responsibility of policing the Pacific region and enforcing sanctions against would-be aggressors. In fact, China would be one of the few Great Powers which could play an effective military rôle in the region. Thus in all respects the permanent order in the Pacific will depend considerably upon the part which China is enabled to play after the war has been won by the United Nations.

THE DEMOCRATIC FUTURE OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

By Eelco N. van Kleffens

THE present interval in which the Japanese are in control of the Netherlands Indies will be fleeting in the perspectives of history. It provides a fitting opportunity, however, to review the process of gradual change through which the Archipelago has been passing under Dutch leadership. Such a review will be more interesting, probably, if it is not confined to a mere inventory of political, social, economic and cultural phenomena, but if it sets forth in addition some tentative conclusions as to the future. The following pages attempt to fulfill that task. They are not written in a biased spirit, but with rigorous objectivity. No other approach is permissible, given the fact that what are at stake are the happiness and well-being of seventy million people.

There is another and more specific reason why a discussion of this theme is timely now. The whole world — political and social and economic — is in the melting pot. Great changes portend in every field of human organization. The war has come upon all of us, not in the form of a local conflict of limited scope, but as a world-wide upheaval, the titanic revolutionary undercurrents of which have rent asunder the established order not only in Russia, Italy and Germany, but in other countries as well, and will profoundly alter the national and international pattern of life for years to come. A new world is being born. We hope to influence that process. And so we ask, "What are we fighting for?"

It is indeed a crucial question. The nature of the crisis and of the vast changes which impend are understood but vaguely. In the United Nations there naturally is a clearer perception of what we do *not* want than of positive new aims. This inclines us to tend to cling to well-tried formulae and traditional institutions, rather than to attempt to make a bold diagnosis of the ills besetting our world and to undertake positive planning to correct them. There is much talk of democracy, of independence, of national self-determination and of trade between sovereign states, as if these were constant values for all times and for all circumstances. We desperately wish to do something constructive. But we still are blind to what the world really needs, and we still do not quite know what we really want for ourselves. The result is that we

are inclined to proclaim that the traditional institutions which we have enjoyed shall henceforth be bestowed upon communities where they did not exist, or where they were supposed not to exist, in the past — in countries where there are autocratic régimes and also in colonial empires. There is a tendency to say, for example, as one looks at the Far East: "Once Indo-China, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, the Netherlands Indies have been freed of Japanese domination, let them be independent. We are not fighting to restore colonial empires, our own or any others."


A noble sentiment, a generous impulse, undoubtedly underlies a statement of that sort. The teeming millions in the vast regions named are, we intend, to have the happiest possible lot. As soon as the war is at an end, they are to share the blessings of free institutions. This is noble and generous indeed — with one limitation. That is in cases where the real motive is not so much to give happiness to untold millions as to incite them to take sides with us now against the Japanese, before we have thought out clearly and precisely the consequences which later would result to them from the independence which it is proposed to grant. Where the welfare of human beings is concerned, purity of motive is an absolute requirement.

A second requirement is stern attention to practicability. Before we make up our minds, as responsible men and women, to grant these peoples new institutions, it is imperative that we first determine whether, in the light of reason and following careful scrutiny, our impulse, however pure, appears to be really calculated to contribute to the best interests of those now under the harsh yoke of Japanese usurpers. The transition from an emotional to a realistic consideration of the problem may be difficult for certain temperaments, but it is nonetheless indispensable.

We talk of independence, of democracy. What exactly do we mean? There are a great number of races and national groups in the territories under discussion. Is every one of them to be made independent? If not, are the ties which exist between groups of them strong enough to ensure that such groups will live together as a single unit? Are they to have not only the rights resulting from democratic institutions, but also the responsibilities that are their necessary counterpart, and without which no democracy can hope to survive?

Let us remember also that our own conception of democracy is undergoing a searching test, a severe crisis. The nineteenth cen-

tury ideal to which we tenaciously cling, that of government by the people, for the people, has in practice become a form of government in which the rights and liberties of the citizen are in grave danger of being pulverized between enormous millstones — party machines, organized capital, organized labor. In this form of government, too, the man in the street now regards himself as a more or less skilled worker rather than as a co-director of policy (or — especially if he pays no taxes — as a beneficiary of state



institutions in the first place, and as a co-director only in the second place).¹ We are convinced that democracy is to be retained as a precious heritage, but we have not yet adapted our conception of it to twentieth century conditions. We may well pause to inquire whether it is fair to impose what may be obsolescent forms of democracy on other nations when, although conscious of their possible obsolescence, we ourselves do not yet know precisely how to transform them in order to make them applicable to present-day conditions.

¹ E. H. Carr, "Conditions of Peace." New York: Macmillan, 1942, p. 21.

It would far exceed the limits of this article if a serious attempt were made to go into the problem raised here for all the territories now in Japanese hands — Indo-China, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, the Netherlands Indies. A choice must be made; and the territory chosen by the present writer naturally is the Netherlands Indies. Not that what holds good for that Archipelago is necessarily equally valid with regard to the other territories just named. An express caveat is entered on that score. In the matter of political institutions and forms, generalization is dangerous, for national characteristics, varying degrees of development, geographical factors, natural resources and diverse other elements have all to be reckoned with. For the same reason, it is impossible simply to project American or European institutions into a country where conditions are completely at variance with those prevailing in either America or Europe.

The following pages, then, in addition to being a review of the political and social development of the Netherlands Indies, also constitute a preliminary inquiry into the question whether, or to what extent, the immediate postwar grant of independence and democratic institutions as we know them would be conducive to the well-being of the peoples of that territory.

II

What is particularly striking — startling almost — about the Netherlands Indies is their intense variety — variety of human life, variety of environment, variety of races, languages, laws, civilizations, variety of political and economic institutions. The area they cover, also, is very great. Superimposed on the map of the United States, a map of them stretches some 250 miles into the Pacific on the west and some 250 miles into the Atlantic on the east, and reaches from Minneapolis in the north down to Memphis in the south.

There are five large islands: Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and New Guinea (the western half of the latter being Dutch, the eastern British and Australian). The smallest, Java, is about the same size as the state of New York, but has four times its population. Borneo is larger than the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan put together. In addition, there are some fifteen minor but still important islands, and literally thousands of small ones. Seas, each of them several times the combined expanse of the Great Lakes, separate the islands.

The land area of the whole Archipelago is approximately one-fifth of that of the United States; but the population is over one-half. Java staggers under the burden of two-thirds of the total population, crowded onto one-fifteenth of the total area. It is one of the most densely populated lands in the world (the United States, 442 to the square mile; Java, 900 to the square mile).

Some of the islands are arid and barren, others have fertile soil and abundant rainfall; some are covered with virgin jungle, others are intensively cultivated and produce a great variety of crops which are highly important for world markets; others again have little agriculture, but valuable mineral resources. Several possess excellent ports and are by their geographical position natural links in the great sea-highways of the East. The Archipelago both joins and separates the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, Asia and Australia.

Although most — not all — of the peoples of the Archipelago belong to the Malay-Polynesian group of races, and hence come as much of a common stock as, for example, the Anglo-Saxons, the Scandinavians and the Germans, they differ in language, political institutions, social structure, modes of life, at least as widely as do Americans, Britons, Norwegians, Swedes and Hollanders.

Some sixty languages are spoken in the Netherlands Indies. In spite of certain common characteristics in some cases, these tongues differ to such an extent that they impede intercourse. Malay, the so-called *lingua franca* of the Archipelago, is understood in most of the islands only by the citizens of the big towns and not by the overwhelming rural population. There also exist nineteen distinct systems of native civil law.

Both the stage of civilization and the species of civilization reached in the several islands are widely disparate. The differences in character, temperament and attitude towards life noticeable between the Achinese of Sumatra, the Sudanese of Java, the Balinese, the Sasaks of Lombok, the Menadonese of Celebes, the Dayaks of Borneo, the Papuas of New Guinea, are far greater than any existing between a Nova Scotian and a Texan.

It is significant that there is not even a common indigenous denomination of the Archipelago. "The Indies" is an arbitrary western appellation, introduced by the traders of the sixteenth century. "Insulinde" is a romantic invention by a Dutch author of the nineteenth century. "Indonesia" is a rather convenient

Greek hybrid, adopted by political leaders as an approach to, and a label for, a new and comprehensive patriotism.

The majority of the Indonesians, as we are now wont to call them collectively, are intelligent, kindly, law-abiding people. Their highly diversified civilization dates back to long before the commencement of our era. In the first centuries after Christ, the Hindus from India invaded several of the islands and established a number of kingdoms. In the fifteenth century Moslem invaders converted practically the whole Archipelago (the island of Bali was an important exception). In the sixteenth century Portuguese traders in quest of spices settled in some of the islands, only to be ejected fifty years later by the British and the Dutch. The latter finally ousted the former.

Two distinct periods mark the three and a half centuries of Dutch association with the Indies.

The first period, commencing just before the opening of the seventeenth century, was one of rule primarily for the benefit of foreign elements. There were colonial domination and economic exploitation for the benefit, first of the Dutch East India Company, then of the Dutch exchequer, and, finally, under the liberal system of *laissez-faire*, of Dutch and foreign capitalism. It would be unjust, however, to present the last phase of this period as only a sequel to the first and to suggest that the country at large and its native population did not derive great benefits from the liberal phase of economic expansion. This period lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century.

The second period, during which the development of the country for its own sake and in the interest of the native population became the deliberate and supreme care of the Dutch Government, has since 1900 evolved from a negative if effective policy of government restrictions on exclusive and untrammelled pursuit of profits into a system positively fostering Indonesian emancipation in the political, economic and spiritual spheres. This period was consciously initiated as long ago as 1901, when Queen Wilhelmina in a famous speech from the throne announced the new policy of the "moral vocation" of the Netherlands in the Indies.

Political developments marked the first quarter of the twentieth century. Economic and social progress has been the keynote of the subsequent fifteen years.

If one takes into consideration that at the turn of the century

political consciousness was virtually absent amongst the native population; that the ultimate decision on every large and small issue lay with the Government in Holland; that the Indies were ruled by an honest, highly efficient and painstaking European and native administration, sincerely devoted to their task, but with a genuine apprehension of any form of popular government — then one is forced to conclude that the progress of these forty years has been immense.

The fact that the constitution of the Indies was modified no less than four times in the first quarter of a century is an indication of the rapid rhythm of political development. One of the important changes was made in 1922. Since then, the Indies are no longer a colony, but one of the four component parts, equal in constitutional rank, of the Kingdom of the Netherlands: Holland in Europe, the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curaçao. The basic civic rights, so dear to Dutch and Americans alike, which had long existed, were reaffirmed and received additional guarantees: freedom of speech, assembly and press; protection of person and property; right of petition. Indonesians were made eligible for all public functions, and recently a prominent Javanese (Pangeran Ario Soejono) became a member of the central government of the Netherlands Kingdom. Representative bodies were instituted for the management of local and regional affairs and for municipal and rural legislation.

The greatest step towards national unity and representative government was taken with the opening in 1918 of a representative assembly, the People's Council. During the first decade this body had a purely advisory character. When it had acquired sufficient experience in the conduct of public business, it received legislative powers for practically all Indian affairs. These powers it shares with the Governor-General. In a real sense it is a proto-parliament, with powers that grow as the country matures politically. Hitherto, the States-General in Holland have reserved certain matters to themselves, and the Governor-General retains the right to overrule decisions of the Council in cases of emergency or public interest; but the exercise of these powers both by the States-General and by the Governor-General is in practice becoming more and more exceptional.

The People's Council consists of 60 members, 38 of them elected, the others designated by the Governor-General. The majority are non-Dutch — 30 natives and five non-native Asiat-

ics, Chinese and Arabians. The majority in the case of both the elected and the designated groups is Asiatic. Thus the Dutch, far from dominating the assembly, are in every sense a minority. The elected members are chosen indirectly, by electoral bodies. Interestingly enough, several of the political groups are composed of both European and Indonesian members.

It is specially noteworthy that the designation of members by the Governor-General is not used to strengthen a government majority. In fact, several leftists and nationalists owe their membership to such appointment. No member is ever supposed to consider himself as a government nominee and as such to speak or vote for the Government; nor do they in actual practice act as if they were government nominees. Today the Council adequately represents the various currents of conscious public opinion, and it has not been loath to make itself heard — and listened to — by the Government.

Parallel to the growth in political institutions has been the very considerable growth in the domain of education. The popular demand for education is increasing every year, and the government aim is to provide the facilities desired. When we assess the amount spent on education, we should be careful not to take into account merely the sums spent under this heading by the central government: the bulk is defrayed by regional and local centers of administration. At the time of the Japanese invasion, instruction was being given in at least 15 languages in more than 20,000 lower vernacular schools and by something like 50,000 teachers. In addition, there were 1,500 primary schools with Dutch as a medium. And for more advanced pupils there were 700 secondary and vocational schools. The total number of pupils of all these institutions was over 2½ million. As a result, illiteracy has been gradually but definitely decreasing. University training has been given at Batavia, where there are faculties of law, medicine, literature and agriculture; and a technical university is located at Bandoeng. The standard of education has been the high one of Holland, though adapted to the special needs of the Indies.

The furtherance of Indonesian economic and social interests has been a primary object of government activity, especially since the beginning of the present century. This welfare policy has found expression in numerous activities and institutions, only a few of which can be mentioned here.

In nearly all the islands, rice is the staple food and rice-growing is the occupation of the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants. Both the acreage under paddy and the yields of rice have been tremendously increased by irrigation systems which water millions of acres, and by the efforts of an admirable agriculture service which ramifies out into the most remote parts of the Archipelago. In 1940 the Netherlands Indies for the first time did not have to import rice from abroad.

Indonesians of Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo have been encouraged to become independent producers of commodities for the world markets. The production of copra, pepper, kapok, tapioca and coffee is already largely in native hands. With efficient government help, native rubber production in 20 years has grown from zero to 20 percent of the world's requirements. Similarly, government guidance and assistance have multiplied native textile and other industries tenfold in as many years.

Slavery was abolished in 1860, five years before it was abrogated in the United States. The liberal policy of *laissez-faire* which thenceforth was dominant has now been radically modified by a system of planned economy wherever the interests of the Indies at large or of the Indonesian population so demand. Thousands of sugar, tea, coffee, cinchona, tobacco, rubber, oil-palm, tapioca and sisal estates and numerous oil fields, tin, bauxite, nickel and coal mines which have been opened up afford employment to great numbers. This is the more necessary, since the population is increasing by leaps and bounds. The fact that in the course of a century the population of Java increased to ten times its original number testifies to the beneficent effect of Dutch rule. But the resulting population pressure presents the Government with a difficult problem. Special government services have fostered emigration from Java to other islands in order to relieve the pressure. As soon as possible, 100,000 Javanese farmers will be moved annually to Sumatra and Celebes, where they will have the opportunity of becoming prosperous holders of small farms.

Finally, until just before the Japanese invasion the Netherlands Indies supplied the world with 95 percent of its requirements of quinine, 40 percent of its rubber, 10 percent of its tea, 86 percent of its pepper, 27 percent of its palm oil and copra, 75 percent of its kapok, 33 percent of its tin, and 72 percent of Far Eastern supplies of mineral oils. This was due partly to the open

door policy maintained by the Netherlands, partly to adherence to the liberal dogma of encouraging free competition, welcoming bona fide enterprise from all quarters of the world and selling the products in the open market to all who were willing to buy them, without the slightest discrimination in favor of Dutch interests.

It must not be thought that these commodities were the lavish offering of friendly nature, available for any casual passer-by. Practically all the cultivations mentioned were imported by the Dutch from the tropical regions of other hemispheres, and were developed and improved by first-class scientists in the most efficient research laboratories and experimental stations to be found anywhere in Asia.

About 1930, overproduction threatened the welfare and even the existence of agricultural producers in the tropics. The Government of the Netherlands Indies promptly coöperated in various international schemes for the orderly adjustment of production to consumption. But in general they have consistently kept aloof from any scheme which, through unwarranted restrictions on output, favored high prices for producers to the detriment of consumers; and they have always been in favor of giving consumer countries an adequate voice in necessary adjustments of supply to demand.

III

When Germany invaded and occupied the Netherlands in Europe, and later when Japan invaded and occupied the Netherlands Indies, the native population in the islands, so far from making an attempt to rise against Holland or even to exploit the situation by fishing in troubled waters, remained loyal to the kingdom of which they form part. It was the acid test of Dutch rule. The result was the reward of what a British authority has called Holland's "steadfast policy of prudent, gradual and judicious progress."² That this policy was progressive was manifested not only by the efficiency of the public services, the wonderful system of irrigation, the intense degree of cultivation, the steady improvement of health, the excellent roads, and especially by the general contentment of the people, but also, and above all, by the continuous and rapid advancement of education and political autonomy.

Proof that the Netherlands consciously aimed at the progres-

² Sir H. J. Bell, "Foreign Colonial Administration in the Far East." London: Arnold, 1928, p. 124.

sive emancipation of its overseas domain is furnished by the fact that, far from following a policy of "divide and rule" like that now applied by the Japanese, it assiduously fostered the sense of political cohesion among all the numerous and various cultural and economic groups in the islands. For all their amazing and sometimes perplexing variety, they still are sufficiently akin to form, one day, a single political unit. In the twentieth century small states have such a limited scope that to invest the individual racial, cultural or linguistic groups in the Netherlands Indies with complete autonomy would be to give them a worse than doubtful blessing. Indeed, it would be tantamount to crippling them for life — a life, moreover, which would in all probability be short.

But with due allowance for the progress made, some impetuous minds still may ask whether the tempo of emancipation in the Netherlands Indies has not been unnecessarily slow, and whether a grant of immediate independence would not be better. It is hoped that the reader will not be disappointed at not finding a direct answer to this question in these pages. The writer is a Dutchman, and an answer from him might be thought biased. The reader therefore is asked to draw his own conclusions, after having gone to the trouble of trying to visualize the peculiar kind of environment in which any change has to be effected in the Netherlands Indies. No sort of democratic atmosphere existed there to start with; on the contrary, the indigenous population had an ingrained static particularism, only a slight degree of civic consciousness, and little sense of unity. Each of these points calls for comment, which, given the small compass of this article, must needs be brief.

Originally there prevailed in the Netherlands Indies, as throughout the East generally, a patriarchal atmosphere which was entirely alien to democracy. The status of the individual was mainly determined by birth and heredity. He was a member of his group first and foremost, and a personality in a subsidiary way only. Aptitude and inclination counted for little. Elections and majority decisions were as unknown as the concept of equality. The enjoyment of property was the discharge of a social function rather than the exercise of a right. Such was the intractable social material with which the Dutch had to begin their work.

In spite of the formidable obstacles which faced them, the Dutch have attempted a real reconstruction on democratic lines from the village autonomies upwards, culminating in the proto-

parliament, the People's Council, already mentioned. They have established a measure of freedom of opinion and of speech, assembly and association unequalled in any Eastern state.³ The planting, tending and growing of democratic institutions have not been at all an easy task. The East — and even the élite of the East — may take on in a mechanical way the externals of democracy, while their hearts remain absolutely cold. Endless patience is required to make the people understand the new institutions. The Dutch have shown that they have that patience. But if the population were left to themselves at the present general stage of development, without the stimulation, collaboration and guidance of the Dutch, they would easily revert to their old ideas and institutions.

We now come to the second obstacle in the way of implanting Western ideas in an Eastern community: particularism. The group spirit is strong: the national spirit is weak. The family counts, the village counts. But the state is personified in the ruler, and the ruler is known from time immemorial as being perfectly able to look after himself. This particularism, then, though not any more immutable than other things in this world, is exceedingly static. "The notion of dividing the community into a majority and a minority between which there exists a tension has a dynamic flavor which is totally alien to Eastern society."⁴ "Arrogance, indifference, seclusion, inertia, and oppression"⁵ are some of the results of this state of things; and so long as it prevails, a guiding hand is necessary if society is to transcend the invisible but very real walls between all the innumerable small communities and merge them in one autonomous entity capable of maintaining itself in twentieth century conditions.

In the third place, there was — and still is — amongst the native population in the Netherlands Indies a conspicuous lack of civic consciousness. The East has its ancient habits of mutual assistance within the village community; but between a social function of that kind and service of a public order there is a great gap. And yet "a village autonomy cannot function according to present-day requirements unless its leadership has been lifted up into the sphere of civic sense, and the higher autonomies will only work if their leadership sees them as part of an organic

³ Cf. de Kat Angelino, "Colonial Policy." Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1931, v. 1, *passim*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

complex. Village councils, local boards and provincial assemblies will not function properly until the civic sense which must support them can also support the unity of the state.”⁶ A very marked degree of exclusiveness of the group towards all outsiders still exists. To instill a civic sense into 70 million people is a Herculean task. It cannot be fulfilled by pronouncing the supposedly magic word “democracy,” and leaving it at that. Anarchy would be the only result.

Lastly, it has to be remembered that in the Netherlands Indies evolution towards national unity had to be started from a point which countries like China and Japan had already left behind in the dim past. Racial diversities, the lack of inter-island communications in the old days, and linguistic barriers would suffice to explain this fact in an archipelago like the East Indies. To remove Dutch authority and grant the natives independence before they have developed a sense of unity — even if not on the part of the whole population, but only of a sufficiently numerous élite — would produce catastrophic results. The unity of the Netherlands Indies which now exists depends on the presence of Dutch rule. As yet it is in many respects a purely mechanical unity. Take the Dutch element of cohesion away, and the whole edifice would crumble into fragments.

The late President Coolidge once summed up the prerequisites of independence. “The ability of a people to govern themselves,” he said, “is not easily attained. History is filled with failures of popular government. It cannot be learned from books; it is not a matter of eloquent phrases. Liberty, freedom, independence are not mere words, the repetition of which brings fulfillment. They demand long, arduous, self-sacrificing preparation. Education, knowledge, experience, sound public opinion, intelligent participation by the great body of the people — these things are essential. The degree in which they are possessed determines the capability of a people to govern themselves.”⁷ These things mentioned by Mr. Coolidge have not yet developed to a sufficient degree in the Netherlands Indies, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of the Dutch administrators. These administrators are the protagonists of organization against inertia, of citizenship against group egotism, of unity against particularism.

⁶ De Kat Angelino, “Colonial Policy.” Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1931, v. 1, p. 483-484.

⁷ *News Bulletin of the Institute of Pacific Relations*, September 1927.

Nobody realizes this better than the enlightened Indonesians. When last year the writer visited the Netherlands Indies, there was not one member of the People's Council, elected or appointed, who asked for independence. These men expressed various desiderata with regard to the place the East Indies should occupy within the framework of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, but they did not wish to sever the connection. Should outsiders, however well-intentioned, seek to impose severance on them? "One is tempted," an expert in colonial government wrote as early as 1928, after an extensive visit to the Netherlands Indies, "to express the hope that those who are responsible for the administration of this great Dutch overseas territory may be preserved from the influence of all impetuous and precipitate agencies."⁸

We have to be careful that we do not thoughtlessly project Western ideas into situations to which they are not — or at least not yet — adapted. It is in this sense, no doubt, that we have to interpret President Roosevelt's words that "the Atlantic Charter applies to the whole world."⁹ The Charter is an instrument for good, and as such is to be applied intelligently. Viewed in this light, Dutch colonial policy is in keeping with the Charter.

According to the President's repeated statements of American policy, one of the basic principles which should govern international relations is that of the inviolability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations. Japan has violated the Netherlands Indies. It is the logical sequel to the principle just stated that Japan should be driven out again. Moreover, all are agreed (perhaps even Germany!) that, quite apart from principle, Japan cannot be left in possession. Once freed, the Archipelago will thus continue to form part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In that respect there will be no change. But in another respect change will undoubtedly come: neither the position of the Netherlands Indies within the organic framework of the Kingdom nor the constitution of the Indies will remain just what it was.

War or no war, the Dutch intended and intend to continue the process of Indian emancipation. Before the present war began, new developments already were foreseen. Among both the Dutch and native elements the feeling had spread that the Indies should be entrusted with the care of their own internal affairs to the exclusion of the legislative power at The Hague, and that

⁸ Cf. Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁹ February 23, 1942.

only matters concerning the Kingdom as a whole (such as, for instance, foreign affairs and defense) should be left to the higher, though common, authority. It goes without saying that this would be tantamount to a revision of the entire structure of the Kingdom.

The war hastened the process. People in the Netherlands Indies, the natives as well as the Dutch, succeeded remarkably well in looking after their own public affairs after the German invasion of the Netherlands had cut them off from the mother country. As always since 1900, the central Government was quick to perceive that a new step forward could therefore be initiated. The Netherlands is a democratic country, however, and since questions regarding the structure of the Kingdom as a whole are here involved, it was realized that this next step could be taken only when all concerned, those in Holland as well as those in the Indies, were able to pronounce an opinion on it. That is why the Governor-General, specially authorized to that effect by the Crown, declared when he opened the session of the People's Council beginning on June 16, 1941, that immediately after the liberation of the mother country the adaptation of the national constitution to the requirements of the times will be taken in hand. He also expressly added that the constitution of the overseas territories (*i.e.*, the Indies) will also be revised. In anticipation of this important step, an opportunity will be provided in advance for the presentation to the Crown of desiderata and opinions. At the end of the war, a conference of prominent persons drawn from the component parts of the Kingdom (Holland in Europe, the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curaçao) will be convened in order to advise the Crown. The revision of the Constitution will follow. In this way the contemplated changes can be carried through on strictly democratic lines.

Amplifying these declarations by the Governor-General, the Queen of the Netherlands herself announced the proposed revision of the Constitution on July 30, 1941, in a broadcast to Netherlanders all over the world. She added:

Besides the changes which affect the Netherlands themselves, the future relationship of the various parts of the Kingdom will have to be adjusted. A commission, drawn from all parts of the Kingdom, will be called together, to assist in the preparation of these changes. In addition to the revision of the general structure of the Realm, reforms will have to be drafted to adjust the constitu-

tion of the various territories accordingly. These will be submitted for consideration to the authorities concerned in each territory. I trust that in this manner the foundations can be laid which will guarantee a sound and happy future for the entire Kingdom.

When these words were spoken the Netherlands Indies were still free. The fact that now they are in the grip of the Japanese postpones the possibility of action but has not altered the Dutch intention to act. Speaking before the Congress of the United States on August 6 of this year, the Queen said that the development of democracy in the Netherlands Indies has been the constant objective of Dutch policy throughout her reign, and especially since the revision of the Constitution in 1925. And she added:

This steady and progressive development received new emphasis and momentum by my announcement last year that after the war the place of the overseas territories in the framework of the kingdom and the Constitution of those territories will be the subject of a conference in which all parts of the kingdom are to be fully represented.

Consultations on this subject were already proceeding in the Netherlands Indies when the Japanese invasion temporarily interrupted their promising course. The preparation of the conference is none the less being actively continued, but in accordance with sound democratic principle no final decision will be taken without the coöperation of the people, once they are free again.

Let us hope that the wait will be short, and that soon — thanks to substantial American help, which was so sorely missed when the Netherlands Indies rose to play their part as loyal allies in the fight against Japan — Mr. A. Salim, the “grand old man” of the Indonesian movement (who for many years was a non-coöperator), will once more be able to say to his people, as he said in June 1940:

But I tell you that Holland, and also we Indonesians, may consider ourselves happy that, through this unjustified crime of the enemy's, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has entered the war on the right side, and we cannot appraise highly enough the courage and the wisdom of Her Majesty, Queen Wilhelmina, who at the right moment took the right decision and withdrew herself and her Government from the power of the enemy, in order to continue the struggle from other parts of the Kingdom in East and West.

PRELUDE TO WORLD WAR

A WITNESS FROM SPAIN

By John T. Whitaker

UNLESS Goebbels writes it, history will properly apportion the responsibilities for the murder of the Spanish Republic. Then it will have to be said that non-intervention and the arms embargo made the Fascist victory possible.

In their approach to the Spanish problem the British and French Governments, acting from most praiseworthy motives, made an initial blunder. Neither of their peoples wanted war. In the first place, neither had persuaded itself that war was inevitable. In the second place, both felt that if war had to come they needed more time to complete their rearmament. Consequently, the diplomacy of the British and French Governments consisted of an effort to localize the Spanish conflict. In theory and on paper this policy was sound. Furthermore, at the beginning neither the Germans nor the Italians liked the policy of non-intervention. Both had already intervened in Spain. Both felt that the issue of the Spanish Civil War would decide the ultimate success of their own schemes for world conquest. Both feared that non-intervention would force the ejection of the military experts and air men whom they had already sent into Spain. They set out to defeat it, and thanks to the German technique of propaganda, and thanks to the spirit of appeasement latent in the great democracies, they succeeded. They twisted non-intervention into an instrument of Fascist victory.

Our Government had as excellent intentions as the British and French, but the course it adopted towards the Spanish Civil War also was a blunder. That blunder, in present circumstances, stands out as clearly as the silhouette of a dive bomber — not a dive bomber you are reading about, but one you are actually under! The Neutrality Act of 1935, as amended, related only to international wars. It did not force our Government to invoke an embargo in a civil war. Nothing in our history or traditions justified such an embargo. Yet we began bringing pressure (so-called “moral suasion”) on American exporters not to sell arms to the Spanish Republic as far back as August 21, 1936; and on January 8, 1937, Congress passed a formal arms embargo.

II

When I went to Spain as a correspondent I already knew something about war and about what the Germans and Italians were up to. I had been under fire during the Dollfuss putsch in Austria, and I had been a war correspondent in Ethiopia. I went to Spain remembering the Ethiopian War as an adventure. I remembered only the excitements of patrols in the Ogaden Desert, where at noon each day the temperature got to 130 degrees or 140 degrees Fahrenheit, and you put your hands under your armpits to cool them because in Somali, the Ogaden Desert and Danakil the air is hotter than body temperature. I remembered the high Tempien Mountains, where the temperatures each night fell below zero. But the jumble of vignettes which remained of the things I had seen and scrawled out in hurried news dispatches was no preparation for war in Spain. I had seen horrors, but even they were no preparation for Spain. Civil wars are notoriously brutal; and there is something awesome and unearthly about the way a Spaniard kills without malice.

The worst part was not the fact of being scared all the time in that curious land of El Greco colors where men talk constantly and knowingly and lovingly of Death as if it were a woman and where the smell of rotting corpses was with us so steadfastly that once I put brandy in my nostrils. It was the shooting in cold blood of innocent men and women that got me. For two months of the time that I was with the Franco forces I kept a room in Talavera de la Reina as a base camp. I slept there on an average of at least two nights a week. I never passed a night in Talavera without being awakened at dawn by the volleys of firing squads in the yard of the Cuartel. There was no end to this purge. They were shooting as many at the end of the second month as in my first days there. They must have averaged thirty killings a day. I watched the men and women they took into the Cuartel each day to provide their quota for the next dawn. They were simple peasants and workers, most of them Spanish editions of Caspar Milquetoast. It was sufficient to have carried a trade union card, to have been a Free Mason or to have voted for the Republic. If you were picked up and denounced for any one of these grave offenses you were given a two-minute hearing and capital punishment. It was called the "regeneration" of Spain. It happened to the poor innocents who belonged to neither side. Non-combat-

ants, they were driven out of villages which the fighting had reached. They would hide for two or three days in the hills or fields, trying to escape the shells and bombs, but they would come back when the hunger or cold was too much for them. Franco had a simple rule — "Those who are not for us are against us." In the gullies along all the highways the corpses of uniformed Republican soldiers lay. If your journalistic curiosity made you stop your car to examine them, you found that more than half the time they were tied. José Sainz, the leader of the Falangistas for the Province of Toledo, showed me a neatly kept notebook. "I jot them down. I have shot 127 Red prisoners with my own hand," he boasted, fondly patting the heavy German Luger pistol on his hip. Sainz had been at work only four months when he showed that notebook.

I shall never forget the first time I saw the mass execution of prisoners. Few correspondents saw what had become a normal procedure. Most of them went to the front on escorted tours, organized by Franco's propaganda bureau, to arrive well after a battle. They saw nothing. I went into the field alone with General Varela, Colonel Yagüe, Colonel Castejon and other officers who helped me hide from their own propaganda bureau. I also went freely over the front with Captain Roland von Strunk, Hitler's key agent in Spain, whom I had known for years and whose military passes took us anywhere. We used to watch the Moors looting. It is uncanny how both sides know when a battle is won. For a few minutes an awesome quiet would fall on that sector of the front. And then suddenly the noises of hell would be raised as the Moors smashed in doorways and began the looting. They were like children with their spoils. One would have a side of meat under one arm and a Singer sewing machine under the other, while his hands would clasp a bottle of brandy and a picture off the wall of some home. One Moor found a saxophone and carried it for two days before wearying of it. I first saw the prisoners mowed down in the main street of a little village called Santa Olalla. The Republican prisoners were herded into the street like cattle. They had that listless, beaten look of troops who can no longer stand against the steady pounding of German bombs. Most of them had a soiled towel or a shirt in their hands — the white flags with which they signaled their surrender. Two Franco officers passed cigarettes among them and several Republicans laughed self-consciously as they smoked their first cigarette in weeks. Sud-

denly an officer took me by the arm and said, "It's time to get out of here." At the edge of this cluster of 600 prisoners, Moorish troopers were setting up two machine guns. The prisoners saw them as I saw them. The whole 600 men seemed to tremble in one convulsion as those in front, speechless with horror, rocked back on their heels, the color draining from their faces, their eyes opening wide with terror. I ducked into the ruins of a wrecked café. There a Moorish soldier had found a battered player piano. It had roll music and his feet worked the pedals frantically. He cackled and shrieked in delight and the piano tinkled out the popular American movie song, "San Francisco," as the two machine guns suddenly roared in staccato, firing short lazy bursts of ten or twelve rounds at a time, punctuated by silences from the street that I could hear over the piano. Then or later, I have never understood why the prisoners stood and took it. I always thought that they might rush the machine guns, or do something, do something, do something. . . . I suppose all volition is beaten out of them by the time they surrender.

These atrocities were always denied abroad by the propaganda bureau. They were rarely denied in Spain by the Spaniards or by the Germans and Italians. Captain Strunk told me twice of protests he made personally to Franco, who made a *pro forma* denial. Franco's answer in each instance was the same. Franco said, with a knowing smile, "Why, this sort of thing can't be true — you have got your facts wrong, Captain Strunk." Similarly, there was a denial of the butchery in the Badajoz bull ring, first reported by Jay Allen who had already interviewed Franco and generally proved himself the best-informed journalist in Spain. Colonel Yagüe, the commander of the Franco forces at Badajoz, never denied the story to me. "Of course, we shot them," he said. "What do you expect? Was I supposed to take 4,000 Reds with me as my column advanced, racing against time? Was I expected to turn them loose in my rear and let them make Badajoz Red again?" The men who ordered the Moors to do it never denied killing the wounded in the Republican hospital in Toledo. They blew up more than 200 screaming and panicked men with hand grenades and they boasted about it. These "regenerators" of Spain rarely denied, too, that they deliberately gave white women to the Moors. On the contrary, they circulated over the whole front the warning that any woman found with Red troops would meet that fate. The wisdom of this policy was debated by Spanish

officers in a half-dozen messes where I ate with them. No officer ever denied that it was a Franco policy. But some argued that even a Red woman was Spanish and a woman.

The Moorish mercenaries fought methodically and well, always showing remarkable calmness and sometimes considerable gallantry. But they never knew what it was all about. These Moslems wore on their tunics the Sacred Heart of Jesus — I don't know where Franco got those uniforms. They were paid, at least during the period of the march on Madrid, in worthless marks dating from the period of German inflation. I have watched these soldiers sit calmly in an olive grove under heavy, even murderous, artillery fire, counting their worthless marks.

The use of Moors and the wholesale execution of prisoners and civilians were the trump cards of the "best" elements of Spain — the ruling classes of whom that hardly Bolshevik publication, *Life*, wrote that they "were probably the world's worst bosses — irresponsible, arrogant, vain, ignorant, shiftless and incompetent." They were the Royalists, the landowners, the generals and the Catholic hierarchy, as distinct from the Catholic masses or, for that matter, from the Catholic middle classes of Catalonia and Vasconia. They represented the one percent of the population which owned fifty-one percent of the land. They represented the 21,000 officers (700 of them generals), against whom the Republic was said to have acted so "harshly" when it retired from among their numbers 7,000 known enemies of the Republic — relieving them from their active commands but giving them full pensions. They represented the 40,000 priests and the clergymen and the religious orders which, in a country second only to Portugal for illiteracy, owned mines, industries, shipping, public utilities, banks, transportation systems and great agricultural enterprises. I talked with all varieties of them by the hundreds. If I were to sum up their social philosophy, it would be simple in the extreme — they were outnumbered by the masses; they feared the masses; and they proposed to thin down the numbers of the masses.

"We've got to kill and kill and kill, you understand," one of Franco's chief press officers used to say to me. He was Captain Aguilera, the seventeenth Count of Yeltes. A great landowner and sportsman, Aguilera had served as military attaché in Berlin during the last war and he perfectly mirrored the mentality of the Spanish militarists who would have brought Spain in against the

Allies during that war if King Alfonso had been less a friend of Great Britain and France. "You know what's wrong with Spain?" Aguilera used to demand of me. "Modern plumbing! In healthier times — I mean healthier times spiritually, you understand — plague and pestilence used to slaughter the Spanish masses. Held them down to proper proportions, you understand. Now with modern sewage disposal and the like, they multiply too fast. They're like animals, you understand, and you can't expect them not to be infected with the virus of Bolshevism. After all, rats and lice carry the plague. Now I hope you can understand what we mean by the regeneration of Spain."

Aguilera suffered that harshness of throat so noticeable among Spaniards. I don't know whether it comes from the aspirates in their language or from the quality of the tobacco they smoke. Aguilera would wet his throat with another tumbler of brandy and proceed, to the approving nods and comments of other leading officers of Franco's army. "It's our program, you understand, to exterminate a third of the male population of Spain. That will clean up the country and rid us of the proletariat. It's sound economically, too. Never have any more unemployment in Spain, you understand. We'll make other changes. For instance, we'll be done with this nonsense of equality for women. I breed horses and animals generally, you understand. I know all about women. There'll be no more nonsense about subjecting a gentleman to court action. If a woman's unfaithful to him, he'll shoot her like a dog. It's disgusting, any interference of a court between a man and his wife."

"The people in Britain and America are beginning to go Communist the way the French have gone," Aguilera would say. "But it goes back further than Baldwin and Roosevelt. It begins with the encyclopedists in France. The Age of Reason! The masses aren't fit to think. Then you pick up with the liberal Manchester school in England. They are the criminals that made capitalism. You ought to clean up your own houses. If you don't, we Spaniards are going to join the Germans and Italians in conquering you all. The Germans have already promised to help us get back our American colonies which you and your crooked Protestant imperialism robbed us of. And we're going to act pretty soon, you understand."

Aguilera was one of the bravest men I have ever seen. He was actually happy under fire, and when I wanted to get to the front

he joined me on trips of our own, even after the propaganda bureau had vetoed them. Then when I got to know the field commanders, I gave Aguilera himself the slip. He began to feel that I was seeing too much of the Franco methods first-hand and suddenly he began to doubt my political reliability. He and a German Gestapo agent woke me up one morning at two a. m., when I had just tumbled into bed after returning from the front lines. "Look here," said Aguilera in his hoarse voice. "You are not to go to the front any more except on escorted tours. We've arranged your case. Next time you're unescorted at the front, and under fire, we'll shoot you. We'll say that you were a casualty to enemy action. You understand?"

I quote Captain Aguilera at some length because his social and political ideas are perfectly typical. I heard them voiced by scores and hundreds of other Spaniards on the Franco side. They had their own divisions and cleavages. There were the Alfonso Royalists. There were the Carlists — those who wanted the other line of succession to the throne (now extinct). There were the landowners and the Catholic hierarchy with their sixteenth century mentality. And there were the Spanish Fascists, the Falangistas, who resembled the German Nazis. These groups could agree only on the necessity of "purifying" Spain by liquidating Reds, a word used to describe anyone who had voted for the Republic. Of these groups, the worst — because the most ruthlessly successful — was the Falange. When the revolt against the Republic began, the Falange membership numbered less than 50,000. Within six months, their enrollment stood at 500,000. Why? Because while the army officers, the Carlists and the Moors were fighting, the Falangistas were busy organizing behind Franco's lines. The Italians liked the Carlists, led by the recklessly brave landowning gentry, but the Germans played with the Falangistas, small shopkeepers and the like — the little disappointed men of each community, the equivalent of the Americans who have listened to Coughlin and Townsend. The German Gestapo instructed the Falangistas in the technique of terrorism. In order to preserve themselves for the ultimate political control of Spain, the Falangistas stayed away from the front. It is doubtful whether they killed 100 Reds in battle. They murdered not less than 500,000 behind the lines.

Colonel Yagüe, for political reasons, had joined the Falange; but he knew them. I was in his headquarters one night when for

the fourth time he telephoned Franco urgently insisting upon reinforcements if he was to hold his position against a Republican counterattack expected on the morrow. On the fourth call Franco said that he was sending up a regiment of Falangistas. Yagüe cursed for a full minute. "Are you trying to destroy my army?" he demanded of Franco. "These Falangistas will withdraw from the line and they'll panic my whole column by their example of calculated cowardice." He told Franco that he preferred to fight the battle without reinforcements. Turning to me with a scowl, he indulged a full five minutes of profane but fairly accurate description of the Falange — his own political organization. "The Spanish Fascists nevertheless proved the political wisdom of running away in order to fight another day."

III

Those were some of the things which I did not like while I was in Spain. Almost worse was to come out of Spain and watch the American, British and French Governments help win the war for Franco. I had to come out and see the American, British and French publics divided by the German propaganda technique, which made us believe that there are two sides to murder. I used to be told that there were no German and Italian troops in Spain — when I had been in battle with their troops, when I had been on enormous German airdromes, when I had been saved by Italian tanks, when I even had driven from the front to headquarters with the German agent who telephoned directly to Hitler himself to demand the immediate dispatch of 10,000 Germans because — said Strunk — Franco would be defeated without them. I used to hear that there were no Germans in Spain when my ears still rang with the tramp of their boots as they marched through the streets of Burgos and Salamanca, surly-faced Visigoths beneath the Gothic purity of one cathedral and the rococo excesses of the other.

I would like now to summarize briefly the truth about the Fascists in Spain — not the whole truth, but only that part of the truth admitted by the Germans and Italians themselves in official statements or publications.

First a little historical background. The Spanish Republic came to power on April 14, 1931, without the shedding of one drop of blood, and under it various governments came in and went out of office. At first the Right was in power, but in the

elections of February 1936 it was beaten by a Popular Front coalition. Out of this election a government was formed which was described as "Red," though it included neither Socialists nor Communists. The Franco elements began to plan armed rebellion and the destruction of the Republic from the day they were voted out of office. Count Romanones, once Alfonso's ablest councillor, said to an ambassador who shall be nameless: "The rebellion? We began to plan it the day we lost the election."

In planning the rebellion the reactionary elements got in touch with the German and Italian Governments on the one hand and, on the other, began to create incidents and spread terrorism which was answered in kind by the Left. The Right murdered a popular Leftist leader and the Left answered in swift reprisal, killing Calvo Sotelo, whose political ability made him outstanding. His death served as the signal for a military coup d'état which went off prematurely in Morocco July 17, and became nationwide on July 18, 1936. In May of 1939 — three years later — Herman Göring and Galeazzo Ciano revealed that German and Italian troops, many of them disguised as tourists, went to Spain to aid this revolt from the day of its outset and that these forces had been prepared for action long before the proclamation of revolt in Morocco on July 17. Through the whole of the "Civil War" the Germans and Italians denied their complicity. Once the war was won, they boasted of having made their preparations even before it began. The official Italian *Informazione Diplomatica* said: "Italy replied to the first call of Franco on July 27, 1936; first casualties date from this time." In Mussolini's own newspaper, the *Popolo d'Italia*, the Duce himself wrote: "We have intervened from the first moment to the last."

In the first weeks of fighting, numerous German and Italian airplanes flew Foreign Legion and Moorish troops from Africa to the mainland. As early as July 31, twenty Italian airplanes flew to Africa to reinforce Italian planes already in Morocco and two were forced down in French North Africa. They had not bothered to disguise the markings of the Italian air force and their pilots carried military papers. Later, according to the Italians themselves, Mussolini's pilots made 86,420 air raids on Republican Spain. In some 5,318 bombardments they dropped 11,584 tons of explosives. Though the Italians and Germans have treated the totals of their effectives as more or less military secrets, I estimate that at one time Italy had not less than 140,000 men in

Spain, while the Germans had not less than 10,000 technicians and 10,000 troops.

The Spaniards paid through the nose for this assistance. In 1938 alone Germany imported from Spain 1,000,000 tons of iron ore, 25,563 tons of copper, 13,167 tons of zinc; while Italy, in addition to wool, olive oil and the like, got the quicksilver of Almaden. The Germans and Italians said — and persuaded millions in the democracies to believe — that they intervened in Spain only after the Russians were there and in order to save Spain from Communism. There was not a single Communist in the Popular Front Government when the Franco forces launched their rebellion. There were disorders and atrocities on the Republican side. But these came from anarchists and criminals whom the Republican Government let out of the jails and armed when the army was found to be in rebellion. No Russian help reached Republican Spain before October 20, 1936, and no Russian troops or “volunteers” were ever sent. The Spanish Republic had a large gold reserve, possibly the third or fourth in the world. It bought arms and planes in France or wherever else it could find them. Nothing arrived from Russia before October. I know personally that the Republican records can be trusted on this because I was at the various fronts with the German and Italian tank and artillery units when we saw the first Russian equipment used. Until the end of October the Russians had sent not one shell or bomb. Later, when I was in Barcelona, an official of the Spanish Republic told me an amusing story. “A ship arrived in Valencia from Russia in September,” he said. “There were cases on the deck and in the hold marked as marmalade and oleomargarine. I clapped my hands. ‘At last we are getting machine guns,’ I thought. Jesus, Mary and San Sebastian! We ripped open those cases. They really were marmalade and oleomargarine!” I talked in October with the German pilots who flew to Cartagena to attack the first shipments from Russia. A German pocket-battleship lay off the harbor and signaled objectives to the planes.

Franco alone never had a chance to win in Spain. The victory was won by the Germans and Italians, who twice saved Franco from imminent disaster; by the policy of non-intervention; and by the American policy of denying arms to the Republic in the one moment when its armies were in a position to take the offensive and sweep even the Germans and Italians into the sea.

Nothing went wrong with Franco's coup d'état when it started

on July 17-18, 1936. The various garrisons rose in rebellion as planned (except Valencia, Frasco and Barcelona). The mass of the army officers turned against the Republic as arranged. Everything went like clockwork. Only, like some vaccinations, the coup d'état failed to "take." Deep in the body politic of Spain there ran a healthy self-respect and a passionate love for the Republic. Not very efficient, the Republic had given the people of Spain, nevertheless, the feeling that now it was their Spain — a new Spain of schoolhouses and food for all and public sanitation and freedom from police spies. When the reactionaries delivered their well-planned and well-timed blow, the Republic was struck to the ground. There was chaos from one end of Spain to the other. But the simple man and woman, the peasant and the worker, the newly rising middle class, the professors, the journalists and the intellectuals, rose as a mass, leaderless and chaotic, but angry. They did not know how to restore the Republic but they knew how to strike down its assassins. They went out into the streets with pistols and knives and paving stones and they fought, not in the spirit of revolutionaries, but as the true conservatives and Loyalists of Spain — preserving the dignity and the homes of a nation with the tradition of the hidalgo. As a result, Franco was beaten then and there.

During the first month after this failure Franco's small columns of trained men, utilizing the armaments they had seized, made progress in the rural regions. But in Spain generally, especially in the cities, the Spanish people were mobilizing. It was the invasion of Spain by the Moors, transported across the straits by the Italians and Germans, which saved Franco and his fellows from the hangman's noose. Rushed over from Africa in German and Italian planes, and aided in the field by those planes, these professional mercenary soldiers crushed such "armies" as the Republicans could fashion out of undrilled men, hastily armed and sent into the field. Marching with these Moors, I watched them flank, dislodge and annihilate ten times their numbers in battle after battle. Individual heroism among untrained soldiers is futile and empty in an army where no man knows whether he can count on the men around him once they undertake the simplest manœuvre. Once such "armies" are gotten into the open, no amount of individual heroism can save them. The Republicans used to fight stubbornly in open trenches until they could no longer stand under the fragmentation bombs and artil-

lery fire of the German and Italian "specialists;" then the Moors would charge and dislodge them. With no officers and no training in the simple tactic of changing front, the beaten Republicans would mill into some village, rushing madly for the illusory protection of stone houses. Then the German and Italian bombers would go for them. Droning backwards and forwards at 6,000 or even 3,000 feet, with neither anti-aircraft fire nor interceptor planes to worry them, the great black bombers would unload their high explosives in leisurely fashion. I used to watch the big bombs turning over and falling slowly. The hundreds of Republicans who died under the blasted masonry might have lived had they been trained and officered to manoeuvre in the open.

Having lost the coup d'état, only to be saved by the Italian and German planes and specialists and the Moors, the Franco crowd next all but lost the war by their vain and costly assault on Madrid. This time they were saved by German and Italian *troops*. I stood in the suburbs of Madrid with the Moors and saw Franco try to destroy himself and his cause in a futile frontal attack against that proud city. With their backs to the walls of Madrid, the Republicans needed no officers and no knowledge of tactics. When Franco first reached the outskirts of the capital he could have taken it, but he delayed in order to consult with his German and Italian advisers. He asked the classic copybook rules for such an attack. General Faupel, the special German ambassador, who was also in charge, incidentally, of German cultural relations with Latin America, acted like an old-fashioned Prussian. There were machine-gun nests in the approaches to Madrid? Very well. Then bring up artillery and tanks to clean them out. Franco might have resorted to the painstaking and slower approach to Madrid used by the British general who later became the Duke of Wellington, or he might have repeated the immediate frontal attack by which General Varela had swept into Toledo, counting on swiftness and audacity. But Franco listened to Faupel and waited two days for the guns and the tanks. In those two days some 1,900 International Brigade volunteers streamed into Madrid, to be followed a few days later by 1,550 more. They were true *volunteers* — anti-Fascist Germans and Italians who hated the Nazi and Fascist régimes, but mostly tough Frenchmen who served the machine guns while joking about blondes. They held Madrid. How they held Madrid I saw with my own eyes. I crawled down to the Frenchman's bridge hoping to be the first correspondent to

cross the Manzanares River into the city. The fire was too heavy and I lost my nerve. But through field glasses I watched the Moors clean out the six- and seven-storied dwelling houses just across that narrow and bloody little river. A detail of 50 Moors would surround the building, silence the ground-floor defenders and rush in. They would then clear the second story with sub-machine guns and hand grenades. These Moors were calm, tight-lipped, expert workmen. They would clear a building floor by floor. There was only one trouble with this work. By the time the Moors had done the job, there wouldn't be any Moors left.

This stubborn Republican resistance took the starch out of Franco's troops. It was the first time in their long triumphant procession from Badajoz through Talavera de la Reina to San Martin de Valdegleisias and Navalcarnero, and thence on to Madrid itself, that the enemy had stood against them successfully. One of the hardest things in war is to change the psychology of troops from offensive to defensive operations, or vice versa. Franco's army could not believe that the resistance they met at Madrid required that they entrench. They lay in open shallow ditches. Somehow, somewhere, the Republicans got guns and planes. They massed everything they had. On one day they achieved the impossible. They put 127 planes in the air at once — almost a third of the calculated preponderance which Berlin and Rome maintained. Franco's Moors were killed. Colonel Castejon, his hip shattered, told me that reports in Franco's own headquarters estimated that out of 60,000 Moors not less than 50,000 were casualties. He added: "We made this revolt, and now we are beaten." The Falangistas were unfit for front line duty and the Carlists — bravest of all Franco's soldiers — were already destroyed. Franco had no army left. I stood with Captain Strunk when General Varela and Colonel Yagüe told the German: "We are finished. We cannot stand at any point if the Reds are capable of undertaking counterattacks." The Spaniards behind Franco's lines knew this too. Revolts against the Franco occupation took place in towns like Cáceres and in many parts of Andalusia. But while the Republicans dreamed of gathering strength to prepare an eventual offensive, Mussolini sent Franco an army of 100,000 Italians. German and Italian money, given the penniless Franco, brought 70,000 more Moors from Africa, at least 40,000 of them recruited from French Morocco. Once again the foreigners imposed upon the Spanish nation a new

succession of victories for a group of rebels who had not even been able to rally an army of Spaniards to their cause.

This Franco who was never able to raise a Spanish army aroused the most lyrical enthusiasm among many foreigners. The Paris newspaper, *Candide*, for instance, wrote: "Franco is not tall, he is a little heavy, his body is timid. Ah! His glance is unforgettable, like that of all rare beings. A troubled and trembling glance, full of sweetness; the man is delicious and mysterious. He is a miracle of tenderness and energy. . . . The ravishing thing about Franco is his purity." Most American apologists did not go quite this far, though some did catch the lyrical note.

Personally I found Franco unimpressive but shrewd. I talked with him when he was still slender and later after he had gone to fat. A small man, his hand is like a woman's and always damp with perspiration. Excessively shy, as he fences to understand a caller, his voice is shrill and pitched on a high note which is slightly disconcerting since he speaks very softly — almost in a whisper. He was effusively flattering, but he did not give a frank answer to any question I put to him. A less straightforward man I never met. When I discussed Franco with his fellow officers I got something more than the picture of an able soldier who fought with distinction against the Riffs, studied in Paris under Marshal Pétain and became the youngest general in the Spanish Army. These officers, speaking with the frankness which comes with a generous resort to brandy after a day's fighting, described an inveterate careerist. To them, Franco was a combination of the sly Gallego, with the reticences of the people of that heavily Jewish province, and the puritan who, on the excuse of helping renovate the Spanish Army, at one time or another bore witness before his superiors to the gambling debts or marital infidelities of a score of his comrades. I talked many times with the late King Alfonso of Spain about Franco. While the war was going on, Alfonso said, "I wish well to Franco for I am a simple soldier in the ranks." Some years later, when Alfonso, before his fatal illness, was arranging to renounce his throne and provide for the succession of Don Juan, a prepossessing young man of character and ability, Alfonso was more outspoken. "I picked Franco out when he was a nobody," said Alfonso, who liked the American argot. "He has double-crossed and deceived me at every turn. In him you see what we Spaniards mean when we are suspicious of the type which comes from Galicia." When I try in my own

mind to make an estimate of Franco's character, I am reminded of a phrase used by the London *Times*. Describing another dictator, the *Times* admitted that he was a dictator but said that he was "a Christian dictator." I suppose the people who grew lyrical about Franco made the same sort of distinction. As for myself, I cannot forget the 1,500,000 Spanish dead, Guernica and the other blackened ruins, or the 300,000 Spanish "Reds" who have been slowly starving to death in Franco prisons and the others in the French concentration camps. The notion of a dictator who is a "Christian" dictator leaves me cold.

It was less difficult to understand the "Reds" whom I saw when I went to the other side in the spring of 1938. By then the Republican offensive had failed for want of arms. The Republican Government had been driven from Madrid to Valencia and from Valencia to Barcelona. So long as the embargo of arms continued, the Republic had only one chance. It could hold on and continue fighting until the Germans launched against Britain and France the war which had become inevitable and which might give allies to the Spanish democracy. This the Republican leaders were determined to do. But they could not help asking their consciences (as they asked me) if this policy — sound strategically — was too cruel to impose upon the Spanish masses who were dying and starving so bravely. In America, Britain and France meanwhile, millions said, "One side is no better than the other." The German propagandists taught us to say that. They taught us to make no distinction between "Red" atrocities, committed by groups that got out of hand but subsequently were punished by the Republic, and Franco atrocities, committed with discipline as part of a fixed policy.

I had known Alvarez del Vayo when he was the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* — long before he became Foreign Minister. I took him from France some soap, cigarettes and marmalade. He and his wife were delighted at the sight of them. They gave the cigarettes to the troops; they took the soap and marmalade to the military hospitals. "But you are a chain smoker," I protested. Del Vayo shook his head, "I haven't smoked a cigarette in six months," he said. "When the troops can't get them, I don't think I have a right to smoke." Into my mind there flashed a contrast. I remembered how during the Ethiopian War the Italians were asked to give up lipstick and other things imported from Britain and France. "I don't mind,"

said Edda Ciano, Mussolini's daughter. "The pilots of the Italian Air Line who fly to Paris will bring me my lipstick."

There is a contrast in my mind, too, when I think of Captain Strunk intervening vainly with Franco to stop the mass execution of prisoners. Franco shrugged his shoulders. By contrast, I remember talking, after he was already in exile, with Dr. Juan Negrin, the last Premier of Spain. This professor of biology, with his profound culture, his modest manners and his lively sense of humor, struck Winston Churchill as one of the ablest statesmen in Europe. I asked Negrin why his government had not been more effective in cleaning out the fifth column behind his own lines in Spain.¹ "The fifth column used to be the cause of more worry to me than anything else," said Negrin. "You would see a man day after day and be absolutely sure that he was working for the enemy. But you couldn't do anything about it."

"Why couldn't you do anything about it?" I asked.

"Because you couldn't get proof," answered Negrin. "You couldn't get proof before the judges."

"But surely in such a crisis you suspended normal court procedure," I suggested.

"Oh yes, we had to have special courts," said Negrin. "But we couldn't arrest a man on suspicion. We had to keep to the system of evidence. You can't arrest an innocent man just because you are positive in your own mind that he is guilty. You prosecute a war, yes; but you also live with your conscience."

This is the man in whose place we and the British and the French helped to put General Franco.

The best comment on the continuance of the non-intervention policy of the democracies at a moment when the Fascist legionaries were consolidating their invasion was offered July 20, 1937, by the Italian newspaper *Stampa*: "While the diplomats play for time, the legionaries cut the Gordian knot with their swords." The best comment on appeasement was offered by Mussolini himself. After the victory in Spain, he declared: "Foreign anti-Fascism is truly incurably, stupendously ignorant of Italian ways — all of which does not disturb us in the least. After all, it is better not to be too well-known, for surprise will then have its full effect. Our enemies are too stupid to be danger-

¹ The phrase, it will be remembered, was born in Spain when Franco's four columns were marching on Madrid and General Mola announced proudly to us journalists that within the city he and Franco had a fifth column which would strike the Republicans in the back and deliver Madrid to the attacking Moors.

ous." There is an even more pertinent summary (if for the words "the British Government" we will read "the Governments of Great Britain, France and the United States") offered in the British Parliament by Clement Attlee, speaking for the opposition to Neville Chamberlain's cabinet at the time Franco was being recognized. Attlee said: "The Government's sham of non-intervention was really devised to prevent the Spanish Government from exercising its rights under international law. The British Government connived at the starving of women and children, the bombing of open towns and the slaying of men, women and children. Now it is scrambling with indecent haste to try to make friends with Franco. This is not in the interests of democracy or of the safety of the British Empire. . . ."

Engaged now in a war for their own survival, Americans ponder Attlee's indictment and wonder if it is not equally applicable to their own past conduct. Franco's brother-in-law, Serano Suñer, told a former American Ambassador — and it is no indiscretion to repeat it since that Ambassador has been replaced — that he "believed in, desired and worked for German victory." He meant a German victory in which Spain would have a share. The Spanish press has left no doubt that Spain looks forward to an Axis victory over the United States and expects that it will enable Franco to reestablish Spanish hegemony in Spanish America, where already his agents are busily making propaganda for Fascism.

More than a century ago, the reactionary forces of Russia, Austria, France and Prussia were threatening to restore the former Spanish colonies in America to Spanish monarchical rule. These anti-democratic forces were linked in the Holy Alliance which Castlereagh described as a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." Great Britain, with American help, checked those forces. President Monroe declared to the reactionary Powers that "we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this Hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." Today this Hemisphere is threatened by the Unholy Alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan. And we by our own efforts made it possible that, in case Hitler sweeps down into North and West Africa, Spain will be added to the forces ranged against us.

THE FUTURE IN RETROSPECT

OSWALD SPENGLER,
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER

By Hans W. Weigert

DER UNTERGANG DES ABENDLANDES: UMRISSE EINER MORPHOLOGIE DER WELTGESCHICHTE. BY OSWALD SPENGLER. Munich: Beck, v. I, "Gestalt und Wirklichkeit," 1918; v. II, "Welthistorische Perspektiven," 1922.

OSWALD SPENGLER, the greatest of the modern prophets of doom, completed "The Decline of the West" in the spring of 1917. In the preface to the first edition he did not conceal his feeling that he was giving the world one of its most challenging and monumental books. He believed that he had written not just *a* philosophy of our time, but "*the* philosophy of our time." The First World War was in its third year when this unknown mathematics teacher in Munich wearily laid down his pen. He had a right to be weary. He had written more than 500,000 words. All that he wrote later was evidently the product of a man who already had poured his immense energies into his one main work.

1917 and 1942. No two other years in the history of the world so justify comparison. Today once more, as then, the world's destiny is in the balance; once again the march of German legions is shaking the earth to its foundations. But we look at Spengler today not alone because the times have reawakened our curiosity in the audacious predictions he then made. In 1942, "The Decline of the West" is more than an antiquated best seller. The similarity of atmosphere between this destiny-laden year and the year in which he wrote has brought about a current renaissance of Spenglerism among writers on politics and philosophy and, what is even more important, among the youth.

Once again the young people in our colleges and universities are turning to Spengler in search of light on the questions which everyone asks but no one seems able to answer. Spengler's book, when it was first published, made a deep impression on German youth. Its main conceptions and prophecies spread like wildfire, burning their way into the souls of that war-torn generation.

Now once again academic youth, this time in America, is drawn to the flame. Students buy and read "The Decline of the West" without being instructed to do so. Reports from a number of colleges and universities confirm the belief that this is a general trend. Since Spenglerism is a flame which burns and can cripple souls we are justified in reëxamining it twenty-five years after. Indeed, we have a duty to do so.

When Spenglerism originally invaded America in 1926 it was greeted with both enthusiasm and horror. One reaction or the other seems inevitable at a first encounter with Spengler's work. He believed that "to write history is to write poetry." The usual first impression of his book is, therefore, that of a work of art, something causing an emotional reaction. It was as such rather than as a scientific treatise which must be based upon indisputable facts that "The Decline of the West" was received by the American public.¹ In succeeding years, moreover, American scholarship has dealt with Spengler only superficially. As a result, Spenglerism was often adopted without a critical understanding of its fundamentals. This, in turn, produced a whole army of gloomy prophets, many of whom know little more about Spengler than what the title, "The Decline of the West," seems to indicate.²

The superficial, uncritical, purely emotional reaction to Spengler's work has produced a diluted form of Spenglerism which critics have gone so far as to call "a mortal danger facing western culture." This mortal danger, Professor P. A. Sorokin of Harvard University writes, "is noisily proclaimed every day by college presidents and professors, by ministers and journalists, by statesmen and politicians, by members of men's and women's clubs. In this diluted form it has become a stock feature of our leading dailies." It is indeed true that many more or less professional prophets have found in the slogan, "The Decline of the West," a snugly fitting garment for their fears, emotions and nebulous philosophies. But Spengler is too great for this kind of disciple; like Revolution, he devours his own children.

German science before the advent of Hitler fully recognized

¹ The first volume, "Form and Actuality," was published in New York by Knopf in 1926, and the second volume, "Perspectives of World-history," in 1928. The same publisher brought out a revised two-volume edition in 1931, and a one-volume edition in 1939. Quotations in the present article are from the last-named.

² Incidentally, "Der Untergang des Abendlandes" should have been translated as "The *Downfall* of the West." The editor of the American edition defends the inaccurate translation rather unconvincingly.

the danger of "The Decline of the West" to a disillusioned generation. Scholars in a number of fields studied Spengler critically and, by refuting many of his statements of fact, prevented his doctrine from becoming, in Germany at least, a convenient text for foggy prophets. Their efforts were facilitated by the appearance on the scene of Hitler and Rosenberg, who out-Spenglered Spengler in offering seductive prophecies for those who wanted to have foretold for them the waves of the future.

The grave errors which German scholarship revealed in Spengler's work affect its value as a tool for the historian; they do not necessarily discredit it as a philosophical treatise. A critical analysis of the basic facts that underlie Spengler's conclusions leads, however, to a rejection of one of his most important and fundamental conceptions, the conception of the "West." When one weighs carefully the factual statements upon which Spengler constructs his concept, one finds that they refer only to a limited cultural area. This realm which he calls the West is not the West as we understand it. It is limited distinctly to Germany, and not even the whole of Germany, but only those parts of it which can be labeled (spiritually rather than geographically) as the Germanic North. England and America, even France and Italy, are not within the boundaries of the West which he covers in his factual material and comparisons. They apply only to his Nordic German world, and all his attempts to make them valid for the entire West are speculation and poetry. If we would read Spengler with more attention to the facts on which his theses are founded, we would see how right he was in calling his work a "German philosophy."

However, the circumstance that Spengler bases his conclusions on facts which are true only of the Faustian-Nordic-Germanic sphere does not necessarily mean that he was wrong in expanding his speculations beyond the boundaries of a German philosophy. Was he right or wrong? It is indeed a vital question.

II

Let us enter this gloomy realm of Spengler's *Abendland*, where prevails an insatiable Faustian longing for the immense and the infinite. In this West there is no historical division among ancient times, middle ages and modern times. Culturally it is a unified world, independent of the past and uninfluenced by other worlds which have disappeared in the past.

In Spengler's poetical conception this culture is an organism like a plant. He sees all cultures as plants, deeply rooted in the mother soil, from which they grow and blossom and in which they fade and die. They die, and others, in this eternal cycle of birth and death, rise in sublime aimlessness, to grow and die in their turn. It is when a culture has passed its zenith that the era of civilization begins. Civilization is the fate, the end and débris of cultural history. Specifically, the West entered into this last gray, darkening phase only after the French Revolution. Now mankind, deadly tired, prepares for the end, for winter and death.

Spengler consciously eliminated free man as a creative factor from his philosophy of history as plant morphology. He sees man's destiny as predetermined. The eternal laws of necessity make him an object of fate like all other earth-bound life. Spengler's disciples considered that the promulgation of the freedom of man as an historical conception was a capital crime.

Today, twenty-five years later, we are prepared to judge this better than the reader of "The Decline of the West" was when it first appeared. For in these twenty-five years we have seen the rise of the earth-bound religions which degrade man: the religion of Hitlerism with its deification of blood and soil, and its sister religion of "living space." Both of them breed war and transform men into machines of war.

Spengler's philosophy of history was like the religion of Hitlerism and its possible heir, the geopolitical *weltanschauung* of militarism, in that all sprang from German soil. So deeply rooted are they in this soil that they have utterly neglected the creative mind of free man. But in spite of the close relationship between Spenglerism and Hitlerism, Spengler did not greet Hitler with enthusiasm. He saw in him "the drummer," and he regarded Hitler's first disciples as chattering fools who would be unable to win the only victories that counted, victories in war. Their outbursts reminded him of men singing to keep up their courage in the darkness of the forest. When Spengler died on May 8, 1936, his contemptuous appraisal of the Nazi revolution had not yet been refuted by history.

Even if Spengler was right in calling his work a "German philosophy," was he right in calling it "*the* philosophy of our time?"

The present writer believes that the human area which Spengler calls the Faustian-Nordic-German sphere, and whence he

drew the factual foundations of his doctrine, is the only one where the Spenglerian conception of a human type fits — the type, that is, which gave up its freedom to become an earth-bound slave of Hitlerism. Perhaps it is too daring to draw a distinct line between a German world, to which this philosophy of historical predestination applies, and the rest of the human world of the West, in which the liberty of man is more than a political phrase. Such a conception means that there is, in fact, no absolute theory of history (which is true Spenglerism), instead that history's aspect is conditioned by the cultural sphere in which it develops. It means that "The Decline of the West" is a typical child of the German spirit of the twentieth century. But it is not the philosophy of our world as a whole so long as the spiritual forces outside of Germany are living forces.

Are they or are they not strong enough to remain living forces? That is the question which is to be decided in our time. The final judgment, therefore, has not yet been passed as to whether Spengler was right in speaking of the downfall of the West rather than of the downfall of his own Northern World. And the decision will not be made by abstract "destiny." It depends on the choice of free men in the lands where free men still exist and guide the fate of their respective nations. If our youth should succumb to the seductions of Spenglerism and view the vital crisis of our time as the death agony of the West, then indeed Spengler would have been right in seeing his philosophy as more than a German philosophy. Our duty is to read him as Goethe wanted "The Sufferings of Werther" to be read when he found that the decadent weakness of its hero so infected and disturbed the minds of youth: "Be a man and do not follow him."

III

In evaluating Spengler's work we must take into account that his prophecies are visions in terms of centuries; twenty-five years are not enough to permit a final appraisal. Another difficulty in attempting a critical analysis of them arises from the fact that many of them were not made in his monumental work but appear only in his political pamphlets. Here it is not the same man who speaks, but often only the voice of the politician urging German youth to surrender themselves to military power.

Spengler's conception of Caesarism foreshadowed the growth of the totalitarian religions of our time. He translated Plato's

ideas on the relationship of tyranny and democracy into the language of the twentieth century. The dictatorship of money had used democracy as its political weapon. At the end of the First World War Spengler saw the doom of this money-power age. New forces, the forces of Caesarism, of which the multitude becomes willingly the passive object, were arising from the soil of democracy. The scene was set for the final battle between the forces of financial plutocracy and the purely political will-to-order of the Caesars.

The rise of the Caesars would be facilitated by political chaos within the states. A few energetic men would fight their way to power and would come to embody the destinies of entire peoples and cultures. The political party would disappear as a form; party programs would wither away and the masses would look to the master alone for guidance. The politics of mind and money would be swept away, leaving the powers of blood and "race" to resume their lordship.

These Caesars who would rule the world when all the creative forces of culture had disappeared would be war-keen men. The appearance of one, Spengler wrote in 1917, would suddenly raise a powerless nation to the very peak, and his death would plunge a mighty nation into chaos. "They are for war, and they want war," he added. "Within two generations it will be they whose will prevails. . . ."

This age, in the Spengler thesis, would be one of gigantic conflicts, a period of contending states. "In these wars of theirs for the heritage of the whole world," he wrote, "continents will be staked, India, China, South Africa, Russia, Islam called out, new technics and tactics played and counterplayed. The great cosmopolitan foci of power will dispose at their pleasure of smaller states — their territory, their economy and their men alike — all that is now merely province, passive object, means to end, and its destinies are without importance to the great march of things."

Between these catastrophes of blood and terror the cry would rise up for the reconciliation of peoples and for world peace. But this longing only makes those who accept it a ready prey to others who do not.

Spengler saw with exciting insight how the wars of the future would be conducted. As early as 1924, for instance, he pointed out that a new era was dawning in which great "strategical high-

ways" would decide wars. The whole system of sea power would be shaken by these new power lines which would connect gigantic land masses and would make possible an entirely new kind of continental blockade. And in 1933 he wrote that the development of air power raised the question whether the day of the dreadnaught had not altogether passed, and he predicted that aircraft and tanks would outweigh armies of infantry.

This prescience enabled Spengler to see Germany in a new rôle. He visualized a Germany of "Prussian Socialism," in which citizens gave uncompromising service to the state. This Germany might play a decisive part in history because of her geographical location on the borders of Asia ("the world's most important continent") and also because the German people might be young enough to make decisions and to formulate and solve the problems of world history, while other peoples, old and rigid, remained on the defensive. "Attack holds the greater promise of victory."

But he did not dare actually to predict such a victory for the German Caesars. Time and again he asked sorrowfully whether Germany, where political changes so often have been made in a state of "emotional drunkenness," would see the vital fact that she was not a self-sufficient and isolated island. Fate would mercilessly submerge her if she failed to perceive her true relationship to the world.

It is still too early for a final appraisal of this vision. Spengler's failure to appraise fully the immediate weight of the Nazi revolution may have enabled him to see with greater clarity the more permanent evolution which was taking place behind the scenes in the great drama of German Caesarism: the fall of the tyrant and the rise of army rule. Even though Hitler may have won the first rounds against the war lords of the army, history may once again follow the course of Spengler's predictions.

IV

The prophets of a "managerial revolution" suggest, if they do not explicitly state, that Spengler's gloomy picture of the downfall of the West applies to a wider area of Euro-American culture and civilization, that the self-destruction displayed in Hitler's world is but a forerunner of our own destinies. The same suggestions appear in the writings of those sociologists who believe firmly in a common destiny for the whole of Europe and America (not to speak of the professional prophets of doom who

pretend to ride the waves of the future). There is not space here to deal with them. Instead we shall review some of the Spenglerian prophecies which dealt with the West beyond the Faustian Nordic-German sphere. We shall see that it was here that the shortsightedness of the prophet began.

Spengler's view of the Anglo-Saxon powers was clouded by prejudices and biases which he shared with most Germans of his time. He attacked the widespread belief in the existence of certain politically gifted peoples; apparent political talent in the masses is nothing but their confidence in their leadership. The English as a people seemed to him as narrow and injudicious in political matters as any other nation. What they did possess was a tradition of confidence in their rulers. He was fascinated by his conception of the English ruling class. This class had developed its aims and methods, he believed, independently of the people. For centuries it had seen the world as its prey. But its power, he thought, was declining. Its character was revealed in the resolution passed in 1933 by the Oxford Union, "the largest student club of the most aristocratic university in England," that "this House will under no circumstances fight for King and Country."

With such a ruling class, asked Spengler, how could England hope to maintain her power? The English nation, he said, was no longer spiritually and racially young enough and strong enough to fight with confidence. The Mistress of the Seas would sink into oblivion along with the dreadnaught. England's youth had become tainted with Bolshevism and had gone in for eroticism as a sport. The Commonwealth could no longer be held together by such a decadent "mother country." What would prevent Canada and Australia from throwing sentimentality to the winds and turning to the United States for better protection against Japan? The English could not survive in the new world because they had been organized around the contrast between wealth and poverty. In distinction, the rising force of Prussianism was built upon the principles of command and obedience.

Looking across the sea, Spengler saw an even darker shadow of decadence over the United States. "Rather a region than a state," he termed it in 1917.³ The parallelism of President and Congress, he predicted, would become unworkable in time of

³ Hitler used almost the same words when he told Rauschning (*cf.* "The Voice of Destruction," p. 70) that "the American people is not yet a nation in the ethnographical sense; it is a conglomerate of disparate elements."

real danger and would give way to such "formless powers" as had long been familiar in Mexico and South America. American politics would become the tool of the great domestic economic powers, the manufacturers' associations and the workers' unions — "unless indeed they find a real political politician as leader."

As the years passed, Spengler's opinion of the United States became even more gloomy. He saw an increasing trend towards "the progressive Bolshevization of the masses in the United States," and detected "a Russian style in their thinking, hopes and wishes." In 1933 he asked: "Will Chicago become the Moscow of the New World?" He saw no center of resistance to these trends in a country "which has no yesterday, and perhaps no tomorrow." The resemblance to Bolshevik Russia seemed to him far greater than was generally realized. There was the same extent of space which excluded any possibility of successful attack from without. This made the "state" dispensable and prevented the development of true political thinking. Life would therefore be organized exclusively on an economic basis and so would lack depth; it would not contain the elements of the historical tragedy which had formed and educated the souls of western peoples through the centuries. Religion in America, he felt, had become a sort of entertainment, and war was treated as a new sport. A standardized type of American had been developed and anyone who departed from it or criticized it would be ostracized.

But Spengler also saw another side of this undisciplined and stateless community, formed of sprawling, unscrupulous and dissolute population, drifting from city to city in pursuit of the dollar. He saw rising a sea power which might become stronger than England's and could control the two oceans. The United States had become a leading factor in international politics. It would be forced to think and act in accordance with truly national policies or it would disappear. But he seemed to be skeptical as to the ability of Americans to develop this conception of their nation. He looked at the millions who did not belong to the "ruling Anglo-Saxon type," the "foreign-thinking proletariat" with its "home in Chicago." He had read of the mighty underworld, of secret societies, of the state-like power of trusts, of revolting farmers in Iowa and the masses of the unemployed, "of which the majority are not 100 percent American," and he wondered which way this land would go. Spengler felt that he was not close enough to America to speak of its future, but ob-

viously he saw darkness rather than light. He even asked whether it might not disintegrate into separate states, such as the industrial Northeast, the farm region of the Middle West, the Negro states of the South, and the area beyond the Rockies.

These thoughts indicate the bewilderment and uncertainty with which Spengler viewed the Anglo-Saxon world. He did not see, because he could not understand, the living forces in England and America. He did not realize the possibilities which they contained of growth and development. More than all, he did not guess that in the hour of danger and destiny all the dormant positive qualities of these countries would awaken and create the factors of nation and state which he truly said would be necessary for their survival. When they became aware of their danger, the English-speaking nations raised forces of resistance against the poison which had threatened to make them helpless before Hitler's attack. Spengler was blinded by what he believed to be the decadence of the Anglo-American world. His basic mistake was to fail to realize that the infected bodies of nations may develop antitoxins strong enough to save their lives.

v

The most powerful parts of Spengler's vision are his forebodings about the future of Russia. He did not dare actually to predict that future.⁴ When the first part of "The Decline of the West" was published in 1918, the last page contained the contents of the second volume, which was to appear later. The concluding chapter was to be entitled "Russia and the Future." But when the second volume was published, this chapter had not been written. Of all Spengler's predictions, the one he was unwilling to make might have been the most significant.

In the second volume of "The Decline of the West" he speaks of the burning of Moscow, "that mighty symbolic act of a primitive people." Then came the Holy Alliance and Russia's participation in the Concert of Europe. The Russian people, whose destiny it should have been to live for generations still to come without history, were thus forced into an artificial and false history whose spirit their primitive souls could not comprehend. In this townless land with its primitive peasantry, false and unnatural cities grew like ulcers. One day they might vanish with

⁴It is particularly necessary here to differentiate between Spengler's main work and the political pamphlets in which he did include more concrete prophecies on Russia.

the morning mists. Jesus had seen such cities in Galilee; St. Peter must have felt this way when he set eyes on Imperial Rome. This falseness was felt by the true Russians. They developed a deep-rooted hatred against Europe — and to them “Europe” was all that was not Russia. Spengler saw depths of religious feeling under the surface of this Russian world. He saw the young Russians of 1914, dirty, pale, excited and always absorbed in metaphysics, like the Jews and early Christians of the Hellenistic cities whom the Romans regarded with irony, disgust and secret fear. The Bolshevists, he said, did not see the power of this Russian Christianity; Christ was to them only a social revolutionary like themselves. The real Russian was a disciple of Dostoyevski, although he may not have read him. In Spengler’s vision the next thousand years of Russia would belong to Dostoyevski’s Christianity.

Russia was to him the promise of a culture which was dawning as the evening shadows grew longer and longer over the West. The schism between the spirit of Russia and the spirit of the West could not be sharply enough delineated. However deep the spiritual, political and economic contrasts among the British, Germans, Americans and French, they were all alike when compared with Russia. The depth of the Russian soul was beyond our understanding: we could not grasp Russia’s formidable hatred of the West. Western civilization had become a city civilization. The true Russian was a peasant, and he remained a peasant even when he became a scholar or an official. The man of the West carried the city with him into the country: the Russian took the village into his city. The Russian worker would never become a part of the masses like the worker in Manchester, Essen or Pittsburgh; he would remain the runaway reaper or ploughman. That explained his hatred of the new society which tried to be American in technique but Russian in soul. It had created a nihilism which was directed against all forms of Western culture.

In “The Hour of Decision” (1933) Spengler used his basic conception of Russianism to draw conclusions as to the part Russia would play in world politics in the future. Now he pictured clearly the Asiatic face of Russia: Russia had been reclaimed by Asia, and Germany had taken up her old position as the barrier against Asia. The Vistula River and the Carpathian Mountains had become the frontiers of Asia. Again he stressed the similarity between America and Russia. Would the two come to an under-

standing which would determine the destinies of the world? This he felt was not beyond the bounds of possibility. Russia was unconquerable from the outside; distance was a political and military force which had not yet been overcome. An offensive from the west had become senseless, Spengler wrote in 1933; it would be a thrust into empty space. And to make his conception of the future Russia even more mysterious and fearful, he included that country in a "colored" world, the yellow-brown-black-red masses of which would threaten the very life of the white Powers. He foresaw a world revolution by the colored races, among which he included Africans, Indians, the mixed breeds of the Americas, the Islamic nations, the Chinese, the people of India, the Japanese and the *Russians*. Such a revolution might shake the foundations of a world upon which the curtain had risen for the final act of the tragedy of the West.

We have followed Spengler's course to the nebulous heights to which it arose as well as to the murky depths into which it descended. We have tried to evaluate his conception of the downfall of the West by calling attention to the limitations in his thinking which enabled him to write the German philosophy of the twentieth century but not *the* philosophy of our time. We have discussed his daring but shortsighted view of the Anglo-American world, and we have reported, without any attempt at criticism, what he saw developing on the vast steppes of Russia.

Spengler's mere outline of the future of Russia makes us aware of the immensity of the problem it presents even though he does not solve it for us. Today the legions of Hitler and Stalin are shedding their life blood for possession of the "Heartland" of the world. Let us hope that when our statesmen sit down after victory to consider the reconstruction of the world they will have learned from the German prophet of doom that it is Russia which will present the greatest difficulties. Then they will avoid the mistake of regarding the East European scene as a sideshow; they will realize that the rulers of the Heartland may rule the world.

We cannot know yet who those rulers will be. But let us take heart from the fact that in our time men are fighting belatedly but stubbornly for freedom. The prophet of Caesarism neglected one vital truth, the truth that "Men, at some times, are masters of their fate." Sometimes. In our times?

NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM IN SOUTH AMERICA

By John C. Campbell

AS THE war proceeds we can discern three major trends in the economic development of South America. The first is an increase in nationalism. Each republic desires to achieve a larger measure of self-sufficiency and thus free itself from what it feels is a "colonial status," symbolized by its dependence upon foreign markets and sources of supply. The second is regionalism. There is a tendency on the part of certain of the republics to draw together to form larger economic areas — which, of course, represents the abandonment of certain aspects of economic nationalism. The third is the "economic mobilization" of the Hemisphere. The United States is attempting, within the framework established by the Rio Conference, to harness the resources of the Americas to the war effort of the United Nations.

The three trends, of course, interact. Thus the mobilization of resources just mentioned can accelerate or retard the development of nationalism and regionalism. Our policy-makers, both now and after the war, should therefore appreciate the significance of these two movements in recent South American history. The Good Neighbor policy of the Roosevelt Administration has been built upon a foundation of scrupulous non-intervention in the political sphere and an open purse in the economic. It has undoubtedly served a historic purpose in banishing, temporarily at least, the specter of imperialism, from the minds of all the American republics. That it will survive in its original form, however, is doubtful, for the war and its aftermath will pose problems in inter-American relations which cannot be solved merely by benevolent political intentions and a willingness to loan money. The Good Neighbor policy will have to be adapted to the economic aspirations of the peoples involved.

II

Of all the continents South America is physically the farthest removed from the main battlefields of this war. From the very beginning, however, the war has gravely affected it. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe and especially the defeat of France

came as stunning blows, not only to the economy of South America but to all its traditional ideals and patterns of thought. The disasters which have struck the Latin nations of Europe have caused Latin Americans to turn their thoughts inward, to try to make a new evaluation of their position in the world. They are now talking in terms of their historic mission and the achievement of "real" independence.¹

This pattern of change, so far as its outline is now visible, resembles the revolution in thought and in policy which has marked the rise of nationalism in many other parts of the world. It would seem to set the South American stage for the playing of that same drama in which other peoples have sacrificed peace and prosperity to excesses of political and economic nationalism. However, nationalism in South America has not yet crystallized in a fixed pattern. It expresses itself in continental as well as in particularistic terms. Its exponents envisage a great future not only for their own respective nations but also for the whole of South America. This leaves us reason for hope that the economic development of the continent can proceed on a broader basis than that supplied by ten separate "national" economies.

Nationalism in South America has had both political and economic origins. Political nationalism is the outgrowth of the gradual process of national consolidation with which the young nations have been busy since they first won independence. Scholars and educators have tried to stimulate a "national spirit," and statesmen have tried to elaborate national institutions capable of giving political expression to that spirit. But in the final analysis, this process of political unification must depend for success upon economic consolidation, the drawing together of diverse and scattered regions by the development of easy communications and the exchange of goods. The nature of this economic development does much to determine what form political nationalism finally takes.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century certain of the republics of South America established fairly stable political institutions as a basis for nationalism. Ironically, however, that same period witnessed the full development of their "colonial" raw material economy, built up largely with foreign capital and based on large-scale extensive agriculture for export and on a steady demand abroad for a few staple products like wheat and coffee. This system was immensely profitable to the foreign investor, to

¹ See Fernando de los Rios, "South American Perplexities," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, July 1942.

the native landowner, and to the few great ports which lived on foreign commerce, but from a very early date voices were raised in protest against it. Men like Alberto Torres in Brazil and José Ingenieros in Argentina proclaimed that the wealth of their nations was being exploited by foreigners. Economic dependence, they held, brought political vassalage in its train. The goal of these reformers was a more diversified economy, producing a greater variety of foodstuffs and more consumers' goods of all types for the masses. Above all, they urged a concerted attack upon what they called "predatory foreign capital."

This movement for economic nationalism had hardly reached beyond a few socialist circles before the First World War; but it received strong impetus from the wartime disruption of trade. It was in this period that the industries of Brazil and Argentina got their first real growth. The governments shielded them with protective tariffs, so that they could hold their gains even at the expense of the local consumer. The second period of intense economic nationalism was the 1930's, when the disastrous fall in raw material prices brought economic ruin to South America and unleashed a series of political revolutions. These revolutions, although not universally democratic in nature, were all given strong popular support, and the new régimes, from the personal dictatorship of Vargas in Brazil to the short-lived "socialist republic" in Chile, had strongly nationalistic tendencies. They all embarked upon programs of diversifying production and showed marked hostility to foreign capital and enterprise. The new nationalism poured forth in a deluge of laws, decrees and regulations intended to preserve Brazil for the Brazilians, Colombia for the Colombians — but also, significantly, South America for the South Americans.

This movement has grown stronger with each passing year. The foreign-owned utilities and other enterprises have had to fight against laws limiting their profits, fixing their rates of exchange, regulating their personnel, and confiscating their property. The South American governments are in dead earnest in their attempt to "de-colonize," to nationalize in the sense of replacing foreign with native capital and management. The war has now provided them with a great opportunity for nationalizing Axis firms which have been put on the blacklist. They will never allow those enterprises merely to be taken over by United States companies. The most the latter can expect is to be able to share in

mixed companies, with both North American and native capital participating. Foreign capital will have to accept the idea of the mixed company if it wishes to remain in South America at all.

Many of the measures of economic nationalism which South American governments have taken were forced upon them by the lack of exchange, or because in a world of autarchic nations they had no alternative. Yet there are other motives at work which are more political than economic. Many of the new industries, for example, are patently artificial but have been kept alive by high tariffs since they are thought of as a source of national strength and a promise of eventual "economic independence." Progress toward that goal in the last three decades has been spectacular. The value of Brazil's industrial production has increased more than tenfold and is now as great as that of her agriculture. São Paulo, formerly famous only as the world's coffee capital, has become the largest industrial center in Latin America. In Argentina, industries have undergone a steady but not quite so rapid expansion. Although the country is still primarily agricultural, the total number of industrial workers is now much greater than the number of persons engaged in farming and stock raising. The value of domestic manufactures, approximately equal to that of imports in 1914, is now four times as great.

Chile, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela are all undergoing a similar transformation, although their lack of sufficient resources, skills and potential markets has set rather narrow limits to what they can accomplish. They have shown that, with substantial governmental aid, they can supply their home markets with simple textiles, shoes, hats, cement, glassware, paints, soap and beer, even though some of the materials and much of the fuel for these industries must be imported. Serious consideration is even being given to the establishment of heavy industries.

It is just at this point that some have become convinced that South America can never be industrialized on a sound basis unless the national approach to the goal of a more active and better balanced economy is supplemented or perhaps even superseded by the regional approach.

III

A glance at the map of South America will make it clear that the present political frontiers have no real economic significance except in cases where they follow natural barriers which forbid

much interchange of goods. Nor is the continent as a whole an economic unit. It comprises a number of roughly defined regions.

Colombia and Venezuela are Caribbean states, with practically no land communications with the rest of the continent. Their share of intra-South American trade has been barely two percent. The Amazon basin, comprising territory under the sovereignty of half a dozen countries, is another area with a unity of its own and with special economic problems. It is the great undeveloped frontier of the continent. The Andean or Pacific region (comprising Ecuador, coastal Peru, western Bolivia, and Chile) is an area with great mineral wealth; but it is deficient in food, and therefore needs contacts with other regions. It has certain uniformities in types of population and of social organization, but only miracles of railway and road construction could make it a well-knit economic unit. Finally, there is the rich Atlantic region of the River Plate basin (Argentina, southeastern Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and southern Brazil) which is at the same time the breadbasket of the continent and the center of industrial production. Brazil, though partially included in both Amazon and River Plate basins, is so huge that it can be called a region by itself, one of the few where nationalism and regionalism can be made to coincide.

Economic progress within each one of these areas requires the extension of local transportation systems, the development of industries, the encouragement of immigration, and the discarding of outworn systems of land tenure. New industrial areas should be able to supply simple consumers' goods in quantity. Such are the São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro area in Brazil, the River Plate estuary, central Chile, and, on a smaller scale, the Lima-Callao district in Peru and the Medellin district in Colombia. As for heavy industry, Brazil might supply iron and steel for a large South American market; smaller developments in other areas are unlikely to supply even domestic markets.

In the past there has been little trade between the different regions despite the fact that many of their products are complementary. The owners of the mines and the plantations almost always found it more profitable to export to Europe or to North America. But there is no question that there exists a basis for exchange between the food-deficient areas and those which are burning surpluses of maize and of coffee; between those which lack petroleum and those which are flooded with it; between the tropics and the temperate zone. Argentine wheat and meat

should find a market in the other regions. Nitrates and minerals from the Pacific states, even Bolivian tin, could be used in the industrial cities on the Atlantic as industry expands. Fruits and coffee from Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil could go to the Pacific and River Plate areas. The oil of Venezuela, Colombia and Peru is desperately needed in Brazil, Uruguay and Chile.

That such trade can develop rapidly is evident from what happens in periods when war blocks the normal trade channels. In this war, as in the last, South America's trade with the United States has boomed, especially in exports. In 1941 these broke all previous records and enabled the South American governments for the first time in years to build up large dollar balances and thus rid themselves of the nightmare of insufficient foreign exchange. Instead they have acquired the problems arising out of an insufficiency of shipping and an inability to use their dollars to buy the goods they want, a situation which throws them back upon their own resources and productive capacity and on the possibilities of trading with each other. There is, of course, no substitute for the steel, machinery, motors and hundreds of other products which the South American countries do not themselves produce, but that is all the more reason for them to squeeze all possible advantages out of their trade with each other.

During the First World War the total value of intra-South American trade rose from \$169,000,000 in 1913 to \$411,000,000 in 1918. This was a noteworthy gain, relatively greater than that of South America's total trade, which increased considerably in the war and immediate postwar years. The exports of the ten republics to each other in 1913 were approximately 8 percent of their total exports; this figure had risen to over 10 percent in the period from 1918 to 1920. Their imports from each other, which represented some 7 percent of total imports in 1913, also passed 10 percent in 1920. Not all these gains were held. As trade slipped back into its own channels, the export percentage went back to the 7 percent level, and still stood there in 1938. The import percentage remained, until the outbreak of the present war, in the neighborhood of 9 or 10 percent.

Such statistics as are available for intra-South American trade since 1939 indicate that the experience of 25 years ago is being repeated. This was already apparent in 1940, when nearly 8 percent of the exports of the ten republics and 15 percent of their imports represented transactions within the continent. The over-

all statistical picture for 1941 is not yet available, but there is no doubt that the great increase in trade with the United States was matched by a proportionate advance within South America. Thus intra-continental trade accounted for 25 percent of Argentina's imports and 13 percent of her exports. For Brazil the figures were 14.5 percent and 15.5 percent. Peru sent to Argentina and Chile alone 17 percent of her exports and took from them 12.2 percent of her imports. In addition, new avenues of trade opened up where none had existed before, such as the export of Brazilian textiles to Colombia and Venezuela. Almost everywhere the 1941 figures mark a significant advance over 1940. Those at hand for the first half of 1942 show even further gains.

These statistics are to some extent deceptive, since the figures on tonnage show that the actual quantity of goods exchanged has not varied much from the yearly average before the war. What has occurred is a general rise in prices brought on by heavy United States purchases of South American raw materials and by the scarcity of manufactured goods. The same amounts of wheat going from Argentina to Brazil, or of oil from Peru to Chile, bulk larger than before in the trade statistics, being based on value.

The experience of the past and much of the evidence of the present seem to indicate that this boom in intra-South American trade is illusory. But the picture has other aspects which suggest that the trade gains made during this war will not be lost, and that any postwar planning for South America should be careful to take into consideration these intra-continental trade ties as well as those which bind the individual republics to the United States and to Europe. One obvious change since 1918 is in the degree of industrialization which has been attained; Brazil and Argentina are now in a position to export some of their manufactures to each other and to neighboring states. Air transportation has greatly facilitated contacts. Then there is the quite definite consciousness of spiritual and cultural unity born of the necessity of facing together the dislocations and dangers of a world at war. Some of the new trade ties are likely to be permanent not only because they are profitable, but also because political leaders will want to retain them.

IV

Most articulate groups and individuals in South America regard the increase of trade within the continent as desirable. It is

definitely part of the pattern of the newly emerging economy. Of course it has limits, but certainly it could be multiplied many times. Whether it develops not as a wartime boom but on a permanent basis depends on whether or not certain problems which have kept South America in a state of relative economic backwardness can be solved.

The first obstacle to be overcome is in the field of transportation. Commercial air transport, in which most of the governments are placing high hopes, has conquered the lofty Andes and the impenetrable jungles. Ambitious road-building programs are opening up the hinterland. But these can hardly be a substitute for the expansion of the railroad and shipping services necessary to a vastly increased traffic in heavy and bulky goods. There must be far better railroad connections between São Paulo, Porto Alegre, and the chief centers of Uruguay and Argentina. There must be more adequate railroads from Argentina to Bolivia and to Chile. The diagonal route, from Lima to Buenos Aires, crosses territory rich in minerals, in animal products, and in grains. If properly expanded and put to use, it could bring new living standards to millions of people now close to the margin of subsistence. Brazil, too, needs a network of railways to knit the country together, and should make fuller use of the magnificent river routes provided by the Amazon and its tributaries. The digging of the proposed canals to connect the Amazon system with the Orinoco system to the north and the Plata system to the south might inaugurate a new era of thriving internal commerce.

Other obstacles to trade in the past have been the monoculture system and the competitive nature of many staple products. These are being overcome by the various programs of diversification. In diversifying agriculture, finding new industrial uses for many products, fostering national industries, undertaking all sorts of development schemes, they are not merely strengthening their national economies; the South American states are also laying the foundations for a fruitful interchange of new products among themselves. But policies of this sort come up against formidable barriers, including the lack of native capital, the insufficiency or immobility of labor, and the fact that the purchasing power of the masses is now so low.

In general, the South American governments have found themselves in an impasse, since the capital and the immigrant labor which they obviously need have been kept out by their own na-

tionalistic restrictions on foreign capital and their short-sighted immigration policies. Besides, to give the masses a stake in the new diversified and semi-industrial economy involves transforming the whole traditional social system. Governments which are an outgrowth of that system can hardly be expected to tear it down. There is, however, a general drift in the direction of social reform. Whether its course will be revolutionary, following the example of Mexico, or peaceful, following that of Uruguay, is not safe to predict; but this is a matter which the present governing groups must face. Without social reform, particularly land reform, their plans for attaining a prosperous and balanced economy can hardly materialize.

There is one obstacle to trade which the present governments have clearly recognized and have begun to attack — the wall of tariffs and trade restrictions erected on every political frontier. It is a hopeful sign that they have been willing to admit the limitations of economic nationalism and to take steps to tear down these walls. In the last two years they have developed a network of new commercial treaties which point the way to freer trade, possibly to one or more customs unions, on a regional or even on a continental scale. It is in these treaties that the regional pattern emerges most clearly.

The River Plate Conference of 1941, attended by representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, was the first meeting of its kind ever held in South America. It was the first step in the movement, in which Argentina has taken the initiative, to build up a regional trade bloc. One purpose was to reach a general agreement on preferential treatment for the two land-locked states, Paraguay and Bolivia, the “poor relations” of the continent, who were exhausted by their war with each other; the other purpose was to organize a new economic bloc, the members of which would gradually approach a system of free trade among themselves. The conference endorsed projects for a regional system of roads and pipelines, recommended uniform legislation on transportation, and set up a permanent office in Buenos Aires to direct regional economic relations. Argentina’s proposal for an immediate customs union met with opposition from the other delegations, who voiced the fear that their countries might become “dominions” of Argentina if it were adopted.

After the Montevideo Conference, Argentina set out to negotiate commercial treaties with nearly every other nation in South

America. If carried out, they will help to banish economic nationalism from the trade relations of the continent and will vastly increase the exchange of goods. Treaties with Bolivia provide for the construction of railways, roads and pipelines, which will link that country's oil-producing region with the economy of Argentina. Recent agreements with Chile arrange for the exchange of Chilean copper and nitrates for Argentine meat, grain and scrap iron. Most far-reaching in its implications is the Argentine-Brazilian treaty of November 1941, in which the signatories promise not to compete with each other's "new" industries, and gradually to lower tariffs on other goods. Brazil in the future will import more Argentine wheat and more of the products of Argentina's factories. Argentina will import more Brazilian coffee and more Brazilian textiles. Under wartime conditions, Brazil's cotton goods have already captured the Argentine market, and great efforts will be made to hold that position. If the two largest and most important countries of the continent actually carry out the purpose as stated in this treaty's preamble, namely "to establish a régime of free trade which permits the realization of a customs union between the Argentine Republic and the United States of Brazil, open to the adherence of neighboring countries," then South America will have come a long way toward the new and "emancipated" economic status for which many of its leaders yearn.

Argentina made pacts also with Peru and with Colombia, both of which can take large quantities of Argentine wheat in exchange for petroleum. Brazil, not to be outdone in this frenzy of treaty making, signed pacts with most of her neighbors. The Brazilian treaties with Paraguay and Bolivia are of special interest, for they envisage the extension of modern transportation lines from Brazil's Atlantic coast right into the heart of those interior countries. Brazil has also contrived to send its textiles in quantity to Colombia and Venezuela, an entirely new market, and to import much-needed oil from Peru by way of the Amazon. But the bulk of Brazil's South American trade always has been, and probably will be, with Argentina.

There have been other treaties, between Brazil and Chile, Peru and Chile, Peru and Colombia, Chile and Venezuela. But the real interest centers in the trade programs of Brazil and Argentina, the position of each on the continent, and their relations with each other. Forty percent of all intra-South American commerce

is Argentina's, and her leadership in this whole movement for a regional economic bloc has been apparent from the first. The other nations, for the most part, have accepted this leadership. All were adversely affected by the war; all saw the general benefits which might be derived from intensified trade. For the moment, political considerations were not much in evidence. After all, "neutrality" and "solidarity" were Argentina's watchwords, and up until the end of 1941 all wanted to be neutral and "solidary," not least Brazil.

Close economic coöperation between Argentina and Brazil seemed to promise increased prosperity and security for the whole River Plate region, through the development of complementary industries in its two largest countries and the apparent willingness of those countries to collaborate rather than compete in the economic development of the small states which serve as buffers between them. The River Plate bloc seemed about to become a reality. However, the success of this attempt by South Americans to solve their own problems by their own means became more dubious as the war came closer to the American continent. If all the South American states had been of one mind on the war, events would have solidified the economic bloc. Uruguay, however, which had not shared in the expansion of intra-South American trade, came out openly on the side of the democracies in the war, and prepared to do its part in the defense of the Western Hemisphere. A noticeable coolness in Argentine-Uruguayan relations developed. Argentine leaders were not happy over the idea of United States ships and planes "defending" Argentina's own River Plate from Uruguayan bases. The negotiations for a commercial treaty between the two neighbors broke down. Uruguay, a small country in a key position, was definitely looking abroad, to England and to the United States, rather than to any regional bloc.

Less than a month after the conclusion of the Argentine-Brazilian treaty, the entry of the United States and several other American republics into the World War put political and economic relationships in the Hemisphere on an entirely new basis. With the United States and Argentina taking opposite positions on the crucial political issue of breaking relations with the Axis Powers, Argentina's sponsorship of an economic bloc, which at the River Plate Conference had been accepted as wholly consistent with inter-American obligations, now began to appear as

a move against the United States. This was a definite check to the economic rapprochement between Brazil and Argentina, for President Vargas, after a long period of calculated neutrality, had shifted to an equally calculated enthusiastic support of the cause of the United States. Enrique Ruiz Guiñazú, Argentine Foreign Minister, made a last desperate attempt to create a "neutral" economic bloc when his colleagues from Peru, Bolivia and Chile were passing through Buenos Aires on their way to the Rio Conference. But by that time every other American republic except that of Chile had made up its mind to break with the Axis, and to seek its economic salvation by participation in the "mobilization of the resources of the Hemisphere" under the general direction of the United States.

Today there is no economic bloc in South America except the partnership in isolation of the two American republics which chose not to go the way of the others. This does not mean that regionalism is dead. The unity of the River Plate area is a geographical fact, which will outlast the political combinations of the present war. Leaders of countries in that region know that their national interests will be best served by a coördinated development on a regional basis. In the other areas the same considerations hold true. Regionalism is still the logical next step in the evolution of South American economy.

v

These trends represent the interests and aspirations of the peoples of South America. The war, as we have seen, has speeded them up in certain ways, and everywhere it has deepened the conviction that the semi-colonial economy must go. But the war also, at least in the past year, has made further industrialization practically impossible and has even forced many existing industries to close down. The nations of South America have discovered how dependent they still are upon the steel and machinery, the fuel and the shipping services of foreign nations. They are sharing our war boom, but they are sharing our shortages too. The United States, the only nation which can possibly supply these needs, finds itself in a strong bargaining position in its quest for South America's raw materials and South America's good will. That was the real basis of the "solidarity" and "harmony" of the Rio Conference. The United States secured agreement to a thoroughgoing "economic mobilization" of the Hemisphere. Latin

America secured our promise that everything possible would be done to "maintain the internal economies" of the American republics.

The United States has been fighting an economic war against the Axis in South America for more than a year. Its purpose has been to eliminate all Axis economic influence there and to secure a stranglehold on the continent's vital raw materials.² A nation fighting for its life cannot afford to let vague considerations of good-neighborliness interfere with a program of this sort. The Board of Economic Warfare is concerned with making the best use of our own and of Latin America's resources in prosecuting the war. This means ruthless enforcement of the campaign against blacklisted firms (which include some of the oldest and largest companies in South America); it means insisting on greater production of rubber and strategic minerals, even if managers and technicians have to be sent from the United States to do the job; it means the allocation of the limited shipping space in accordance with our war needs, which must take precedence over Latin America's civilian needs. South Americans want to sell their raw materials and are getting good prices for them. Nevertheless, this concentration of effort on a few strategic materials does imply the abandonment of programs of diversification, and it foreshadows inevitable dislocations after the war boom is over. The shortage of essential machinery and other equipment has already paralyzed certain industries. The United States, inevitably, is generally held to blame for this unhappy situation.

The Board of Economic Warfare, acting in conjunction with the Department of State and the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs, has accepted responsibility for cushioning the shocks of these changes by providing "relief." But merely cushioning the shocks does not seem to be enough. Are there not possibilities of cutting the economic mobilization to fit the pattern of nationalism and regionalism described above, and of stretching relief to include a long-range program of economic construction? This depends upon the extent to which the operation would aid South America to overcome the obstacles to economic expansion.

Since one of the greatest of those obstacles is inadequate transportation facilities, much depends on how the dwindling supply of shipping is allocated, and on where the new railways, roads and canals are built. In this connection, the plan to build a fleet of

² See Percy W. Bidwell, "Our Economic Warfare," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, April 1942.

wooden sailing ships for inter-Latin American commerce shows imagination and a comprehension of what the shipping shortage has meant to Latin America. As concerns land transportation, if attention is given only to the lines that lead from the mines to the ports, South Americans will have little for which to thank us. Much more fruitful, from their point of view, is the proposed regional development of the Amazon basin, which will not only provide the Hemisphere with a great future rubber supply but will also open up a vast new area for colonization and for the production of many materials which can be consumed in South America itself. This one project raises many of the problems common to other regions of the continent: that of diversification; that of supplying a food-deficient area with the food it will need until its own soil can be made productive; that of moving masses of labor, particularly for the rubber industry, and providing against their being stranded after the war boom ends; and that of pumping purchasing power into the hands of the rural proletariat.

The Government of the United States has indicated its willingness to supply, so far as the demands of its own war production permit, the capital, the heavy machinery, the managerial and technical skills necessary to the carrying out of vast projects of this type. The crucial question is how and in what quantity they will be supplied. Political considerations, for example, are bound to play some part in this. Essential goods will go to those states which have broken with the Axis rather than to the "fence-sitters." Uruguay will get the equipment needed for her Rio Negro power project; while Argentina, planning enterprises which may be of greater long-term value to the River Plate region as a whole, likely will get none. Projects which benefit our own war effort and bring South America no return except larger dollar balances in New York will win us few friends in the long run. Much more promising are those like the large-scale development of the Itabira iron mines and the Victoria railway, which fits in closely with the expansion of Brazil's new heavy industry development at Volta Redonda.

It is absolutely essential that the United States encourage the growth of industries in South America and run with the tide of nationalism in so far as it means industrialization. Mr. Warren Pierson, President of the Export-Import Bank, has stated that the Bank's policy is "to help Latin Americans to build those industries which Europe never wanted them to have." Many of the

loans which the Bank has made have been for the undertaking of new "national" industries. A recently announced plan of the Board of Economic Warfare to send to Latin America quantities of the displaced machinery of consumers' goods industries now converted to war production is encouraging. The Good Neighbor policy, if it is to survive the war at all, must be implemented by bold and imaginative steps such as this.

The vast capital which South America requires must come in large part from outside sources, and the manner in which it will be supplied squarely raises the issue of nationalism in some of its other and more acute aspects. The fear of "subservience" to foreign capital is now so deep-rooted that there seems hardly a possibility that private capital will be willing to meet the conditions which South American governments will set. The current practice of loans to Latin American governments by the Export-Import Bank is for the moment acceptable to both lender and borrowers, but in itself it offers no ultimate solution. Though apparently made on a business basis, these really have been "political" loans, intended to keep Latin America favorably disposed towards the United States and its policies. For that very reason, they are likely to become suspect. After all, the use of economic means to influence and control the policies of weaker nations is still within the definition of imperialism, whether a powerful corporation or a powerful government exercises the control. In both cases the reaction of the weaker nation is the same — a political movement against "predatory imperialism." What is needed is a policy which will go along with South American nationalism in its desire for local control of enterprise and for diversification and industrialization, but will discourage its tendency towards particularism and the creation of artificial industries.

This task requires, above all, that both North and South Americans take a wider than national view of their economic problems. It requires an acceptance of regional economies as parts of larger American and world systems of trade and economic development. Public men and the press in South America have broached the question of regional and continental customs unions. President Vargas has gone on record as favoring an inter-American or South American *Zollverein*. There has been talk of an American trade currency on a gold or dollar basis. As we have seen, the South American republics have themselves taken the initiative in these matters. The River Plate Conference was first

suggested by Argentina. A conference of Amazon countries has been suggested by Brazil. The Argentine-Brazilian treaty of 1941, whether or not it is actually carried out, has at least put on paper the pledge of an eventual economic union of those two countries.

Unfortunately, the machinery of coöperation evolved out of the inter-American conferences has not been correspondingly broad in its application. The Inter-American Bank has remained a dead letter, and trade is still hampered by the existence of a score of national currencies. The Inter-American Development Commission, which was intended to be a central planning agency, has accomplished little. Its basic defect, from the long-range point of view, is the same as that of the agreements made since the Rio Conference for the economic mobilization — they provide for a series of unrelated national development programs. The whole Latin American program of the State Department and of the Board of Economic Warfare has taken the form of development programs for each individual Latin American republic, ignoring the regional approach which would make for more rationally organized production and for easier solutions of the human problems bound to result from mass movements of laborers into new industries. Admittedly the pressing demand for war materials has not allowed much time for anything except negotiating with each individual state for the purchase of all the strategic materials it can produce. But South Americans want something more than that. To them, the "economic mobilization" is not just a means of preparing for and waging war, but the prelude to an era of great economic expansion.

VI

Several high officials, notably Vice-President Wallace and Under-Secretary Welles, have shown an understanding of these aspirations. Mr. Welles, in his Memorial Day address, assured Latin America that the victory of the United Nations will spell the end of imperialism. But the policies followed now, during the war, will do much to set limits to what can be done later. We cannot "reconstruct" South America after the war unless our present measures of mobilization help carry that continent toward the goal already fixed by its own economic evolution. It is not enough to proclaim the end of imperialism. Machinery for coöperative economic development must be made strong enough to withstand any revival of imperialist feeling in the United

States. It might take the form of international development corporations, sponsored not by the United States alone but by the United Nations and their associates. Such corporations could operate across South America's political frontiers and foster a general economic expansion without necessitating any demand that the nations give up their sovereignty. The effect of an expansion of that sort might well be to erase the remaining trade barriers, to tighten up the whole South American economy, and to give economic sinews to the continent's present vague spiritual unity.

The United States Government has no fixed postwar "plan" for South America. The Board of Economic Warfare has some rather general plans to raise living standards, and its leading planners look forward to a vastly increased trade between the United States and a South America made prosperous and healthy by our capital, our technicians, and our sanitation engineers. The Treasury has its own plan for increased trade through the operation of an international stabilization fund. The Department of Commerce, if we may take a recent address by Under-Secretary Taylor as representing its views, favors development projects in which foreign and native capital will share on a basis of equality. The Department of State has not as yet come forward with any general or specific plan, perhaps because of the conviction that South American "reconstruction" must necessarily be a part of a world program of reconstruction, the outline of which is not yet clear.

It is encouraging that almost all our planning for South America shows a willingness to encourage and to assist the movement for "decolonization." Regionalism is also worth encouraging. From the point of view of power politics, it may seem safer to deal with many weak states than with a few larger units, especially if we foresee the creation of a strong economic bloc led by Argentina. But this war is not being fought to preserve power politics. In economic terms, the consolidation of South America through industrialization and the development of regional unity will make for a stronger Western Hemisphere, and for not less but more trade between North and South America. To foster it intelligently may be the only way to keep good-neighborliness alive not only in a world at war, but when the war is over.

THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ALLIANCE TODAY

By Robert G. Caldwell

THE first formal treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Portugal was signed in 1386. But coöperation between the two countries had begun at an even earlier period. Many of the Crusaders who helped Portugal gain her independence were English, and afterwards the Portuguese maintained their rule only as far inland as they could secure ready assistance from the sea. The treaty of 1386 was directed especially against the danger of Spanish aggression. In later years, defense of the Portuguese colonies became the central and permanent object; and today Portugal regards the ancient alliance as primarily useful in case aggression should threaten her relatively large and vulnerable empire.

From the legal point of view, and to a large extent from the practical point of view as well, the central feature of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was defined most clearly in the so-called Secret Article of the Treaty of 1661: "The King of Great Britain . . . doth promise and oblige himself to defend and protect all conquests or Colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies as well future as present."

More than two centuries later this statement still seemed to summarize the British obligation so perfectly that in 1899, when Great Britain wanted to make sure of Portugal's benevolent neutrality in the Boer War, the British negotiators limited themselves to a restatement of the original and historical promise.¹ This was the last occasion, so far as is generally known, when the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was renewed definitely in a diplomatic document.

On the British side, then, the promise to protect and defend the Portuguese colonies remains the constant and vital factor, to which nothing of any importance has been added. In return, whenever the alliance is renewed, as it always has been in every serious international crisis, Portugal enters into special and temporary agreements related to the particular emergency. But in spite of the fact that such engagements are temporary in origin, many of them have crystallized gradually into something

¹ "British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914." London, 1927, v. 1, p. 93.

fairly concrete and more or less binding. In contrast to those of Great Britain, they are for the most part practical and historical rather than legal.

Recent precedents indicate that the Portuguese requirements and obligations can be summarized tentatively as follows:

1. In a crisis, Portugal regularly gives diplomatic support to the British position. Failure to do so would endanger the whole basis of the alliance. Thus, at the time of the Ethiopian crisis in 1935, Dr. Augusto de Vasconcelos, the Portuguese representative on the Council of the League of Nations, accepted the chairmanship of the Committee of Sanctions which had previously been declined by the representative of the Netherlands. This action was clearly helpful to the course of British diplomacy.

2. In case Britain becomes involved in a war, Portugal is expected to adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality. Thus on numerous occasions British war vessels and their prizes have been received in the port of Lisbon. In 1899, arms and munitions were allowed to go to the British armies in the Transvaal through the port of Lourenço Marques, in Portuguese East Africa.

3. An actual declaration of war on the part of Portugal seems rarely to be desired by Britain. Certainly no Portuguese obligation to go to war is established in the alliance. But on a number of occasions — as during the First World War — Portugal's position as a benevolent neutral has become virtually impossible and she in consequence has entered the same conflict in which Great Britain was engaged.

4. It is a recognized principle of Portuguese policy, resting, apparently, on practical necessities rather than on any secret agreement, that no important concessions involving large amounts of capital or the establishment of permanent improvements shall be granted to any foreign company or group in the Portuguese colonies without the specific approval of the British Government. In the summer of 1935, for example, when Pan American Airways petitioned to be allowed to establish radio and other ground facilities in Macao, the Lisbon representative of the company was told that the request must be submitted to the appropriate authorities in London before it could be granted. In recent years a similar procedure has been followed in the case of other foreign countries which have sought grants in the African and Asiatic colonies of Portugal.

5. The Portuguese obligation to obtain British approval for

foreign enterprises is less specific in continental Portugal and the adjacent islands (the Azores and Madeira) than in the colonies. Formerly it was quite rigorous — especially under the provisions of Lord Methuen's treaty of 1703. Gradually, however, it has been reduced to a series of informal understandings. Nevertheless, even in Portugal proper these economic understandings are of substantial importance. A few years ago, for instance, in speaking of an important contract which involved the possible expenditure of several million pounds, a prominent British diplomat remarked to the writer, quite as a matter of course, that no contract would be signed until it had been carefully examined by British interests. It is well known that practically all contracts for the building of units for the Portuguese Navy are awarded to a British firm and that the specifications make these vessels suitable for inclusion in the British Navy in case of need. The practice is less rigid in the case of airplanes and aeronautical equipment; but even in this field most contracts in recent years have been awarded to British firms whenever they were in a position to meet bids from firms in other countries.

II

In spite of the alliance's antiquity it does not pass without criticism and objection, and no one conversant with Portuguese opinion could truthfully say that at the present time it is really popular. On the other hand, though often it has imposed sacrifices on Portugal it also has brought her great benefits. Most thoughtful Portuguese see clearly that their country's continued possession of so large a remnant of its old colonial empire, and perhaps the very existence of Portugal as an independent nation, depend upon British diplomatic assistance and naval protection.

Even the critics, moreover, can suggest no satisfactory substitute. It is evident that if Portugal could not depend on Great Britain she would have to find some other ally with a fleet and the will to use it if she could hope to control the routes which lead to such far-distant places as Angola, Mozambique, Timor and Macao. Accordingly, though in recent years Portugal has had a variety of governments — monarchist, parliamentary and now autocratic — all these, no matter how much they may have differed in other respects, have almost without exception made close political and economic collaboration with Great Britain a central feature of their foreign policy.

The only serious book written by a Portuguese citizen on the subject of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance is "Portugal e Inglaterra,"² written in exile by a former Premier, Francisco Pinto da Cunha-Leal. It is bitterly critical of what the author regards as Great Britain's ungenerous treatment of Portugal. In his search for examples of this he goes back to the Portuguese cession of Bombay and Tangier in the seventeenth century, sacrifices for which he does not believe that Portugal received adequate recompense. He also refers to the promise made by Portugal in 1703 to receive British textiles in return for lower tariffs on Portuguese wines — an agreement which, in his opinion, destroyed Portugal's rising industries and led to undue specialization in the production of a single, though important, object of export. Coming closer to our own day, he mentions with some bitterness Portugal's loss of Rhodesia as a result of the so-called ultimatum of 1890. And he describes the secret negotiations between England and Germany in 1898 and 1912, when the partitionment of the Portuguese colonies was envisaged as an easy way to preserve the threatened peace of Europe.

These last instances, especially, indicate to Dr. Cunha-Leal what grave dangers lurk in the illusion of a security based exclusively on British good will and protection. After reaching this conclusion, however, even Dr. Cunha-Leal can suggest no alternative. He merely recommends, now that the danger of Spanish aggression has, to his mind, disappeared, that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance be balanced by increasingly close relations with Spain and, through Spain, with France. He believes that if Portugal has this second string to her bow she will be able to hold Great Britain strictly to her promises and so reap the full advantage of the ancient alliance.

Nothing could better illustrate the axiomatic character, for Portugal, of the alliance with Britain than this lame conclusion by a severe critic. Nor is there any reason to suppose that if a member of the present government were to state his own position with equal frankness it would differ in any substantial degree from that taken by this exiled leader of a fallen party.

When Dr. Oliveira Salazar became Premier with almost unlimited powers in 1932, he stated the guiding principles of his foreign policy to be "the greatest possible respect for all nations which respect us and the greatest possible fidelity to our ancient

² F. P. Cunha-Leal, "Portugal e Inglaterra." Coruña, privately printed, 1932.

alliance, always more close, with Great Britain." And he added: "As a sincere, conscious and conscientious friend of England, I shall endeavor, to a larger degree even than previous governments in Portugal, to make certain that this alliance shall be more than a rhetorical phrase and that it shall be based on economic, financial and political interests, clearly thought out and justly satisfied. I base my politics and my administration substantially on British principles."³

III

Anyone who knows Dr. Salazar may be excused for suspecting an element of satire in his promise to be guided by "British principles." It is also true that various events of the past few years have shaken Portuguese confidence in the value of the ancient alliance and increased the temptation to seek a possible substitute.

From the point of view of a government founded on the principles of the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, and deriving strength from the religious devotion of its people, the admission of Russia to the League of Nations in 1934, with Britain's blessing, created a rift in the close diplomatic harmony which had prevailed between Great Britain and Portugal since the close of the First World War. But when Dr. Caeiro da Matta, Salazar's representative at Geneva, protested against this act he did so in terms which left no doubt as to Portugal's continued adherence to the principle of collective security in general and also to the special form of security which Portugal had found for so long behind the guns of the British fleet. In those years, too, even when the Portuguese newspapers were praising the autocracy of the *Estado Novo* as an original contribution to the art of government, they recognized what they called "the astonishing success of parliamentary institutions in Great Britain."

In 1935, when others hesitated, Portugal gave wholehearted support to the policy of sanctions against Italy. The failure of her ally, Great Britain, to apply sanctions to oil at a time when others were making grievous sacrifices, and the consequent failure of collective security, produced the first definite evidences of bitterness and disillusionment in the Portuguese press, which had been consistently pro-British for many years. As it is a controlled press, the change was the more significant.

³ Antonio Ferro, "Salazar, Le Portugal et son Chef." Paris: Grasset, 1934, p. 311.

The next year the Spanish Civil War began, and for a time the strain on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance seemed likely to be fatal. Italy and Germany intervened at once on the side of General Franco and a little later Russia came to the aid of the Republic. England, under Anthony Eden, based her hopes for preserving international peace on a policy of non-intervention. Though Portugal finally agreed to this policy, and even allowed British observers on Portuguese soil to make half-hearted efforts to prevent the shipment of munitions to Franco and to report on the movement of volunteers, she did so — to say the least — without enthusiasm. At one time early in 1937 badges which combined Portugal's colors with those of Germany and Italy were sold in the streets. The French Minister was snubbed; and the Ambassador of the Spanish Republic was first isolated and then expelled. The trivial grounds on which the representative of Czechoslovakia was dismissed later in the year was a clear and ominous indication of the extent of German influence. There were others. At one diplomatic reception Dr. Salazar gave the British Ambassador five minutes; after which he remained closeted with the German Minister, Baron von Hoyningen-Huene, while other diplomats cooled their heels in an anteroom. The newspapers which had criticized the German blood purge of 1934 and ridiculed the official story of the Reichstag fire no longer distinguished the Nazi philosophy from that of the *Estado Novo*, and began recognizing the Führer and the Duce as defenders of an endangered civilization of which Portugal was a part. Some observers saw in all this the beginning of the end.

With Franco's victory, however, the rift which had developed was soon healed. A British naval mission under Rear Admiral N. A. Wodehouse was received in Lisbon with marked attention in 1938 and the two governments openly considered plans for the building of a strategic air base at Faro, on Portugal's southern coast, only 20 miles from the Spanish border and within easy striking distance of the Strait of Gibraltar.⁴ Portugal thus was shown to be still faithful to the ancient alliance, and the fires which the astute Hoyningen-Huene had so carefully fanned were put out.

None of the small powers in Europe is more desirous of peace than Portugal. Consequently, when Munich seemed to have

⁴ A. Randall Elliott: "Portugal: Bewildered Neutral." *Foreign Policy Reports*, December 15, 1941, p. 235.

averted a great danger of war the rejoicing in Lisbon had none of the artificial character which had greeted the fall of the Spanish Republic. Chamberlain became the hero of the day. It was proposed to erect a statue of him in Lisbon, and a street was named in his honor. Few recognized the hollowness of the "victory" for "peace in our time."

The consequent disillusionment when Hitler entered Prague in the spring of 1939 was nowhere more bitter than in Portugal. War was now almost sure. When it actually arrived, Portugal could only try once again, as she had done so often in the past, to preserve an uneasy and benevolent neutrality under the ægis of her ancient alliance with the only power which might keep open the highways of the sea. At the same time, as an obvious form of insurance, Cunha-Leal's suggestion was put into effect, and Portugal sought additional safety through a treaty of non-aggression with her Hispanic neighbor. In an able and important speech on May 22, 1939, Dr. Salazar hailed the victory of Franco, pointed to the amount of assistance Portugal had given to him, and reaffirmed the Anglo-Portuguese alliance as the cornerstone of Portuguese foreign policy.⁵ Spain, Britain, and safety! Such was the program. It sounds somewhat artificial and over-optimistic. Only time can tell whether Salazar was wrong or whether he in truth had found the magic formula.

IV

The actual outbreak of war in September 1939 had an effect on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance curiously similar to its effect on the Monroe Doctrine. Both policies were strengthened, both were modified and both also were put in danger. In the case of Catholic Portugal, as among the dominant groups in Latin America, the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 23, 1939, made easy a clear affirmation of sympathy for the allied cause. Within a few days of the outbreak of the war, leading papers in Lisbon took sharp issue with the philosophy which advocates the use of military power to secure "living space" and racial supremacy. Both Dr. Salazar and his chief friend and adviser, the able and charming primate of the Portuguese church, Cardinal Cerejeira, publicly underlined this point of view and put renewed emphasis on the necessity for international law and morality.

⁵ Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional, "The Present Position of Portugal: Documents Relating to Portugal's Imperial and Foreign Policy." Lisbon: Oficina Gráfica, 1940, p. 25-34.

The fall of France in June 1940 and the terrible threat to England in the months which followed produced, perhaps for the first time in history, a serious doubt in Portugal as to whether England could still protect her as in the past. Rumors spread that the next step in the Nazi program would be an invasion of Spain. In that case there could be no doubt about Portugal's fate. References to the alliance with Britain disappeared from the press. Though Portugal remained neutral, her neutrality was now an uneasy balance between conflicting forces.

It was stated publicly at this time that in case the country were invaded the Portuguese Government would withdraw to Angola, just as long ago, under similar circumstances, Dona Maria and the regent João VI had reestablished the throne of Portugal in distant Brazil. Meanwhile a special commissioner was sent hurriedly from Lisbon to Berlin. Many thought it was already too late, but though the results of the mission are not publicly known, it apparently brought some measure of reassurance. In any case, Portugal's neutrality was preserved and Lisbon became beleaguered Europe's last gateway, as well as an important listening post for all of the belligerents.

On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt strengthened the position of Portugal by pointing out, in no uncertain terms, the strategic importance of the Azores and the Cape Verde islands. The United States could not tolerate the seizure of the islands by the Germans, he said, and added: "It would be suicide to wait until they are in our front yard."⁶ In reply to this warning Portugal protested that she would do what she could to defend her empire. The State Department, for its part, assured Portugal that the United States "harbors no aggressive intentions against the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Portugal."⁷

Portugal obviously still felt herself in a dangerous position, however, and seems to have considered a possible substitute for the alliance with Britain. Brazil had taken a leading part in the celebration of the anniversary of Portuguese independence in 1940, and the next year Lisbon sent two special missions to Rio de Janeiro. A member of one of these missions, João do Amaral, gave out a statement in August 1941 asking joint protection of the Portuguese islands by the United States and Brazil. In case any foreign occupation became necessary, the great Portuguese-

⁶ *New York Times*, May 28, 1941.

⁷ *Department of State Bulletin*, June 14, 1941, p. 718.

speaking country of Brazil would be the natural heir of Portugal's imperial responsibilities.⁸ The suggestion was unofficial, but it was received in Brazil with some marks of approval and it might yet become important if the sea power of Great Britain should prove inadequate for its far-flung tasks. In the meantime, by achieving a balance of power among strong rivals, Portugal still retains both her neutrality and her empire.

There are many indications that the fundamentals of Portuguese foreign policy remain substantially unchanged today. Despite the Portuguese fear of Communism, the press did not adopt an especially unfriendly tone when Russia was brought into the war by the German invasion in June 1941, and it gave the Russian communiqués equal prominence with those of other belligerents. When the United States entered the war on December 8, 1941, the Portuguese newspapers expressed the opinion that this event enormously increased the likelihood of an allied victory and that it gave renewed vitality to the Portuguese alliance with Britain. When Britain asked permission to occupy Timor in order to prevent a Japanese landing, Portugal could hardly do otherwise than give a qualified refusal. But when, after fruitless negotiations, news of the British occupation arrived on December 17, 1941, Dr. Salazar's report to Parliament was singularly mild and referred to Portugal as not only neutral but as Britain's "friend" and "ally."⁹ When the Japanese seized the island, the wisdom of a reply which left the ancient alliance intact became evident.

From all this it seems as certain as anything can be in the shifting kaleidoscope of international affairs that, at least until another and so far unforeseeable substitute is found, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance will continue to be supported by both countries in its present form — definite for one party, somewhat vague but nevertheless binding for the other. As on many occasions in the past, so again today Britain's policy arouses some bitterness and discontent in Portugal, and prophecies are to be heard that the centuries of British influence in the affairs of her oldest ally are nearing their term. But the common interests of the two nations still continue in spite of deep and obvious differences of race, language, culture and ideals. In consequence, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance seems also likely to continue as the most persistent factor in the international relationships of modern times.

⁸ *Christian Science Monitor*, September 5, 1941.

⁹ "The Case of Timor," in *Portugal*, December 1941.

THE ILO: PRESENT FUNCTIONS AND FUTURE TASKS

By Karl Pribram

ALMOST everywhere in Europe, and in some of the countries of Asia, the position of labor has changed radically since the International Labor Organization was created after the First World War. The ideas dominant at that time will therefore have to be carefully reconsidered when, following the present conflict, the United Nations turn to the task of reorganizing the structure of the ILO and determining its future functions.

From the outset the policy of the ILO was strongly influenced by what might be called the philosophy of "evolutionary" Socialism. In terms of this philosophy, organized labor, as represented by the powerful trade unions, was charged with the task of defending — and possibly enforcing, by means of strikes and otherwise — the claims of the working class to better working conditions and an increasingly larger share in the social dividend. The ILO was thought of as an instrument for promoting social peace by assisting labor to win this fight. The assumption was that, in principle, the interests of labor were identical in all countries. It was further assumed that an international labor front existed and that it could serve as a bulwark against the aggressive policies of nationalistic political parties. This united front was formally represented by the International Federation of Trade Unions, with headquarters in Amsterdam. In practice, the Amsterdam federation largely determined the policy of the ILO.

Another assumption was that the interests of the employers were strongly influenced by international relationships. It was argued that substantial and continuous progress in the improvement of labor standards might be frustrated without the enactment of collective agreements under which the costs of such improvements were imposed upon all competitors for international markets. In practice, as employers' representatives participated regularly in the work of the International Labor Organization, a kind of united front of employers developed as a counterweight to the international labor front. Where conflicting views developed, the governments were assigned the task of influencing the discussions and decisions in accordance with the general interests of their respective countries.

The validity of these assumptions must now be reconsidered. The war has considerably affected the ILO's external structure; it has also modified deeply the social and economic conditions under which it must function.

II

The General Conference of the ILO held in New York in the fall of 1941 was a remarkable demonstration of the organization's inherent strength and vitality and of the fact that in the democratic countries the war has not impaired faith in social progress and in the promotion of it through international coöperation. But in spite of the coöperative spirit which animated the Conference, there was evidence that the international labor front which had been the backbone of the ILO had been destroyed by the ruthless suppression of the trade union movement in all the countries dominated by extreme nationalistic parties or subjugated by totalitarian conquerors. The international trade union movement seems to have lost its rallying-point and, along with it, its cohesive strength. The labor organizations which exist today pursue separate policies determined by local conditions. Several groups, however, can be distinguished.

One group is formed by the strong trade unions of the British Commonwealth. These trade unions are intent primarily upon doing their part in the great task of winning the war. Where necessary, they have temporarily subordinated specific interests of the working class to the accomplishment of this task. At the Conference, the delegates of British workers as well as of employers solemnly confirmed their respective intentions to work together, fully and unequivocally, until victory has been achieved. The social structure of Great Britain appears to be undergoing far-reaching changes under the impact of war and as a result the present views of the British trade unions on reconstruction and the postwar position of the working class seem rather vague. They seem to be influenced almost exclusively by the particular British situation and very little by international considerations. In the British Dominions and India the labor organizations are preoccupied to an even greater degree with their own specific problems. All the British trade unions are undoubtedly willing to participate in international action; but they can hardly be expected to assume constructive leadership in this field.

A second section of the trade union movement consists of the

workers' organizations in the Latin American countries. Many of these still do not enjoy the right of free association or are controlled by political parties. They are fighting for recognition, in some cases even for existence. They, therefore, are not yet in a position to establish and maintain effective international relationships. The encouragement and strengthening of these trade unions may in the future be one of the important tasks of the International Labor Organization. At present, they are incapable of assuming international leadership.

The trade unions of the United States form a class by themselves. They are absorbed by their own problems, specifically by those arising out of the rivalry between two conflicting groups of almost equal strength. More or less effective coöperation between these groups has been established for the duration of the war; but the respective leaders do not appear to be willing to give much consideration to the international aspects of social problems in devising their policies.

We must also take into consideration the trade union leaders of countries conquered by Germany. Many of these have found refuge in England or in the United States, and some of them were appointed as workers' delegates to the New York Conference by the governments-in-exile of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia. They made impressive speeches at the Conference, demanding effective action to liberate their unfortunate countries. But as things are, of course, they are in no position to assume leadership.

As for the International Federation of Trade Unions, its power had begun to be gradually whittled away from the moment one government after another, beginning with that of Italy, was seized by extreme nationalistic parties. To the extent that trade unions were tolerated at all they were either rigidly controlled by the public authorities and deprived of the right to join international associations or, as in Italy, were made constituent elements of the administrative machinery. This process, which reached a climax in the destruction of the German trade unions, seemed to indicate that the ideas which had been instrumental in creating, spreading and strengthening the trade union movement on the continent of Europe had slowly lost their hold on the working class. The trade unions had been transformed from organizations designed originally to unite the workers for an impending fight over radical changes in the capitalist order into peaceful instru-

ments of collective bargaining equipped with large and frequently cumbersome bureaucratic machinery. What they had gained in size and financial resources they had lost in vigor; thus they lacked sufficient power of resistance when they were attacked by aggressive nationalist parties.

Can it be assumed that the old trade union movement will be revived in these European countries after having experienced such a crushing defeat and after having been suppressed entirely for many years? Can the principles of an evolutionary trade union policy find renewed allegiance from the generality of European workers, most of whom have been so bitterly disillusioned? Is it not more probable that when the moment for overthrowing the totalitarian régimes comes, the working class, at any rate in Germany and Italy, will be gripped by extremist revolutionary movements? In that case, the reestablishment of freedom of association and other democratic institutions in the countries in question might be impossible for a considerable period of time. Workers' organizations might still be kept under strict government control and might be prevented from entering into relation with similar organizations in other countries. There is a very intricate situation in France, where both the Communist labor groups and the leaders of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* share responsibility in the eyes of the public for the weakening of French economic and military power which contributed so largely to the French defeat.

On the other hand, the traditional trade union movement may be revived, perhaps under new leaders, in the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps in Belgium. But it is doubtful whether a strong and efficient international federation could develop out of the combined efforts of organizations representing such a small number of countries; and their activities might in any case be hampered by the emergence of rival unions of various types.

If, as will probably be the case, the ILO admits all states regardless of their constitutional forms of government, the organization may be subjected to a heavy strain. The present tripartite method of representation could hardly be maintained if the representatives of employers and workers from a considerable number of countries were deprived of freedom of action by their governments.

There is little prospect, then, that during the war or even for a

considerable period after it, any strong group of trade unions will emerge, able and willing to determine the policy of the International Labor Office. Nor can the Office expect effective backing if it evolves a strong policy of its own. We must take account of the probability that for some time after the war no united international labor front can be established comparable in strength to that which the Amsterdam Federation represented in the heyday of European trade unionism.

III

If the trade union movement is unlikely to supply effective international leadership, the International Labor Office will have to turn for guidance and backing to the democratic governments, and especially to those of Great Britain and the United States. This may not be an undesirable temporary solution of the problem, even though it is very different from the intentions of those originally responsible for the creation of the International Labor Organization and its administrative agency, the International Labor Office. Unlike the Secretariat of the League of Nations, the Labor Office was not intended to be guided in its policy by powerful governments. Rather it was meant to stand for the cause of labor and of progressive social legislation even in the face of resistance or reluctance on the part of governments. But no statutory provisions can safeguard the distribution of power within an international organization. In the postwar period, workers' organizations may be destined to exert their influence upon the policy of the International Labor Organization and the Labor Office indirectly, through their governments, rather than directly, through a united international labor front. But labor, at least in the democratic countries, will doubtless be more influential than ever in the determination of public policies, particularly in the economic and social fields. What is perhaps even more important, public opinion in all countries, democratic and totalitarian alike, is demanding a greater degree of economic security than heretofore, and as part of this a far-reaching improvement in the labor standards and living conditions of the working class.

Hence, if social progress on an international scale is to be achieved in accordance with democratic principles, new methods of social action will be required to meet the exigencies of the postwar situation. The traditional method has been mainly to establish standards of labor legislation, which then shall be

adhered to by all states, or at least by the industrialized states whose manufactured products compete in international markets. Observance of those standards has been relaxed for the duration of the war; but in democratic and highly industrialized countries like the United States, Great Britain and the British Dominions they probably will be restored when peace comes. In the totalitarian countries, however, and now in the countries conquered or controlled by Germany, not only are these standards being disregarded, but it is doubtful when, and with what modifications, they will again become applicable. The prospects of any higher standards being adopted there are correspondingly remote.

Obviously, any consideration of alternative methods implies abandoning the traditional assumption that a clear distinction can be drawn between social legislation in the strict sense of the word — legislation adapted to the specific interests of labor — and legislation of other types designed to serve the economic interests of the community as a whole. The validity of this assumption has been questioned repeatedly by the International Labor Office, on the ground that there are many purely economic questions which assume specific aspects when examined from the point of view of the working class. For this reason the Labor Office has insisted, time and again, upon being given an appropriate rôle in the international discussion of such economic problems. This issue will become still more significant when, with the defeat of the Axis Powers, the moment comes for concerted international action for the political and economic reconstruction of the world. The New York Conference, which was attended by delegates from more than thirty nations, clearly realized the gigantic social tasks involved.

IV

In its external arrangements this Conference followed pretty closely the traditional Geneva pattern of assemblies composed of representatives of governments, employers and labor. In other respects, however, it was significantly different from its predecessors. It was not a regular annual session of the Organization and consequently did not consider the adoption of draft conventions or recommendations.

The special aim of the Conference was to renew contact between the International Labor Organization on the one hand and the various government, workers' and employers' groups on the

other. The two items on the agenda of the Conference were particularly adapted to this purpose. One was the report submitted by Edward J. Phelan, Acting Director of the International Labor Organization, which will be referred to in a moment. The second was a consideration of methods of collaboration between public authorities and organizations of workers and employers. This problem had been on the agenda of the Conference which was to have met in Geneva in June 1940, but which because of the war was never held.

The Conference insisted upon the need for effective collaboration among the three elements represented in the ILO as an indispensable factor in the economic and social reconstruction of the world. It declared collaboration of this kind to be impossible unless freedom of association of workers and employers was guaranteed within the framework of democratic political institutions, while recognizing, however, that the methods of collaboration might vary from country to country according to national experience. The Governing Body was asked to take the necessary steps to secure for the Organization its proper place in the preparation and execution of reconstruction plans. Another resolution endorsed the economic, social and political principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter and pledged the Organization's full coöperation in carrying them into effect. The Organization considers that it is particularly fitted to help in such tasks as feeding needy peoples, reconstructing devastated countries, restoring economic activity, reopening trade outlets, resettling workers and their families, changing industry over to a peace-time status, maintaining employment and raising living standards throughout the world.

The rôle of the Organization in world reconstruction was discussed in greater detail, but in more cautious terms, in Mr. Phelan's report, mentioned above. On the basis of nearly 20 years of experience, the Acting Director drew the conclusion that labor legislation "in the old narrow sense" is only a partial remedy for the social evils which the ILO was created to combat. Since conditions no longer exist in which it could be hoped that adequate economic standards would be provided for all members of the community "by the interplay of blind economic forces," self-preservation dictates that national and international policy be directed deliberately to that end. In terms of this economic philosophy a "social mandate" was claimed for the ILO. If

granted, this "would constitute a general declaration of international social policy and give the Organization a program to implement." This new social policy would be directed toward promoting economic planning on a national and international scale and toward increasing governmental interference with the operation of economic forces. Some of the methods to be applied were indicated and the items to be included in the "social mandate" were tentatively enumerated and analyzed.

These items can be divided into several groups. The first would include propositions which are covered by the traditional concept of social measures to be accomplished through social legislation and administration in the strict sense of the terms. Among them are such matters as the improvement of social insurance systems and the extension of such systems to social risks of all types; operation of minimum wage requirements for those too weak to secure proper wage levels for themselves; measures to secure generally improved conditions of work; measures to promote better nutrition, to provide adequate housing and to supply facilities for recreation and culture. It remains to be seen, of course, to what extent the Organization will be able to contribute directly to the achievement of these objectives. Social unrest might delay the reestablishment of peacetime conditions; the necessity for resettling the victims of ruthless nationalistic policies might also be an important factor in delaying the process of readjustment.

The list included another group of items which could be put into effect only if the existing economic order were considerably modified. In this category belong such proposals as the elimination of unemployment, the institution of wage policies aimed at securing a just share of the fruits of industry for the worker, and greater equality of occupational opportunities. It remains to be seen whether the economic changes involved can be brought about by international action or whether they must be dealt with within the scope of national economic policy. But the report seems somewhat overoptimistic in its declaration that, faced with the task of eliminating cyclical unemployment, "statesmen can now see their problem with sufficient clarity and can work out a constructive policy not on this or that vague theory or doctrine but on knowledge and experience greatly exceeding that heretofore available." Only one type of knowledge is reliable: that which is based on a theoretical understanding of the causal

relationships of the phenomena under observation. The problem of how to eliminate unemployment is yet to be solved.

Mr. Phelan's report contains, finally, two proposals in a field where concerted international action can really be expected to produce results. They contemplate the adoption of an international works policy for the development of world resources, and the organization of migration for employment and settlement under adequate guarantees. Any attempt to carry out these tasks must obviously wait upon the establishment of comprehensive international machinery and, to be successful, would require the coöperation of the various governments. Representatives of workers and employers could assist in an advisory capacity. The relation of the International Labor Office to this machinery would have to be defined more clearly than is possible under present circumstances. An international works policy, as understood by the report, would mean not simply the adoption of measures of the work relief type, but the coördination of national efforts to remedy the economic dislocations brought about by the war. In a broader view, it would also include the international planning and execution of public works programs as a means of mitigating the effects of prolonged and recurrent world-wide depressions. This kind of international works policy would tend to establish or promote secular economic trends. International colonization schemes belong in the same sphere.

In connection with the "social mandate" claimed for the International Labor Organization, the report raises a further question. In the case of large industries the development and prosperity of which depend largely upon the behavior of world markets and international trade relationships, should not international action be taken to coördinate their national sectors? Such coördination, it was argued, is prerequisite to any attempt to secure lasting improvement of the economic and social conditions of the workers employed in those industries. Agriculture, the mercantile marine and the textile industry were mentioned as fields of economic activity in which some work of this kind has already been attempted by committees of the Organization.

These discussions emphasize the need for redefining the functions of the ILO. Under pressure of wartime developments, both political and economic, the Organization has outgrown its original statutory limitations. The Versailles Treaty assigned tasks primarily in the sphere of political international relations to the

League of Nations. The International Labor Organization, loosely connected with the League, was restricted to promoting social progress. This restriction was based on the erroneous assumption that such progress depends exclusively or primarily upon the adoption of legislative and administrative measures of specific types, measures which can be clearly distinguished and segregated from those covered by the broad concept of economic policy. The mistake grew out of the demarkation of the functions of labor ministries or departments of labor in various countries. It was overlooked that such agencies form integrated parts of fully organized government machines which are directed by unified policies. No such machinery was created in the international field, nor were provisions made for coördinating international economic and social policies. The need for international standards of economic policy has by now been fully recognized and an attempt to set them up will have to be made. A first step in this direction was taken at a recent meeting in London of members of the Governing Body of the ILO. A special advisory commission will be nominated to study the measures essential to the attainment of full employment and a rising standard of living.

v

To sum up. The social and economic conditions of the world have changed, and many of the original assumptions upon which the guiding philosophy of the ILO was based are no longer valid. Its structure and functions, therefore, seem almost sure to be different in the future from what they were in the period between the two great wars. Its primary mission emphatically will not be to establish new international standards of labor legislation. The concerted international action which will be necessary to improve the economic and social conditions of the working class in countries which have suffered heavily from the war will be in the field of administration rather than legislation. Large-scale public works programs and resettlement and colonization schemes are examples. Such projects might be initiated by the General Conferences of the ILO; but the tasks of planning them in detail and supervising them in operation would fall upon the administrative agency of the Organization, the International Labor Office. The necessary changes in the structure of the Office and its methods of work might well receive preparatory study now.

THE NAZIS IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE

By Maurice P. Zuber

THE French Government at Vichy did not have the power to prevent the German Government from virtually annexing Alsace and Lorraine. Without even going through the pretense of organizing a plebiscite, without waiting for a peace treaty to decide, the Germans, with their usual contempt for the rights either of individuals or peoples, have proceeded to the forcible Nazification of those two French territories. Alsace, a fertile plain with varied crops and important industries, has become part of the German province of Baden, administered by Gauleiter Robert Wagner. Lorraine, an agricultural land which also contains some of the richest iron mines in Europe, is joined to Sarre-Palatinat under the rule of Gauleiter J. Buerckel.

Few Americans know Alsace and fewer still Lorraine. Those who have visited there may have found it hard to differentiate these French provinces from adjacent German provinces. They might incline to adopt the German point of view that they are German-speaking and German-populated areas and belong naturally to the Reich. A closer study will lead to a very different conclusion. As to race, which in any question touching the Nazis cannot be overlooked, the majority of the population in both provinces is Celtic, of the Alpine group, short-headed with dark hair. They speak a dialect derived from German, like the Dutch and Flemish languages and the dialect of northern Switzerland. Like those, their dialect (especially in Lorraine) is unintelligible to Germans.

The Alsatians became officially French as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Books could be filled with evidences of their French patriotism. It was in Strasbourg that the glorious "Marseillaise" was composed. Alsace and Lorraine gave the French Revolution three of its best generals — Kellermann, who won the battle of Valmy, the Marne of 1792, Kleber, the hero of Fleurus and of the campaign of Egypt, and Ney, the "bravest of the brave." Another general of the Napoleonic wars, General Foy, said a few years later: "If ever the love of all that is great and generous were to fade in the heart of the inhabitants of the old France, they should get across the Vosges and come to Alsace to learn again the meaning of patriotism and national fervor." These words sound now almost like a prophecy.

When the two provinces were annexed by Germany in 1871, their inhabitants uttered, through their representatives at the Assemblée Nationale in Bordeaux, a celebrated protest which ended as follows: "We proclaim forever inviolable the right of the Alsatians and Lorrainers to remain part of the French nation and we pledge ourselves as well as our constituents, our children and their descendants, to claim it eternally, by every means, and against all usurpers."

Now Alsace and Lorraine are again under German rule. This time, though, it is not only the Prussians but the Nazis that they have to face. Today the old methods of denationalization are used, but they are pushed to the limit by icy Nazi logic. The process goes on constantly through propaganda in the newspapers, over the radio and at mass meetings for the "recovered brethren," by parades, by spying and betrayals, by persecutions, and by suppression of every

detail that is French or might convey any French idea or memory. None of this is new, nor is it likely to impress the Alsatians and Lorrainers, in spite of the fact that it is more efficiently conducted than it was after 1871. The people of these provinces know better than any other Frenchmen how to cope with it.

In addition, the Nazis have worked out two new approaches to the problem of Germanization that make their rule over their unfortunate victims both more hypocritical and more stringent.

First, they start with the idea that the Alsatians and Lorrainers *are* Germans, loyal subjects of the Führer. Consequently they are free to enter all party organizations, to salute in the Nazi manner, to join the Wehrmacht, to receive instruction in Germany. They are expected to show their appreciation of their liberty, of the honor that is bestowed on them; they must be proud and enthusiastic citizens. They are told that they are even free not to make use of these liberal privileges; but no attempt is made to conceal the fact that things might become unpleasant for them should they not use their liberty properly. Never has the word freedom been employed more lavishly than at the beginning of the German occupation: everything the Alsatians and the Lorrainers were required to do — attendance at meetings, registrations, and so forth — was always done *freiwillig*. That meaningless word, however, is now disappearing as the resistance of the people grows.

In the second place, the Nazi leaders attach the greatest importance to what is done in Alsace and Lorraine, as they want it to have a demonstrative value. These two provinces are considered as a new field of experimentation, as a pure German land in which, unlike Austria, no Nazi movement existed before the occupation. On this ideal foundation is to be raised a perfect Nazi structure, a more perfect one than in the Reich itself where too much opposition still exists. The borderline between Germany and Alsace is strictly guarded, lest German minds not yet wholly converted to the new order be disturbed by the drastic methods employed in Alsace.

Let us now examine in more detail the ruthless and thorough German procedure used in Alsace and Lorraine since June 1940, and the resistance which it has provoked.

As soon as the Germans arrived they tried to eliminate all elements of the population which they considered unfit to be assimilated. The Jews were expelled first, of course; the French not born in Alsace and Lorraine went next, as well as the religious orders, and the entire civil administration, except lesser employes. Then, during the following months, train after train arrived in unoccupied France packed with Alsatians from the Bruche and Orbe valleys, where nothing but French is spoken, and with Lorrainers from the southern and western parts of that province. Whole villages were thus emptied. The inhabitants were forced to leave, on an hour's notice, their houses, their land (which had often remained in the same family since the Middle Ages), their machines, their cattle. They were given the choice of being transported to Poland with their possessions or being sent penniless to unoccupied France. Their farms were taken over by Germans from the Baltic area and Bessarabia.

These mass expulsions have stopped since the summer of 1941, as the labor shortage has become acute in the Reich. Individual expulsions, however, have never stopped, though the Germans have attempted lately to avoid this squandering of man-power by making wider use of forced labor and the con-

centration camp. Expulsion is one of the penalties incurred by the sin of attachment to France, even though it may have been expressed as long ago as before the First World War. The process hardly varies. One morning at dawn, without the least warning, an agent of the Gestapo, followed by soldiers or policemen, appears at the victim's door and gives him 30 to 45 minutes' notice to leave his home, his family, his job. Keys, check books, bank books, all valuables are confiscated, with the exception of 5,000 francs, plus 2,500 francs for each child, a valise of clothes, a watch, the rings that are usually worn. A policeman follows the victim step by step during the last preparations to see to it that he keeps only what is allowed. When the half hour is up, he is shoved into a military truck and herded to a sort of clearing station where he is locked up for four or five days, sleeping on a straw bed and receiving insufficient food and drink. There he waits with hundreds of others for a train to take him to unoccupied France. In the meantime, his office or farm will already have its new German proprietor, and his house, sealed up after his departure, will shortly be sold at auction together with its contents.

Innumerable opponents of the Nazi régime have been expelled in this way, without regard to social rank, physical condition or age — the Catholic bishops of Strasbourg and Metz; women the day after childbirth; families whose head was working in Germany or was away for a few days and found on his return an empty home; even men and women 70 or 80 years old, and sick people and wounded. Though no complete figures are available, the Germans themselves acknowledge that at least 70,000 Lorrainers and more than 100,000 Alsatians have been deported to unoccupied France. This does not include the great number of those who fled without waiting to be expelled.

All reminders of France, every object that carries a French meaning, is sought after with the utmost care. The French language is, of course, banished from the schools and from all public places; it is forbidden to speak French at home or to listen to the British, Swiss or even to the German-controlled Paris radio. French names of cities, villages, streets and shops, French inscriptions on the tombs in the cemeteries must be Germanized. Monuments to the dead of the wars of 1870 and 1914-18 are removed or blown up. Family names and Christian names that sound French must be translated into German or changed; the police stations have lists of good German names from which the Alsatians may choose. The book shops cannot sell any more French books, and even private libraries have to be cleared of everything in that language, not excepting Bibles, prayer books, cook books, postal cards and photographs. Private collections of valuable books are confiscated and taken to Germany or simply thrown out in the streets to make bonfires.

Religion has always been an important factor in Alsace and Lorraine, some regions having a Catholic majority, others being predominantly Lutheran or Calvinist. The clergy of Alsace and Lorraine were well informed of the religious persecutions on the other side of the Rhine, and they took a very definite attitude from the beginning of the occupation. The Nazis were equally quick to strike back: the Catholic Bishops Ruch, of Strasbourg, and Heinz, of Metz, and their coadjutors were declared *unerwünscht* (undesirable) and expelled with a large number of curates and Protestant pastors. All seminaries were closed. The Protestant Faculty of Theology of Strasbourg had to move to Clermont-Ferrand in unoccupied France, the religious orders were driven out

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and their estates confiscated, the monastery for women at Saint-Odile, traditional sanctuary of the patron saint of Alsace, celebrated by Goethe, Taine and Barrès, was closed and its old walls of pink sandstone, which command a view of the whole plain of Alsace, are used as a school for German youth (*Hochburg Deutscher Jugendbewegung*). A Nazi attends every church service to take down the names of those present, especially of the civil servants, and to watch the preacher.

The main hope of the Führer lies with the young people. Religious teaching at school has become a lesson on "Mein Kampf," which literally replaces the Gospel. The catechism has been succeeded by that unbelievable parody which is called the Hitlerian catechism. Children are taught, before going to bed, to examine their consciences as follows: "My Führer, have I lived today in thy spirit, thou to whom we owe everything?" Here is the burden of a song taught in the schools in Alsace:

*Wir wollen nicht mehr Christen sein,
Denn Jesus ist ein Juden Schwein.¹*

To succeed in this campaign, the Nazis must keep the children away from the churches and from their families. Compulsory meetings and moving pictures are scheduled at the usual time of the church services, particularly on Sunday mornings. Family life is reduced to a minimum, as the children come home only for meals or to go to bed. Nearly every evening is taken up by some gathering of the *Hitler Jugend* or of the *Bund Deutscher Mädel*, both Party organizations that the children have to join. The child comes home late or may stay away all night, and the parents have nothing to say: the Party, they are told, is henceforth "the defender of the children against the tyranny of their parents."

The technique of Nazification goes still further. If bribery and lies do not destroy the moral conscience which is the backbone of resistance, the Nazis attempt to do it by playing on human failings such as ambition and vanity and, last but not least, sensuality. Full liberty of sexual intercourse is taught both in the schools and in the youth organizations. The girls learn that it is a duty "to give a son to the Führer" when they are 18 years old and an honor to do so when they are 13 or 14. Girls and boys are thrown together on all possible occasions, and girls are informed that the Party will take entire care of any child they may have from the moment of its birth. In the Parish of Mulhouse-Dornach, in May 1941, 12 girls preparing for confirmation were pregnant; so were 20 other girls out of 50 in the same city who came back from a Nazi vacation camp in the Tyrol.

The means of propaganda among adults are inexhaustible. It is practically impossible for a citizen of a free nation to realize what it is like to live in a country where everything — newspaper, radio, posters, speeches, contacts with the administration, economic and financial regulations — is directed towards the same end; where one breathes and eats completely one-sided and perfectly coördinated propaganda. This propaganda, furthermore, is backed by severe penalties. As the German saying goes: "Willst du nicht mein Bruder sein, So hau'ich dir den Schädel ein" ("If you don't want to be my brother, then I'll smash your head"). Heavy fines, prison or hard labor, concentration

¹"We will no longer be Christians, for Jesus is a Jewish swine."

camp, transportation into Central Europe, not to mention capital punishment, are decreed for any resistance. And undoubtedly certain minds, though honest, can be taken in. The technique of conversion is illustrated by this authentic example. In a village in the south of Alsace the mayor's assistant was a builder, an intelligent and honorable man and a loyal French citizen. The Germans on their arrival offered him the post of *Stadtkommissar*. He would just have to join the Party, they said, and make a few speeches. He rejected the idea at first, but soon discovered that he really had little choice; finally he gave in. The following morning he found a huge swastika nailed on his door to indicate his new position. He was called to Party meetings every evening; speeches were passed on to him to read to his fellow-citizens from a platform on which he stood between two armed Brownshirts. He was soon ostracized by the people of his village, even by his own family, and his growing isolation left him more and more at the mercy of the relentless Nazi pressure. The time came eventually when he himself no longer knew exactly where he stood.

There is one aspect of the present state of affairs in Alsace and Lorraine, however, which can hardly be used for propaganda. It is the economic and financial situation. In spite of the magnificent promises of the Nazis during the early part of the occupation, the absorption of the provinces by the Reich has brought general impoverishment rather than prosperity. The Germans have seized all important business firms, first the banks which were absorbed by the Deutsche Bank and the banks of Baden, then the insurance companies, and now gradually all the industries. At the same time, the reichsmark was introduced as the only legal tender at the disastrous rate of 20 francs to the mark. (In 1918 the French had reintroduced the franc at the rate of 1.25 to the mark, even though the latter was already worth only a few centimes.) A rapid inflation of prices ensued, spurred by a rise of 80 percent in wages. This policy of high wages, intended to bring working-class support to the new régime, only made worse the difficult situation of industry and trade, which already were suffering from the requisitioning of raw materials, the lack of fuel and the transportation difficulties. The result was growing unemployment which made it possible to send many excellent workers to Germany. As early as December 1940, it was estimated that 20 percent of the industrial workers of Alsace had thus been forced into German factories; those who refused to go were denied unemployment allowances. Nor have the peasants been spared. Under the pretense of encouraging the Alsatian wine-growers to produce only high-quality wines, for instance, the Germans forced them to uproot a considerable proportion of their vineyards, thus doing away with any future competition that might threaten the German wine-growers of the Moselle.

Unlike certain occupied countries which were sometimes taken in for a time by the discipline and "correct behavior" of the German troops, Alsace and Lorraine showed, from the beginning, the most stubborn hostility. This contrasted markedly with the invaders' verbal tenderness for their "recovered brethren." Fifty years' experience of colonization had taught them that nothing good could come to them from the Germans. With a few exceptions, the only inhabitants who coöperate actively with the new régime are Germans who stayed on after 1918, became naturalized French citizens and then organized the fifth column in these provinces. The original hostile feeling of an overwhelming majority of the population has now grown into active hatred, as the

military occupation has been replaced by a civil administration, the Party organizations and the Gestapo.

Resistance shows itself in sabotage, in the penetration of Hitlerian organizations by patriot representatives, and in a variety of individual and collective manifestations. At Ribeauville, in Saverne, for instance, Nazi standards fixed to the ruins of the old chateau were repeatedly torn down and replaced during the night by French emblems. Propaganda posters are always torn down. A snatch of the "Marseillaise" is suddenly heard in moving picture theatres or whistled at night in front of the Party meeting-places. Numerous boys and girls cross over to unoccupied France rather than go to work in Germany, although the trip is dangerous and their parents face concentration camps and even deportation by way of retaliation (8,000 Lorrainers were sent to Poland for this reason last June). The students of the University of Strasbourg, who have to continue their studies at Heidelberg or at Freiburg-im-Breisgau, take advantage of every opportunity to proclaim their convictions; though closely watched by young Nazis, they have formed groups of passive resisters. They can choose their own subjects for lectures in diction classes, and they never miss a chance to exalt France, freedom, the fight for independence. The books, alive with patriotic ardor, which Clausewitz and von der Goltz wrote after the conquest of Prussia in 1806 are used for ingenious paraphrases. Spiritual resistance centers around the churches; they were never so full.

These notes on the present situation of Alsace and Lorraine may conclude with a quotation from an address presented to Marshal Pétain and signed by 456 officers of the French Army, liberated from prison camps in Germany, who crossed Alsace on their way back to unoccupied France in the autumn of 1941:

"The undersigned officers, veterans of the war of 1914-18, prisoners of war in Germany, coming back from captivity, consider it a duty to tell Marshal Pétain, Chief of the French State, how moved they were by the enthusiastic and wholly spontaneous ovation they received from the population of Alsace on August 15, 1941, while they were on their way from Haguenau to Belfort via Strasbourg and Mulhouse. During the entire trip, across fields and through villages and towns, our train was acclaimed from as far as the French uniforms could be recognized. We saw thousands of women in tears, men standing at attention and saluting, girls blowing kisses to us and crying: 'Long live France!' . . . All the population of Alsace from north to south thus showed forth, in most touching words and deeds, and with bold courage, its love and faithfulness to France."

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1938. Volume I. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, ASSISTED BY V. M. BOULTER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 735 p. \$9.00.

This latest annual addition to an indispensable survey, prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, deals with the important economic and political events of 1938 except for the German-Czech crisis; that is to be covered in Volume II.

GLIMPSES OF WORLD HISTORY. By JAWAHARLAL NEHRU. New York: Day, 1942, 993 p. \$4.00.

This remarkable book consists of letters written during one of Nehru's periods of imprisonment. Relying almost wholly on his memory, he gave his young daughter, to whom these letters were sent, a three-year course in world history. The work is interesting as an Oriental interpretation of man's progress.

FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN WORLD SOCIETY. By LINDEN A. MANDER. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1941, 910 p. \$4.25.

A comprehensive, factual survey intended primarily for students.

THE GOOD INHERITANCE: THE DEMOCRATIC CHANCE. By NORMAN COUSINS. New York: Coward-McCann, 1942, 318 p. \$3.00.

The trial and failure of democracy in Ancient Greece, and what that history has to teach us in our modern attempt to preserve popular government.

THE THEOLOGY OF POLITICS. By NATHANIEL MICKLEM. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 164 p. \$2.50.

An explanation of the Christian principles of government.

PROBLEMS OF MODERN GOVERNMENT. EDITED BY R. MACGREGOR DAWSON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1941, 124 p. \$2.00.

Seven essays by Canadian and American scholars.

THE PROBLEMS OF LASTING PEACE. By HERBERT HOOVER AND HUGH GIBSON. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 291 p. \$2.00.

One of the outstanding differences between this war and the First World War is the amount of speculation and planning about the peace settlement being carried on while the fighting is still in progress. The present work of the ex-President and a prominent career diplomat is symptomatic of this trend. The authors make no pretense at drawing up a detailed and definitive blueprint of the new world, being content rather to review, very summarily indeed, the path that has led us to where we are, to analyze the lessons we can draw from this experience, and to suggest broad principles and procedures for the coming peace settlement. They advocate that the latter be achieved in three consecutive stages, the first of which shall include general disarmament.

CONDITIONS OF PEACE. By EDWARD HALLETT CARR. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 282 p. \$2.50.

A broad-ranging analysis of the world's woes and a statement of some of the general

principles and techniques which the author believes must be applied in the postwar reconstruction period. Professor Carr's ideas may not obtain universal agreement but they should certainly arouse interest.

THE COMING AGE OF WORLD CONTROL. By NICHOLAS DOMAN. New York: Harper, 1942, 301 p. \$3.00.

This is both a diagnosis of our present discontents and a prescription for their alleviation. After the war Professor Doman wants to see established a universal system of democratic control in which individual states have surrendered their sovereignty. He is particularly insistent on an international police force.

THE BASES OF A WORLD COMMONWEALTH. By C. B. FAWCETT. London: Watts, 1941, 167 p. 7/6.

This is an interesting example of the national variations which the interpretation of geopolitics is taking. Professor Fawcett's book emphasizes the important strategic situation of the two great Anglo-Saxon Powers, and thus of the North Atlantic. "Union Now" finds small favor with him.

TOWARD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. By HOWARD ROBINSON AND OTHERS. New York: Harper, 1942, 218 p. \$2.00.

Eight lectures by as many experts, academic and otherwise, delivered at Oberlin College in 1941.

GEOPOLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR SPACE AND POWER. By ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPÉ. New York: Putnam, 1942, 274 p. \$2.75.

This book is a corrective to the not inconsiderable amount of nonsense that has been written about German geopolitics. Mr. Strauss-Hupé distinguishes between the nascent sub-science of political geography and the blueprint for German world domination which General Haushofer and his ilk have palmed off on the world as "geopolitics."

HOW MANY WORLD WARS? By MAURICE LÉON. New York: Dodd, 1942, 164 p. \$2.00.

Mr. Léon thinks that if in 1919 the American political leaders, including Wilson, had accepted Marshal Foch's proposal for the permanent occupation of the Rhineland and the Allied control of Germany's important industries, there would have been no Second World War. The moral drawn from this interpretation of history is of course that this mistake must not be repeated when Germany has been defeated again.

NEWTOKIA. By P. W. WILSON. New York: Scribner, 1941, 219 p. \$2.00.

Animadversions on "The World We Want" by a former M. P., more lately on the editorial staff of the *New York Times*.

DAYS OF DECISION. EDITED BY CHARLES MERZ. Garden City: Doubleday, 1941, 278 p. \$2.00.

Some fourscore farsighted editorials on the war appearing in the *New York Times* between September 1939 and September 1941, with a supplement up to December 12, 1941.

PROPAGANDA BY SHORT WAVE. EDITED BY HARWOOD L. CHILDS AND JOHN B. WHITTON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942, 355 p. \$3.75.

This fact-filled book consists of eight chapters by a number of specialists connected with the Princeton Listening Center. The papers deal with such questions as radio in international politics, atrocity propaganda, and the broadcasting activities of the British, French and Italian Governments.

THE STRATEGY OF INDIRECT APPROACH. By LIDDELL HART. London: Faber, 1941, 316 p. 12/6.

A revision and amplification of the author's "The Decisive Wars of History," first published in 1929.

THE TOOLS OF WAR. BY JAMES R. NEWMAN. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 398 p. \$5.00.

An illustrated history of the development of all sorts of weapons from the Stone Age to the present, intended for the layman.

THE HISTORY OF COMBAT AIRPLANES. BY CHARLES G. GREY. Northfield (Vt.): Norwich University Press, 1941, 158 p. \$1.00.

A somewhat technical summary by an English aviation authority.

WOMEN FOR DEFENSE. BY MARGARET CULKIN BANNING. New York: Duell, 1942, 243 p. \$2.50.

A well-known American writer describes the rôle of women in the last war and in this one, both here and abroad.

SPOILERS OF THE SEA. BY JOHN PHILIPS CRANWELL. New York: Norton, 1941, 308 p. \$3.00.

Episodes from the history of commerce raiders since the American Civil War.

General: Economic and Social

THE COMING SHOWDOWN. BY CARL DREHER. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 419 p. \$3.00.

Another *post mortem* on the present capitalist system, followed by an argument for a "democratic collectivism." There is a long section on industrial control in the World War and in this war.

DEGISEN DUNYA-IKTISADI DEVLETÇİLİK. BY AHMET HAMDI BASAR. Istanbul: Kenan Basimevi, 1941, 168 p. Ltq. .80.

A study of world economic crises, of the rise and fall of capitalism, and of the fundamental principles of the New Order, from the point of view of Turkish Economic *Étatism*.

THE PRICE OF PLENTY. BY G. RALPH BAKER. London: Headley, 1941, 160 p. 5/.

Essays on economic problems by a religious-minded engineer.

ECONOMIC BASIS FOR WORLD PEACE. BY JOHN TORPATS. New York: Felsberg, 1941, 222 p. \$3.00.

The author believes that the principal causes of war are economic, and that internationalism in tariffs, investment, money and banking is the basis of peace. Writing before Pearl Harbor, he found the Administration and the isolationists both in the wrong, but was vague about how to attain the goals he desired.

ECONOMIC PEACE AIMS. BY OSWALD DUTCH. London: Arnold, 1941, 280 p. 12/6.

An expression of the view that the economic reconstruction of Europe must be planned in advance of peace and must in particular seek to insure employment and some sort of security for all.

INTRODUCTION TO WAR ECONOMICS. EDITED BY ALFRED C. NEAL. Chicago: Irwin, 1942, 248 p. \$1.25.

A general survey by a number of Brown University economists.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS. BY CONLEY HALL DILLON. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1942, 271 p. \$3.00.

A scholarly study concerning the interpretation and revision of conventions concluded in connection with the International Labour Office.

SEARCH FOR A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. BY F. W. EGGLESTON. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1941, 360 p. 15/.

Essays covering a wide sweep of human affairs, by an Australian professor.

RELIGION AND THE WORLD OF TOMORROW. BY WALTER W. VAN KIRK. Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1941, 150 p. \$1.50.

An analysis of the political, economic and spiritual foundations of the world of tomorrow, and of what church groups have said of them, by a Protestant leader in the United States.

ESSAYS ON ANTISEMITISM. EDITED BY KOPPEL S. PINSON. New York: Conference on Jewish Relations, 1942, 202 p. \$2.00.

Historical, regional and analytical studies by a dozen experts.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE PROTOCOLS OF ZION. BY JOHN S. CURTISS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, 117 p. \$1.00.

An attempt to apply impartial scholarship to a highly controversial question. The author concludes that the so-called "Protocols" are spurious.

The First World War

MILITARY OPERATIONS: EAST AFRICA. Volume I. COMPILED BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHARLES HORDERN. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1941, 603 p. 1/1/—.

The official account prepared under the direction of the historical section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. This volume covers the period up to September 1916 and contains an appendix of over sixty colored sketch maps.

The Second World War

APPEASEMENT: BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE WAR. BY PAUL EINZIG. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 215 p. \$2.50.

A warning on the dangers of trying to appease Hitler, especially in the economic realm.

"A PEOPLE'S WAR." BY ROBERT GORDON MENZIES. New York: Longmans, 1941, 143 p. \$1.25.

Addresses by the recent Prime Minister of Australia.

THE MEANING OF THE WAR TO THE AMERICAS. BY J. LOEWENBERG AND OTHERS. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941, 172 p. \$1.50.

Lectures delivered at Berkeley in 1941.

REMEMBER PEARL HARBOR! BY BLAKE CLARK. New York: Modern Age Books, 1942, 127 p. \$1.25.

An interesting eyewitness account of how Hawaii reacted to the Japanese attack on December 7.

AMERICA ORGANIZES TO WIN THE WAR. New York: Harcourt, 1942, 395 p. \$2.00.

A handbook of useful information about the way the American war effort is being organized in its many phases. There are a score of contributions.

STRATEGY FOR VICTORY. BY HANSON W. BALDWIN. New York: Norton, 1942, 172 p. \$1.75.

Here is a brief, thoroughly realistic and entirely unhysterical outline of the strategy of this war. Mr. Baldwin, military expert for the *New York Times*, makes it plain that at present we will lose it unless we step up our effort — military, industrial and psychological — to the point where we are waging total warfare, and that victory will come only when we have carried the offensive to the enemy and defeated him on his home ground.

VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC. BY ALEXANDER KIRALFY. New York: Day, 1942, 283 p. \$2.75.

A detailed survey of the strategic situation in the Pacific, in which the author comes

to the conclusion that since time is not on the side of the United Nations they should take the offensive at the earliest possible moment.

VICTORY FROM THE AIR. By AUSPEX. London: Bles, 1941, 238 p. 10/6.

A well-authenticated argument for the doctrine that a combination of overwhelming sea and air power together with a small but efficient mechanized army is the key to an Allied victory.

ATTACK. By MAJOR F. O. MIKSCHKE. New York: Random House, 1942, 267 p. \$2.50.

A somewhat technical description and analysis of Blitzkrieg tactics as practised during the first two and a half years of this war.

GLOBAL WAR: AN ATLAS OF WORLD STRATEGY. By EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER and MARTHE RAJCHMAN. New York: Morrow, 1942, 128 p. \$1.00.

A remarkably useful and fact-filled handbook, with seventy instructive maps.

WILL GERMANY CRACK? By PAUL HAGEN. New York: Harper, 1942, 283 p. \$2.75.

This is one of the best-informed and most hard-headed books on Nazi Germany. The author, intimately connected with the anti-Hitler underground movement, is especially good in his analysis of the economic situation in Germany, of the balance of forces as between Party, Army and big business, and of the underground struggle against Hitler. He offers no hope of a collapse of Germany except under the blows administered by her enemies on the field of battle.

POLAND AT ARMS. By ANNA MACLAREN. London: Murray, 1942, 116 p. 5/.

Snapshots of action in Poland, France and Norway, and on the sea.

IT STARTED IN POLAND. By U. DRAGOMIR. London: Faber, 1941, 249 p. 8/6.

A personal narrative of life in Poland during the Blitzkrieg and the first months of Nazi occupation.

I SAW POLAND SUFFER. By A POLISH DOCTOR. London: Drummond, 1941, 127 p. 6/.

A graphic eyewitness account of the capture of Warsaw and the early days of Nazi rule in Poland, by a doctor who managed to escape via Italy. The last forty pages, carrying the story of the German occupation down to the spring of 1941, are by "Alcuin."

ODDS AGAINST NORWAY. By E. HAUGE. London: Drummond, 1941, 218 p. 7/6.

A personal narrative by a Norwegian journalist throwing a lurid light on the state of his country's unpreparedness but documenting the heroism of Norwegian resistance to the Nazi invasion.

RUSSIANS DON'T SURRENDER. By ALEXANDER POLIAKOV. New York: Dutton, 1942, 191 p. \$2.50.

Vivid experiences from the diary of a Russian soldier-journalist.

RUSSIA'S FIGHTING FORCES. By SERGEI N. KOURNAKOFF. New York: Duell, 1942, 258 p. \$2.50.

A former Imperial and White officer, after reviewing Russian military history, gives an enthusiastic picture of the organization, equipment and prowess of the Red Army in the present war.

ALL OUT ON THE ROAD TO SMOLENSK. By ERSKINE CALDWELL. New York: Duell, 1942, 230 p. \$2.50.

An American writer's observations on the fighting in Russia.

SHOOTING THE RUSSIAN WAR. By MARGARET BOURKE-WHITE. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942, 298 p. \$2.75.

An admirable collection of pictures of wartime Russia with a running commentary, by America's foremost photographer-reporter, wife of Erskine Caldwell.

RECENT BOOKS

MOSCOW WAR DIARY. BY ALEXANDER WERTH. New York: Knopf, 1942, 297 p. \$3.00.

Mr. Werth, for many years Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, grew up in Russia, and thus is better equipped than most observers there to interpret that country and its people. He went to Russia shortly after the Germans struck in June 1941. This diary is the most vivid and informative account we have so far of the manner in which the Russian people have reacted to the war.

MIRACLE ON THE CONGO. BY BEN LUCIEN BURMAN. New York: Day, 1941, 153 p. \$1.75.

The author, an American writer, reports on a year spent with the De Gaulle forces in the Congo, Chad, Libya and Syria. As the first American work on the actual state of the French movement in Africa this book is of especial importance.

ASSIGNMENT TO BERLIN. BY HARRY W. FLANNERY. New York: Knopf, 1942, 439 p. \$3.00.

The personal experiences and reactions of the man who followed Shirer as the correspondent of the Columbia Broadcasting System in Berlin. For various reasons, among them perhaps the author's unfamiliarity with Europe, his book suffers by comparison with that of his predecessor.

TIME RUNS OUT. BY HENRY J. TAYLOR. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 333 p. \$3.00.

During the two months prior to Pearl Harbor the author, an American businessman, made a rapid tour of Europe — Britain, Scandinavia, Germany, France, Spain and Portugal. His highly interesting report is thus one of the very last to come out of the Continent.

I CAN'T FORGET. BY ROBERT J. CASEY. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941, 398 p. \$3.00.

One of America's more colorful correspondents reports on his experiences in the present war — on the Western Front and in Britain.

ONLY THE STARS ARE NEUTRAL. BY QUENTIN REYNOLDS. New York: Random House, 1942, 298 p. \$2.50.

An irrepressible American journalist and feature writer enjoys the war in Britain, Russia and the Near East in spite of its inconveniences.

WAR HAS SEVEN FACES. BY FRANK GERVASI. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 296 p. \$2.50.

In this plain-speaking report on brief visits to various war zones in Africa and Asia, Mr. Gervasi, industrious correspondent for *Collier's*, gives his quite candid impressions and opinions on events and leaders. A highly readable book.

DIGGING FOR MRS. MILLER. BY JOHN STRACHEY. New York: Random House, 1941, 150 p. \$1.25.

The noted Leftist theoretician and writer recounts some of his personal experiences as an air-raid warden.

ATLANTIC BATTLE. BY COLLIE KNOX. London: Methuen, 1941, 103 p. 4/.

Personal glimpses of the struggle to put the convoys through.

RULE BRITANNIA. BY CECIL KING. New York: Studio, 1941, 280 p. \$4.50.

Snapshots of the British Navy at war.

HEROES OF THE ATLANTIC. BY IVOR HALSTEAD. New York: Dutton, 1942, 235 p. \$2.50.

Episodes illustrating how the British merchant marine carries on against heavy odds.

ARISE TO CONQUER. BY WING-COMMANDER IAN GLEED. New York: Random House, 1942, 223 p. \$2.00.

Life and death in a fighter squadron of the R.A.F.

The United States

DER AUFSTIEG DER VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA ZUR WELTMACHT. BY MAX SILBERSCHMIDT. Aarau (Switzerland): Sauerländer, 1941, 498 p. Fr. 17.

A summary and interpretation of the last forty years of American political and social history, based largely on secondary sources, by a professor in the University of Munich.

THE WORLD'S DESTINY AND THE UNITED STATES. Chicago: World Citizens Association, 1941, 309 p. \$1.00.

A report on a "conference of experts in international relations" held at Lake Forest, Illinois, in April 1941, at which a wide variety of political, economic and social problems were examined.

AMERICA IN THE NEW PACIFIC. BY GEORGE E. TAYLOR. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 160 p. \$1.75.

A brief but long-range view of the fundamental power relationships in the Pacific and in Asia — in the past, during the present war and in the foreseeable future.

PRELUDE TO VICTORY. BY JAMES B. RESTON. New York: Knopf, 1942, 234 p. \$2.00.

A well-aimed blast against the various illusions which are preventing the American people from understanding the nature of the price they must pay — and pay *now* — for victory and freedom, by a former *New York Times* correspondent in London and Washington.

ANNAPOLIS. BY CAPTAIN W. D. PULESTON. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 259 p. \$3.00.

A history of the Naval Academy and of its rôle in American history.

WINGS OF DEFENSE. BY CAPTAIN BURR LEYSON. New York: Dutton, 1942, 210 p. \$2.50.

A popular description of the organization, apparatus and tactics of American aerial warfare.

PUBLIC POLICY, 1941. EDITED BY C. J. FRIEDRICH AND EDWARD S. MASON. Cambridge: Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1941, 458 p. \$4.00.

This is the second yearbook issued by the School and contains thirteen essays on various topics — domestic and foreign, economic and political.

POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS. BY V. O. KEY, JR. New York: Crowell, 1942, 814 p. \$3.75.

A handbook on the organized political movements in the United States.

ON THE AGENDA OF DEMOCRACY. BY CHARLES E. MERRIAM. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941, 135 p. \$1.50.

A proposal that new rights be added to the Bill of Rights.

REMAKING AMERICA. BY JAY FRANKLIN. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 287 p. \$2.75.

What the New Deal has accomplished toward the conservation and social utilization of America's material and human resources.

BANKING STUDIES. BY MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM. Washington: Federal Reserve System, 1941, 496 p. \$1.50.

Essays on various American banking problems.

FINANCING THE WAR. BY ROBERT WARREN AND OTHERS. Philadelphia: Tax Institute, 1942, 357 p. \$2.50.

A symposium of eighteen experts.

YOUR BUSINESS GOES TO WAR. By LEO M. CHERNE. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 496 p. \$3.50.

More advice to the American businessman by one who has put the dispensing of such counsel on a mass-production basis.

THUNDER ALOFT. By KENT SAGENDORPH. Chicago: Reilly and Lee, 1942, 300 p. \$2.50.

An explanation, in simple terms, of the techniques and strategy of air power with special reference to the United States.

AIRWAYS. By HENRY LADD SMITH. New York: Knopf, 1942, 430 p. \$3.50.

The thrilling story of the phenomenal growth of commercial aviation in the United States.

AIR MAIL PAYMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT. By FRANCIS A. SPENCER. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1941, 402 p. \$3.00.

A technical, legal treatise.

IDEOLOGIES AND AMERICAN LABOR. By PAUL K. CROSSER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 221 p. \$2.50.

The philosophical background of the principal ideas prevalent or inherent in American labor policies.

THE AMAZING ROOSEVELT FAMILY, 1613-1942. By KARL SCHRIFTGIESSER. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1942, 367 p. \$3.75.

A fascinating excursion into the genealogy of one of America's foremost families.

GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR: FIGHTER FOR FREEDOM. By FRANCIS TREVELYAN MILLER. Philadelphia: Winston, 1942, 280 p. \$1.35.

A hurry-up biography, consisting largely of colorful episodes and anecdotes.

ALL MY BORN DAYS. By JOHN A. GADE. New York: Scribner, 1942, 408 p. \$3.50.

The reminiscences of an American naval intelligence officer frequently in the thick of important events.

AMERICA CHOOSES! By GORDON BECKLES. London: Harrap, 1941, 144 p. 5/.

Extracts from President Roosevelt's speeches and other papers, arranged to reveal the continuity of his policy.

FILIPINO PLANTATION WORKERS IN HAWAII. By EDNA CLARK WENTWORTH. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941, 245 p. \$2.00.

A statistical case study of incomes, expenditures and living standards on a Hawaiian sugar plantation.

GUAM AND ITS PEOPLE. By LAURA THOMPSON. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941, 308 p. \$2.50.

Life on the island and how it was modified by American occupation.

Western Europe

ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, 1760-1939. By ERNEST L. BOGART. New York: Longmans, 1942, 734 p. \$4.50.

A scholarly précis.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE. By CLIVE DAY. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 746 p. \$4.00.

An expanded, up-to-date version of a standard text covering seven countries.

EUROPE IN REVOLT. By RENÉ KRAUS. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 563 p. \$3.50.

A terrifying, occasionally exaggerated, but on the whole credible panorama of Nazified Europe — of the barbarities of Hitler's rule, of the betrayals by the various Quislings, and of the growing resistance by the conquered peoples.

UNDERGROUND EUROPE. BY CURT RIESS. New York: Dial Press, 1942, 325 p. \$3.00.

How the subject peoples of Europe are reacting, each in their own way, to the Nazi barbarism inflicted upon them.

LA GRANDE CRISE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE. BY YVES SIMON. Montreal: Éditions de l'Arbre, 1941, 237 p. \$1.25.

Observations on French political life from 1918 to 1938.

VÉRITÉS SUR LA FRANCE. BY LOUIS LÉVY. New York: Penguin, 1941, 192 p. 25 cents.

M. Lévy was one of the leaders of the Socialist Party and it is only natural that his account of French politics and foreign policies before and during the present war should show a *Front Populaire* slant, though on the whole he is fairly objective.

JE LES AI TOUS CONNUS. BY LÉON GUERDAN. New York: Brentano, 1942, 248 p. \$1.50.

Pen portraits of some thirty figures in French political life, with concluding chapters on the French press, literature, army and clergy and on Vichy France after the armistice. The author is inclined to be partial to men of the Right.

THE LAST TIME I SAW PARIS. BY ELLIOT PAUL. New York: Random House, 1942, 421 p. \$2.75.

A very human memoir on the last days of free France, guaranteed to produce a bad case of nostalgia in any Francophile.

UNCENSORED FRANCE. BY ROY P. PORTER. New York: Dial Press, 1942, 305 p. \$2.75.

Life in occupied France as seen by an Associated Press correspondent.

THE GOVERNMENT OF VICHY. BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PIERRE TISSIER. London: Harrap, 1942, 347 p. 15/.

This is an invaluable book, the first that gives a comprehensive and objective account of the origins, the ideology, the legal façade, and the political and economic realities of the Pétain régime. The author was formerly a high civil official in France who now serves in the Free French cause as Comptroller and Legal Adviser.

TÉMOIGNAGE SUR LA SITUATION ACTUELLE EN FRANCE. Montreal: Éditions de l'Arbre, 1941, 117 p. 75 cents.

By a leader of the Catholic Action in France.

PRISONERS OF HOPE. BY HOWARD L. BROOKS. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1942, 319 p. \$2.75.

Life in unoccupied France as witnessed by an American connected with the Unitarian Service Committee.

THE FRANCE OF TOMORROW. BY ALBERT GUÉRARD. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942, 287 p. \$3.50.

Professor Guérard places a wreath on the tomb of fallen France and bespeaks her resurrection under a non-parliamentary but non-dictatorial régime within a federated Europe. This and other novel ideas enliven the reading of this highly individual book.

SHVETSIYA. BY D. STRASHUNSKY. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1941, 216 p. 75 cents.

A Soviet account of contemporary Sweden.

THE PRUSSIAN SPIRIT, 1914-1940. BY S. D. STIRK. London: Faber, 1941, 235 p. 12/6.

An examination of the psychology of the present generation of Germans as revealed in contemporary German literature.

BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM. BY FRANZ NEUMANN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 532 p. \$4.00.

A closely-knit analysis of the origins and dynamics of Hitlerian imperialism in which

a primary place is given to the expansionist necessities of German monopoly capital and the industrial machine it controls.

HITLER O EL RETORNO OFENSIVO DEL PAGANISMO. BY GUSTAVO COMBES. Mexico City: Polis, 1941, 113 p.

Nazism interpreted as an anti-Christian movement.

THE FOE WE FACE. BY PIERRE J. HUSS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 300 p. \$3.00.

Interesting but on the whole not very important sidelights on Hitler and his hierarchs, by the recently returned head of the Berlin office of the International News Service.

EUROPE IN ECLIPSE. BY A. KERR CLARKSON. London: Hale, 1941, 346 p. 15/.

A not entirely successful attempt to explain Hitler and his Germany by the criteria of modern psychology.

THE BEASTS OF THE EARTH. BY GEORG M. KARST. New York: Unger, 1942, 185 p. \$2.00.

A graphic personal story of life in the concentration camp at Dachau.

NO RETREAT. BY ANNA RAUSCHNING. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1942, 309 p. \$2.75.

This human and sincere story by the wife of Hermann Rauschning illustrates the intolerable moral conditions of life in Nazi Germany against which decent people cannot but revolt.

I WAS IN HELL WITH NIEMOELLER. BY LEO STEIN. New York: Revell, 1942, 253 p. \$2.50.

A fellow prisoner of the Pastor recounts his two years passed in a Nazi concentration camp.

FOUR YEARS OF NAZI TORTURE. BY ERNST WINKLER. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 200 p. \$2.50.

A blood-curdling personal story of life in Nazi concentration camps.

AGENT IN ITALY. BY S. K. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 331 p. \$3.00.

The author of this anonymous work claims to be an anti-Nazi German who engaged in espionage in Italy on behalf of an Allied Power and in conjunction with anti-Fascist underground movements. Skeptical readers may find reasons for doubting these claims.

ITALY MILITANT. BY ERNEST HAMBLOCH. London: Duckworth, 1941, 293 p. 12/6.

In this quite readable book on Fascist Italy the author shows keen insight into many phases of Italian life though his narrative is sometimes poorly organized and his arguments not convincing.

DETRÁS DE LA CRUZ. BY JOSÉ BERGAMIN. Lucero (Mexico): Séneca, 1941, 219 p. Pesos 0.80.

The tenor of this book is indicated by its sub-title "Terrorism and Religious Persecution in Spain."

CONTESTACIONES AL CUESTIONARIO OFICIAL DE DOCTRINA DEL MOVIMIENTO. BY J. B. ORENGA. Madrid: Magisterio Español, 1941, 288 p. Ptas. 12.

A semi-official manual explaining the origins of the Falangist movement in simple language.

EL PENSAMIENTO POLÍTICO DE CALVO SOTELO. BY EUGENIO VEGAS LATAPIÉ. Madrid: Cultura Española, 1941, 229 p. Ptas. 8.

An analysis of the political thought of the Fascist leader whose assassination in 1936 helped precipitate the Spanish Civil War.

Eastern Europe

OUTLINES OF RUSSIAN CULTURE. BY PAUL MILIUKOV. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942, 3 v. \$5.00.

A welcome English edition of a standard Russian treatise. The author is a leading Russian historian and will be remembered as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Kerensky Government. The American editor is Professor Michael Karpovich of Harvard University.

THE URGE TO THE SEA. BY ROBERT J. KERNER. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942, 212 p. \$2.50.

Brief chapters on the part such things as rivers, portages and the fur trade have played in Russian history. There are some twenty maps and six appendices.

THE NEW RUSSIAN EMPIRE. BY ANDREW EFRON. New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, 1941, 130 p. \$2.00.

"A theory of the Soviet State conceived in terms of a dynamic interpretation of law."

HOW RUSSIA PREPARED. BY MAURICE EDELMAN. London: Penguin, 1942, 127 p. 6d.

A well-informed, balanced, but brief account of the expansion of Soviet heavy industry beyond the Urals.

BEHIND THE URALS. BY JOHN SCOTT. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 279 p. \$2.75.

A vivid personal description of the arduous process by which the Soviets created *ex novo* centers of heavy industry in western Siberia, by a young American who worked at Magnitogorsk and later in Moscow.

RUSSIA AND THE BATTLE OF LIBERATION. BY CHARLES S. SEELY. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1942, 114 p. \$1.00.

A retired American naval officer gives his not unfriendly impressions of Soviet Russia.

LA CLEF DU MONDE ET LA VICTOIRE. BY ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME. New York: Maison Française, 1942, 402 p. \$1.75.

Ever since the turn of the century M. Chéradame has been writing books on the Pan German danger. Though some of these, like the present, may have been somewhat distorted in matters of detail, their fundamental thesis and the warning they sought to give have been justified by events. In the present work the author enlarges upon the strategic importance of the Balkan zone during the last half century, and particularly in this war.

THE NEW ORDER IN POLAND. BY SIMON SEGAL. New York: Knopf, 1942, 286 p. \$3.00.

A factual, objective survey of conditions in Poland under Nazi rule, based on all available information including underground sources in Poland itself.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MASARYK THE PRESIDENT-LIBERATOR. BY VICTOR COHEN. London: Murray, 1941, 272 p. 7/6.

A not entirely successful attempt to combine the recent history of Central Europe with a conventional biography of Masaryk.

DIE GETREIDEWIRTSCHAFT RUMÄNIENS. BY DR. MICHAEL ROTHMANN. Berlin: Reichsnährstand Verlagsgesellschaft, 1940, 196 p. M. 5.

A factual monograph illustrated with some seventy statistical tables and a number of maps.

TRANSILVANIA SUB MAGHIARI SI ROMÂNI. BY VASILE M. THEODORESCU. Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial, 1941, 244 p.

A detailed comparison, by an eminent Rumanian jurist, of the treatment of minorities in Transylvania under the Hungarian and Rumanian régimes, from 1868 to 1940.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

VICTORY BEGINS AT HOME. BY G. H. GRETTON. London: Allen and Unwin, 1941, 183 p. 6/.

Ideas and suggestions on Christian objectives for social and economic reform in England.

BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM. BY ALLEN HUTT. London: Lawrence, 1941, 160 p. 2/6.

A short history from the Marxist point of view.

THE GROWTH OF THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE, 1780-1939. BY EMMELINE W. COHEN. New York: Norton, 1941, 221 p. \$3.25.

A competent but not very imaginative history.

BRITISH UNEMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS, 1920-1938. BY EVELINE M. BURNS. Washington: Social Science Research Council, 1941, 385 p. \$2.75.

An historical and statistical study, supplied with appendices and tables.

SCOTLAND IN MODERN TIMES, 1720-1939. BY AGNES MURE MACKENZIE. New York: Macmillan (London: Chambers), 1941, 412 p. \$4.00.

The sixth and final volume in a popular review of Scottish history.

IRELAND, PAST AND PRESENT. BY TOM IRELAND. New York: Putnam, 1942, 1010 p. \$5.00.

An ambitious panorama of the history and current politics of Ireland by an Irish-American with decided opinions on various points.

A SHORT HISTORY OF CANADA FOR AMERICANS. BY ALFRED LEROY BURT. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1942, 279 p. \$3.00.

A popular, readable summary covering the Dominion's economic and social as well as political development.

THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CANADA. BY S. D. CLARK. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1942, 484 p. \$4.00.

This socio-historical study is organized by regions and is supplied with many illustrative documents.

LES PROBLÈMES POLITIQUES DU NORD CANADIEN. BY YVON BÉRIAULT. Montreal: Valiquette, 1942, 201 p.

A dissertation on the legal status of Canada vis-à-vis the Arctic islands, including Greenland.

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. BY V. W. BLADEN. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1941, 299 p. \$2.25.

With chapters on special problems of Canada's economy.

THE BRITISH COLUMBIA FISHERIES. BY W. A. CARROTHERS. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1941, 136 p. \$2.00.

A statistical monograph in economic and political geography.

THERE ARE NO SOUTH AFRICANS. BY G. H. CALPIN. London: Nelson, 1941, 412 p. 10/.

A plain-speaking book about controversial and social issues in South Africa, by the editor of the *Natal Witness*.

AUSTRALIAN NATIVE POLICY. BY EDMUND J. B. FOXCROFT. New York: Oxford University Press (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press), 1941, 168 p. \$2.50.

A documented history by a lecturer on political science at Melbourne University.

OUR INDIA. BY MINOO MASANI. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 165 p. \$1.75.

Fundamental facts about India presented simply and graphically.

THE INDIAN STATES AND INDIAN FEDERATION. BY SIR GEOFFREY FITZHERVEY DE MONTMORENCY. New York: Macmillan (Cambridge University Press), 1942, 165 p. \$1.25.

A handy, almost over-concise explanation of a complicated problem, by an ex-Governor of the Punjab.

The Near East

MIDDLE-EAST WINDOW. BY HUMPHREY BOWMAN. New York: Longmans, 1942, 346 p. \$4.50.

The illuminating memoirs of the man who organized the modern education systems of the Sudan, 'Iraq, and Palestine.

Africa

AFRICANS AND BRITISH RULE. BY MARGERY PERHAM. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 98 p. 45 cents.

The relations between Britain and her African subjects reviewed in simple language.

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND AFRICA FROM AN AMERICAN STAND-POINT. New York: Committee on Africa, the War, and Peace Aims, 1942, 164 p. 75 cents.

This is the report of a committee on African questions composed of a number of American experts, white and colored, and sponsored by the Phelps-Stokes Fund. The report lays down the fundamental principles — political, economic and social — which the committee feels must govern a rational and humane settlement of African questions in the coming peace. Accompanying the report is a supplement, "Events in African History" (168 p. 50 cents), a summary in chronological form, stressing the last century and a half.

SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS. Volume II. PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC POLICY: 1918-1939. Part II. BY W. K. HANCOCK. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 355 p. \$5.00.

This is a continuation and conclusion of an indispensable reference source of which the first volume was reviewed in our issue for January 1941. The contents of this volume concern South Africa and British West Africa. This work appears under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

THE COLOUR BAR IN EAST AFRICA. BY NORMAN LEYS. London: Hogarth, 1941, 160 p. 7/6.

A critical analysis of the various devices — legal, economic and otherwise — by which the natives are discriminated against.

The Far East

RAMPARTS OF THE PACIFIC. BY HALLETT ABEND. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 332 p. \$3.50.

A month before Pearl Harbor, Mr. Abend, long-time Far Eastern correspondent of the *New York Times*, made a rapid trip from the United States to the Philippines via Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia and the East Indies. This is his report on that tour, together with some general remarks on the ensuing Pacific war.

FAR EASTERN WAR, 1937-1941. BY HAROLD S. QUIGLEY. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942, 369 p. \$2.50.

A reliable and serviceable review of events in China from July 1937 to December 1941, with maps, documentary appendices and bibliography.

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE. BY HOMER LEA. New York: Harper, 1942, 343 p. \$2.50.

Originally published in 1909, this book has been reissued to indicate the author's prescience and firm grasp of the principles of strategy in foreshadowing some of the main lines of Japanese attack against the United States and its possessions. Lea was an American associated with Sun Yat-sen and thus well acquainted with the Orient.

AIR TRANSPORT IN THE PACIFIC AREA. BY SYDNEY BERNARD SMITH. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942, 120 p. \$1.00.

A mimeographed compendium of useful information about the status of commercial aviation in the countries of Asia and America fronting on the Pacific Ocean. Many tables and maps.

JAPAN: A WORLD PROBLEM. BY H. J. TIMPERLEY. New York: Day, 1942, 150 p. \$1.75.

A well-informed, readable summary of the history, ideological foundations and international policies of Japan, by an Australian journalist twenty years resident in the Far East.

GOODBYE JAPAN. BY JOSEPH NEWMAN. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1942, 338 p. \$2.50.

One of the more balanced accounts of the internal situation in Japan which led to the attack on Britain and the United States. The author was formerly Tokyo correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*.

WITH JAPAN'S LEADERS. BY FREDERICK MOORE. New York: Scribner, 1942, 365 p. \$2.75.

Mr. Moore, after serving as a newspaperman in various parts of the world, became adviser of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1921, and remained in that position during most of the period thereafter, notably from 1934 to December 1941. During all these years he strove to interpret American policy to his employers in the hope that he could thereby prevent a conflict between the two countries. His close association with Japanese leaders enables him to throw a great deal of light on Japanese policy on the eve of her attack on the United States. Though Mr. Moore did not invariably show foresight justified by events, his book will undoubtedly become one of the important sources for our knowledge of the immediate origins of the war in the Pacific.

PETTICOAT VAGABOND IN AINU LAND AND UP AND DOWN EASTERN ASIA. BY NEILL JAMES. New York: Scribner, 1942, 318 p. \$3.00.

The principal importance of this readable travel account is the intimate picture it paints of Hokkaido, Japan's lesser-known northern island.

FORMOSA TODAY. BY ANDREW J. GRAJDANZEV. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942, 193 p. \$1.00.

Another of the Institute's little handbooks of useful information — geographical, economic and political.

WANG CHING WEI: PUPPET OR PATRIOT. BY DON BATE. Chicago: Seymour, 1941, 187 p. \$1.50.

A purportedly objective study of the man, his policies and his government which, however, is violently anti-Communist and anti-Chiang Kai-shek.

RUSSIA AND JAPAN. BY MAURICE HINDUS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 254 p. \$2.00.

A sequel to the author's "Hitler Cannot Conquer Russia" in which he recounts his experiences in Siberia, describes the tremendous changes wrought in that vast region by the Soviet régime, and predicts that the inevitable war between Russia and Japan will not result in victory for the latter.

MONGOLSKAYA NARODNAYA RESPUBLIKA. BY B. PERLIN. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1941, 76 p. 10 cents.

A description of the development of the Mongolian People's Republic.

FOREIGN CAPITAL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. BY HELMUT G. CALLIS. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942, 120 p. \$1.25.

A mimeographed, annotated survey, covering the Philippines, East Indies, Formosa, Malaya, Siam, Indo-China and Burma.

MODERN BURMA. BY JOHN LEROY CHRISTIAN. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942, 381 p. \$3.00.

A comprehensive, sound and timely handbook on the history, government, foreign relations, and economic and social life of Burma, by a former principal of a technical school there. Useful appendix and bibliography.

THY PEOPLE, MY PEOPLE. BY E. J. EDWARDS. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1941, 251 p. \$2.00.

A personal history illustrating Catholic missionary work in the Philippine Islands.

ISLES OF SPICE. BY FRANK CLUNE. New York: Dutton, 1942, 323 p. \$3.50.

An informative account of a trip made by the author from Australia to Indo-China by way of the Dutch East Indies, including some of the lesser-known islands such as Timor, Celebes and Borneo.

THE DUTCH IN THE FAR EAST. BY ALBERT HYMA. Ann Arbor (Mich.): Wahr, 1942, 249 p. \$1.75.

A history of Dutch commercial expansion.

BLACK BORNEO. BY CHARLES C. MILLER. New York: Modern Age Books, 1942, 278 p. \$2.75.

Light on the people and country of darkest Borneo by an enterprising explorer born in Java. According to the author's account, the island is a treasure-house of all sorts of natural wealth.

Latin America

THE ABC OF LATIN AMERICA. EDITED BY FRANK HENIUS. Philadelphia: McKay, 1942, 134 p. \$1.50.

Useful information, largely economic, conveniently arranged for ready reference.

HISPANO AMERICA EN GUERRA? BY FELIPE BARREDA LAOS. Buenos Aires: Linari, 1941, 258 p.

A pre-Pearl Harbor plea that Latin America keep out of the war, by an Argentine lawyer and diplomat.

LANDS OF NEW WORLD NEIGHBORS. BY HANS CHRISTIAN ADAMSON. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 593 p. \$3.50.

Twenty-six chapters — to be used as supplementary reading for a series of educational radio broadcasts — about the geography, exploration and historical curiosities of many places in the Western Hemisphere, north and south.

PROBLEMAS DE AMÉRICA. BY BERNARDO SUÁREZ. San Juan (Puerto Rico): Author, 1941, 200 p.

Political and economic essays by a Venezuelan democrat.

SOUTH AMERICAN PRIMER. BY KATHERINE CARR RODELL. New York: Reynal, 1941, 234 p. \$1.75.

A thoroughly revised edition of a popular introduction to the history and problems of South America.

EL PROCEDIMIENTO INTERAMERICANO PARA CONSOLIDAR LA PAZ. BY HERMANN MEYER-LINDENBERG. Bogotá: Talleres Gráficos Mundo al Día, 1941, 312 p. \$3.50.

A judicial analysis of Pan American theory and practice, with documents.

QUINCE AÑOS DE POLÍTICA MEXICANA. BY EMILIO PORTES GIL. Mexico City: Botas, 1941, 575 p.

The reminiscences of a former President of Mexico.

GUIDE TO LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES, PANAMA, BERMUDA AND BRITISH GUIANA. BY ARTHUR E. GROPP. New Orleans: Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1941, 721 p. \$5.00.

Valuable information, organized by country and colony.

EL CASO DE BELICE A LA LUZ DE LA HISTORIA Y EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL. BY GUSTAVO SANTISO CÁLVEZ. Guatemala City: Tipografía Nacional, 1941, 346 p.

A legal statement of the Guatemalan case for the possession of British Honduras (Belize), originally prepared as a doctoral thesis for the National University of Mexico and now published under the auspices of the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

LIBERTAD Y DEMOCRACIA. BY COSME DE LA TORRIENTE. Havana: "El Siglo XX," 1941, 255 p.

Addresses, interviews and articles on Cuban political problems and on the present war, by one of the republic's most eminent elder statesmen.

THE FRENCH IN THE WEST INDIES. BY W. ADOLPHE ROBERTS. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1942, 335 p. \$3.00.

A thoroughly readable survey of the historic rôle played by France in and around the Caribbean Sea.

BLACK MARTINIQUE — RED GUIANA. BY NICOL SMITH. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1942, 312 p. \$3.50.

A sparkling, anecdotal travelogue throwing light on conditions in Vichy-controlled Martinique and French Guiana, which the author visited in the spring of 1941.

INDIANS OF SOUTH AMERICA. BY PAUL RADIN. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 324 p. \$4.00.

This book is by a professional anthropologist but will prove quite comprehensible to the layman.

TWO THOUSAND MILES UP THE AMAZON. BY FRANCES NORENE AHL. Boston: Christopher, 1941, 244 p. \$2.00.

The account of a trip by air into Brazil's vast interior.

EL SISTEMA ELECTORAL CHILENO. BY JOSÉ LUIS CASTRO A. Santiago de Chile: Nascimento, 1941, 131 p.

Chile's electoral laws and how they operate.

CURSO DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA Y ARGENTINA. BY JOSÉ A. CAMPOS. Buenos Aires: "El Ateneo," 1941, 730 p. Pesos 18.

A treatise on economics with special application to Argentina.

GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. BY AUSTIN F. MACDONALD. New York: Crowell, 1942, 476 p. \$3.75.

A systematic analysis by a professor of political science at the University of California.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain*: British Library of Information, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Cooperation*: Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office*: 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

ARMAMENTS

INTERNATIONAL traffic in arms; regulations issued on June 2, 1942 . . . 8th edition, Washington, 1942. 51 p. (Dept. of State Publication 1759.) 10¢.

ASSOCIATIONS

TRADE and professional associations of the United States, by C. J. Judkins. Washington, 1942. 324 p. (Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Industrial Series No. 3.) 70¢.

CANADA

CANADA 1942: The official handbook of present conditions and recent progress. Ottawa, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1942. 168 p. 25¢.

CLAIMS

CLAIMS. CONVENTION between the United States of America and Mexico. Signed at Washington, November 19, 1941 . . . Proclaimed by the President of the United States, April 9, 1942. Washington, 1942. 7 p. (Treaty Series 980.) 5¢.

CLAIMS of American nationals against Mexico. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 2528. June 30–July 14, 1942. Washington, 1942. 230 p.

COMMERCE

AGREEMENT between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Belgian Government renewing the arrangements for the regulation of purchases of commodities from the Belgian Congo and Ruanda Urundi . . . London, June 4, 1942. London, 1942. 4 p. (Treaty Series No. 1 (1942). Cmd. 6365.) 1d.

FOREIGN commerce and navigation of the United States, for the calendar year 1940. Washington, 1942. 953 p. \$2.75.

RECIPROCAL trade. Agreement between the United States of America and Haiti relating to waiver in respect of tariff preferences accorded the Dominican Republic by Haiti under a treaty of commerce . . . signed August 26, 1941. Effected by exchange of notes, Signed February 16 and 19, 1942. Washington, 1942. 4 p. (Executive Agreement Series 238.) 5¢.

TRADE agreement between the United States and Argentina; digest of trade data . . . Washington, U. S. Tariff Commission, 1942. 283 p.

ECONOMIC PLANNING

DOCUMENTS and reports, Nos. 1–4. New York, The Central and Eastern European Planning Board, 1942. 4 v. Mimeographed.

THE I.L.O. and plans for a "people's peace"; The London meeting of the emergency committee, April 1942. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1942. 43 p. 10¢.

Reprinted from the *International Labour Review*, July 1942.

EXCHANGE CONTROL

PROCLAIMED list of certain blocked nationals. Revision III, August 10, 1942. 230 p. (Dept. of State Publication 1779.)

FINANCE

AMERICAN direct investments in foreign countries, 1940, by Robert L. Sammons and Milton Abelson. Washington, 1942. 43 p. (Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Economic Series No. 20.) 10¢.

LEAGUE Loans Committee (London). Ninth report (July, 1940–February, 1942). London, The Committee, 1942. 8 p.

ATLANTIC LIBRARY
SOURCE MATERIAL
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

GREAT BRITAIN

TREATY of alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Iran (with notes), Teheran, January 29, 1942. London, 1942. 5 p. (Persia No. 1 (1942). Cmd. 6335.)

INDIA

INDIA (Lord Privy Seal's Mission). Statement and draft declaration by H. M. Government with correspondence and resolutions connected therewith. London, 1942. 30 p. (Cmd. 6350.) 6d.

INTER-AMERICAN HIGHWAY

ALASKA highway. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. Res. 253. June 1-16, 1942. Washington, 1942. 94 p.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

DIGEST of international law, by Green Haywood Hackworth. Washington, 1940-42. 3v. (Dept. of State Publication 1506, 1521, 1708.) \$5.75.

LABOR

THE INTERNATIONAL seamen's code; conventions and recommendations affecting maritime employment adopted by the International Labour Conference, 1920-1936. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1942. 55 p. 25¢.

LATIN AMERICA

PROVISIONAL administration of European colonies and possessions in the Americas. Convention between the United States of America and other American Republics. Signed at Habana July 30, 1940 . . . Proclaimed by the President of the United States February 12, 1942. Washington, 1942. 33 p. (Treaty Series 977.) 10¢.

ANUARIO estadístico de la República Dominicana, 1940. Ciudad Trujillo, Dirección General de Estadística Nacional, 1942. 2 v.

EL COMERCIO exterior Argentino en 1941 y su comparacion con el de 1940. Buenos Aires, Dirección General de Estadística, 1942. 75 p.

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