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
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The Editors.



# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 39

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No. 1

## RUSSIA AND CHINA: THE DILEMMAS OF POWER

*By G. F. Hudson*

**I**N TENSE anti-American propaganda has been a permanent feature of the Chinese Communist scene for the last decade, and it might have been supposed that a point of saturation would by now have been reached in the endeavor to incite the Chinese people to the emotional state desired by their rulers. But the month of June 1960 saw the launching of a campaign of unprecedented vehemence, described as "a new storm of struggle against United States imperialism," culminating in a special "Anti-American Week" organized throughout China from June 21 to 27.

With the Chinese people as a whole being overworked, underfed and ruthlessly coerced, and nature adding its quota of misery through last year's floods and this year's drought, it is no time for the Chinese leaders to encourage a basking in the sunshine of peaceful coexistence and relaxation of international tension. On the contrary, the masses must be persuaded that outside their borders the devilish American imperialists are waiting for the opportunity to invade and subdue their country, that their salvation depends on the speedy transformation of China into a vigilant armed camp, and that every wheelbarrow of earth moved in the struggle for "socialist construction" is a blow in defense of the motherland. But how could such emotions be evoked if there were any doubt about the malevolence of the imperialists or their will to war? Fear and hatred of "the enemy" would lose their force if it came to be believed that the imperialists could resign themselves to perpetual peace and that "different social systems" could live side by side indefinitely without war. The "new storm" in

China is designed precisely to persuade the Chinese people that this cannot happen.

So far, indeed, the bark has been worse than the bite, and the absence of actual crises recently in relations with Communist China has led Western opinion largely to ignore the intensity of the anti-Western indoctrination to which the Chinese people are daily being subjected. To the time of writing there has been no renewal of serious Communist attack in the Formosa Straits since 1957; the symbolic bombardment of Quemoy to mark President Eisenhower's visit to Taipeh was a relatively feeble affair. The armistice line in Korea remains unbroken; Hong Kong carries on as usual; even on the Indian border the Chinese have for some time been quiescent.

Such discrepancy between violence of speech and practical inaction was also characteristic of Communist Russia at the beginning of the thirties; this was the so-called "third period" of the Comintern when the democratic Socialist and Labor parties of Europe were denounced as "social fascists," and it was also the time of the Ramzin and Menshevik show trials in Moscow, when the amalgam of internal disaffection and foreign imperialist instigation was first presented to the Soviet public through carefully prepared confessions in court. It was not, however, a period of actual Soviet aggression abroad, for the reason that the short-term effect of Russia's "great leap forward"—as distinct from the long-term effect—was to weaken her as a military power. Far from being in a position to undertake foreign conquests during this time, she had to accept the humiliation of complete passivity while the Japanese army overran her long-established sphere of influence in northern Manchuria; the food shortages and economic confusion rendered it out of the question to risk a major war.

## II

Today, Soviet reasons for not wanting to risk a major war are quite different, but no less compelling. Moreover, with the relaxation of internal tensions, policies of national self-isolation, cultivated xenophobia and predictions of inevitable war no longer appear so expedient as they once did.

In the new Russian mood of incipient prosperity and *embourgeoisé* self-satisfaction these tactics merely served to cast a chill over the hopefulness which the Party was trying to turn to its ad-

vantage, while in the West they created a wall of suspicion and opposition which Soviet diplomacy and publicity could not penetrate. Moreover, they were averse to success in the international movement which showed the greatest promise of aid to the Communist cause—the campaign for “peace” with its various front organizations throughout the world. The theme of universal disarmament made a profound appeal to the peoples of the Western democracies. But how could Communism exploit these powerful emotions in the Western world if it continued to assert that the very existence of the capitalist system made war inevitable? For those whom the Communist “peace” propaganda was designed to persuade—or at least for the more intelligent of them—this doctrine made nonsense of Moscow’s appeals. It was therefore of great assistance to all those concerned with the public relations of the Soviet Union, whether as diplomats or as propagandists, when Khrushchev announced at the Twentieth Party Congress that war with the imperialist powers need not be regarded as inevitable.

There was of course a further reason which made such a declaration desirable from the point of view of the Soviet leadership. Soviet publicity for internal consumption and for Communists everywhere was by habit excessively boastful, and it had made the most of Russia’s invincible military might as manifested by the victory of Russian arms in the Second World War. It was indeed important to give the utmost credit to the régime for Russia’s new power and also to show that Moscow was not afraid of “massive retaliation” or of anything else the West might threaten to do. But privately, no doubt, anyone in the top leadership with knowledge of the facts about the potency of the new weapons and the Western capacity for delivery could hardly fail to take the view that, even if Russia were to emerge victorious from a major war, the damage to her own territory and population would be so great as to threaten the survival of the régime. War therefore was something to be avoided.

On the other hand, such wisdom, in so far as it did affect the top leadership, did not easily penetrate to the middle and lower levels of the Soviet Communist Party. These consisted of men and women who had been brought up to believe that the world-wide victory of Communism was historically inevitable—and the extension of Communism from Russia to Eastern Europe and China after the Second World War appeared to support this idea. They

further had been taught that wars imposed by imperialists on the Communist states were historically inevitable—and Hitler's invasion seemed to prove it; and that now Soviet science and technology had provided armaments superior to those of the West in addition to the political and moral superiority which had won the victory over Germany and Japan virtually single-handed. To these minds, therefore, there was no longer any need for caution or restraint in dealings with the capitalist world; the Soviet Government should enforce its will on every disputed issue. The Party expected from its leaders new victories and glorious affirmations of the greatness and power of Russia. But this was very embarrassing for the leaders, whose continual boasting and grandiloquence were all the time building up the state of mind which produced the expectation. They found themselves under pressure to carry on an expansionist foreign policy involving a risk of the war they now had good reason to fear, or else appear to their followers as weak and cowardly—to the prospective intra-party advantage of advocates of bolder policies.

It was at least partly in order to emerge from this dilemma that Khrushchev and his associates from 1956 onwards sought to propagate the view that war with the imperialist states was not inevitable and that Soviet foreign policy could be based on the idea of permanent "peaceful coexistence." Attempts have been made to claim the authority of Lenin for this new outlook, but it has been so obvious that it was not Lenin's view that Khrushchev has had to fall back—even at some danger to the authority of Marxism-Leninism as a sacrosanct doctrine—on the argument that Lenin was out of date in this respect because he lived before the era of nuclear weapons. The propaganda of "peaceful coexistence" has been primarily directed against those within the Soviet Union who, even if they do not desire war, advocate policies which must lead to war. But it not only serves to curb the arrogance and vain-glory of the Soviet chauvinist; it also, in so far as it is taken seriously, reduces fear and suspicion of Russia in the Western democracies and increases the scope for diplomatic initiatives by the Kremlin.

By the time of Stalin's death Soviet foreign policy had reached an impasse; it had been successful in consolidating Communist rule in Eastern Europe, but it had dissipated all the assets of good will for Russia which had existed in the West after the joint victory over Hitler, and it had produced the NATO coalition as a



counter to Soviet expansion. Stalin's successors deemed it expedient to allay the universal alarm which Soviet postwar policy had aroused. The West, which had not willed the cold war, was looking for signs that the new rulers of the Soviet Union genuinely wished to end it, and despite lingering suspicions in official quarters and the revival of anti-Soviet popular feeling due to the suppression of the revolt in Hungary, was gradually won over to the idea of a negotiated settlement of outstanding issues, by a conference at "summit" level if ordinary diplomatic channels proved inadequate. Khrushchev himself promoted the trend by his personal expeditions abroad culminating in his visit to the United States. He saw a prospect of obtaining by means of peaceful diplomacy, and by allaying the fears that had caused so many nations to combine against him, the three main objectives of his foreign policy: the subjugation of West Berlin, the dissolution of NATO and large-scale disarmament without effective measures of control.

Unfortunately for Khrushchev there was a basic contradiction in his whole approach to world affairs. Churchill once remarked that the rulers of Russia "do not want war, but they want the fruits of war." What he meant was that the fundamental idea of Communist diplomacy is always to get something for nothing, to gain without paying a price the kind of advantage which is normally only to be obtained at the point of a gun. This attitude is in fact inherent in the Communist outlook. In a system of ordinary international relations among states which, however sharp may be the conflicts between them, regard other governments as having the same right to existence as themselves, there is a tacit assumption that negotiations which are not directly subject to duress can produce results only through a process of mutual give and take. The ideal diplomatic agreement is a trade between a willing buyer and a willing seller, to the advantage of both sides. But the fundamental Communist attitude is that all non-Communist governments are only interim authorities; they are representatives of the class enemy, historically doomed to destruction sooner or later. They cannot in any circumstances be right in a dispute with a Communist state and they cannot have points of view for which a true believer should feel any sympathy. Communist diplomacy, to accord with the processes of history, should always be on the offensive against them; the task of the Communist statesman is to make them yield to his demands, and if he cannot do that, to manifest a proper hostility towards them. Only under pressure of

dire need should he ever make concessions to them; if he is in a position of strength there can be no justification for compromises with the enemy. Talk about peaceful coexistence does not alter this attitude; as Khrushchev has himself explained, it means only that military conflict is ruled out, while ideological, political and economic struggle continues.

What Khrushchev, however, seems not to have understood at the outset and what has brought him disappointment in his foreign policy is the fact that it is not possible to attain peacefully and without paying a price political objectives which deeply encroach on the interests and security of other nations. Peaceful coexistence requires the aims of policy to be brought into harmony with it, or at least a willingness to pay an adequate price for their attainment. Paradoxically, the more the West has come to believe that Khrushchev means what he says when he claims that all-out war would be suicidal for all concerned, the more remote has become the prospect of his getting what he wants. Confidence in Khrushchev's intention to keep the peace has indeed reduced the tension caused by the overshadowing fear of war and has to that extent made it easier for Moscow to negotiate on friendly terms with the West, but at the same time it has made the West less ready to yield to Soviet demands without concessions in return. In the Western view, peaceful coexistence should mean a diplomacy of normal negotiations on a give and take basis. But an examination of the record of the last two years shows that this is just what Khrushchev has never been prepared to contemplate. At no point has he had anything to offer in return for acceptance of his demands about Berlin and Germany except reduction of the danger of war—a danger which Soviet policy had created but which the preaching of the impossibility of a major war rendered less and less convincing.

In fact, the whole of Khrushchev's diplomatic offensive from the autumn of 1958 onwards was based on a threat of war. His demand for an alteration of the status of West Berlin, contrary to existing agreements and originally in the form of a six months' ultimatum, followed the Soviet sputnik successes and the consequent alarm in the West at the discovery of the "missile gap." Each subsequent major occasion of Soviet political action—the arrival of Khrushchev in America and the summit conference—was marked by a spectacular new manifestation of Soviet rocketry in outer space, and the intention was clearly not only to impress

the world with Soviet zeal and skill in the pursuit of astronomical science, but also to scare everybody with the Soviet capacity to hit distant targets with nuclear warheads. Unfortunately, from Khrushchev's point of view, the effect he thus produced by frightening people was cancelled by the effect he produced by preaching the doctrine that war had become too terrible to resort to it.

During the months before the summit conference the West came round more and more to the conviction that Khrushchev was not going to risk war over Berlin, and as the fear of war receded, so grew the West's determination to resist Soviet demands. After all, the Russians had no legal or moral right to change the status of West Berlin unilaterally and they had nothing to offer which might serve as the basis for an agreed settlement. What reason was there then to submit to their dictation? It is clear that the Western attitude on Berlin hardened in the period between the Camp David talks and the summit conference. Khrushchev thus found himself frustrated; it was probably only after his visit to President de Gaulle, who is said to have done some plain speaking, that he realized he was not going to get his way on Berlin at the conference. Since he could not come back from such a conference without a great diplomatic success and since he had lost his earlier expectation of achieving one, there was nothing for him to do except to wreck the conference at the outset on an extraneous issue—for which the U-2 episode provided a stratosphere-sent opportunity. If he could not get Berlin, at least as a good Communist, he could show he was tough. He showed himself tough again at the disarmament conference; it had become evident that the West was not going to give him what he wanted without sufficient guarantees of inspection and control, so here too a walkout was the solution most conducive to the prestige of Khrushchev as a Communist leader.

There has been much speculation in the West about the possible domestic pressures on Khrushchev and some observers have claimed to detect an organized faction compelling him to change the previous direction of his policy. But there is no need to attribute the pressure to a particular group of persons; Khrushchev appears still to have a firm grip on the Party apparatus and to be able to prevent the emergence of a dangerous rival for leadership. He is nevertheless the prisoner of the Party in the sense that he must act in the way that all right-thinking Communists expect him to act; if he fails to do so, he will lose the prestige essential to

his position as leader. The kind of diplomatic agreement which would be regarded as a success for a Western foreign minister is of no use to a Soviet First Secretary in 1960; if he cannot get what he wants in his foreign policy on his own terms, he can save face only by smashing up the shop—which at the stage short of military violence means wrecking conferences. But the comrades may expect him to go further than wrecking conferences. Have they not been informed that Russia has the best rocketry in the world? So after the breakdown of his summit diplomacy Khrushchev more than ever had to try to persuade his followers that war must be ruled out. One can abuse the imperialists and make faces at them, but one must try to avoid a shooting war with them because hydrogen bombs are not things to be taken lightly.

Khrushchev has not, therefore, succeeded by his doctrine of peaceful coexistence in escaping from the dilemma between a bellicosity which involves the risk of a real war and a really peaceful diplomacy which falls short of what is expected of a Communist leader. He must intimidate nations and aggravate tension in order to acquire the fruits of an aggressive foreign policy, but at the same time he must explain to everybody—to reassure the West and to restrain his own supporters—that war is out of the question, with the result that his threats lose their force and the tension becomes a cause of annoyance rather than fear. When the intimidation thus fails and his demands are not conceded, he flies into a rage, tells the world's assembled journalists how he used to treat cats when he was a boy, and talks about protecting Cuba with Soviet rockets. But at the same time he lashes out at those in the Communist world who suggest that war with the imperialists is after all inevitable and says he will "not retreat an inch" from the policy of peaceful coexistence. In practice, he simply keeps on jumping from one horn of the dilemma to the other. The only way to get clear from it would be for him to accept the principle that in a system of sovereign states from which war is excluded the only alternative is to seek agreements on a basis of mutual benefit and compromise. But this is what his position as leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and his own background as a militant Communist make it impossible for him to do.

### III

In such a situation the part played by China becomes an increasingly important one. It should not be exaggerated or de-



scribed in terms of Russian versus Chinese, because it is the Russian Party itself that is the main source of the pressure on Khrushchev to pursue objectives that are unattainable without victorious war. But just because the assumptions and sentiments implied in this pressure are so much more explicit and uninhibited in contemporary China, the Chinese influence has an important effect in reinforcing and strengthening the trends in Russia towards international intransigence. Conditions in China and in Russia are not indeed the same, for the strain of the industrialization drive in China provides a reason for cultivating fear of imminent foreign aggression such as no longer exists in Russia. But since Russia is unwilling to make a settlement with the West on any terms but those of complete diplomatic victory, Western-Soviet tension continues and the posture of Russia in relation to the West, in spite of all Khrushchev's speeches and state visits abroad, tends to be indistinguishable from that of China. It is the Chinese who can say "I told you so!" when the highly publicized diplomacy of Camp David ends in diatribes against President Eisenhower as a false friend and a tool of imperialism. The Chinese Communists kept on warning that it would end in failure. In this the wish indeed was father to the thought, for there can be no doubt that there is nothing they feared so much as a real Soviet-American rapprochement leading to a fulfillment of Soviet ambitions in Europe, but with no pickings for China in the Far East. They had not sufficient confidence in Khrushchev to believe that if he saw a prospect of achieving Soviet aims in agreement with Washington on condition of dropping support for the claims of Peking he would hesitate for a moment in accepting the bargain. A Soviet-American deal, if it could have been attained on Khrushchev's terms, would necessarily have been at the expense of Western Europe, but it would also have been at the expense of Communist China. The Chinese, therefore, hoped that the Soviet-American negotiations would fail, and long before Khrushchev's buoyant self-confidence was deflated they became convinced that the event would be as their interests required. They explained in their press that the nature of American imperialism was unchanged and that it was useless to try to come to an agreement with it. When therefore the summit conference collapsed, they were able to claim that it was just what they expected to happen.

With regard to nuclear weapons, the Chinese Communist leaders do not have to make excuses to the Party for not using them,

since they do not as yet possess them. They can preach the inevitability of war and launch a "new storm of appeal" against American imperialism without anyone asking why they do not launch against American cities the missiles that they have not got. At the same time, so that their own people may not be intimidated by awareness that the enemy does possess the weapons which China still lacks, their domestic propaganda minimizes the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, and this can be extended to reproach "revisionists" for overestimating them. To be "afraid of war" and to "dream of begging peace from the imperialists" are now high among the mortal sins of the Chinese Communist code, and it is broadly hinted that persons more important than Tito have been guilty of such cowardly defection from their Communist duty; hence the vigor of the official Soviet counter-attack, which claims that "it is not sufficient to repeat the old truth that imperialism is aggressive" and that the task today is "to make full use of the factors making for peace in order to save humanity from the catastrophe of another war."

It may well be that Mao Tse-tung really is less daunted by the prospect of a nuclear war because of the vast numbers of the Chinese population and the dispersal of the Chinese economy. As an old guerrilla fighter he is no doubt inclined to be unimpressed by massive armaments. But at any rate he has no need to make any decisions about launching an atomic war since he has not the power to do it. He can be as warlike as he pleases inside China and stage "anti-American weeks" as often as he will, but it does not cause a world crisis because the ultimate weapons are not his. But since Khrushchev *does* possess them, *he* can only make warlike gestures by threatening to use them; and since a general belief that he was going to use them would rapidly raise international tension to the point at which they might be launched, he must continually counter his own threats by reaffirming his resolve to avoid war. As a consequence of this situation the contemporary Soviet attitude is far less consistent than the Chinese. Communist China is coherently truculent. But Khrushchev keeps on rattling the nuclear equivalent of a sabre in support of an aggressive diplomacy while assuring everyone that he will never draw it except in self-defense. The danger for the world is that confusion about his intentions may exist not only among foreign observers who try to interpret his policy but also in the mind of Khrushchev himself.

## THE BROKEN DIALOGUE WITH JAPAN

*By Edwin O. Reischauer*

THE rioting crowds that clamored at the gates of the Japanese Diet building in May and June and the throngs of Zengakuren students who snake-danced wildly down the streets of Tokyo and swarmed over Hagerty's car at Haneda Airport have given pause to many persons in both the United States and Japan. To Americans, who saw these scenes on their television screens, it seems that Japan stands irresolute at a way station between the Communist camp and the free world. Many Japanese who participated in this drama or watched it unfold on their own television screens feel even more strongly that their country stands at a crossroads of history—but to them, the diverging roads lead, not to Communist or democratic camps, but to somewhat vaguer goals labeled “peace” and “war” or “democracy” and “Fascism.”

It is perhaps this sharp contrast in images of the situation between Americans and Japanese that is the most alarming feature of the recent crisis. Never since the end of the war has the gap in understanding between Americans and Japanese been wider than over this incident. Almost to a man, American observers express bafflement over the violent Japanese reaction to the revised Security Treaty with the United States and Eisenhower's scheduled visit, while Japanese intellectuals appear frustrated over their inability to explain their attitude to American friends. After 15 years of massive contact, Americans and Japanese seem to have less real communication than ever.

One point on which all would agree is that, whatever the basic motives and immediate inciting forces, the demonstrations and riots of May and June were expressions of wide opposition to the Security Treaty and any military link with the United States. Virtually all of the demonstrators would have liked to see at least a postponement of the ratification of the treaty, and the great majority wanted the treaty killed and the present military link with the United States, together with the existing American bases in Japan, either eliminated at once or else ended in stages.

It is not hard to surmise what the results of such a policy would be in East Asia. A Japanese repudiation of its alliance with the United States might stir up a momentary pro-American reaction

in such strongly anti-Japanese and firmly pro-American countries as South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, just as the enforced cancellation of Eisenhower's visit to Japan seems to have heightened the enthusiasm of the welcomers in these countries, who gloated that now, at last, Americans could see who their real friends were. But even in these countries, to say nothing of the less committed areas, the long-range reactions would undoubtedly be most unfavorable to the United States. Neutralism, if not open pro-Communism, would be shown to be the obvious "wave of the future," and a scramble to get on the Communist bandwagon would probably soon follow.

At the same time, American defense potentialities would be drastically reduced throughout East Asia. This might not be true in the field of nuclear weapons—only a person with classified knowledge could speak confidently on that point—but it certainly would hold for limited wars with conventional weapons, which seem to be the more present danger in the Far East. It would probably be folly to attempt to stem a second attack from North Korea on South Korea if the United States lacked the backing, not so much of its bases in Japan, as of the great industrial facilities available in Japanese ports and cities. Bases in Okinawa, Formosa and the Philippines offer no real substitute for the latter. Thus, an unfriendly Japan or even a strictly neutralist Japan might well mean the inevitable withdrawal of the American defense line to the mid-Pacific—with all the vast political consequences this would entail for the whole of East Asia.

The present situation in Japan, however, does not lend support to so gloomy a prospect—at least in the near future. In spite of all the frenzy of May and June and the torrent of extreme statements it let loose, Japan's actual foreign and domestic policies have remained on a surprisingly even keel. Although vast crowds of highly aroused people, sometimes running into the hundreds of thousands, demonstrated day after day for more than a month, only one person, a girl student at Tokyo University, was killed; Kishi stoically sat out the storm, and the new Security Treaty came into effect on June 19 without further parliamentary debate; the bulk of the opposition, that is, all but the extremists who have all along advocated the forceful overthrow of the government, have accepted, with irritation but also with resignation, this *fait accompli*, as they call it; the Japanese public as a whole has recoiled in distaste and fear from the violence that accom-



panied the anti-treaty demonstrations, just as it has reacted unfavorably against political violence each time that it has occurred since the war; both sides are loud in their insistence that parliamentary procedures must be maintained; the daily press, which has tremendous influence in Japan, has adopted a very moderate, judicious tone on the recent disturbances and the disagreements that lie behind them—in rather sharp contrast to the more inflammatory stand it took in the early days of the crisis; three elections for governors in rural prefectures have shown the local voting appeal of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party scarcely dented by the opposition Socialists, who had the backing of the Communists in two of these elections; Ikeda, who succeeded Kishi as party chief and Premier has been favorably received by the public and seems to have its confidence more than Kishi ever did; and it is taken for granted that the general election for the Diet, expected in November, will result in the usual clear victory for the Liberal-Democrats, who, it is predicted, will not lose more than 30 seats to the opposition, and possibly no seats at all. In other words, the normal orderliness of the Japanese public, aided by the vacation atmosphere and the muggy oppressiveness of summer, has caused the confusion, excitement and anxiety of May and June to subside more rapidly than seemed possible at that time, and there is every prospect that the governing party, which is solidly committed to the present defense relationship with the United States, will stay in power for the foreseeable future.

These conclusions may be comforting to Americans, but they do not warrant writing off the May and June crisis as a tempest in a teapot. It was a sign of a huge current of discontent within Japanese society—a frustration with present trends and a strong sense of alienation from the existing order. This current has broken surface from time to time in the past, but never so clearly or forcefully as in the past few months. It cannot be disregarded, for it is made up, not just of the formally organized Socialist opposition, centering around the trade-union movement, but also of the bulk of Japan's intellectuals and college students—that is, the would-be ideological pathfinders and the generation to which the future Japan belongs. There is little prospect that their views will prevail in Japanese politics in the immediate future, but their victory at some future date seems not just possible but probable. It is for this reason that the growing gap between their thinking and that of Americans is a truly frightening phenomenon.

American views on the Security Treaty and the recent disturbances in Japan need no explanation for an American audience, but it might be best to set them forth briefly as a prelude to a consideration of the views of government and opposition elements in Japan. The prevailing American attitude might be put simply and bluntly as follows:

Japan is an industrially important country located dangerously close to the borders of both the Soviet Union and Communist China. In Communist hands, it would give overwhelming strength to the Communist movement throughout Asia, but, allied with the West, it could give great economic and political support to the whole cause of democracy and freedom in Asia. The Japanese people, however, still reacting strongly against the terrible suffering they brought upon themselves in the last war, are staunchly pacifistic and refuse to devote more than a mere 10 percent of their national budget to defense. The United States, therefore, has been forced to carry the main load of defense for the islands, as well as for neighboring areas. But, recognizing the desire of the Japanese to stand on a more equal footing with the United States, the latter has been willing to negotiate a new Security Treaty, which makes substantial concessions to Japanese desires. For example, the new treaty, unlike the old, is limited to a mere ten years, and the United States agrees to consult before employing elsewhere its forces stationed in Japan.

Although the Kishi government, which negotiated the new treaty with the United States, was firmly based on close to two-thirds of both the popular votes and the seats in the Diet, the opposition Socialists seemed determined to stop ratification of the treaty by fair means or foul. Less than two years ago, this same minority opposition managed to block passage of a bill giving to the present pusillanimous police force powers more comparable to those exercised by the police in other democratic countries. A repetition of this sort of victory for the minority would seem a travesty on democracy—especially since large elements in this minority are openly pro-Communist and thus are in no sense believers in democracy. It seemed quite possible that this would happen when the Socialists attempted on May 19 to stop a vote to extend the duration of the Diet by a sit-down encampment in the halls of the Diet building, imprisoning the elderly Speaker of the Lower House for six hours. Kishi, therefore, was probably justified, even if not politically wise, in clearing out

the encamped Socialists by force late that night and in then ramming through in the next few minutes both the extension of the Diet and the ratification of the treaty, even though there was no debate and the opposition minority was absent.

The mammoth demonstrations which followed (so the American view continues) were an undemocratic effort by minority elements—city people as opposed to rural and town dwellers and the intelligentsia as opposed to the common people—to force their will by non-parliamentary agitation on the duly elected representatives of the people. The original organizers of these demonstrations were clearly anti-democratic elements. In the forefront stood Sohyo, the largest of the labor organizations, and Zengakuren, the union of university student-government associations, which can claim to speak for 270,000 of Japan's 630,000 college students. Sohyo, though usually a formal supporter of the Socialist Party, is distinctly pro-Communist in its international stand, and the leadership of Zengakuren is split between violently battling Communist factions. If many of the demonstrators in May and June were themselves sincere believers in democracy, then they were showing themselves naive dupes of international Communism in lending support to non-parliamentary agitation led by these obvious enemies of democracy. Kishi is to be praised for having withstood this sort of pressure and for having seen to it that the views of the majority prevailed in this matter of vital importance for the future safety of Japan.

While many Americans would, no doubt, object to one or another of the above statements, as a whole they represent the overwhelming American response to the situation and actually are not far from the thinking of important elements among Japanese businessmen and government leaders. Still more of the conservative economic and political leaders of Japan would probably object to certain aspects of this analysis, while accepting others. They would be more inclined to criticize Kishi's tactics in handling the crisis. In fact, several of the Liberal-Democratic Diet members refused to take part in the surprise vote on treaty ratification. Many would be inclined to stress Japan's desire for peace and for friendship with Communist China, while not denying the need for defense. Most would probably emphasize the importance to Japan of trade with America and the resulting need that Japan go along with American policies, thus making their own support for the treaty more a matter of necessity than of free choice.

The attitude of the rank and file of Liberal-Democratic voters would undoubtedly be even less clear-cut. The desire for peace and neutrality runs deep in Japan. Those with direct responsibility for international policies have had to face up to the hard realities of the international situation, but the further one moves from these positions of immediate responsibility, the less realistic becomes the appraisal of the situation and the stronger the emotional demands for peace and neutralism at any price. A large proportion of the Liberal-Democratic voters might join the opposition Socialists if given a chance to vote solely on the question of the Security Treaty.

But, when rural and small-town Japanese vote for their governors, local councilmen and Diet representatives, other things loom much larger in their minds than foreign relations and complicated treaties. They are much more conscious of the new roads, bridges and subsidies for local organizations provided by the Liberal-Democratic politicians. Under their aegis, Japan has enjoyed six years of unprecedented prosperity and economic growth. Last year alone, this growth amounted to an almost incredible 16 percent. A consumers' revolution is taking place—most spectacularly in rural Japan, where television sets, washing machines, motorcycles and powered agricultural machines are now taken for granted. Marxist class dogma and the hyper-theoreticalness of the Socialists have little meaning to the hard-headed farmers and small-town residents of Japan. In their eyes, the excesses of the city eggheads and smart college boys in the recent rioting probably went a long way toward nullifying the appeal of the peace motive in the anti-treaty agitation. Like their counterparts elsewhere in the world, especially in times of prosperity, the farmers and small-town dwellers of Japan have been voting conservative and show every sign of continuing to do so.

## II

The opposition to the Liberal-Democrats and to their policy of alliance with the United States is of two types. At the extreme left stands the Communist Party, which can usually muster only around 2 or 3 percent of the vote, and the communistically inclined *shimpa* or "sympathizers." These extremists, though few in number, give a strongly radical tinge to the whole opposition movement because, as dedicated activists, they tend to dominate organizations whose general membership is much more moderate.



Zengakuren and Nikkyoso, the main teachers' unions, are outstanding examples of such Communist-led groups. The nature of the opposition of these Communists is clear, as is their cynical attempt to use parliamentary government as one route by which to achieve the type of dictatorship in which they believe.

The bulk of the opposition, however, consists of supporters of the Socialist Party and of the recently formed Democratic Socialists, who stand a little closer to the center. Most of these people are sincere believers in democracy and are devoted to the ideal of international peace. Though much less publicized abroad than the Communists, they are vastly more significant. Not only do they outnumber the communistically inclined at least four or five to one, but they show a capacity for growth, whereas true Communist converts have in recent years been a steadily shrinking band. The moderate opposition may prove to be the political wave of the future, and only through skillful manipulation of it could the Communists ever hope to come to power.

To understand the attitude of the moderate opposition and its outburst of protest in May and June one must first look at the historical background. Like most other people throughout history, the Japanese are much more conscious of past blunders than of future dangers. An authoritarian, militaristic government during the 1930s suppressed Japan's nascent democracy and led the nation on a course of imperialistic expansion that ended in complete, shattering defeat, dramatized by the instantaneous destruction of two whole cities by atom bombs. Remembering this history, many Japanese feel that their most urgent task is to battle any sign of resurgent Fascism or militarism. Thus, the augmentation of the powers of the police seems to them, not a routine measure to combat crime and public disorder, but a sinister plot to restore one of the main and most hated weapons of the prewar Fascistic militarists.

Similarly the Security Pact with the United States, which in their eyes amounts to a military alliance, seems the first step back toward involvement in imperialistic world rivalries, made all the more perilous by the development of new and more terrible weapons, of which only the Japanese people in all the world have had a true taste. Neutral abstention from senseless Russian-American power rivalries would seem the only reasonable course. Naked defenselessness would be safer than partisan involvement in a war in which neither side can have any real defense.

Involved in the treaty question is the problem of the new Japanese Constitution. Article 9 of this document states that the Japanese "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation" and that "land, sea and air forces, or other war potential, will never be maintained." Despite this idealistic declaration, which has the fervent support of a large part of the Japanese people, the Liberal-Democratic government has reconstituted a Japanese army, navy and air force, under the name of Self-Defense Forces, and, what seems even worse to the opposition, is doing its best to tie Japan to one of the two great military blocs now fighting for supremacy in the world. The revised Security Treaty, though ostensibly an improvement over the old, is felt to be worse for Japan, in that the Japanese had no responsibility for the earlier one, since it was imposed upon them during the Occupation, but the new one is of their own making. Thus the new Treaty's provision for prior consultation on the use of American forces stationed in Japan, far from being a gain for the Japanese, merely involves them more fully in the dangerous game of power politics.

Article 9 has been the focus of proposals for Constitutional revision, which the opposition views with even greater alarm. A few may concede that there is something to the Liberal-Democratic argument that a country cannot give up the right to self-defense, but most look upon conservative proposals to revise Article 9 as merely the opening wedge in an effort to emasculate the whole Constitution and undermine the democratic structure it supports. Conservative arguments that the Constitution needs revision because it was at least in part dictated by the American occupation authorities, they look upon as pure chicanery, since to them the Liberal-Democrats seem blindly pro-American and, therefore, obviously not sincere in this argument.

The violence of the Socialist opposition on such issues as strengthening the police, negotiating a new Security Treaty, or revising the Constitution, can be explained only by the opposition's assumption that the leadership of the Liberal-Democrats, if not the party as whole, is dedicated to recreating the authoritarian, militaristic system of prewar Japan. To stop this, they feel, forward-looking people must be constantly vigilant and must be prepared to exert extra-parliamentary pressures if necessary. This is particularly true since Japan, they feel sure, is far from being a true democracy. However perfect the external forms may be, the inner realities are not there. The Japanese people, ac-

customed to centuries of authoritarian rule, do not have natural democratic reactions. Japanese society is still hopelessly "feudalistic," by which they mean that a high degree of social inequality and authoritarianism still remains in personal relations in the family, in education, business and government, and the individual still lacks the habit of depending on his own independent judgment. The Liberal-Democratic majority in the Diet, therefore, is not really the expression of majority desires so much as the result of skillful manipulation of the less awakened strata of society, through traditional channels of authority, through a judicious parcelling out of economic favors, and through open bribery. Under these circumstances, mass demonstrations and extra-parliamentary pressures are justified to prevent this somewhat bogus and highly suspect majority from forcing the enlightened minority back into the despicable prewar system.

This whole attitude is symptomatic of the dangerous ideological gulfs that exist within Japanese society. These gulfs may be the inescapable result of the tremendous rate of social, political and ideological change over the last century, and particularly during the past 15 years. Change has been so rapid that the Japanese have temporarily lost a central core of ideals on which all groups can agree. Change of course has been rapid in the West, too, but the speed has been sufficiently slower in countries like England and America so that the various groups in society have not lost this unifying core of ideals; therefore they do trust one another's sincerity, if not their wisdom. In Japan, on the contrary, businessmen and intellectuals seem to speak different languages. There is little trust and respect between them. The gap between generations is even greater. Young people feel that their elders simply do not understand. The fact that the "main stream" group of Zengakuren is engaged in bitter fighting with the Communist Party can be cited as a typical example of youth revolting against the older generation—even when the two are on the same side.

Since the opposition to the Liberal-Democrats expresses itself as Communist and Socialist political movements, it is reasonable to ask what is the economic background for it. Naturally the labor-union core of the Socialist Party can be explained as a manifestation of clashing economic interests, but this does not apply clearly to either the intellectuals or students. Intellectual and white-collar workers in Japan, as in other economically advanced countries, are finding their relative economic status sinking in

comparison with that of both management and labor. Japanese students also are under very heavy psychological pressures from primary school onward in the tremendous competition to excel—first in passing entrance examinations to the more desirable schools at each educational level and then in passing the examinations that lead to the relatively few promising jobs in government or business. But a rapidly expanding economy has definitely eased the economic pressures on intellectuals in recent years, and employment prospects for college graduates have recently taken a sharp turn for the better. The strong sense of dissatisfaction with society and alienation from it on the part of these groups, therefore, is all the more significant just because it has become further exacerbated at a time of unprecedented prosperity.

Though Marxian theory does little to explain the ideological cleavages in Japan, Marxism as a belief is undoubtedly an important factor. Japanese intellectuals and students tend to think in Marxian terms. Why this should be so is a difficult question. One reason may be that Japanese intellectuals, reacting against an extremely pragmatic society around them, have tended to be overly theoretical. In the latter part of the nineteenth century they took eagerly to the rigid theoreticalness of German thought, abandoning in large part the Anglo-American schools of philosophy that had at first attracted them. In the 1930s only the Marxists, armed with their rigid dogmas, stood up firmly against the wave of hyper-nationalistic mysticism that inundated Japan. The idea became firmly implanted, therefore, that Marxism, rather than liberal democracy, was the chief enemy of militarism and authoritarianism. The poverty of the American Occupation in theory—for all its practical reforms—did nothing to correct this situation. The result is that, for many Japanese intellectuals, Socialism and democracy are closely intertwined concepts; businessmen, as “capitalists,” are suspect by definition; and the Communist countries, for all their deplorable excesses, are vaguely felt to stand on a higher political plane than the democracies.

Naturally this results in a very different picture of the world situation than that prevalent in the United States. Democratically inclined students and teachers, fearing “capitalism” and “imperialism” more than Communism, see no reason why they should not make common cause with the Communists against the “forces of reaction,” and they even welcome Communists as leaders of their organizations, because the latter are so “sincere” and active

in the cause. Anti-Russian sentiments remain strong, but the attitude toward China is very different. Feeling deeply their geographic propinquity, racial affinity and, above all, their cultural relationship to the Chinese, the Japanese have a tremendous yearning for the reestablishment of friendly contact with China. Culturally, China is their Egypt, Greece, Rome and Renaissance Italy combined. An unspoken but keen feeling of guilt over Japan's wartime conduct in China heightens this attitude of friendship. China as a Communist nation greatly increases Communism's appeal in Japan, just as a Communist Russia weakens it.

Given this background, one can understand what happened in May and June. For the past two years there has been a rising sense of frustration in the opposition, because the Socialist vote, which previously had been gaining steadily, has been showing signs of levelling off into a permanent minority of about one-third. The fault for this probably lies with the Socialists themselves for being too class-bound in their appeal and too theoretical, unrealistic and negative in their criticism of the Liberal-Democrats. But the result is a dangerously unbalanced political situation in which the majority has little worry about losing to the opposition, and the latter, despairing of ever winning, becomes increasingly frustrated and therefore more extreme.

A combination of factors this spring helped to aggravate feelings further. The Security Pact in itself is as hot an issue as exists in Japanese politics and one on which many Liberal-Democratic voters lend support to the opposition. The U-2 incident, followed closely by the break-up of the summit conference and the cancellation of the Russian invitation to Eisenhower, dashed Japanese hopes for peace and heightened fears regarding the treaty. This seemed to be a particularly unwise time to anger the Soviet Union and Communist China, Japan's two great neighbors, both of whom had made harsh and threatening statements about the proposed treaty. To many Japanese, Socialist efforts to delay action on the treaty, even by sit-down encampments in the Diet, seemed completely justified, particularly since Kishi seemed evasive in answering questions about the treaty and the Socialists could point to several slight irregularities on the part of the Liberal-Democrats in committee hearings on the treaty and in the actions of the Ways and Means Committee.

When Kishi, in response to the May 19 sit-down, pushed ratification through by an immediate surprise vote, the reaction was



truly explosive. Even those who were inclined to criticize the forceful tactics of the Socialists felt that Kishi's offense against parliamentary procedures was far greater, and many others decided that Kishi had intended all along to resort to this underhand tactic in order to have the treaty go into effect automatically a month later, in time for Eisenhower's visit to Japan on June 19.

Whatever Kishi's motives may have been, the timing of the surprise vote brought Eisenhower's visit directly into Japanese politics. Increasingly it appeared to the Japanese public that the visit was aimed at lending Kishi support and at helping to push the treaty through against popular opposition. American insistence that Eisenhower would come willy-nilly, while largely determined by fears that a cancellation would be regarded as a triumph for international Communism, looked to the Japanese like obvious willingness to interfere blatantly in domestic Japanese politics. The inclusion of Japan in a tour to the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa and Korea was commonly interpreted as proof that the United States regarded Japan as merely another "semi-colonial land" in its Far Eastern defense chain.

What had started as a violent but straightforward attack on the Security Treaty by a fairly limited group rapidly expanded after May 19 into a tremendous, mass outburst against Kishi, against Eisenhower's visit, and for the immediate dissolution of the Diet so that general elections could be held to obtain a new popular mandate before so controversial and perilous a step as ratification of the treaty should be undertaken.

The demand for dissolution of the Diet was by no means unreasonable. One could argue that, in an ideal democracy, major political decisions should always be referred to the voters. In practical politics, however, the party in power naturally tries to avoid an election on any relatively unpopular aspect of its program. To Western observers, Kishi's refusal to dissolve the Diet seemed quite natural, but all elements in the opposition and many conservative voters as well rose in righteous indignation at what they considered Kishi's arrogant refusal to heed "the voice of the people."

The fury of the anti-Kishi sentiment needs some explanation. Unlike a popularly elected President, or even a British Prime Minister, who is the unchallenged head of his party, Kishi had achieved the Premiership as the leader of one of several bitterly feuding cliques among Liberal-Democratic politicians. Thus in

his own party many persons were prepared to welcome his fall. And to the opposition he was the personification of all that they feared most. As an old-line bureaucrat and a member of the Tojo Cabinet that had led Japan to disaster, Kishi seemed to many Japanese a resurrected Tojo or a Hitler.

Reports of the demonstration in the Western press naturally emphasized the leadership taken by Communist-dominated groups, the hiring of some of the demonstrators, the participation of many people simply to avoid the censure of their companions, and, most of all, the acts of violence of the Zengakuren zealots. All these points were true, but to the bulk of the Japanese participants they appear only minor aspects of the movement, more than offset by the use of hired rowdies by certain rightist groups. To the opposition, the demonstration seemed a great and noble expression of popular will. Undoubtedly the vast majority of the demonstrators went out into the streets because they felt that Kishi, in his refusal to dissolve the Diet and in his ramming through of the treaty ratification, was trampling on democracy and leading Japan back to rearmament and war. The student bodies of the universities, for once answering the Zengakuren call, turned out almost en masse. Strollers on the city streets and stay-at-home housewives joined the parades. The faculty and students of five Christian universities of Tokyo organized their own demonstration. Though they paraded some 6,000 strong, they were so careful to avoid inflammatory placards or any sign of violence that their effort went virtually unnoticed by the press.

One interesting feature of the demonstration was that, despite the violently anti-American stand of the Communists and despite the tremendous opposition to the treaty with the United States and the visit of Eisenhower, there was no general anti-American feeling. All observers agree that the demonstrating crowds showed not the slightest sign of hostility toward individual American observers, and almost all Japanese intellectuals who had contact with Americans showed an almost pathetic eagerness to explain the "true situation" to their American friends. My own impression during the aftermath of the crisis is that I have never seen Japanese more genuinely friendly toward the United States.

The May and June outburst, though politically a complete failure, has left a curious sense of excitement, even euphoria, among intellectuals. Since they feel that the greatest weakness of democracy in Japan is the apathy and political inexperience of

the people, they view the mass response of the city crowds, and particularly of themselves, to the political crisis as symbolizing the beginning of "true" democracy in Japan. The university students have enthusiastically switched to a "back to the village movement," by which they mean an effort to stir up greater political consciousness in their home communities. In as much as this effort is aimed primarily at the polls, it may indicate a much healthier political phenomenon than snake-dancing parades. Many intellectuals regard the recent demonstrations as their first practical encounter with politics and argue that if, as foreign critics point out, the weakness of the opposition is its theoreticalness and unrealism, then this marks the first step toward a more realistic approach to political problems.

It must also be recognized that the May and June outburst in a sense centered around the demands of the minority that its view be given serious consideration. The rights of the parliamentary minority have been institutionalized in some countries, as in the curious phenomenon of the filibuster in the United States. The Japanese through this travail may be working out a balance between majority and minority rights that may prove a distinct contribution to democracy—at least as it exists in Japan.

It is easy enough to point out flaws and dangers in the views of the opposition. No one can say what is in the hearts of individual Liberal-Democratic leaders, but the actual political record in post-war Japan and the attitude of the general conservative-voting public would indicate that the fears of the opposition about the Liberal-Democratic Party are grossly exaggerated. Moreover, in a country like Japan in which spontaneous democratic reactions are not yet firmly developed, any recourse to violence or emotional public outbursts seems dangerous. Violence obviously breeds violence. The stabbing by inflamed rightists of Kishi and Kawakami, a Socialist Diet member, at the height of the excitement illustrates the point. Violence by the opposition seems the most likely way to stir up the very rightist reaction that they seek to prevent. And most Western observers are discouraged by the naiveté of the democratic opposition in its acceptance, not only of Communist support, but even of Communist leadership. One can even detect a dangerous tinge of élitism in the intellectuals' unwillingness to accept the conservative vote of rural Japan as a valid expression of majority opinion—an élitism that harks back to an old and most undemocratic tradition.

Much of the opposition's attitude also seems based on unformulated but firm premises that are obviously wrong. One is the assumption that Japan now, as in the past, has an all-powerful government, somehow imposed from the top down. This was more or less the situation up through the age of General MacArthur, less than a decade ago. Intellectuals and the press are apparently so accustomed to this situation that they visualize their role as merely one of criticism. Perhaps, as a result of the recent crisis, the press and some intellectuals have come to realize that, now that government policy is controlled ultimately by popular opinion which they themselves help shape, criticism must be both responsible and realistic.

Another unspoken assumption, I believe, is that American defense of Japan is part of the natural order of things. Few intellectuals seem to have given serious thought to the question whether Japan can maintain true neutrality and independence without first rearming. None seems to have pondered what the Japanese would do if the decisions on nasty international problems were left up to them. They have given no thought to whether or not they would attempt to stop a new Communist aggression in Korea. And yet such difficult questions might well arise whether or not there were a Security Treaty. The chief opposition to the new treaty has been concentrated on Japan's increased responsibility for the American military posture in Japan; the attack has not been a frontal one on American defense itself. In other words, Japanese intellectuals have not realistically faced the logical conclusions of the course they advocate.

### III

All this reveals a weakness of communication between the Western democracies and opposition elements in Japan. Though the latter include the most fervent supporters of peace and democracy, their thinking is so far removed from that of their counterparts in the West that sometimes no real dialogue is possible. On top of the ever-present language barrier stands an even higher barrier of unspoken assumptions that make true understanding difficult.

We can, of course, say that the fault lies with the Japanese intellectuals for being so unrealistic, but the fault also lies with us for failing to understand what is in their minds. The shocking misestimate of the situation in May and June on the part of the

American Government and Embassy in Tokyo reveals how small is our contact with the Japanese opposition. It is natural that our Embassy should have more contact with English-speaking businessmen and with conservative political leaders, who not only stand in the positions of responsibility but also share more of our point of view on world problems. But we should know enough about Japan to realize that a great gulf in thinking lies between these people and the intellectuals and others of the opposition. The latter are right in their charge that the close contacts they once had with Americans during the Occupation no longer exist.

No one can say what the historical upshot of the recent disturbance will be. One could argue that it has offered a sign of the growing gap between the party in power and its opponents, of rising tension and violence that can only end in a leftist revolution or a Fascistic suppression of the opposition. The intemperance of arguments lends support to this thesis. A major economic recession or heightened world tensions would naturally increase the possibilities of this outcome.

Under present conditions, however, a more realistic appraisal might be that the obvious distaste of the Japanese public for violence, the rapid quieting down of the situation, and the sudden judicious balance shown by the press, all indicate that Japan's practical politics will probably continue on its remarkably level course, despite the verbal storms that rage around the ship of state. One might even give some credence to the views of the intellectuals who see the mass demonstrations as strengthening grass-roots democracy and increasing the realism of an overly-theoretical opposition.

One factor that should be borne in mind is the appearance soon on the political scene of the first truly postwar generation, that is, the first group of college graduates which has received the whole of its education since the end of the war. The greatest change in Japanese education has been at the elementary level, and therefore these first products of postwar elementary education are of special interest. The discussion method and study-project system have made them a much more outspoken, individualistic and self-confident group than their predecessors. But just for this reason, they feel all the more alienated from their elders. Their self-reliance could easily turn into revolutionary impatience. On the other hand, their outspokenness and independent outlook could contribute to the strengthening of true democracy.



# WORMWOOD AND GALL

## AN INTROSPECTIVE NOTE ON AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

*By A. Whitney Griswold*

LAST spring and early summer events transpired on the international stage which, if not finally judged to have been disastrous, must certainly be recorded as among the most disconcerting in the annals of American diplomacy. However we may look upon them now, whatever the consequences to which they may have led or may yet lead, the U-2 incident, the wreck of the Summit Conference, the Tokyo riots, the collapse of the Disarmament Conference, and the Cuban crisis constituted a series of immediate setbacks to our foreign policy of such gravity as to cause serious doubts about the conduct of that policy at home and among both friendly and neutral nations abroad. They made it look as though President Eisenhower's personal odyssey in the cause of peace had ended in failure and American leadership of the free nations in that cause had faltered. Hopes for an armistice or an easement of tension in the cold war were dashed and the conflict was resumed with furious intensity over the Arctic, in Cuba and in the Congo.

As these events followed one another in rapid succession they gave rise to increasingly troubled feelings and reflections. The stoning of Vice President Nixon in South America two years ago came vividly to mind. What was happening? Had these things been stage-managed from Moscow? Or did they spring from deeper and more complicated sources? Were they evidence of inadequacy in our own diplomacy? Such were the questions Americans asked themselves as they absorbed their almost daily installments of sensation and shock during the weeks leading up to the national nominating conventions.

Many answers have been given to those questions without, however, allaying the doubts and uncertainties which prompted them. Official explanations of the U-2 flight were so incoherent and self-contradictory that they became as much of an embarrassment as the ill-fated flight itself. The full reason why such a hazardous risk was run so close to a conference on which such prolonged, laborious and elaborate preparations had been expended and in which, rightly or wrongly, so many hopes had been in-

vested, will probably not be known for some time. Neither will the full reason for the subsequent behavior of Khrushchev, who began by making the most of a legitimate grievance handed to him on a silver platter and ended by consuming both grievance and platter in such an egregious display of rage and histrionic self-righteousness as to leave little doubt that he had been out to break up the conference no matter what happened. Why? Had he moved farther toward the West than his military colleagues or the Chinese would tolerate? Or was he subjecting us to the hot-and-cold Pavlov treatment in the hope of reducing us to docility like the famous dogs? Instead of producing answers, the questions merely reproduced themselves.

The mood engendered in many Americans by these events was one of chagrin. It was not unnatural, perhaps, for a nation that has but recently arrived at man's estate in international affairs and had such enormous and unaccustomed responsibilities thrust upon it to feel rueful about some of the things it has experienced in its new role. We have, I think, learned to recognize Communist gall for what it is, and though we do not like its taste, we do not allow it to upset us. But when, as has happened during the past two years, this is augmented by waves of anti-American feelings, demonstrations and manifestations of hostile sentiments in nations dependent upon us in varying measure for economic aid or military protection (or both) and avowedly friendly to our aims, wormwood is mixed with the gall. Savoring the bitter mixture we say to ourselves, we are damned if we don't and damned if we do. After the First World War we were damned for not staying with the peace. Now, after the Second World War, we are damned because we are staying with the peace. A quarter century ago we were denounced as isolationists. Now the slogan is, Yankees go home. As Communist propaganda this is one thing. As a reflection of what may be independent national feelings it is quite another.

We are obliged to face the possibility that it is indeed the latter, without taking refuge in self-pity or thoughts of the ingratitude of friends. For we cannot go home. As shown by the history of our participation in Far Eastern affairs beginning with the writing of the Open Door Notes, isolationism was dying for half a century before it finally expired at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Strong as its historic sources had been—traditional, sociological, geographical or political—they had dried up. The part we played in organizing the United Nations and have continued to play as a member; the

Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO and SEATO; the Korean War; the nomination of President Eisenhower in 1952, and the present platforms of both political parties—these and other events should suffice as proof on both sides of the Iron Curtain of the fundamental change that has taken place in our national outlook and politics. We are forced to stay with the peace by the imperatives of the nuclear age. We therefore have no choice but to master our emotions and examine intellectually the nature of the forces arrayed against us.

## II

The most obvious and easiest to identify of these forces is the Soviet Government and the tactics it employs in the cold war. But, as I have already implied, this is not the only force, and even it is complex in nature. Is it more Russian than it is Communist or more Communist than it is Russian? Did Khrushchev mean what he said about peaceful coexistence in the pages of this magazine last October or was he merely throwing dust in our eyes while preparing new cold war offensives? Which is more significant to us, Khrushchev's speech at Bucharest last June in which he apparently broke with the Chinese once and for all on peaceful coexistence with the West, or subsequent Russian tirades against us over the RB-47, Cuba and the Congo? Possible answers to these questions lead off in many different directions, too many and too different to be boxed up in any such simplified formula as capitalism versus Communism or to admit of the equally simplified explanation that every reverse we have experienced in international affairs was caused by Khrushchev pulling a lever.

Undoubtedly Russia's advance in satellites and missiles, whether or not it is as great in relation to our own as critics of the Eisenhower Administration aver, has been great enough to bring about some shift in the balance of power; and this in turn has influenced the calculations of some of our allies. On the other hand, the aggressive tactics of the Chinese may have caused a compensating shift among some of the neutral nations. The Tokyo riots were not a conclusive test of either hypothesis. Too many non-Communists took part in them; and the horror of nuclear warfare, the seeming contradiction between the treaty and the prohibition against war in the Japanese Constitution—both of which we had sponsored—and revulsion at the parliamentary tactics of the Kishi Government were, in the view of many rioters,

perfectly good Japanese rather than Russian reasons for doing so.

It is of course much easier to be wise after the event than it was before it. But two conclusions about the Tokyo riots seem inescapable. The first is that in both origin and nature they turned out to be very much more complicated than a Communist plot directed from Moscow. The second is that because this complexity was not fully understood by us it cost us another diplomatic setback which might have been avoided.

Does this mean, as some critics have held, that the President should not go traveling abroad on visits of state? I do not think so. There is a time for the President to travel and a time for him not to travel, and it is up to his own judgment and that of his advisers to determine which is which. What the Tokyo experience argues in this regard is that diplomacy is an exacting, full-time profession with a functional purpose as vital to the United States in the space age as it was to the Greeks who started it, to the Italian states which organized it as a profession in the fifteenth century, and as it has been to all the nations, including the United Nations, that have practiced it since those times; and that while personal visits by heads of state may assist in the performance of that function, they can also interfere with it and they can never replace it. Diplomacy is supposed to keep things in a negotiable state. By investing in the process the final authority and national prestige attached to the office of the President, whether it be a summit conference or in a visit of state, we run the risk of freezing what ought to be kept fluid before it is ready to be frozen, of assuming attitudes we did not mean to assume, of manoeuvring ourselves into uncomfortable positions from which we cannot budge. There are times when such a risk is worth taking. Summit conferences may be forced upon us by the fact that in Soviet Russia we are dealing with a totalitarian state which can negotiate to any purpose only through its head. But the risk should never be taken without recognizing that it is a risk, and never in substitution for the systematic formulation and conduct of policy that are the functional as well as the traditional responsibilities of the Department of State. As to visits of state, showmanship is not statesmanship and parades are not plebiscites. After the cheering has died away, warm feelings and pleasant memories of the visitor soon fade unless they are sustained by well-thought-out policy on the basis of which constructive decisions can be made about what to do next.

## III

If we have failed to convince Japan or Cuba or any other free nation of the validity of our foreign policy, the possibility exists that it is because we have failed to give that policy the force and direction it needs. By force I mean the force of conviction, and by direction, a clear view of the principles on which the policy is based and the ends it is intended to accomplish. Could it be that some of both have been lost in the administrative ant hills in which our foreign policy is defined and the intricate filtration system through which it must pass before it can be executed? The President with his staff of special assistants, the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the International Coöperation Administration, the Development Loan Fund, the Export-Import Bank, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency are but some of the agencies directly concerned with the making of foreign policy in addition to the Department of State with its staff of nearly 35,000 officers and employees. In such organizational redundancy, the grass roots from which national aims in a democracy are supposed to spring and the goals of policy into which those aims must be translated may become too widely separated; the computer may be too complicated for the programming, the programming too complicated for the user.

In an age of organization and in a nation with a passion for it, perhaps all this organization is to be expected. But is it wise and is it necessary? It is not for me or any other layman to say just how many men are needed to carry out a given technical assignment within the universal scope of our international commitments and responsibilities, or what the sum of all such technical personnel requirements should be. This is a fast-moving age of scientific and technological revolution which produces (and requires) many experts of many sorts. Conceivably we need more, rather than fewer, men than are at present employed by the Foreign Service, the International Coöperation Administration, the United States Information Agency, and all other operating staffs and agencies in the field. But when it comes to the goals toward which the efforts of these technicians are to be directed, the fundamental conception and definition of the policy without which they will be the blind leading the blind, wisdom is at an even greater



premium than technical knowledge and facts; and wisdom has a tendency to shun crowds. The present foreign policy of the United States needs to be enriched by creative ideas as much as does American art or American music. Creative ideas are seldom produced by conferences or committees. There is one maxim attributed to Lenin the wisdom of which transcends its origin. It is, Reduce the membership and strengthen the Party. This might well be applied to the sprawling, many-headed colossus that now directs our foreign affairs.

At the same time the grass roots need tending. The American electorate has hardly begun to acquire the knowledge of its foreign affairs that should go with its responsibilities. I use the word knowledge broadly to include understanding as well as information. Too often foreign problems are reduced to the metaphor of the prize ring: "Lodge hits back at Gromyko" and "Let's stand up and slug it out toe-to-toe with Khrushchev." Granted that the whole subject of foreign affairs is inherently complex, and that the more it involves military considerations and the more military considerations depend upon scientific data, the more esoteric it becomes. This is no reason for the layman to wash his hands of it. On the contrary, it is a reason for him to improve his knowledge so as to be able to give the policy-maker discriminating support or to register intelligent dissent in moments of decision.

Yet we are woefully deficient in the means of acquiring such knowledge. Outside of our larger cities—and inside many of them—foreign news receives meagre treatment in the press; and in our educational system as a whole, in relation to the present responsibilities of the United States, the academic map of the world is almost as primitive as the maps of Columbus. The press has a great void to fill; the academic map must be redrawn to include nations and civilizations—heretofore known only to explorers, missionaries and professional diplomats—which man's skill and man's fate have brought together with us in a realm of common experience. The obligation of our educational system, particularly of our colleges and universities, does not stop with the study of these nations and peoples. It includes the devising of ways for them to study us—for their professional apprentices, above all, their teachers, to spend part of their apprenticeship in our institutions of higher learning, as we have long since been accustomed to do in the universities of Britain and the Continent. This, incidentally, holds true for Europe as well as for Asia and Africa.

But the obligation of our colleges and universities extends still further. One of the most serious difficulties our diplomacy has encountered is the lack of understanding of science and its role in the modern world. The isolation of scientific knowledge from general knowledge has become a subject of growing concern to scientists and philosophers on both sides of the Atlantic. Scientists are no less troubled than philosophers by the widespread impression that science is mainly preoccupied with instruments of destruction and by the veil of official secrecy that enhances that impression and makes it difficult to dispel. Apart from the natural frustration they feel at such a misrepresentation of the true aims of science, they are dismayed by our failure to utilize scientific knowledge as effectively in eliminating the causes of the cold war as we do in augmenting its arsenals. Moreover, in the gap between scientific and non-scientific knowledge they see a lively possibility of tragic mistakes and misadventures.

It may never be possible to close this gap altogether, but it can be narrowed and bridged. American society is more gregarious than the British, and our college curriculum is less highly specialized than in the English universities of which C. P. Snow writes. Nevertheless, the gap exists here also, and in the direct interest of the foreign policy of the United States the colleges and universities must put forward their best efforts to close it. Not least of their advantages in this task is the tradition of a university as a community of scholars in which knowledge is shared rather than bottled up and monopolized. They are called upon now to revive that tradition and put to its service all the ingenuity and resources at their command, so that we may not only be competent in science and technology but also able to understand more perfectly their meaning and relationship to the other arts by which we live.

#### IV

The most disturbing of all thoughts inspired by recent events—more disturbing even than the thought that the sacrifices we made in the Korean War and the billions of dollars we have spent in aid of the free and uncommitted nations should hang in precarious balance in the scales of world opinion—is our suspicion today that on the one hand we are not gauging the independent aims and interests of those nations as clearly as we should and on the other that they may not see ours as clearly as they should.

Do the aims and interests of those nations form or correspond to any consistent pattern according to which our policy should be more closely shaped?

It is a common complaint of the professional diplomatist engaged in his day-to-day tasks in the field that he cannot see the woods for the trees. As he works away, more often than not with great industry and competence, he suffers for want of a grand design within which he can feel his labors are leading to some constructive conclusion or goal. It is at this point that the policy-maker must come to his assistance, and the electorate and the educational system must come to the aid of the policy-maker. Have they done so? When Vice President Nixon was stoned in South America, it was said that this was not such a bad thing after all because it taught us the importance of understanding and keeping up with what was going on in that part of the world. How much it may have taught us and how much we have yet to learn remain to be seen. In the Castro revolution, for example, we are dealing with economic and social forces that had become clearly visible in Cuba a decade ago. Similarly, the Tokyo riots took our officials unawares in a country in which we had had unusual opportunities for first-hand observation and study.

It would be rash indeed to suggest that these events were entirely and exactly predictable, and equally rash to attribute them wholly or even mainly to the machinations of Khrushchev. Perhaps it will help us to see and understand them and others like them more clearly if we take into fuller account the five distinct yet simultaneous and interrelated revolutionary forces that common knowledge tells us have been and are at work in the world. The first of these is a scientific revolution, the second is an industrial revolution, the third is the Communist revolution and the fourth is a revolutionary movement toward national independence. The fifth is a restiveness on the part of the younger generation which is evident in almost all countries and reaches revolutionary intensity and proportions in some.

The cold war is neither the cause of these revolutions nor the result of them, though it happens to be going on at the same time and is, of course, fed by one of them, namely, the Communist. If we would keep the well-known fact of the existence of these revolutions more clearly in mind day in and day out, and if we would ask ourselves whether or how any of them or any combination of them may be affecting each specific situation of national concern,

public opinion might gain perspective and our diplomacy might be caught off-guard less often.

The scientific revolution caused by recent discoveries about the nature of energy, space, time and matter is the greatest and most far-reaching in its effects since the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. The industrial revolution, to which the earlier scientific discoveries gave rise in the eighteenth century and grew mightily in the nineteenth, has been spreading through the world ever since. The scientific revolution of our time has infused it with new forces—electronics, automation, atomic power—and thereby is accelerating its spread. In heretofore unindustrialized countries such as India, China, Indonesia and the African nations, changes in human society are in prospect, if not already begun, which will have more momentous social, economic and political effects than any that have taken place since man turned from hunting to agriculture. Because nations are similarly affected by the scientific and the industrial revolutions, it might be supposed that they would be drawn together by them. So they might be were it not for the Communist revolution that exploits the gap between the backward and more highly developed peoples and the virulent nationalism that often accompanies the move toward independence.

The scientific revolution did not start the Communist revolution. The industrial revolution did not start it. Its prophet, Marx, rested his case on industrial data that were in process of rapid change while he wrote and obsolete when he had finished his writing. Marx put a doctrinaire interpretation on the industrial revolution and promised all who accepted his doctrine the complete “scientific” rationalization of that revolution in economic and social terms. That promise has never been made good. In most countries it has died a-borning; claims to have fulfilled it have been made in others where the rationalizing has been done and enforced by absolute dictatorial authority. The very fact of coercion belies the pretension of scientific inevitability. On the other hand, where the industrial revolution has been permitted to develop in conditions of greater freedom the evils predicted by Marx have not ensued. It has steadily improved rather than worsened the conditions of labor. Marx proclaimed the Communist revolution as the final evolutionary phase of a highly industrialized society. Instead, it has taken root only in underdeveloped agrarian societies.

Of all five revolutionary forces the restiveness of youth, which seems the most familiar, is perhaps the least well understood. This restiveness manifests itself on the surface in forms ranging all the way from jazz festival riots in the United States and England to the overthrow of governments in Turkey, South Korea and Japan. It impels nations now one way, now the other. In Turkey and South Korea it appears to have been directed toward and resulted in more democratic régimes. In Japan, though some of it was similarly directed, it is still too soon to judge results. In Cuba it appears to be moving in the opposite direction. In all of these countries it has proved to be a force to contend with, as it is in one form or another in every country, including our own.

There is more to this force than the normal friction between the generations. There is something in the minds of young people today which they themselves have not been able to make wholly articulate and not all the behavioral sciences have succeeded in bringing out fully into the light. Exactly what that is lies beyond my scope and perhaps my competence to explain. Suffice it to recognize it as a subject of profound significance to our diplomacy and to offer three thoughts which may shed some light upon it.

The first thought is that youth is far more disillusioned with war than most of its elders—who think that they too are disillusioned with it—realize. With this disillusionment goes a disbelief in the old concepts of patriotism and codes of chivalry that used to find their ultimate fulfillment and sanction in war. Yet patriotism is not dead and youth still feels the primal urge to fight. The Great Deterrent wrings the last drop of glamor, even of honor, out of war, but does not stop our young men from fighting in Korea; or serving the armed forces of their country with courage and devotion; or, at high school age, fighting one another in gangs for the sole purpose of proving their courage to themselves; or, as college students, withdrawing into the symbolic rebellion of the beatnik, or actively contesting or rioting against any and all semblances of authority. Where there is plenty of freedom and the living is good, they riot at jazz festivals. Where there is not plenty of freedom and the living is precarious, they riot to overthrow the government. One thing that gives continuity to these actions is their thoughts about war. In Japan, for example, when non-Communist students were asked what they were thinking about when they joined in the Tokyo riots, they are said to have replied, "The day the sky turned red and our



house burned down." I am sure that in the American and English riots touched off by jazz rather than by treaties of alliance the same feelings and thoughts about war (though we might have to probe more deeply to discover them)—the same skepticism, mistrust and unbelief concerning everything and everyone connected with war—were present in the minds of the rioters as were present in the minds of those in Tokyo.

A second thought about the restiveness of the younger generation relates particularly to the underdeveloped and emergent nations. In these it is only the younger generation that has received any education in our sense of the word. Because of previous conditions the educational opportunity has passed the older generation by. As this opportunity now brings knowledge of the world flooding into these countries, that knowledge will fill only one set of receptacles. This means that, to the degree that political stability depends upon the balancing weight of age and experience, there will be less and less political stability.

Even in countries like our own, mastery of the scientific and industrial revolutions—if they are ever to be mastered—is going to the rising generation; and the pace of those revolutions is handing the future to that generation more rapidly and more completely than most of us realize. This brings me to my third thought about its restiveness. This restiveness is not to be understood purely by its more obvious symptoms. Underlying it is a more accurate knowledge of the physical world and a potentially more intelligent disposition of its human affairs than any which have preceded them. Knowledge turns into power. The forms that power will take will depend upon the way in which the United States, the free nations and the emergent nations respond to the educational challenge that confronts them all.

This much is certain: the five revolutionary forces which I have cited, and which are often treated or taken for granted as being one and the same thing, are neither one and the same thing nor yet the ineluctable, deterministic results of one another, but separate and distinct things which can, and often do, move in different combinations and directions. There is scope for nations to react to these five forces, and to others that might be added, such as hunger and fear, in a multiplicity of ways. A better understanding of the forces would not only give us a clearer idea of the general direction our foreign policy should take but a firmer grasp of the concrete situations to which it is applied.

There remains the possibility that we may not have given the world an accurate impression of our own national character and aims. In this regard what we do about ourselves counts for much more than what we say about ourselves. As it is, the free and neutral nations know several things about us which, though our statesmen may not have turned them to immediate advantage, should be decided assets to our diplomacy in the long run; and I suspect that the Russians know these things, too. One is that, whatever else our failings and shortcomings, we are poor dissemblers, more accustomed to blurting out the truth than to keeping state secrets. We believe that the truth is on our side and will prevail. Another is that no other nation in history has ever achieved such power and used it with such forbearance in its international relations. Another is that the spirit which produced the charters of free government and individual liberty in our Constitution and its Bill of Rights, and which now supports those principles in the United Nations, is stronger than any disposition to feel sorry for ourselves because we are misunderstood or to withdraw into ourselves because of diplomatic reverses. Again, American capitalism bears no more resemblance to the Communist picture of it than Abraham Lincoln does to Karl Marx (or, for that matter, than the present Russian industrial state to the one that Marx prophesied). No nation has created as productive an economy as ours; none provides so many opportunities and so much freedom for human talent to find its natural outlet. These truths can be denied, but not successfully in the long run.

When the free nations examine the record they must conclude, too, that we are not imperialists. We never were imperialists. Our tentative, highly self-conscious, highly imitative adventures in imperialism at the turn of the century were short-lived and ended in remorse. As far as concerns China, now our principal accuser in this respect, we have always been anti-imperialist. During the entire history of our relations with China, as the record plainly shows, we have defended her territorial and administrative integrity. This was the fundamental principle around which our whole Far Eastern policy was built. The Russians know (though it is convenient for them to forget it) that it saved them the maritime provinces of Siberia. The nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain should know, finally, that we are not merely the leader of a defen-

sive alliance but rather a participant in a common effort on the part of free nations and nations emerging into freedom to build a community of peace, in which mankind may emancipate itself from hunger and disease and improve its standard of living, as modern science and technology have now, for the first time in history, made universally possible.

Much has been said during this presidential campaign about the image of America and how to improve it. To begin with, we must have a good original. On this subject I think no one has spoken more wisely than the French economist Turgot, who in 1778, shortly after the Battle of Saratoga and the alliance with France had ensured the success of our struggle for independence, wrote to his English friend Dr. Richard Price about the American people as follows:

This people is the hope of the human race. It may become the model. It ought to show the world by facts, that men can be free and yet peaceful, and may dispense with the chains in which tyrants and knaves of every color have presumed to bind them, under pretext of the public good. The Americans should be an example of political, religious, commercial, and industrial liberty. The asylum they offer to the oppressed of every nation, the avenue of escape they open, will compel governments to be just and enlightened; and the rest of the world in due time will see through the empty illusions in which policy is conceived. But to obtain these ends for us, America must secure them to herself.

These prophetic words point to a fundamental principle which we neglect at our peril: that is, the continuity between domestic and foreign policy. Granted that the Communists have done everything in their power to deface our national portrait and poison the minds of its beholders. But if the rest of the world cannot see in us all that we should like them to see, the main reason is because we cannot see it in ourselves, no matter how often or how hard we stare in the mirror. The mirror cannot create; it can only reflect, and what is not there will not be reflected. In the domestic realm we have unfinished social and economic business of grave importance on our hands. It is itemized in the platforms of both parties. One way to strengthen our foreign policy is to get on with that business. This is not the responsibility of our diplomacy. It is our responsibility *to* our diplomacy.

# THE CUBAN CRISIS

## FAILURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

*By Adolf A. Berle, Jr.*

THE deepening crisis in Cuba inescapably reflects a failure of American foreign policy. Failure rather than disaster, for the situation is not unmanageable. Yet it should not have happened. Because somewhat similar crises are possible in other parts of Latin America, it is not amiss to analyze the policy (or lack of it) for future reference.

The more obvious background events are well-known; they need only be summarized here. Cuba as an independent state came into existence as a result of the Spanish-American War. This in turn was the climax of the war of independence sporadically carried on in the island for a long time, reaching an active phase in 1895. Three bloody years preceded the three-months war with Spain. On December 10, 1898, by the Treaty of Paris, Spain renounced her claims to lands discovered by Columbus. American occupation was set up under the Governor Generalship of Leonard Wood; parties were organized, elections were held. On May 20, 1902, the Cuban Republic was inaugurated and the American occupation ended. The United States retained the right to intervene in Cuba to restore order; this right, rarely exercised (and never successfully), was renounced by the United States in 1934.

Meanwhile, Cuba pursued her independent way with substantial success. Among other things, desiring to assure an economic base for the new country, the United States assured her preferential tariff treatment for imports of Cuban sugar. This was subsequently translated into the large quota of Cuban sugar granted import into the protected American market. Then, as now, Cuba's primary economic resource was the growing of sugar cane and its manufacture into raw sugar, chiefly for export.

The economic life of Cuba was, quite obviously, bound up with that of the United States. Geography would have done this in any event. The economic norms of civilized intercourse were then the conventional ones of private commerce and investment. Cubans traded with Americans. Americans invested in Cuba. This was not philanthropy on either side. The trade was mutually profitable. One must note here a distortion of history which is

being widely pushed both in Latin America and among the less responsible intellectuals of the United States. This is that the current of trade and investment, being "dollar diplomacy," was merely a purposeful establishment by the United States of an "informal empire." (I have even heard Cubans insist that the United States "intervenes" in Cuba merely because it exists, is nearby and is economically powerful.) The argument is not entitled to intellectual respect. Eras move in their own times. From 1900 at least until 1933, Cuba had only three possible alternatives. She could be a colony, she could be an independent entity living within the only trade system then current, or she could starve. Of the three, the second alternative was obviously the most advantageous. The intellectuals who now irresponsibly use the strictly propaganda word "imperialism" are men who never experienced real "empire." In point of fact, Cuba was as free to develop her life, moral structure and social forms as any small country at the time—perhaps as any small country can be.

## II

More recent Cuban history developed stress, despite substantial and continuing economic progress measured statistically. From 1927 on, the world produced great surpluses of raw sugar. It sold at catastrophically low prices, even in the protected American market. Distress grew. An aggravating factor was that cane sugar employment, besides being unskilled and badly paid, is seasonal: sugar mills grind from December or January to early May. During the dead season only a fraction of field labor is employed. By 1933 the government of the country then headed by President Gerardo Machado was in trouble.

In the late summer of that year a revolution came to a climax, forcing Machado to flee. A government, chiefly composed of students, was set up in Havana, whose head was a former university professor, Dr. Grau San Martin. The real power was held by Fulgencio Batista, an army sergeant who had led a mutiny displacing all the Cuban officers and had established himself at Camp Columbia as the leader of the Cuban armed forces. In parts of the country mobs held sway, and there was more than a trace of Communist agitation. Personal power at length came to rest in the hands of Batista and the armed forces. He became a candidate for President, was elected and assumed office on October 10, 1934. At the expiration of his term, Grau San Martin was elected Presi-



dent; he was followed in October 1948 by President Prio Socarras. Batista, who had been biding his time politically, again presented himself for President in June 1952. But when it became clear to him and his supporters that the vote was running heavily against him, he coolly took over the army, assumed the presidency and became in fact a military dictator.

As dictators go, in the earlier days of his power Batista might have been worse. Stealing of government funds reached phenomenal proportions under Grau San Martin and Prio Socarras. It is no compliment to Batista to say that he personally did not equal their record. His friends and associates nevertheless did pretty well. Economic considerations favored this: the market for sugar during and after World War II, and through 1957, was high. Money was plentiful. Until the last few months the Cuban Army was generally loyal to Batista; during much of his career, indeed, it was reported to be the highest paid army in the world. Social legislation was enacted. Wages of Cuban workmen about doubled in the decade from 1949 to 1959, though their real wage had perhaps increased by only 50 percent. But employment in the cane fields was still seasonal. The base from which the increase took place was so low that improvement (like that occurring in the days before the French Revolution) emphasized the fact of poverty almost as much as it ameliorated it. Twenty-five percent of Cuban labor is reported to have been "normally" unemployed. Wealth was hopelessly concentrated in a tiny upper class, which displayed a shockingly small sense of social responsibility to the Cuban masses. Graft in Havana was the rule rather than the exception. Against a background of military dictatorship no peaceful way out was apparent. When a government can be changed only by force, revolution through civil war (its date uncertain) is almost inevitable, though there are rare cases where the dictator will—and can—abdicate peacefully.

In point of fact, Fidel Castro headed an abortive attempt at such a revolution on July 26, 1953. He organized a small force intending to initiate a revolution. Most of his force was wiped out; he was captured, imprisoned and subsequently released. Once more he organized a small force, this time in Mexico, and succeeded in taking a dozen men to the Sierra Maestra to carry on guerrilla warfare.

The political program developed in this period was far from clear. Primarily it opposed the dictatorship of Batista. From the

1953 attempt it could have been known that the movement sought social justice for the unemployed and the agricultural laborers, distribution of land, the cutting of rents, industrialization, rise in productivity, and better distribution. At the time, nothing anti-American was suggested; that was to come later.

By early 1958, two facts became clear. One was that a substantial majority of Cuba wanted no more of Fulgencio Batista. The other was that a contra-Batista revolution had wide support among Latin American democratic leaders throughout the entire Caribbean area. Castro indeed was receiving aid from Venezuela, from Central America and from diverse elements in the United States where somewhat ineffective efforts of the United States Government failed to prevent a flow of money and supplies, including arms, to him. The Batista government protested against any support reaching the Castro insurrection on the familiar ground that this constituted "intervention." The pro-Castro group countered with bitter charges that the United States (presumably by stopping flow of supplies to Castro) was supporting undemocratic dictatorship. They likewise charged that the United States was giving Batista arms—a charge which had a measure of truth in it since under military aid agreements Washington had in the past supplied, and was obligated to supply, a certain measure of weapons and munitions. It must be added that as the civil war increased, Washington not only dragged its feet but came perilously close to breaking the agreement in an effort not to give arms or other assistance to the Batista government—just as it was also endeavoring not to permit American supplies to flow to the insurrection in the Sierra Maestra.

Batista had enjoyed the passive support of a small but toughly organized Cuban Communist group. Around their hard core they had recruited sympathizers who may not have been Communists but were prepared to follow the Communist lead. Apparently the hard core decided the time had come to change sides. In mid-1958 they signaled a shift in policy, determined to support Fidel Castro, strengthening their organization, especially in Havana, and awaited the outcome. Also, as 1958 drew to its close, elements of the Cuban Army ceased to be reliable Batista forces. Some changed sides. Conspiracies of officers against the Batista government were increasingly frequent. The break-up of that government was in sight.

At least three separate and distinct groups were now converg-

ing on Havana. Fidel Castro himself with his brother, Raul, were in Oriente Province far removed from the capital. Other groups who had steadily supported him in his revolution, though without commitment as to the future government of the country, moved in as the situation broke up. On January 1, 1959, Batista fled. An underground youth group emerged, took over, stopped looting, and occupied the police stations and the palace. "Che" Guevara, as head of insurrectionist troops, seized Cabañas fortress on January 2. An anti-Castro Colonel, Ramon Barquin, freed from imprisonment, assumed temporary chieftainship of the Cuban armies and immediately sent out a call for Castro to come to Havana.

In Santiago on January 2 Castro announced the formation of a government under former Judge Manuel Urrutia Lleo as provisional President. Urrutia returned the compliment by naming Castro head of the nation's armed forces, and he outlined a political policy. Constitutional guarantees were to be restored. Freedom of press and radio would be reestablished. Harvesting of the sugar crop was to be started on schedule. The new government would honor international commitments. On January 8 Castro and his *barbudos* marched into Havana. There was general rejoicing not only in Cuba but in most of Latin America. The democratic revolution which began when Brazil broke away from dictatorship in 1945, overthrowing on its way, among others, Argentina's Peron, Colombia's Rojas Pinilla and Venezuela's Perez Jimenez, had at length arrived in Havana. One of the great leaders of the democratic movement, former President Jose Figueres of Costa Rica, who with President Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela had actively assisted Castro, promptly offered the new government his congratulations and help. A star had been restored to the galaxy of Latin American democracy.

Disillusionment came swiftly. Within a month Cuban observers were shocked at a new and quite different note: increasing and bitter anti-Americanism within the Castro group which bore the earmark of organized propaganda. On a visit to Venezuela, Fidel Castro attacked the United States and proposed to "liberate" Puerto Rico. A group of Cubans attempted a guerrilla landing in Panama, synchronized with a left-wing demonstration against the United States there. In March, President Figueres visited Cuba as guest of the Castro government. He was invited to speak at a mass meeting. He found himself in the center of a throng at

which Castro and his associates violently inveighed against the United States. Figueres replied defending the United States—following which Castro attacked him personally, including President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela for good measure, although these had previously been his principal supporters.

This attack was an overt turning-point. A number of the leaders who had fought with the Castro forces in the Sierra Maestra left for Central America, seeing the handwriting on the wall. Communists and pro-Communists all over Latin America opened a barrage against the democratic governments and their leaders. Their complaint appeared to be that these were “stooges of American imperialism,” meaning that they were not hostile to the United States. In April 1959, a number of Cuban leaders who had assisted Castro in obtaining power reviewed the situation. They were clear that Castro’s policy was now to set up a straight Communist government, and were wholly unconvinced by his violent denials. Some recalled that it was standard Communist practice to deny the Communist affiliations of governments they were in process of establishing. Similar denials had been made with great vehemence when Soviet-dominated forces seized Czechoslovakia, and again when the Chinese revolution was in progress. Sadly, they passed the tragic verdict: “A betrayed revolution.”

Castro visited the United States that spring. He was well received. Obviously he had American sympathy. Unhappily it rapidly became clear that what Castro said in Washington was the opposite of what he and his friends were saying and doing in Cuba. An agrarian reform law was promulgated by the Castro dictatorship on June 3. Its provisions gave quite legitimate concern to American landowners there. A courteous note by the United States on the subject was answered on June 15 by the Cuban Foreign Office in reasonably courteous terms, but by Castro himself with a tirade of abuse directed against the United States. By midsummer capable State Department officers were warning that Latin America was beginning to believe that the United States was supine and helpless in face of the superior power and propaganda of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean. A stream of Cubans leaving the Castro régime were insisting that the revolution was betrayed; and that, behind Castro’s manic oratory, Communists were organizing affairs.

Since then, the communization of Cuba has followed the classic tactical pattern. Denials and other explanations have been volu-

minous. The fact that Castro was not a member of the Communist Party (he probably is not) has been stressed. Another line has been that he is endeavoring to create a nationalist government like that of Nasser in Egypt. The point was made that there are non-Communists in his government, and it has been insisted that the Communist character of the government has not been proved. For obvious reasons the internal intellectual history of the Castro government is not yet traceable. Clearly a social revolution was being effected. It is possible that its actual orientation during 1959 was under debate. The undeniable fact is that in result its orientation became, in terms of foreign relations as well as in terms of structure, Communist in character. Until historical evidence is available, we shall not know whether this had been intended at the outset, or whether the decision was taken after January 1, 1959. It can only be noted that as early as March 1959 some of the most capable men associated with Castro in the Sierra Maestra were clear that the revolution was intentionally being directed into Communist hands and that Cuba was intentionally being made an enemy of the United States.

A year later Soviet intervention became overt. Mikoyan paid a state visit. In May 1960, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would "defend" Cuba against "American aggression." In July 1960 Raul Castro visited Czechoslovakia to buy arms and Moscow to receive honors. Meanwhile, Cuban embassies all over Latin America (save where the personnel has defected) openly engage in pro-Communist organizing activity. To the extent they are allowed, they distribute Communist literature, much of which is reported to have been printed in Moscow. Cuban agents, with Communist support, are endeavoring to upset the government of Guatemala and are active in agitation elsewhere. Khrushchev has announced that the Monroe Doctrine "has died a natural death" and should be interred as a stinking corpse.

The situation may be summarized. Wholesale social and economic change was needed—indeed, was long overdue—in Cuba. Given the military dictatorship of Batista, revolution was the only way by which it could be secured. This was the feeling of the United States and of most of the specialists in the Department of State. There was a general American disposition to assist the process. From the inception of the new régime, January 1, 1959, to midsummer of 1960, the Government of the United States behaved with scrupulous consideration and tolerance.



But, from the spring of 1959 on, directors of the Cuban revolution seemed as much interested in picking a quarrel with the United States as in effecting their social revolution. American policy and American diplomacy avoided giving any pretext for hostility, and acted with remarkable moderation in the face of growing provocation. It had not, as in the case of the Bolivian revolution of 1954, moved in to offer direct assistance, and in retrospect it is unclear whether such coöperation would have been possible. In any case, it is one thing to offer friendship to a revolution. It is not so easy to offer support to a revolutionary group which proclaims the desire and intent to become an enemy of the United States. The problem becomes infinitely more difficult when that revolution throws itself into the game of world power politics, sacrifices Cuban national safety and Cuban national interests by seeking to make that country and its people a part of the Soviet empire and its régime a client government of Moscow.

### III

The present situation is clear enough. Under the Castro government, Cuba is carrying out a social revolution. In this it had general popular sympathy in the United States and tolerant acceptance by the United States Government. It also chose, apparently intentionally, to become anti-American when anti-Americanism appeared wholly unnecessary. Pretexts given the Cuban people for this sound strange to American ears. (The Cuban people were to arm and, if need be, die to repel a threatened American invasion which was a pure figment of imagination.) Organizing a social revolution apparently was not good enough; it had also to be converted into an act of hostility to the United States. Apparently, also, Cuban politicians increasingly conceive themselves as divinely appointed leaders to carry on anti-United States activities throughout the entire hemisphere, and to become spearheads in aligning Latin America with the Soviet or the Chinese Communist bloc in a cold war aimed directly against the national existence of the United States.

To assess the substantive failure requires an understanding of the shift in Latin American affairs over the past 15 years. Partly as a result of economic and social change, Latin America since 1945 has progressively abandoned the system of dictatorial rule by *caudillos* all the way from Cape Horn to Central America. It has established governments stemming from direct and more or

less popular elections. This sweeping revolution, embracing the better part of a continent and a half and affecting most of its 180 or more millions of people, has been treated by the Department of State as an almost trivial change—and not a wholly agreeable one.

The State Department carried on a conventional policy of friendship with the governments of these countries before their dictatorships fell. Its diplomats had been on friendly terms, sometimes intimate, with the dictators. So long as these were in general friendly to the United States, respected our interests and cooperated with our policy, the diplomatic task was considered done. Although these dictators (like all rulers whose power does not come from popular assent) had to maintain a steady and frequently an increasingly cruel policy of suppressing popular opposition by police methods, the United States took pains not to show sympathy with their opponents—irrespective of the quality of the men or of the forces they symbolized. In this attitude, the Department was supported by a steady stream of reports from the chiefs of dictatorial secret police to the effect that all their opponents were “Communist.” This material found its way into the State Department files, and was fed to Congressional and other officials. It proved a useful excuse for harrying and harassing entirely genuine democratic leaders and movements.

Whether in their own countries, or in exile or refuge in the United States, the democratic leaders found themselves baffled, discredited, almost persecuted by the Government of the United States—supposedly the symbol of democracy. When their revolutions succeeded, as they did in Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica (where Figueres overthrew a Communist-Fascist dictatorship in 1948) and Honduras, the misinformation and prejudice in many cases held over. In most instances the trouble has been repaired. In a number of important countries, the Chiefs of State and their associates had received the shabbiest of treatment (to understate the case) before they acceded to power. Yet by all intellectual standards they were precisely the men the United States should have best understood.

One must be just here to our diplomats. They consider their business to be handling relations between governments. Intimacy and friendship with the occupants of the palaces is a normal goal. Having views about the social conditions in, or the form of government of, any country is not, as they construe it, their function.

The character of its government and the structure of its social system are matters for the people of that country only. Sympathy for a Betancourt during the dictatorship of Perez Jimenez in Venezuela—to take one example—would spoil or embitter inter-relationships. Courtesy, even decorations, given to dictatorial officials were thought to assist in maintaining “good relations.” One no more questioned the popular implications of such moves than eighteenth century ambassadors in Europe questioned the right of the reigning prince, however unpopular, to his throne.

Accompanying this classic diplomatic habit, there was exaggeration of the doctrine of “non-intervention.” Prior to 1932, the United States Government had in certain situations intervened with Marines and economic measures to protect American rights, or to assist in restoring order. This excited deep resentment in Latin America. At the Montevideo Conference of 1933, Secretary Hull had renounced this right, just as he renounced the right to intervene in Cuba under the Platt Amendment in 1934. At the Conference of Buenos Aires in 1936, more specific renunciation was made when the United States voted for a declaration against non-intervention. But “intervention” was then well understood, and its outlines were reasonably clear. The intervention referred to was intervention by force of arms, or by blockade. It was not assumed then, nor is it today, that a country cannot have an opinion of its neighbor governments, or a point of view about them, or about social conditions in them, or that such opinions or points of view cannot be expressed. Certainly the governments, the diplomats, the politicians and the press of Latin America have felt entirely free to express their opinions of the policies and make-up of neighboring countries, including the Government of the United States.

Further, by a growing consensus now embodied in the Charter of Bogota in 1948, the American nations have brought into being a body of principles which are acknowledged to be of common concern to all of them. Included in these are fundamental principles of human rights and freedoms. For example, it is recognized that social justice and social security are bases of lasting peace (Charter of the O.A.S., Article 5-h) and that every person in the hemisphere has the elementary rights of free association, liberty under law, and freedom of religion, of opinion and of expression of ideas. Nothing in the doctrine of non-intervention imposed either on the Department of State or on its embassies the obligation not to

understand and not to express an opinion about the political and social movements which were sweeping the hemisphere.

The doctrine of non-intervention as practiced thus became almost a doctrine that the United States would encourage the status quo, however unsatisfactory to the local population. But in the case of dictatorships, the only certainty is that at some point the status quo will change. In the democratic revolution of the past 15 years, this exaggerated interpretation gave the impression that the United States was almost an ally of the systems which were steadily being overthrown. The excuse given—that the democratic movements were perhaps “Communist” in character—was untrue to begin with. Any force it might have had was nullified by the strange fashion in which the United States allowed it to be known in ensuing elections that it favored this, that or the other candidate who not infrequently accepted Communist support, as was the case in Venezuela. And, not infrequently, the individual thus silently favored was defeated.

The only safety, then and now, was for the United States to make a positive affirmation of faith and to act as a solid intellectual and spiritual protagonist of that faith. Partly because this is the only self-respecting position a great power can take, and still more because of the respect Latin Americans of all political faiths have for men who act consistently on principle, the United States lost one of the greatest opportunities it has had. Perhaps in Castro's reestablishment of naked dictatorship, the opportunity recurs in another form.

In the Cuban case, this continuous, cautious and technically correct attitude of the United States made it easy to represent her as a supporter of the Batista régime. The accusation was not fair. Particularly in later phases, the United States went as far as perhaps it properly could in doing nothing positive which would shore up his falling power. Because the State Department was well informed about Castro (rightly, as the event proved), and had little faith in his democratic propensities, it did not choose to decide between either contender, justifying its aloofness in the name of non-intervention. Factually, for a substantial period of time, the aggregate morale of the Cuban revolution was democratic, anti-dictatorial and anti-Communist. That force could and should have been encouraged, canalized, and, in the hour of its success, given every assistance. A liberal democracy as well as drastic social reform was what Cuba wanted when it

revolted against Batista. It is what a great majority of Cubans want now.

## IV

Also among the substantive reasons for our failures in Latin America was the surprising ineptness of our economic policy. Contrary to general opinion, the heart of Latin American political formation does not revolve around economic issues: the Latin American begins with philosophical principles and only secondarily translates them into economics. Nevertheless, economics are of enormous importance. On them hang the hopes of emergence from the nineteenth century shackles of grinding poverty for the vast majority and of wealth for a small oligarchic upper class.

The United States by all normal standards was not ungenerous, though by comparison with her munificence towards Europe its aid to Latin America was pitifully small. But it was planless: there was no attempt to work out a continental program with the same sweep and objectives as that adopted for the Marshall Plan in Europe. Preachments about the value of private enterprise and investment and the usefulness of foreign capital were, to most students of the situation, a little silly. In Latin America, as elsewhere, there is a great and extremely useful place to be filled by foreign investment, and a great deal of work which can be done very well by private enterprise. But not always, and not everywhere. Probably, if the truth were known, this form of economic development in Latin America at the moment is a minority rather than a majority function. With the possible exception of Brazil (a very great country developing her own norms and rules), the chief capital developments have to be carried on either by public enterprise, or by mixed public and private enterprise, or in any case by arrangements stemming from the central state. Indeed, in some of the Indian regions of South America, private property as we understand it is almost unknown.

Coupled with the absence of over-all planning, foreign aid, like private investment, became a hit-or-miss sort of thing. This is not to suggest that in many cases great good was not done. Rather it is to say that opportunities were lost to present to Latin America as a whole a clear-cut, viable program giving solid basis for a pledge that production per capita would rise by a stated percent in a stated number of years—a rise which could be greater than the increases promised by Communist agitators.



The social conditions presently existing in Latin America were normal in the nineteenth century; questionable in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century; intolerable now. The measure of improvement has served to highlight the difference in the condition between the great majority of Latin Americans and corresponding conditions among the populations of the United States and Western Europe. There was—there is—no particular faith (and not much reason for any) in the proposition that unmodified continuance of the existing social-economic systems will produce general improvement.

Bracketed with this is the eternal problem of social justice. Foreign aid or private investment may industrialize, may increase production, and still leave the masses in as bad shape as ever. Obviously when the United States through its private or its public sector decides to invest in or otherwise to assist another country in the hemisphere, its primary objective should not be the creation of a few more Latin American millionaires. It should assure itself that the fruits of the increased production will be used to give greater measure of food, health and comfort and (still more) hope for the future, to the *peon* or *guajiro* or *campesino*, rather than to bankers or landowners. Here our old friend “non-intervention” bobs up again. Is this the business of the United States? Should we have offered aid with “strings,” conditioning grants on social effectiveness? The answer is yes. No one is obliged to seek capital in the American market, or to accept assistance through foreign loans or grants. The purpose in either situation must be the purpose of the United States, which has every right to state it, express it, and work out plans by which the purpose will be fulfilled. In this case the only justifiable American purpose is to bring the level of life and social welfare in Latin America as close to that of the United States as possible, and as rapidly as possible. Most Latin Americans are clear that, properly handled, their twentieth century revolution can give both freedom and social welfare.

In point of fact, where justifiable social revolution is involved, the United States can and should assist in making it viable. We did this in Bolivia and the result to date has justified it, though that revolution is still in midstream. It would have been perfectly possible, for instance, to offer to a Castro (assuming he did not choose to be an enemy of the United States as apparently Castro has done) a means of financing his agrarian reform and his state-owned program of industrialization. The United States should be

able to work in entire cordiality with any kind of social system which does not insist on being its enemy. American so-called capitalism is not a religion or a dogma; it is a way of getting things done which works extremely well in the United States—and may be quite inappropriate in many other situations. Obviously the United States cannot be, and cannot be expected to be, cordial or coöperative towards a revolution whose chief end is hostility to the United States, or which refuses to maintain at least minimal standards of human rights.

But our policy in Cuba gave little hint of this. The close economic relations between Cuba and the United States and the preferred Cuban position in American markets had undoubtedly improved the over-all Cuban position. A little of the benefit from it did trickle down to the Cuban *campesinos*. The chief result, however, was great luxury for a relatively small group in Havana, and a small rise above the starvation level for the masses. The field was clear for Communist intriguers to identify the United States with the squalid social situation—and divert the revolution to Communist power-political aims.

## V

Let us turn to a second consideration—that of method. In part the trouble in Cuba (indeed, the trouble in Latin America generally) is a failure of American organization.

For 20 years the foreign activities both of the President of the United States and of his Secretary of State have been almost wholly engaged by Europe and the Far East. Latin America was a stepchild. Reorganization of the State Department on recommendation of the Little Hoover Commission has set up a system of committees and inter-departmental clearances making it extraordinarily difficult for anyone of lower rank than the Secretary of State to get anything done in reasonable time. Latin American affairs have historically been handled by an Assistant Secretary. They continue to be so handled, but under the new system between him and the Secretary of State were interposed under secretaries, deputy under secretaries, committee clearances, and so forth. The official directly responsible now has less organizational capacity to act than a division chief had in 1940. The situation is aggravated by a natural desire in the Foreign Service for “big” assignments; that is, assignments in Europe or in the greater countries of the Far East where press coverage provides opportunity

for reputation-making. Here the Foreign Service merely reflects a sad American fact: the United States public is chiefly conscious of countries on the European and Far Eastern tourist circuits. Most of it has not the foggiest idea whether Ecuador borders on the Atlantic or the Pacific, or knows that a majority of South Americans speak Portuguese and not Spanish. The men working in Latin American affairs on the whole are an able, devoted and dedicated group. But they work in isolation, and will continue to do so until the White House and the Secretary of State give continuous and personal attention to the problems of a continent and a half whose affairs are of first importance to the safety and welfare of the United States.

Another blank in the picture is the fact that the United States Government communicates with governments but has evolved no effective means of communicating with peoples. Conceding, as we must, that an embassy's primary business is with the palace, it must be added that a greater and more enduring necessity is for the United States to maintain relations with the people themselves. In practice, this means maintaining relations with individuals in, and leaders of, the opposition, of trade unions, of university life, as well as with government officials and formal society. Where the government is democratic, this can be done by a well-organized, well-staffed and competent embassy. In a democracy, the diplomatic official both can and is expected to maintain as wide connections as possible. In a dictatorship, or where opposition is violent, a non-diplomatic mechanism is needed. For the Communist bloc, the Communist parties or organizations supply this function. The United States would operate rather differently, but comparable connection and communication could be worked out. The British Foreign Office has been past-master in doing this; there is no reason why the United States cannot have a left as well as a right hand where circumstances require.

More in fact is needed here than mere contact. Latin America is now dividing itself, as elsewhere in the world, between groups which pin their faith on a Communist solution, though this means loss of personal freedom and even of independent action, and those which hope both to maintain freedom and responsive government and also to achieve social justice and improved economic conditions. Of the latter, the United States is the acknowledged successful symbolic leader. But if an inhabitant of Cuba or Peru or Argentina seeks to find an organization or a movement

dedicated to these ends with which he can identify himself, he has the greatest of difficulty. There is always an organizer and agitator prepared to take a pro-Communist or malcontent into an organized camp. Where, however, is the hand outstretched to men who wish the assistance or seek to follow the ideals of the United States? A handful of pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet organizers with quite adequate financing and support has been active for years from Mexico and Cuba to Cape Horn. Sympathizers with them at once find identification, companionship, outlet for their desire to be effective. The United States has almost abandoned the field.

Hence the Cuban problem. When Batista fell, the hard-core Communist cadres found little, if any, choate force to prevent them from taking over.

## OUR 'COLONIAL' PROBLEM IN THE PACIFIC

*By Harold Karan Jacobson*

THE United States will soon become one of the last remaining Administering Authorities under the United Nations Trusteeship System. Of the eleven territories once included, all but Nauru, northeastern New Guinea and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands will have achieved the stated goal of either self-government or independence within a few years. We will then find ourselves in a new and perhaps unpleasant situation. Until now our record in the Pacific Islands has generally won applause in the United Nations; it has appeared favorable in both relative and absolute terms. But praise will not be gained as easily in the future, and criticism will be meted out with less provocation.

When the Trusteeship System is narrowed down to supervision of Australia's rule in Nauru and New Guinea and that of the United States in the Pacific Islands, more frequent Visiting Missions will be likely and annual reviews of the record will become more detailed. Flaws now perceived as minor may well be magnified. The increasingly rapid liquidation of colonialism will heighten the mood of intolerance in the United Nations toward the remnants of anything smacking of that practice, and as more and more ex-colonies attain membership, anti-colonialism will become an even greater political force.

It would be ironic, in view of our self-proclaimed anti-colonial tradition and oft-repeated concern for the colonial practices of our allies if, at the end of colonialism, our own "imperial" policies came under harsh criticism. In an era of "competitive coexistence" the consequences could be serious, and the Soviet Union can be counted on to seize all opportunities to publicize our imperfections. Although the path of events is already partly determined—independence dates for other territories are set, the anti-colonial fervor in the United Nations cannot be dampened, and conditions in the Pacific Islands can be changed only slowly—some room for manoeuvre still exists. Now is the time to evaluate our policies.

The unique character of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands presents perplexing problems for the United States as Ad-



ministering Authority. The Territory comprises the Caroline and Marshall Islands and all of the Marianas except the island of Guam, which has been an American possession since 1898. Though it is spread over approximately 3,000,000 square miles of the Pacific Ocean (an area roughly equivalent to the continental United States), it contains only 687 square miles of land. More than 2,000 islets form 96 "island units" (single islands, clusters or atolls), of which only 64 are regularly inhabited. The total population in 1959 was 73,052. Although the term Micronesia is used to designate the Territory, the unity thereby implied does not exist. There are nine major indigenous languages. English and Japanese are the common tongues most used, but only a quarter of the population five years of age and over is able to speak and read either one. Cultural patterns vary greatly. Little sense of common identity appears to have developed so far. The economic potential of the area is limited. The difficulties of communication are immense.

Having acquired these islands at great cost from Japan in World War II, we have administered them since 1947 as a United Nations Trust Territory. Some in the United States would have preferred to avoid responsibility for them. Others favored outright annexation; for the Islands have great strategic importance, lying as they do athwart our line of communications to Guam and the Philippines, and in a position from which a hostile power could hinder our access to many vital areas. They extend for more than 4,000 miles across the Pacific, to within a few hundred miles of the Philippines, Indonesia and New Guinea. Japan seized them from Germany during the First World War. Although the Japanese would have preferred unfettered control, they were forced to hold the islands as a League of Nations Mandate, the terms of which forbade fortification. Had Japan continued observing those terms, as it apparently did at least until 1938, American security interests might have been protected. But the Second World War provided convincing evidence that we could not afford to have these islands held by a hostile, or potentially hostile, power.

On the other hand, the United States desired to promote and develop the U.N. Trusteeship System. Since all other League of Nations Mandates with no immediate prospects of independence were to be included (and all were except South-West Africa, which the Union of South Africa still refuses to submit to United

Nation's jurisdiction), an exception could hardly be made of the Pacific Islands. Besides, to seek annexation would not have fitted our anti-colonial posture; and even a decade and a half ago it was apparent that imperialism was not a popular cause.

The resulting compromise was to include the Pacific Islands within the Trusteeship System, but to make special arrangements beforehand in the U.N. Charter for the designation of part or all of a Trust Territory as a "strategic area." The Pacific Islands were so designated—the only case where this provision has been applied. The "strategic area" concept was designated to give the United States greater control over the Pacific Islands than possible under an ordinary trusteeship. In practice, since all Trust Territories can be fortified, the Pacific Islands are exceptional only in that the United States has the right to restrict access to the Territory, and it need not extend the economic privileges it exercises there to other states.

Within the United Nations, the Security Council rather than the General Assembly has ultimate responsibility, but the significance of this is difficult to gauge. So far the Security Council has been involved only when the Trusteeship Agreement was approved and in a resolution transferring routine supervision to the Trusteeship Council. The organization's scrutiny of the American régime is conducted in the same fashion that it studies other Administering Authorities, except that the Trusteeship Council's reports in this case go to the Security Council rather than to the General Assembly. However, the Security Council has never considered these reports nor even taken note of them. Presumably, if matters ever came to a head in the Security Council, the United States could exercise its right of veto there. However, when the Trusteeship Agreement was considered, Ambassador Austin explicitly stated that, because it was an interested party, the United States would forego this privilege; and it might be embarrassing to reverse his stand. The fact that the Security Council has ultimate responsibility also means that the Soviet Union would be in a position, should it choose, to veto any proposal we might make to end the trusteeship status of the Pacific Islands. Whether the General Assembly has any jurisdiction over this Trust Territory is moot. Article 83 of the Charter clearly states that "all functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas . . . shall be exercised by the Security Council." On the other hand, Article 13 of the Trusteeship Agreement can be interpreted as

giving the Assembly a measure of competence, and some hold that several Assembly resolutions are applicable to the Islands.

## II

Although the American administration of the Pacific Islands has gained general approval in the United Nations, there have been certain persistent criticisms.

The most publicized have been in connection with tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in the Territory. A small group has always questioned our right to hold these tests there. A much larger group condemned the United States when two atolls in the Marshalls (Rongelap and Uterik) and 84 Micronesian inhabitants suffered ill effects from radioactive fallout because of a miscalculation during the 1954 hydrogen bomb tests. Attempts to have the Trusteeship Council adopt a resolution of censure failed, but the incident provoked general criticism and produced a sense of disquiet even among our allies. Our zeal in providing care and compensation for the individuals involved—those injured, and others who had to leave their islands—helped, but the subject remains a prominent feature of Trusteeship Council debates. If we resumed weapons testing in the Trust Territory, there would surely be a critical reaction in the United Nations.

The other major criticisms of our record as Administering Authority center on three topics: economic progress, administrative arrangements and political advancement. For the future, these may be more important.

The problem of stimulating economic growth in the Islands is complex. The budget for the Trust Territory Government in the 1959 Fiscal Year was \$8,169,303, of which \$1,825,083 was raised locally and the remainder appropriated by the United States. Freight and passenger fares on the government-owned but privately operated transportation systems are the largest source of local revenue, usually accounting for more than one-third of the total. But these fares do not even cover the costs of operation. The territorial "national" income for 1959, exclusive of the subsistence sectors of the economy, is estimated to be about \$4,000,000. Despite regular annual subsidies of over \$5,000,000, it is far from certain that the standard of living is as high today as it was during the Japanese Mandate; and for a period then the Islands were self-supporting. Further, the Territory is now heavily dependent for cash income upon the export of one commodity,

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copra. Copra exports, however, have not yet reached the peak established in the prewar period, when copra ranked fourth as a source of cash income. Rapid economic growth does not seem likely under present American policies. On the credit side of the ledger, it is clear that the inhabitants of the Islands are not being exploited for the benefit of others.

While the Trusteeship Council has been pleased with our efforts to protect the Micronesians from exploitation, it has frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the rate and nature of their economic progress. The 1959 Visiting Mission recommended that to stimulate growth we undertake a comprehensive economic survey and formulate specific plans for development in all fields. Preparations for such a survey are now under way, but whether it will lead to greater diversification and more rapid economic progress is open to question. New resources are unlikely to be discovered, and if they were, capital would be needed to develop them.

Many feel that not enough capital has been available even to develop the Islands' known potential. The same Visiting Mission reported that in its judgment the United States had failed "to provide adequate funds for the maintenance of present services and for the purposes of economic development." It recommended increased appropriations. This recommendation is unlikely to be met. The philosophy governing American policy is that our subsidy should not be increased beyond a point which eventually the Micronesians themselves might reasonably be expected to afford. Some in the United Nations question our estimate of what is "reasonable;" others dispute our theory and argue in favor of more pump-priming; while others maintain that we should provide greater subsidies in view of the security benefits we gain from holding the Islands.

It has been our official policy to rule out private foreign investment in the Trust Territory, including investment by United States citizens. The rationale offered is that the limited local resources should be reserved for the Micronesians. Security reasons may also be a factor. This policy stands in curious juxtaposition to our general attitude toward private foreign investments in underdeveloped areas. And a number of delegates from underdeveloped countries, who frequently express reservations about private foreign investments in their own states, appear to be not wholly convinced that an absolute prohibition is wise in this case.

Without increased public funds or private investment the outlook for the development of new industries, or even for the revival of some which thrived during the Japanese Mandate, is bleak. Nor is lack of capital the only obstacle. The fact that Micronesian handicraft shipped to this country is subject to high import duties has doubtless hampered its sale here, and perhaps partially explains the limited extent to which this industry has been developed. Commercial fishing offers one of the most hopeful possibilities for economic development in the Islands. The Japanese developed a strong fishing industry during their rule, but they relied on alien labor. This we will not allow. Indeed, Japanese or any foreign fishing vessels are forbidden to come within three miles of any of the Islands. Questions have been asked in the United Nations whether outsiders should be so rigorously excluded and it has been suggested also that we should move faster in teaching the Micronesians the necessary skills.

The concern shown for the economic progress of the Trust Territory results in part from a natural interest in the subject but also from recognition of its bearing on the Territory's political future. As long as the ratio of our subsidy to the revenue raised locally remains at its present height, political possibilities will be severely restricted. Virtually everyone agrees that the Pacific Islands should become more self-reliant. The controversy concerns the most appropriate method of achieving this goal.

Our administration of the Islands has been criticized in the United Nations on two scores: the division of responsibility between the Departments of the Navy and the Interior, and the location of the headquarters outside the Territory on Guam.

The Navy originally governed the Pacific Islands. This was logical during the war, and it followed our practice in Guam and American Samoa. When the Second World War was over, however, many in the United Nations and in the United States felt that control should be transferred to a civilian department, and in June 1951, after a bitter bureaucratic struggle, President Truman gave responsibility for the entire Trust Territory to the Department of the Interior. Seventeen months later he reassigned Saipan and Tinian to the Department of the Navy, and in July 1953 the Navy was given the remainder of the Northern Marianas except the island of Rota. The reasons for the Navy's resumption of control have only been vaguely identified as relating to national security. No logical explanation was given for excluding Rota.



However, by holding it the Department of the Interior retains a foothold in the Northern Marianas.

The Trusteeship Council has continually criticized this division of authority. There is a strong feeling that the entire Territory should be under one administration and that, at the very least, the Northern Marianas should not be divided. There is a bias against a military department having responsibility for civil administration in a Trust Territory. Delegates frequently ask why United States security needs cannot be met in the Northern Marianas within the framework of civilian control as they are in the Marshalls. But even if it meant extending military rule to Rota, many in the United Nations would prefer to see the Northern Marianas treated as a unit.

Doubts have been expressed in the United Nations about the coordination between the two administrations in the Trust Territory. The fact that the Micronesian Title and Pay Plan, which regulates salary scales for indigenous employees of the government, is not applied in the Navy's Saipan District has been viewed with disapproval, even though (or perhaps because) the Navy's salary schedule is somewhat higher. The establishment of a separate copra stabilization fund for the Saipan District has also been questioned.

The desire for a unified administration has deeper roots than a mere penchant for tidy administrative arrangements and an aversion to military rule. Some fear that the Trust Territory may become permanently divided. Certain facts underscore their fear. The Chamorro people who inhabit the Marianas are somewhat different from the other Micronesians, and there is popular support for integration of the Marianas—that is, a union of the Northern Marianas with Guam. This year the Saipan Legislature petitioned the Trusteeship Council requesting that a plebiscite be held on the question of the “reintegration of the Mariana Islands within the governmental framework of the Territory of Guam.” United States citizenship was included in their plan. The Guam Legislature has also adopted a resolution favoring unification. In commenting on Saipan's petition, the Indian delegate stated that he thought the Council would find it “difficult to contemplate the secession” of a part of the Trust Territory and its merger with a non-self-governing dependency of the Administering Authority. He insisted that the Pacific Islands must be regarded as indivisible. No action was taken on the petition.

Criticism of the location of the Trust Territory's headquarters on Guam is based on similar arguments. The headquarters for the Pacific Islands was located on Honolulu until 1954. The move to Guam was officially described as an "interim" measure pending the availability of funds to construct the necessary buildings within the Trust Territory. In 1953 the United States informed the Trusteeship Council that Dublon Island in the Truk Atoll had been selected as the location for the permanent headquarters, and that year the U.N. Visiting Mission inspected the proposed site. Since then, however, there have been no visible efforts to transfer the headquarters from Guam, and the United States' report to the United Nations for 1960 stated that there were no plans for such a shift in the immediate future.

In appearances before the Trusteeship Council, Delmas H. Nucker, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory, defends the present location of the headquarters on grounds of efficiency and with the argument that the Micronesians themselves should determine the permanent site when they had achieved sufficient political maturity. Prior American action, in his view, would be prejudicial and possibly wasteful. In addition, he claims that Guam's facilities could not be duplicated in the Trust Territory without inordinate expense. Those who criticize the present site maintain that if the headquarters were within the Trust Territory it would help to stimulate political cohesion. They also argue that the physical equipment for government is an important heritage of colonial rule, and while they agree that the Micronesians should be consulted, they feel that the location of a capital is always the result of a number of arbitrary factors. Underneath is an unstated question about the long-term effects of the Territory's tie with Guam.

Discussions of political advancement in the Pacific Islands bring into the open questions concerning our ultimate plans for the Territory. The original draft of the Trusteeship Agreement which the United States submitted for the Security Council's approval in 1947 listed "self-government" as the goal. At the Soviet Union's suggestion, this was amended to read "self-government" or "independence." Since then there have been doubts that the United States fully accepted the spirit of this change. At the last session of the Trusteeship Council the question arose in connection with this sentence in our annual report: "The policy of the Department of the Interior is to encourage the political advance-

ment of the people of the Trust Territory toward a goal of self-government." Our explanation that the omission of "independence" was an oversight did not still the questioning.

Official American policy, as expressed by Mr. Nucker, is that the Micronesians must first attain self-government; then they will be in a position to determine whether or not they desire independence. The road to self-government, he feels, starts at the local level, and this is where American efforts have been concentrated. Rapid progress has recently been made in chartering municipalities—a term used to cover local governments for various geographical areas. Legislative bodies with restricted powers have been established at the District level, and an Inter-District Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner has been in existence since 1957. Some Micronesians have attained responsible positions in the administrative hierarchy. Mr. Nucker recently testified before the Trusteeship Council that it would be five years before an elected territorial legislature could be established and at least another five before the Territory would be fully capable of managing its own affairs.

There is dissatisfaction in the United Nations with the pace of political advancement. During the Trusteeship Council's 1960 debates, the French delegate—who could hardly be called a rabid anti-colonialist, although with the independence of Togoland he had become the representative of a non-administering power—commented that "unfortunately in these territories political progress and evolution can be very slow and, I might even say, fragmentary." His comments could apply to our own political action (or lack thereof) as well as to developments in the Pacific Islands. Congress has not yet adopted an Organic Act establishing the framework and defining the powers of the Trust Territory Government and shows no signs that it will do so in the near future. At present these basic matters are covered by Executive Orders and the Code of the Trust Territory, which was promulgated by the High Commissioner in 1952. As early as 1947 an inter-departmental committee recommended that an Organic Act be adopted, and in 1954 we promised the United Nations that such legislation would be completed by mid-1960. The Trusteeship Council has recommended that greater efforts be made to stimulate political progress in the Pacific Islands and has urged the prompt adoption of an Organic Act.

## IV

The criticisms raised in the United Nations concerning our régime in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands have not yet had serious consequences, but before long they may. The issues raised are serious, and when we and the Australians stand alone as administering powers, these criticisms may well assume new proportions. As imperialism recedes at an ever-quickenning tempo, our patient efforts to build sound economic and political foundations in the Pacific Islands—however right they may be—may seem out of harmony with trends in the world at large. New Zealand's decision to grant independence in 1961 to its Trust Territory of Western Samoa—an area with 1,090 square miles of land and a population of about 106,000—will surely be cited as an example we should follow.

What happened at the Trusteeship Council's most recent session is perhaps an indication of things to come. Two Micronesians appeared as petitioners in connection with land claims in the Marshall Islands. Their testimony, partly as a result of questioning and partly through their own volition, covered a wide range of subjects. One, Jalle Bolkeim, Magistrate of Kwajalein, asserted: "We are hopeless slaves to conditions we do not like." He went on to say: "Maybe it would be better if we were given our ancient freedom. The people of Africa and Asia are getting their freedom. We think we can do as good a job of governing ourselves as do these countries." His companion, Amata Kabua, who has been President of the Marshall Islands Congress (the District legislative body) since 1955, stated that the Marshallese regarded their Congress as "a great joke" because of its lack of power. These statements became the subject of intense discussion. For a variety of reasons the United States did not, in this instance, suffer great embarrassment, but the incident certainly contained the seeds of more difficult debates to come.

The continuing criticisms in the United Nations and the obvious trend of developments call for a review of our present policies. Perhaps ways can be discovered of forestalling future criticisms and holding those currently raised to a moderate level. Although a detailed examination of possible alternative courses cannot be undertaken here, a few broad considerations can be outlined.

The first step must be an evaluation of the strategic role of the

Pacific Islands. Even though a layman should be wary of trespassing into the realm of the specialist, it is not going too far to suggest that with the vast changes in military technology and in the alignment of political forces since the conclusion of the Second World War, the Territory's place in military strategy may not be exactly the same as it was then.

With a firm estimate of the Pacific Islands' strategic role, various political arrangements could then be explored. Consideration of our future relationship with Guam and perhaps also American Samoa should be included in the planning. We must recognize that there will be increasing pressure on the United States to grant the Trust Territory full independence. If both we and the Micronesians desire some form of lasting association, such as exists between the United States and Puerto Rico, for example, steps should be taken before the political climate becomes so set that this kind of solution would provoke an untoward reaction in the United Nations. On the other hand, means of protecting our security interests are conceivable within the framework of independence.

With a clearer goal in mind, we could give our policies a sharper focus. Even if it proves impossible to formulate definite plans for the future of the Trust Territory—and many Micronesian leaders have not themselves thought this matter through—some revision of our present policies to meet the criticisms raised in the United Nations should be considered. Greater expenditures and more rapid political evolution than would be desirable under ideal conditions might appreciably strengthen our position in our relations with the newly independent states of Africa and Asia.

It is possible, of course, that the current policies are the only acceptable and realistic ones, and if they are criticized it is unfortunate but unavoidable. Calling for revisions is always easier than putting them into effect. However, before we accept the almost certain consequences of our present course, we should thoroughly examine all the possible alternatives.



## NEW TEETH FOR NATO

*By Pierre M. Gallois*

THE Atlantic Community is wavering before Khrushchev's aggressive threats. Each day it loses here or there a little more of its substance and its members increasingly question both the validity of the cause it represents and the suitability of the system which is meant to defend it. When the Atlantic Alliance was formed, the atomic monopoly held by the United States compensated easily for the enormous disparity between the existing conventional forces of the two blocs. Moreover, the Soviet threat at that time was clearly defined. While the problem of maintaining the security of the free world was serious and pressing, it was still relatively simple. Today it has become infinitely more complex.

Obviously the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has served its purpose thus far. As André Fontaine rightly observes, "In the ten years since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, the demarcation line between the two blocs in Europe has not shifted by so much as a millimeter. . . ."<sup>1</sup> Conceived as a means of protection against a clearly defined threat aimed at a specific group of territories, NATO has been a success.

Today two questions must be answered: In view of the great upheavals of the past few years in both politics and the realm of science and technology, can NATO still be counted on to serve its essential purpose? And if so, will this be sufficient—considering the new problems now facing the Western world?

The accelerated development of weapons technology is responsible for the most fundamental changes that have taken place in strategy, and consequently in politics, since NATO was formed. The loss by the United States of its atomic monopoly at an unexpectedly early date and in particular the Soviet experiments with long-range ballistic missiles have altered the hierarchy of power. Since public opinion was not forewarned of this it has made a very deep impression. Indeed, it is in the psychological sphere that the Soviet success in breaking the atomic monopoly has had the most serious consequences.

The strategic picture was abruptly altered, however, when Mr. Khrushchev announced at the end of August 1957 that his

<sup>1</sup> *L'Alliance Atlantique à l'Heure du Dégel*. Paris: Calman Lévy 1959, p. 10.

technical experts had launched long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. That event has had staggering military, strategic, psychological and political consequences about which everyone has had his say. But two of them in particular have affected the defense of the West. In the first place, the Soviets have given the world eloquent proof of their scientific progress. Their successes dealt a blow to the complacent Western dogma that science could progress only in an atmosphere of freedom. Henceforth the atomic monopoly was to be shared with a régime whose very nature, it had been thought, made it incapable of stimulating scientific thought and giving application to its findings.

Above all, however, the I.C.B.M. equipped with a nuclear warhead robbed the United States of the advantages of its geographic position vis-à-vis Eurasia. Ever since the War of 1812 and the destruction of Washington by British troops America had been able to intervene with force in world affairs without danger of having to fight on its own territory. World War II took a toll of more than 50,000,000 lives; but thanks not only to its technological advantages and its organizational capacity but also to its privileged geographical position, the United States was able to play the major role in the conflict without losing so much as 1 percent of the total number of victims. After 1957 it no longer enjoyed that century-old invulnerability. Distance no longer afforded protection. When the Soviet Union added the I.C.B.M. to its arsenal, it destroyed the foundations of American "geo-strategy."

Now Washington was forced to realize that henceforth it could commit itself to the defense of other nations only at considerable risk. And America's allies, aware of the dangers she must be willing to accept on their behalf, began to question the worth of her guarantee. If public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic had been better informed concerning the laws of nuclear strategy, and if the policy of deterrence had been more widely understood, the advent of long-range missiles would not have had such a powerful psychological and political impact. Actually, the temporary advantage which it gave the Soviets did little to alter the balance of forces, for the American policy of deterrence retained its effectiveness to a considerable degree.

The important fact was that little by little the American people were coming to realize that they, too, were now in the

front line. Yet while they were becoming more vulnerable to enemy attack they were no closer geographically to their allies than they had been in the past. Thus the development of weapons technology seemed to work to the disadvantage of the free world. It served the aggressor, who could boast that henceforth he was capable of striking at the heart of the United States, but it did nothing to bring closer those allies whose security depended not only on American ballistic missiles but also on the presence of American soldiers on their soil. Could the Strategic Air Command be expected to use its weapons of mass destruction on behalf of third parties when to do so meant exposing America to such dreadful reprisals? What became of the indispensable credibility of the American response?

True, this was only one side of the picture. The aggressor would be taking the same risk in carrying out his threat to devastate the territory of his victim. The fact remained that America's ability to act with impunity was no longer assured; and since Western opinion—even in scientific circles, to say nothing of opinion inside certain Western governments—is slow to grasp the subtleties of an entirely new strategic situation, doubts have arisen concerning the continuing value of a defense system which had rested formerly on the guarantor's capacity to strike at the enemy without being struck in return.

These considerations are at the root of NATO's present difficulties. Governments which feel they can afford it are seeking to reinforce the collective deterrent with deterrents of their own, hoping in this way to assure their own safety in the event that a system they no longer have confidence in should fail. The others counsel prudence and in effect paralyze a defense system which can serve its purpose only if it accepts risks.

## II

It is hardly necessary to dwell on the cost of modern armaments. And with the need to increase their range their cost has increased also. In addition to maintaining what is called conventional equipment, provision has had to be made first for new explosives, then for missiles and finally for space technology. The United States Department of Defense must devote more than \$4 billion a year to study and research alone, and even then the whole range of the fields to be explored is not covered. Britain was unable to devote more than £650 million (nearly \$2 billion)

to its whole 1960 armaments program, including research, development and production. Obviously it cannot keep up with the swift pace set by the "Big Two." Furthermore, there is the problem of the speed with which armaments techniques are evolving (as the "Blue Streak" affair demonstrated).

Acting separately, even the most powerful nations of Europe cannot at one and the same time keep their conventional forces intact and undertake the development of intercontinental missiles, early warning devices, alert and reconnaissance satellites and nuclear explosives of various degrees of power. Whether in developing fuels or new explosives or new means of delivery, they will always be outdistanced by the Big Two. In the hierarchy of power they are falling lower and lower; their distance behind both the United States and the Soviet Union is increasing. Tomorrow they may find themselves behind still other peoples who are only now beginning their ascent. Either they must be resigned to their decline, acknowledging by the same token that they will eventually lose their independence, or they must join forces and agree to move from the narrow national level to the European level—or better still, the level of the Atlantic Community, as befits the scope of the task to be accomplished.

Although a particular technological advance is not as decisive militarily as it might have been 15 years ago, public opinion is just as sensitive to it as ever. The man in the street thinks that if it had not been for the sputniks Mr. Khrushchev could not have made his trip to the United States. The Soviet Union realizes this and is acting accordingly. If the West accepts second place it will find in the long run that it not only has lost the means of defending itself but also has demonstrated the inferiority of its vaunted political and social system. It is for the United States to accept the challenge and win the technological race. Europe's help should be useful in this contest.

Here again the Atlantic Community faces two alternatives. Either it will remain divided, in which case the struggle will be more difficult and the European countries will inevitably become "uncoupled" and fall behind, or the resources of the member nations will be pooled, in which case all will stand together, each one will ascend in knowledge and power, and the chances of peace will be multiplied.

Another relatively new problem is that of the less-developed countries. Even ten years ago, it would have been appropriate

to ask what the richer countries were going to do to help equalize living standards throughout the world. Yet the Soviet threat loomed so large that it seemed to justify concentrating first of all on the creation of a military instrument capable of protecting Western Europe from actual invasion. The underdeveloped countries had not yet become springboards for the progressive encirclement of the great capitalist powers. In the past few years the situation has become better understood. It is now realized that 70 percent of the inhabitants of the globe have an average annual income of less than \$300, as compared with a figure of \$2,600 for the United States; and the gap is widening, for the rate at which the poor are progressing is slower than the rate at which the wealth of the rich increases. Whatever arrangements are adopted to cope with this problem, members of the Atlantic Alliance will have to dig deep into their pockets for the money to support economic development—preferably as an inter-Allied enterprise. In addition to paying the price for a wide variety of intricate weapons, of pressing forward in scientific research and development, and committing ourselves to the technological race at a cost of billions, the Western powers will have to find still further resources with which to combat “hunger and chaos” on behalf of nearly a billion human beings.

### III

It is stressing the obvious to say that we live in a period of scientific and technological developments so complex and so rapid that they are totally beyond the grasp of the man in the street. Either he is so poverty-stricken that his physical and social condition prevents him from forming the slightest opinion concerning international or even national problems, or, if he has achieved some degree of prosperity, he is preoccupied with his personal affairs. International problems, especially, appear forbiddingly complex. This indifference or this desire to avoid considering matters of public interest may have certain advantages but it is also dangerous.

Both the study and the conduct of public affairs today must be entrusted to specialists. Trained for their tasks, having access to information which is not available to the public, practiced in the analysis of questions relating to their specialists, they form all-powerful administrations. The outsider must acknowledge that by virtue of their opportunity and organization they have



the best chance of being correct in their judgments, but the result is that the political aspects of public affairs become blurred. Technocracy takes over. For a long time now the opposition in the majority of the Western democracies has been using arguments which are less rational than emotional; yet it has found increasing difficulty in challenging the position of the government, which has access to information unavailable to the opposition.

Accordingly, the practice of democracy—at least as it is conceived in Western Europe—is becoming less and less easy. The two sides are moving in opposite directions: more and more the governed concern themselves with the fulfilment of their private destinies, while the governors are absorbed in the conduct of affairs too complex to interest anyone but themselves and their specialists. Power beyond the reach of popular control leads to excesses, as the events of last spring in Turkey and the Far East demonstrated. And despite the poor material conditions in Japan, Korea and Turkey, it was not price and wage policies or social programs that were under attack, but rather the political programs of these countries—both domestic and foreign.

Another characteristic of these movements was that young students played a decisive role in them. Indeed, students were perhaps the only ones who could form pressure groups capable of making an effective protest against their governments' conduct. Their education predisposed them to scrutinize, discuss and, consequently, to challenge the soundness of policies which they could not fully understand because they lacked the necessary information. Not yet having the burden of responsibilities borne by their elders, they were quite free to pour into the streets and demonstrate.

The intrusion of these youths into the political and administrative affairs of Korea, Turkey and Japan was all the more violent because there was scarcely anything to restrain them. Between the sovereign, distant, ill-understood State, almost as inaccessible as Kafka's "Castle," and the resigned and indifferent masses, there were no other active groups—with the exception of the military in Turkey—which were capable of taking part in the struggle.

In Korea and Turkey the question of security was not affected, at least for the time being. But in Japan security policy was indeed the cause of the trouble. The Socialists' attack was all the

more bitter because there was no substitute for that policy: the Japanese, like many others, have little choice between the risks involved in a commitment to the United States, and the dangers of isolation.

Yet how is the support of the Japanese people to be won if it means that they must share the risks of a defense system based on the possibility of nuclear destruction? The truth is that it is no longer possible to maintain peace with a purely defensive strategy and purely defensive weapons. It is a hard truth to teach. Few are able to grasp that precisely because the new weapons have a destructive power out of all proportion to even the highest stakes, they impose a far more stable balance than the world has known in the past, when the losses and sacrifices suffered in a war fought with "conventional" weapons could be weighed against the benefits to be expected from resorting to force.

Nor is it any easier to make people realize that the more numerous and terrible the retaliatory weapons possessed by both sides the surer the peace; that if those weapons are to be less vulnerable they must be kept in a state of constant alert; and that it is actually more dangerous to limit nuclear weapons than to let them proliferate. These, unfortunately, are the realities of our time, but no one is willing to accept them at first blush.

Where public opinion either has no effect on government conduct or is trained to support its every act, it does not matter whether it knows the real facts of atomic life. But the West suffers from the emotional and irrational reactions of a public which cannot be ignored. The leaders of the Western democracies are going to have to choose between bowing to the public, however unfounded its reactions may be, and undertaking a major educational effort. Naturally, the second alternative is the only one they can choose. It is futile, if not dangerous, to allot billions to a defense policy without making major expenditures for the purpose of explaining and justifying it.

Ten years ago, when the United States held a monopoly in atomic weapons, public opinion in the West demanded few explanations. It was content to know that there was a preponderance of strength which seemed to ensure its safety. That time has come to an end and the position of the West is the more precarious because the Kremlin has exploited to the full the obscurities and paradoxes of the thermonuclear age. Conse-

quently, the difficult task of erecting a defense system which will be proof against a variety of dangers must be supplemented by another, without which the first will be vain: the approval and even the active support of public opinion must be won.

## IV

The vulnerability of the United States to direct attack by the Soviet Union, the ever-rising cost of modern armaments, the urgency of the technological race, the emergence of the underdeveloped countries and the absence of an adequately informed public—these are the principal factors which have changed the situation existing when the Atlantic Pact was signed. In short, the situation has been altered not only by the vulnerability of the United States but by the expansion of the means by which the Communist world threatens the West. It has thus become necessary to devote immense intellectual and material resources to problems other than the purely military threat which was the major concern when NATO was conceived.

What can be done with regard to the specific problem of defending Western Europe? There are at least two ways of overcoming the fear that the deterrent is no longer credible. The first is to station American armed forces in all the countries under its protection. American school children would serve the same purpose, for the important thing is to put physically in Europe something so precious that the guaranteeing power would be certain to react as forcefully to an attack there as at home. But such a solution is neither practical nor lasting, for it is subject to limitations which may be imposed by either or both the governments involved.

The other course would be for each country to be able to apply in its own behalf the policy of deterrence which the United States has heretofore been pursuing for the protection of all. This would enhance the credibility of the threat of retaliation, for an aggressor would then have to take seriously into account the national reaction of the people whose vital interests were directly at stake. Furthermore, it obviously is easier to ensure an almost automatic response by an individual nation than by an alliance, in which each member will be reluctant to expose itself needlessly to inordinate dangers. All the members would not be asked to agree to a sacrifice which perhaps benefited only one and yet might mean their general annihilation.

To avoid unnecessary risks, the nuclear weapons so distributed would be placed under dual control. Suppose that the United States puts the weapons required for a policy of decentralized deterrence at the disposal of certain governments allied with it, or of groups of nations sufficiently close to and dependent on each other to agree that they will act as one in the face of danger. The circumstances under which these weapons would be used would be set forth in an agreement between the United States and the recipient nations. If those expressly defined conditions were to materialize, the United States Government would hand over to its ally the "key" held by its own representative. Thus an arsenal hitherto held under dual control would be converted into an instrument for purely national defense. The general provisions of the agreement would be public; but in order to provide some room for manoeuvre and to increase the enemy's margin of risk, it would be made known that the circumstances set forth in the agreement were not exclusive, that in addition to the threats enumerated there were others which by mutual consent might be considered sufficient to justify Washington in relinquishing control.

The perils of this plan are less than they might at first appear. Arms such as ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads are of no military and consequently no political value except in extraordinary circumstances. They are not, as some still think, the modern counterpart of the conventional weapons of yesterday. No government can use them as divisions or naval squadrons were once used. The threat to use thermonuclear weapons can be effective only in the last extremity and for the protection of absolutely essential interests; it would not be taken seriously—and so could not serve its purpose—unless the nation involved were confronted with the most terrible of alternatives: annihilation or the end of its freedom as a nation.

The security problem facing a country like Denmark can illustrate the advantages of nuclear decentralization. It is not suggested that Denmark would be given the capacity to exterminate its attacker but simply that it be enabled to inflict enough damage to outweigh the benefits which the aggressor could hope to win by resorting to force. The threat would have to be extremely serious, of course, before the Danish Government could even contemplate using the power which it had acquired through the bilateral agreement with the United States. But, if a missile was

launched against a Danish city, or if enemy land forces crossed the frontier in strength, if, in short, the enemy engaged in major operations—at least from Denmark's viewpoint—then it might be expected that the victim, knowing itself to be doomed in any case, would retaliate. Even if the likelihood of such a response were very small, it would still be something for a potential aggressor to reckon with.

What of the responsibilities of the United States? Would not Washington be held accountable for Denmark's action? And would not the system of decentralization thus involve the same liabilities for the United States as the present system?

Assuredly not. Before attacking Denmark, the enemy would certainly threaten the United States by charging that if Washington relinquished control over the Danish missiles it would be responsible for the consequences. But in fact such a threat would be meaningless since it could not be carried into effect; the Soviet Union would not consider it worthwhile to risk exchanging ballistic missiles with the United States just for the sake of subjugating Denmark.

Another advantage of decentralization is that it would put the potential aggressor in the position of taking the initiative in all-out war. As things stand now, the United States must take the initiative in retaliating with nuclear weapons against an attack which may involve only the use of conventional forces and may be directed against only one member of the Alliance. A policy under which each country had its own deterrent power would put the responsibility back on the attacker and convince him of the risks inherent in any attempt to alter forcibly the territorial status quo in Western Europe—or elsewhere, in the event that the policy were extended to other areas.

Finally, the dual control system might check the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every country protests against them and fears the dangers to which they expose humanity; but there is not a single nation which would refrain from trying to become an atomic power if it had the requisite industrial, financial and intellectual resources. The arrangement would unquestionably obviate a considerable duplication of effort in research and production. It would satisfy both the need to make the threat of retaliation credible and the free world's need to pool its resources so as to use them as economically and effectively as possible for the development and manufacture of the weapons best suited to its defense.

It would be a supplement to present NATO strategy, of course, not a substitute. By reinforcing the collective system with the strength and credibility of a national response, resistance to aggression would be given added depth, based on several successive lines of defense.

The first of these lines is formed by the Allies' conventional forces stationed as far to the east as possible and composed of national contingents under an integrated command. Little by little, the component parts of this "shield" are being equipped with atomic warheads carried by aircraft or missiles of limited- or medium-range. These so-called "tactical" atomic weapons form the second line; they counteract the enemy's superiority and also force him to think about the possibility that an "escalator" process might begin. For if he breaches this second line of resistance he risks abandoning conventional weapons and crossing the nuclear threshold to what might prove to be the "spiral of disaster."

These two overlapping lines of resistance are part of the collective defense system. Washington furnishes the tactical atomic weapons—under a control arrangement—to its own contingents or to those of certain allies. But the collective shield cannot serve its purpose unless there is a complete identity of views among the allied governments. It is greatly weakened if one of them is afraid that it will be asked to assume risks out of proportion to the direct threat to it. The fear is shared by all the allies; each realizes that none is as ready to be firm and resolute on behalf of the others as it would be in defending its own vital interests. But if at the third stage the enemy finds that the country on which he is putting pressure is likely to retaliate with the weapons placed at its disposal under the dual-control system, he will have to expose himself to a new risk. Thus, the possibility of nuclear retaliation by the individual nation will contribute greatly to the policy of deterrence. In effect, it creates a third zone of resistance to aggression.

Still farther back, beyond the seas, the possibility that the Strategic Air Command will intervene on behalf of Western Europe constitutes the fourth line of defense. Some may consider it unlikely that SAC would be used for this purpose. The mere fact of its existence, however, continues to be an important element in the strategy of deterrence and as such benefits the allies of the United States. And finally, the edifice of Western defense has at



its core the unassailable and invincible "fortress America." Who would willingly face the dangers with which the successive lines of defense bristle if, supposing he had surmounted them all, he had then to tackle the massive structure barring final access to the coveted prize of world hegemony?

The suggested reorganization of the Western defense would not change either the spirit or the letter of the Treaty. But it would compensate for technological and strategic developments by adding a supplementary line of defense. It would offset the decreasing credibility of a massive nuclear response in defense of Europe and mitigate the dangerous tendency of the allies to drift apart in the face of the enemy's divisive efforts.

## v

Is it possible to cut down the resources devoted to the research and manufacture of weapons without falling to second place? In view of the almost immeasurable increase in the obligations imposed upon the free world, can we hold our present battlements and yet divert enough of our resources to defend others as they come under attack?

For our generation the word "strategy" still has its dictionary meaning—"the art of drawing up a plan of campaign and leading an army in its decisive engagements." Strategy is still generally seen as nothing more than the study and conduct of operations in the field, the shrewd application of well-known principles of warfare to the manœuvring and confrontation of massed armies. It was in this sense that Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte were great strategists, in this sense that Clausewitz and Jomini understood the term.

In the twentieth century there has emerged a new kind of strategy which may be called the "Strategy of Means." It encompasses logistics but is more than this, for it embraces the development and manufacture of weapons, their disposition, their emplacement and their readiness as well as their maintenance. In 1944, when General Eisenhower launched the assault forces across the Channel, he was far more the capable administrator of a powerful "strategy of means" than a military strategist in the traditional sense of the word. The means assembled under his command were so overwhelming that to a considerable extent they could have compensated for any tactical errors committed. Because so many thousand tons of fuel and ammunition had been as-

sembled where they were needed, because allied aircraft were able to carry out more than 10,000 sorties a day and the fleet was able to carry hundreds of thousands of men with their arms and equipment across the Channel with impunity, the outcome of the landings was never in doubt. Bad leadership could have delayed the Allied victory; superb leadership could have hastened it. But the victory was assured. The strategy of means of the Allies had triumphed over the strategy of means of the Third Reich.

Five years later, however, either the lesson had been forgotten or it had not been properly understood. When the Western governments sought to form a defense system in keeping with the atomic age, they sacrificed everything to the strategy of operations. The General Staffs were to be organized on an inter-allied basis and in the event of actual war the fighting was to be done by troops which had been integrated to the fullest possible extent. Battle plans were to be drawn up jointly and carried out in concert. As far as these excellent provisions went, they took into account some of the lessons of the Second World War. But at the same time it was left to each nation to train, arm and equip the forces which were its contribution to collective defense. Not only did logistics remain a national concern, but also planning, research and development, production and allocation. Thus while the strategy of operations was jointly conceived, the strategy of means remained, in effect, a purely national responsibility.

Yet in the thermonuclear age the problem is to prevent war rather than to wage it, and only a sound and powerful strategy of means can accomplish that purpose. The planning of campaigns that may degenerate into general chaos in a few hours is far less important than the production and distribution of weapons capable of discouraging the resort to force. This can be accomplished only by a pooling of effort and resources.

The priority accorded to the strategy of operations was valid only as long as the West had a monopoly in thermonuclear weapons. Today, when each nation is less and less willing to take collective risks, the preoccupation with collective military operations is not sufficient.

## VI

The defense system to which Europe has heretofore owed its safety thus has two great weaknesses: while it serves to make general war improbable, it can do little to resist limited attacks;

and it has not been able to develop an adequate strategy of means. To correct these weaknesses, what is now a national concern—namely the assembling of the means required to wage war—must be made a collective one, while responsibility for the use of the arsenal thus assembled must be shifted from the collective to the national level.

Fear of today's weapons of mass destruction has brought humanity to the age of the *fait accompli*. As the value of the objective pursued or defended is no longer in proportion to the risks involved in conquering or protecting it, the *fait accompli* must be accepted. In an earlier era wars were fought because a consul was hit in the face with a fly-swatter or a dispatch was garbled. Today an American military aircraft can be shot down over international waters, or, conversely, an American fighter can attack a Russian or Chinese aircraft and neither side can do more than make a formal protest and a demand for indemnification.

Clearly, the West's many defeats in recent years result from its failure to comprehend the nature of the struggle in which it is engaged. To put it plainly, its setbacks are due to its unjustified fears and its acceptance of the *fait accompli* with which the enemy ceaselessly confronts it. If the likelihood of a Western response is indeed the determining factor in the Kremlin's evaluation of the risks it is willing to take, then that likelihood should be increased. There is little time or space left in which to do it.

## BRITAIN'S DEFENSES: COMMITMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

*By Michael Howard*

THE policy of one's own country in defense, economics or foreign affairs is not easy to define. The outside world may assume that at the center of government there is a cool-headed, far-sighted policy-forming group which has formulated a clear assessment of the national goals and the national interests, and which ensures that each action or reaction is planned and carried out in conformity with them. But to the student of internal politics—to say nothing of those more intimately acquainted with the erratic workings of any government machine—the image is less precise. Other nations seem to pursue their interests with resolution and wisdom; the policy of one's own country is all too clearly at the mercy of pressures and counter-pressures, of rival political groups, of conflicting economic interests, of ambitious or venal personalities. And although what emerges out of these conflicting forces may appear to foreigners to be a logical continuation of traditional policy, the close observer is more conscious of the painful and usually undignified process of the dialectic than of the synthesis which ultimately emerges.

The chronic schizophrenia from which Britain suffers as an off-shore island, at once part of the continent of Europe and detached from it, is nowhere more apparent than in the strategic problems which have confronted her ever since, in the sixteenth century, she emerged as a major European power. The development in that century of long-range navigational techniques opened up to Europe new worlds of wealth and commerce which England, so long as she could remain aloof from continental entanglements, was in a unique position to exploit. Her rivals—Spain, Holland, France—were wealthier, further advanced in civilization and not her inferiors in seamanship. But they suffered from the crippling handicap that they had to pour money and resources into large armies for land warfare which nearly or quite bankrupted them. The English did not. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, England could concentrate the greater part of her military effort on naval development and maritime expansion, and emerge wealthier from each of the successive wars which impoverished her enemies and her continental allies alike.

But this concentration on maritime war could never be complete. If any of her adversaries succeeded in establishing a total hegemony in Europe, not only would England be faced with physical invasion, but a power would be created strong enough to crush her in the colonial, maritime and economic fields in which the rivalries of Europe and her own military immunity had enabled her to stand supreme. The contribution of France to the independence of the United States is universally acknowledged; but it is less often realized that Britain admitted defeat in 1783 mainly because for the first time she could find no continental allies to distract and pin down the French.

Thus in every war, from those against Louis XIV to that against Hitler, the same strategic problem has confronted the British Government: how to divide its resources between, on the one hand, a maritime and economic war waged outside Europe and on the high seas, with the object of preserving and increasing British resources and diminishing those of her enemies; and, on the other, a continental war, to support the armies of her continental allies and help them gain those victories in the field which alone could be decisive. The "Maritime" and "Continental" schools during the eighteenth century developed doctrines which survived into the twentieth; and for over 200 years British governments have tried to avoid any binding continental commitments which prevented a more fruitful employment of forces elsewhere. The conflict between "Easterners" and "Westerners" bedeviled the conduct of British strategy during the First World War; British governments refused until 1938 to enter into any firm military commitment to France; and in the Second World War the same historic instinct, to concentrate on naval and extra-European warfare and weaken the enemy by blockade, by subversion, and now by aerial bombardment, was judged somewhat uncharitably by allies brought up in a different tradition, who only wanted to go in as quickly as possible and *win*.

This historical background is necessary if the full significance of the change which has come over the British position during the last ten years is to be understood. Britain has now been deprived of her freedom of choice. She is committed to both of the strategies which, in happier days, she liked to consider as alternatives. On the one hand she has accepted, as part of her NATO commitments, the obligation to maintain both ground and air forces in Europe in peacetime—an obligation as contrary to all traditions of British

policy as the similar American commitment is to those of the United States. The strategic necessity for this, as well as its desirability on purely political grounds, has never been seriously questioned in British official circles, and acceptance of it was all the easier as it involved, originally, only a maintenance of the distribution of forces which prevailed at the end of the Second World War. But this continental commitment—originally assessed at four divisions—though imposing little strain on a war establishment was not one which a peacetime force, of the size which Britain was accustomed to keep up, could easily fulfill.

For British overseas commitments were still pressing. The transition from Empire to Commonwealth, the development of colonies into independent nations, had modified and altered many of these commitments, but it had not destroyed them. India and Burma opted for a formal neutrality, but Pakistan and the Malay Federation did not. In the territories which still retain colonial status, such as Kenya, British Guiana, British Honduras, and until recently Cyprus, the British possess an unwelcome responsibility for the maintenance of internal order—the “Imperial Policing” which for nearly a century and a half has been the British Army’s principal role. Even when these territories become independent they look to Britain—with notable exceptions—to train and equip their forces, and they remain, however temporarily, within the British military orbit, with all the moral obligation in which this involves the United Kingdom to aid them even if there is no specific obligation to do so.

The same principle applies yet more strongly to Canada, Australia and New Zealand—nations which, although they lean increasingly and inevitably towards the United States for operational and material support, still constitute with the United Kingdom a single military system, largely uniform in weapons and equipment and sharing a common military education. Finally, outside the Commonwealth but of no less concern to British policy, are those Middle Eastern States—Jordan, Kuwait, the Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf—where traditional obligations and pressing national interests alike commit the British to do all they can to preserve the stability of the existing régimes.

It all adds up to a formidable list. British troops are currently stationed in the Bahamas, Jamaica, British Honduras, British Guiana, Gibraltar, Libya, Malta, Cyprus, East Africa, Aden, the Persian Gulf, Singapore, Malaya and Hong Kong. Many of these



commitments have been integrated with the alliance systems of CENTO and SEATO into which Britain has entered concurrently with the United States; but they have an existence independent both of these alliances and of the cold war which brought the alliances into being. Some are as old as the British settlement of the West Indies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; others date only from the discovery of the oilfields of the Middle East. The military necessities of the cold war have given them all a new significance but did not create them.

There is indeed a gap between the British and the American attitude towards the military problems of these non-European areas—a gap which is not always fully understood in either country, and which could provide a dangerous source of misunderstanding. American strategic thinking is shaped almost entirely by the great ideological cleavage between the Communist and the Western worlds which alone was powerful enough to coax the United States out of the traditional isolation into which it showed every sign of relapsing after the Second World War. To this pattern of conflict all other developments and complications in international politics have somehow, in the American mind, to be related, and to it all else is subordinate. Such at least is American defense and foreign policy as it appears from London. But for Britain, the threat of Communism is only one factor among many to be considered in a world which has always been full of difficulties and menaces. In some of its aspects, indeed, Communism is only the latest form of such old and recurrent threats to local peace and world balance as nationalism and Russian imperialism—threats to which Britain has long been accustomed, even if she has not countered them particularly well. To Americans, this may seem a tradition-bound approach fatally incapable of adjusting itself to the realities of a world in which the disciples of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung are striving patiently and ruthlessly for world domination. But the British can reasonably argue that most of the conflicts in which their forces have been involved since 1945—Kenya, Malaya, Cyprus, Oman, Suez, Jordan—have had only an indirect connection with the major confrontation between Communism and the West, and were likely to have arisen in some form even if Marxism had never existed. The adversaries with which British troops have had to deal have been as much the followers of Giuseppe Mazzini as those of Karl Marx. Those who frame British defense policy work therefore on the assumption

that violence may occur for many reasons and in any part of the world where Britain has a responsibility to her allies, to the inhabitants or to herself for keeping the peace. Their main concern is to remain in a position to deal with violence when it does arise. It is this concern which explains that dominant characteristic of British defense policy—the determination to preserve a chain of bases around the world as *places d'armes*, not specifically intended for a war with the Communist powers and their satellites, but simply to enable British forces to deal with any emergency, however unexpected, that may demand their attention.

Since the Second World War, then, Britain has not only assumed new responsibilities as a major European power, but she has preserved many of her commitments in the extra-European world as well. To these she has added a third and equally demanding set of commitments: those involved in becoming a nuclear power, with the consequent necessity not simply of developing a nuclear potential to provide the warheads of nuclear weapons but of keeping abreast in the means of delivering them, either by rockets or, more recently, by using aircraft as mobile launching sites. This ambitious decision has been under increasing attack within Britain, not only from pacifist and anti-nuclear groups, but from serious military commentators and specialists, who have objected to it as an unnecessary expense, undertaken for reasons of political prestige rather than of sound military necessity. They argue that it adds nothing to the deterrent force of the West, decreases British ability to keep up adequate “conventional” forces, and opens up the problem of the “nth” nuclear power. Few of these arguments were relevant, however, between 1946 and 1948, when the vital decisions were taken. The problem then was not whether or not to develop an independent nuclear power; it was whether, as a result of the American decision to dissolve the wartime partnership in the investigation and military exploitation of nuclear energy, to halt developments in Britain which were already well under way. British scientific expertise and industrial capacity could undertake the task without noticeable strain, and the V-bomber force which the R.A.F. developed as carriers for the bomb were useful all-purpose aircraft. The decision to proceed was not one which a Labor government doubtfully sympathetic to the United States found difficult to take, or one which the Conservatives, traditionally careful of Britain's independence and prestige, found it in them to oppose.

The expense involved in these three areas of commitment—Europe, overseas and nuclear development—was accepted by the country during the critical years between 1948 and 1953 when war with the Soviet Union seemed likely and at times imminent—much as a similar increase in defense burdens was accepted, during the same period, by the United States. But after 1953 the danger appeared less intense. At worst, it seemed to be dissipated into non-military or para-military channels. A Conservative government was in power, temperamentally inclined towards the reduction of taxes, greater production of consumer goods and liquidation of the restrictions and shortages under which the British had suffered since 1939. The American example was tempting. President Eisenhower's Administration in 1953-4 had also felt that the defense burden of the past four years was heavier than the country need reasonably be asked to bear, and in seeking to reduce it had adopted the principle of concentrating national resources on forces which would, it was hoped, deter war by threatening aggressors with swift and certain nuclear retaliation rather than on forces to fight through a war by conventional means. The British Defense White Paper of 1957, presented by Mr. Duncan Sandys, also adopted this principle. Economies were made, not in Britain's deterrent apparatus, but in her conventional forces. A five-year plan was initiated which succeeded in reducing the burden of defense, as a percentage of the Gross National Product, from 10 percent in 1957 to approximately 7½ percent in 1960; and the decision was taken to reduce the services to a size at which compulsory National Service could be abolished altogether in 1962.

It was the decision to abolish conscription which attracted most attention in the Defense White Paper. It was naturally popular on all sides. The Labor Party had always been temperamentally opposed to National Service, and even among the Conservatives there were two strong sources of opposition to it: those who considered that it rendered economically useless a substantial proportion of the nation's manpower; and those who objected to the distortions and strains which it imposed upon the traditional pattern of the fighting services to which many of them were deeply attached. Within the services themselves there was little objection to the provisions of the White Paper. As the complexity of weapons increased, the training of National Servicemen had become progressively more difficult. The principal need of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force was for long-serving specialists,

while in the army the rapid turnover in the personnel of regiments fighting in Malaya, Kenya or Cyprus drove commanding officers to despair. The prospect of a stable, professionalized force was an attractive one; and the officers for whom no place could be found were to be awarded generous terms of compensation.

But how large a force could be raised by volunteer recruiting alone? The figure aimed at in the 1957 Defense White Paper was 375,000, of which it was reckoned that 165,000 would be the share of the army. It was widely believed that this figure was determined, not by any dispassionate assessment of the minimum figure needed to fulfill British commitments, but by an actuarial estimate of the number of regular recruits that the forces could expect to get. Certainly there was one commitment which had to be modified almost immediately, and that was the British element in NATO. The British declared that their contribution to the nuclear deterrent justified their reducing the commitment of four divisions which they had hitherto maintained in Europe; and they were further to argue that improvement in the effectiveness and equipment of their forces and the introduction of the new-model Brigade Group made it possible to diminish their size without affecting their value. Neither argument satisfied the critics; and the political repercussions were even more unhappy. There was a strong implication that Britain, whatever her protestations, was economizing at the expense of her allies, and this, in the existing condition of European politics, was an unfortunate precedent.

Nevertheless the 1957 White Paper was in general accepted. It had to be. The only alternatives were to maintain an increasing rate of expenditure on defense, which neither political party was prepared to advocate; or to economize, not by cutting conventional forces, but by abandoning the deterrent. To abandon the deterrent so soon after Suez would have involved a measure of national humiliation which no Conservative government was likely to court, whilst to maintain conventional forces at their existing level, with the continuance of National Service, was not a policy which any Labor opposition could be expected to urge. Discontent therefore made itself felt only gradually. The services themselves—whose leaders were presented with the White Paper as a *fait accompli*—grew increasingly alarmed as they realized how much they were expected to do with so little. Independent military critics, led by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, Professor P. M. S. Blackett, and the defense correspondent of *The Times*,

questioned the value of a strategic posture capable only of fighting a war in which Britain would almost certainly be destroyed. And in the public as a whole a serious disquiet spread, of which the launching of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament with its annual ritual marches from Aldermaston was only the most spectacular symptom. In the annual defense debates an increasing number of critical voices were heard from the Conservative benches, led impressively by that of Mr. Antony Head, Mr. Duncan Sandys's predecessor as Minister of Defense. Then in the autumn of 1957 came the launching of sputnik; and in January 1959 Lunik hit the moon.

The impact of these events on the United States was formidable, revealing, as they did, that the technical supremacy of the West, till then taken for granted, had disappeared, even if temporarily, and could be regained only by struggle and sacrifice. Responsible officials began publicly to express doubts about the credibility of an American deterrent based on manned bombers which Russian missiles might destroy before they even left the ground. But the American Strategic Air Command could at least protect itself by a wide degree of dispersal; the British V-bomber force, operating within the narrow limits of the United Kingdom, was at a yet greater disadvantage. And whereas SAC could expect 20 minutes' warning of a Russian strike, the Royal Air Force, if the attacking missiles were launched from Eastern Europe, could count at best on five.

Moreover, when in the mid-sixties the British deterrent was transferred from manned bombers to missiles, the British defense budget would not permit the development of the multiplicity of missiles—land, water and air-based—to which the United States looked forward. One weapons system alone would have to succeed the V-bombers. The Ministry of Defense settled for Blue Streak, an I.R.B.M. with a range well above the average and capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead. But these would be large in size, delicate in mechanism, liquid-fueled and therefore immobile. Even in underground silos they would be as vulnerable a target as the airfields themselves. It seemed unlikely that they would stand any better chance than the V-bombers of evading a possible Russian first strike.

By the autumn of 1959 when Mr. Macmillan's Conservative Government returned with an increased majority, it was clear that a reconsideration could not be long delayed of the two



basic principles of the 1957 Defense White Paper: the independent British deterrent, and the ending of National Service. To persevere with the first would involve—even if Blue Streak alone was developed—a rate of expenditure far greater than anything anticipated two years earlier; and Blue Streak by itself would be so vulnerable that its deterrent value was highly doubtful. The Government might persevere both with Blue Streak and alternative weapons regardless of expense. It might, as the Opposition was eventually to urge, abandon the whole principle of an independent British deterrent, rely on conventional forces and make a virtue of necessity by forming a “non-nuclear club.” It might, as Alastair Buchan proposed, pool its resources with its European neighbors and with them create a NATO deterrent; or it might enter into a closer partnership with the United States in weapons production, cease to duplicate the research and development undertaken in that country, and, while preserving the forms of independence by retaining its own nuclear warheads, reconcile itself to dependence on the United States for the missiles themselves.

In the defense debates in the spring 1960 Mr. Harold Watkinson, Mr. Sandys's successor at the Ministry of Defense, made it clear that the hopes which his predecessor had built on Blue Streak had been disappointed, and it was generally accepted that he would take the last of the courses outlined above. There was little surprise when, in June 1960 after a visit to the United States, he announced that Britain would henceforth share in the development, and ultimately the allotment, of an American solid-fueled missile, capable of being fired from a mobile base. More controversial was the weapon he chose. Many experts favored the U.S. Navy's Polaris, a weapon already far advanced in development and particularly suited to a naval power such as Britain. But Polaris has disadvantages. Its present range of 1200 miles limits its value; moreover, the Royal Navy will not for many years possess the fleet of nuclear-powered submarines with virtually unlimited cruising range which is needed to make Polaris fully effective. But the Royal Air Force does possess its V-bombers, and although they will become increasingly vulnerable both on the ground and in the air, this expensive and expert force can still serve as a platform from which to launch the Skybolt, on which American research teams have been working. This, it may be assumed, was the principal reason for Mr. Watkinson's decision to opt for Skybolt. It has been greeted with strong criticism. Skybolt



does not yet exist. There is no guarantee that it will ever exist. The Americans may abandon it, as, to the chagrin of the Canadians, they abandoned the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile to which their continental defense was formerly geared. And even if it is developed, will not the bombers which carry it be as vulnerable to a preëemptive strike as they are today? Mr. Watkinson's brave protestations about the chances of dispersal and the speed of take-off did not convince all his critics. But he has, for better or worse, made his decision; and it is one which marks the end of Britain's decade as an independent nuclear power.

The second decision, at the moment of writing, still remains to be taken. National Service is due to cease in 1961, and the size of the Armed Forces will then depend on the number of volunteers they are able to attract. Hopes vary with the fluctuation of monthly recruiting figures, and at present the Ministry of Defense still officially expects its plans to work out. But even the most optimistic officials do not expect to see for some years an army larger than their present goal of 165,000, and about the adequacy of that figure there have been increasing doubts. If it is not reached, and maintained, Mr. Watkinson will have an unpleasant choice. Either he will have to propose some form of selective service and face the wrath of his party, the scorn of the opposition and the grumblings of a nation dogmatically attached to the principle of equality of sacrifice; or he must revise his and Mr. Sandys's estimates and hope that, with economies in the use of manpower and increased mobility, the British Army will be able to fulfill its commitments with fewer men than was previously expected. But if the latter choice is made, the Government may take another long, hard look at those commitments, and the age-old question will arise again: Is Britain primarily a maritime or a continental power? Will she, in fact, maintain her present NATO strength? Will she shed some of her overseas obligations? Or will she, by transforming her army, be able to create that mobile, hard-hitting force, amply provided with air-lift and available for immediate service anywhere in the world, which alone might solve her historic dilemma? Such a force would inevitably be very expensive indeed, and this would again raise new political and economic problems. Cynics doubt the likelihood of any such transformation taking place. In 1957 Mr. Sandys announced it as his objective; but every year since then the pungent revelations of Mr. George Wigg in the House of Commons have shown how far he has been

from attaining it. The military revolution, so long promised, has not yet occurred. Money, vision and a ruthless departure from traditional procedures and ways of thought may yet bring it about. But until they do, the verdict on Britain's defense policy must still be one which might, in spite of naval supremacy, have been passed on it at almost any moment during the past century and a half: that she is courting disaster by assuming responsibilities far beyond her capacity to sustain.

## SPANISH AND AMERICAN IMAGES

*By Julián Marías*

WHEN the Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset, finished his lecture before an American audience at Aspen, Colorado, in 1949, the great German scholar Ernst Robert Curtius pointed to him and said: "There you have the Mediterranean and a country that ruled the world." The remark is worth keeping in mind when one thinks of Spain. I don't mean, of course, that Spain has preserved any of her former power or that she will regain it in the future. But a country which ruled the world—so few did—must have some features that are not likely to vanish into thin air. Such a country cannot be a nonentity; it should not be ranked among others which "statistically" seem similar in population, output, income, manpower or military strength, but have a quite different background and perhaps are newcomers on the historical stage instead of having had major parts in the making of history.

Many Americans still remember the tremendous impact that the Spanish Civil War had on their lives in 1936–39. For not a few who were then young it was an historical "coming of age;" some felt it as strongly as the subsequent World War in which the United States itself was engaged. In my opinion, this is proof that Spain, even in her decline, still "matters," still is a many-sided reality in the world, at least in the shaping of the Western man's soul.

The Spanish intellectual and literary élite again has proved to be influential in defining the trends of Western culture, despite the obvious fact that the total volume of its achievements lies behind that of Britain, Germany, France or the United States. It is sufficient to cite a few who rank among the great of the twentieth century: Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, Juan Ramón Jiménez, García Lorca, Manuel de Falla, Picasso, Miró, Casals—not to mention others who are rated as high as these in Spain but have had less impact or popularity beyond its frontiers, such as Valle-Inclán, Azorín, Baroja, Machado, Menéndez Pidal, Ramón y Cajal. One could hardly draw the profile of the world in which we live without referring to the contribution of these men and—less visible—of others still young who follow the same pattern in new ways and are increasingly influential in their country and in all

Latin America, including Brazil. Most people in the United States are not aware of the fact that the most widely read—and listened to—authors south of the Rio Grande have been and still are writers and thinkers from Spain, whereas nearly all Latin American authors are little known beyond the borders of their own countries.

Finally, Spain as a whole has a subtle influence on political and social developments in all the Spanish-speaking countries of America. On the one hand, very active and powerful minorities are composed of Spaniards (or their descendants) who immigrated many years ago; they belong to their adopted countries, but at the same time look back to Spain, taking from her inspiration, ideas, convictions, feelings, patterns of appreciation and judgment. On the other hand, even native Latin Americans—if one can use this rather inaccurate and misleading expression—have in mind Spain. If she is in good shape, she becomes a positive model; if she is a failure, they lack a powerful stimulant; if she is misled and disoriented, some of this trouble is reflected in the Spanish American republics. It would be rewarding to attempt a study of Spain's unintended influence on the recent history of Spanish America; I imagine it would produce more than one surprise.

From a more general point of view, too, it would be dangerous to ignore what may happen in countries which are not, or which are no longer, great powers. Recent experience shows that most of the troubles in the world come from relatively unimportant countries. The present system is highly complicated and every piece of the machinery has its function; any friction may damage the whole, any maladjustment may in the long run cause the failure of very large enterprises; even a little too much heat at a certain spot may set afire a continent—or the world.

It would be unwise, I think, to ignore what is happening or might happen in Spain.

## II

Few truthful words have been written about what has been taking place in Spain during the last 25 years. And in fact it would require a book of uncommon insight and power of analysis to give an intelligible and substantiated outline of Spanish history in that period. I am going to confine myself here to a single point: the changes in the American image of Spain in the last few years and

in the Spanish image of the United States, as the *main* factor in the present and future relations between the two countries.<sup>1</sup>

Between 1950 and 1960, mankind has been living—as it usually does—on metaphors. Ours are two, closely connected: “iron curtain,” “cold war.” They constitute the soil on which we stand—precariously. Most things have been altered, modified, at least colored by these powerful metaphors. In consequence, the American image of present-day Spain switched from a “fascist” or “totalitarian” country to an “anti-Communist” one. The next step was easy to foresee, an implication made at first, perhaps, for simplicity’s sake: a member of the “free world.”

The opponents of Spain’s present régime, especially those abroad (émigrés, members of foreign left-wing political parties, etc.) have been accustomed to refer to the situation in Spain as oppression, terror, revolt—a police state. Now when visitors from the United States and Europe go to Spain as tourists, businessmen, students or on special missions they often have the surprise of their lives, because they enter the country freely, travel anywhere, talk to everybody, watch bullfights, sip drinks pleasantly at sidewalk cafés, stroll in the cities and towns, and the result of their experience is a different diagnosis: normality, peacefulness, carelessness, cheerfulness, verbal criticism but no organized opposition, political jokes, little or no fear. The conclusion they easily draw, mainly because their impression is so different from their expectations, is that everything is all right: Spain is a friendly country, an efficient and strongly anti-Communist ally, with even some “organic” democracy, a “free” country, if only somewhat “authoritarian” in view of the impending danger of Communism.

During and immediately after World War II, the Spanish image of the United States included these relevant features: freedom, a high standard of living, opportunities, open-mindedness, hopefulness. The United States seemed to many Spaniards to be a major asset for their future. Then, step by step, disappointment began invading the Spaniard’s soul; or rather, *multiple* disappointments—sometimes conflicting ones, not always or at least not equally justified, perhaps not too logically connected. A part of Spanish opinion expected or feared—according to different interests and

<sup>1</sup> The reader can find a broader approach to this subject in my contribution to the volume “As Others See Us: The United States Through Foreign Eyes,” edited by Franz M. Joseph (Princeton University Press, 1959), and in my book, “Los Estados Unidos en escorzo” (“The United States: a Foreshortening”), available only in Spanish (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores, 1956, 1957).

positions—drastic changes in the political structure of Spain immediately after the collapse of the Axis powers. This first disappointment—or relief—came soon. I would say that the belief in such drastic and “automatic” changes was held by the relatively small number of Spaniards heavily implicated in politics, namely the exiles and those holding office. The vast majority of the people merely expected the beginning of a new period in which their country would move toward adopting the structures prevailing in the Western world, especially among the nations which had defeated Hitler and Mussolini and now were trying to check Stalin’s imperialism.

Then came the second disappointment. It was many-sided. On the one hand, Spain, which needed economic help very badly after the heavy losses of civil war and isolation during the years of the World War, was not included in the Marshall Plan, which was so effective in restoring political as well as economic welfare and balance in all the Western European nations. On the other hand, little was done to induce Spain to join the new organization of the West. The withdrawal of ambassadors, Spain’s exclusion from the United Nations and international agencies, the “quarantine” policy of the late forties—all this could lead only to a “solidification” of the internal Spanish structure, to a fossilization of nearly obsolete principles and slogans; it hurt Spanish pride and gave unexpected strength to the existing state of things. (But not *entirely* unexpected; some Spaniards suspected that behind the “quarantine” policy was a Soviet eagerness to prevent any change in Spain, as the best available tactic at the moment.)

These disappointments, it should be noted, did not refer primarily to the United States, but to the Western nations as a whole. Indeed, I would say that the United States was less involved than most, which is one of the reasons why Spain from 1945 to 1953 or 1954 was a friendly island in the ocean of growing anti-Americanism in Europe. Many Spaniards were sympathetic and still hopeful about the United States. The change came with a third wave of disappointment, mainly connected with American military and economic coöperation with Spain. Except for a few people deeply engaged in politics and committed to extreme positions, most Spaniards welcomed the normalization of Spain’s international position and were hopeful that she would really *join* the Western world. By joining they meant accepting the main standards of public life and personal freedom in the West, even if



some allowance was made for national differences. They received the impression now, however, that no requirements whatsoever had to be fulfilled in order to "join" and begin this coöperation—not even the enforcement of previous Spanish "fundamental laws" concerning civil rights, which, were they really in force, would be a sort of token constitution and would have opened up some possibilities of legal public life, the discussion of important issues and a political evolution along the main lines prevailing in Western Europe and the United States. The impression proved to be largely justified. As might have been expected, the association with the United States failed to influence Spain's main lines of domestic policy in the direction of liberalization or democratization. Indeed, in certain aspects such as intellectual and academic freedom, control of the press, etc., the situation worsened and reached a low in 1956, only partially tidied up later.

It would be a mistake, however, to make these disappointments wholly responsible for the obvious deterioration of the American image in Spanish minds from 1954 on. There have been three other factors in this process. The first was the growth of anti-Americanism both in Western Europe and Latin America. This had little influence on Spain previously, but it was increasingly effective as communication between Spaniards and foreigners became easier and more frequent through tourists, students, books, magazines, newspapers and trips by Spaniards abroad. The second factor was left-wing propaganda, which emphasized Soviet achievements. The third was the official relationship between the United States and Spain and the impression which the public had of it. In my essay in the book, "As Others See Us," I dealt at some length with the first two factors; let us now consider the last one.

### III

On the Spanish side, one must remember that the image of the United States and everything related to it relies largely—entirely, for the vast majority of the population—on public sources of information and interpretation, and this means officially controlled sources. These usually speak of "the free world" and "free countries," meaning both the United States and Spain. The unavoidable conclusion is that if this is so, there must be little freedom left in the United States. One often sees in the newspapers, usually under friendly headlines, derogatory comments in which American achievements, morality, culture and way of life are com-

pared unfavorably with those of other countries. The principles which inspire and regulate public life in the United States, as opposed to those prevailing behind the iron curtain, can hardly be expected to be a topic of information and discussion in the Spanish press. The existence of several political parties, elections for most offices, including the highest, open discussion of all issues, political freedom, and of course freedom of the press, separation of church and state (approved by Catholics), freedom of worship, independent labor unions, little state control—these are things that Spanish papers cannot be expected to discuss. For them to give their readers a fair image of the United States would be tantamount to showing that the two systems have little in common and the reader would wonder about the meaning of his choice between the two sides of the curtain.

From the point of view of the United States, I am afraid that the average American is not aware of the implications of apparently harmless attitudes. American officialdom, with few exceptions, seems to take Spanish positions at their face value. It seldom makes clear that "freedom" is not simply "anti-Communism." It does not take proper steps to see that the United States is not presented to the Spanish people in a light and with associations that may suit particular interests but do not increase the appreciation, understanding and sympathy for the United States. It does not make it easy to feel confident in the prospects for a close association with the United States and gives little hope that new possibilities may open in that direction.

#### IV

If I am not mistaken, possibilities are what matter. I said above that the visitor's impression of Spain, if he is not too biased, is extremely favorable. He finds things perfectly normal; he sees that everyday life is very pleasant, that there is some poverty, but no more than in many other countries, in any case no more than 30 years ago in Spain, and that the average standard of living is better; he sees opportunities for travel, business, writing, publishing. He knows more or less about the political organization of the state; he hears something about pressures and trials, but he may stay for months in Spain without having any immediate evidence of these sad things. On the other hand, he feels certain that all the other possibilities, commodities and pleasures exist.

They do, indeed. The only thing the visitor fails to realize is

that his friend in Spain is not *entitled* to them. He can do many things, but—only as long as he is allowed to. There is an element of what I would call a certain “graciousness,” of “privilege,” about everything that is permitted. In the eyes of the superficial observer this may seem just a subtle nuance, but if the American visitor were to set about comparing this background seriously with his own, he would perhaps be startled. Publications, passports and travel, meetings, lectures, teaching associations—everything *may* be possible, but the possibility is not something that you can rely on. Therefore, you are at a loss when planning, projecting, trying to launch anything, be it business, a review, a society, a spectacle, a discussion group, a trip abroad, a center of research (of course I am referring to activities remote from politics). When public life encounters too many obstacles, it tends, since it cannot be private, to become clandestine. And at the same time, a strange feeling pervades the soul: the closing of the horizon, the freezing of history.

People are slow to lose hope. Not too long ago, most Spaniards were hopeful that the United States, representing the greatest “possibility” in the world at present, would help to warm and melt everything frozen, to set in motion, after the years of war, everything alive, to open the future. Many people—especially among the youth, born to the present situation—are now turning in other directions. Most of them are far from belonging in the extreme positions they seem to adopt, and which they even believe they share. A friend of mine often says when he sees some individual’s unfortunate and insincere change of position: “One more who’s in orbit.” Most of these would like and love the United States if only they had the right image of it, if they could visit it. But they cannot overcome the handicap of misrepresentations; they have no hope left. Paradoxically, the United States appears to be praised and supported now by quite a few of its old (pro-Nazi) opponents and by other people who in fact strongly dislike it; meanwhile, anti-American feeling is growing among the potential real friends of the United States.

The likelihood is that in the near future, if nothing is done to prevent it, a large part of the influential people in Spain will not be friendly to the United States. Yet they could be. The Western defense system, which of course is very important, ranks high among the present issues; but I cannot help thinking that though bases can be very valuable assets if surrounded by a friendly,

willing and reliable country, there is some chance that the future may be subordinated to a precarious present.

What can be done? This is a matter for discussion and reflection. I have wanted mainly to raise a few questions. But the first thing to be done, I think, is to become aware of the problem. The second is to know how to evaluate degrees of importance in Spain. Who, for instance, are the makers of opinion? How do different groups rate? What is the influence of a businessman, a politician, an official, a priest, a scholar, an author? How much are writers read, and how earnestly are they listened to? The third need is to make at least a gesture which would show that Americans really care for liberty and reject *any* crushing of it, from either side. Thus confidence in the United States might be restored among Spaniards, and Spain made a sincere and reliable friend. This, in turn, could perhaps change the present unfair image of the United States in the world as a whole by giving Americans a better and more cheerful reflection in the Spanish mirror.

# EVERYONE A SOLDIER

## THE COMMUNIST CHINESE MILITIA

*By Ralph L. Powell*

**U**NDER the slogan "Everyone a Soldier," the Chinese Communist leaders are militarizing the people by enrolling immense numbers in the militia. This campaign exceeds the Western concept of a nation in arms, and is reminiscent of the proposals of the French revolutionaries or of Lenin. It is closely related to the "great leap forward" in economic development and to the regimented commune system. From a military standpoint, the massive training program has been described officially as creating a "human sea" or "steel wall." It also seeks to provide a highly dispersed defense against nuclear attack. The precipitate drive to create a "universal" militia demonstrates the supreme confidence and revolutionary zeal of the Communists. But it may be that they are also taking grave risks in creating localized, disciplined organizations and in training so many to use weapons of war.

The Chinese Communist Party is a militant organization, which has been at war during most of its existence. It came to power primarily by military operations, and even its peacetime projects are often described in military terms. The majority of its Politburo and Central Committee members have served as military commanders or commissars. The Party chieftain, Mao Tse-tung, a recognized authority on mobile and guerrilla warfare, has written extensively on these subjects; the importance of a people's militia to a revolutionary movement runs like a thread through his writings. He has confidence in his ability to utilize armed citizens safely to further Party objectives.

After breaking with the Kuomintang, or Nationalist, Party in 1927, the Communists organized peasant militia bands; and during the war against Japan they exploited nationalism, patriotism and reform programs to expand greatly the rural militia. These part-time soldiers served as replacements for the Red Army and fought sporadically as guerrillas. By 1945 the Party claimed to have over 2,200,000 militiamen, and during the rebellion against the Nationalist Government (1945-50) it was officially estimated that the number reached 5,500,000. Victory on the mainland did not bring demobilization. In 1955 compulsory military service

was proclaimed, but the militia was not abolished. The law stated that the militia would continue to preserve order and protect production. From mid-1955 to the summer of 1958, however, little was said in the China mainland press about the militia. Evidently it was playing a less important role than it had during the earlier phases of the Chinese Communist movement.

## II

The year 1958 was one of unprecedented campaigns and conflict, both internal and external. It was the year of the "great leap forward" in economic development, of the formation of the communes, and of the Quemoy Islands crisis. It also saw the beginnings of the drive to modify and vastly increase the militia, under the slogan "Everyone a Soldier." The sacrifices demanded of the Chinese people and the regimentation forced upon them by the interlocking mass campaigns of 1958 have never been equalled even in the Soviet Union. The basic objectives, or compulsions, were to consolidate still further the totalitarian controls of the Communist Party over every aspect of Chinese life; to make China a great industrial and military power at a superhuman rate of speed; and to hasten the transition from "socialism" to a Chinese version of "communism."

The "great leap forward" in production began early in 1958, shortly before the first experimental merger of agricultural producers' coöperatives into much larger communes. Then, during the autumn, the masses of the rural populace were organized by persuasion and coercion into more than 26,400 communes; and in some areas communization of the cities also was begun. The communes were to be political, economic, social and military units; government and management were to be integrated; there was to be unified control over local agriculture, industry, commerce, education and defense. Naturally, leadership was to be provided by the Party, which thus would gain enormously in power and in means of control over the people. In December, the Central Committee temporarily modified some of the most extreme features of the communes and took one step backward on urban regimentation; it also amended the implication that the communes would provide a rapid road to Communism. The insinuation that Red China would achieve the "ultimate goal" of Communism ahead of the U.S.S.R. had not been appreciated in Moscow. Even so, if Communist China achieves its final goal in the form of communes,



this Orwellian system will have little in common with Marx's vision of a withering away of the state.

On August 23, 1958, a heavy Communist bombardment of Quemoy opened the Taiwan Straits crisis. It was in the midst of these military operations and while the great drive to establish the communes was in full course that the related campaign to make "Everyone a Soldier" was begun. The Communists claimed that the Chinese masses, "aroused by U.S. provocations," demanded arms to defend the homeland. The already extensive militia system was rapidly multiplied, both in the countryside and in the urban areas.

Originally it was asserted that the enlistments were voluntary. For example, it was alleged that in the sophisticated old city of Peking 2,200,000 people "volunteered." At Chungshan University in Canton, all of the faculty and students joined the militia, "with the exception of the weak and aged professors." Although we may doubt the voluntary nature of the drive we must not underestimate the ability of the Communists to organize and control the people. They demonstrated this by the tremendous speed and size of the operation, and by carrying it through without creating effective opposition.

If fully implemented, the militia plan theoretically could provide Communist China with about 120,000,000 young men and women who had had some basic military training, plus over 180,000,000 more with at least a conception of military organization and discipline. Based on statistics from part of the provinces, one author has estimated that by the end of 1958 there already were more than 200,000,000 on the militia rolls.<sup>1</sup> The official statement was that there were over 30,000,000 *trained* militiamen, but it was admitted that only about 4,000,000 of these had had marksmanship practice with live ammunition.<sup>2</sup> The great majority of the militiamen had figuratively "held a hoe in one hand and a rifle in the other," with the emphasis on the hoe.

Responsibility and credit for the campaign to make "Everyone a Soldier" lie with Mao Tse-tung. The Communist press repeatedly has stated that it is an expression of his great strategic thinking and of his views on people's war. Sometimes an attempt is

<sup>1</sup> Cheng Chu-yuan, "The People's Communes." Hong Kong: Union Press, 1959, p. 90-91.

<sup>2</sup> New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.), Peking, Dec. 31, 1958, in "Survey of the China Mainland Press," Jan. 15, 1959, p. 8. The present article is based primarily on the "Survey of the China Mainland Press" (S.C.M.P.) and the "Current Background" (C.B.) series, both produced by the American Consulate General, Hong Kong.

made to establish the orthodoxy of the concept by saying that it represents a combination of the "universal truths" of Marxism-Leninism with the special problems of the Chinese revolution.

In its basic objectives the campaign seems to be more political and economic than military. The aim is to utilize military organization and discipline more effectively to control and mobilize the masses for production. The official line is that the establishment of a "universal" militia will promote production in all fields, simplify the mobilization and transfer of large numbers of laborers, provide for more effective indoctrination and education, and establish an inexhaustible supply of military reserves. Mao Tse-tung has stated: "The establishment of militia divisions on a large scale is not purely a question of mobilization of manpower, collective action and fulfillment of production tasks. It is a question of having the masses militarize and collectivize their life."<sup>3</sup> Mao is also frequently quoted as saying that the militia is a military organization, a labor organization, an educational organization and a physical training organization. The fact is that the Communists are developing agricultural and industrial armies, based on the totalitarian principle of "democratic centralism."

As always, "politics is in command." The method used is the Communist technique of interlocking controls. The Party committees and secretaries at all levels are involved; so are the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff and the military district and sub-district offices in each province. The Young Communist League, the Physical Culture and Sports Commission and other mass organizations coöperate. Theoretically, at least, the people's councils at each level play a role. Much of the training is provided by the highly indoctrinated regular army. These methods are designed to safeguard the principle propounded by Mao Tse-tung and others that the Party should control the guns and never permit the guns to control the Party.

The militia is divided into two principal types, the "basic" and the "ordinary." The first is composed of young activists, selected mainly from males between 16 and 30 or 32 years of age but apparently also including a number of young women from 17 to 22 years of age. These basic militiamen, who are supposed to receive military training on a regular schedule, will be called up to reinforce the standing forces in case of war. Furthermore, as activists they assist the security authorities, help to crush opposition and

<sup>3</sup> *Kiangsi Jih-pao*, Dec. 13, 1959, quoted in S.C.M.P., Feb. 15, 1960, p. 39.

urge the other workers to meet advancing production norms. The ordinary militia is essentially an enormous labor corps consisting of all that great mass of citizens, male and female between 16 and 50 years of age, who are not basic militiamen. Excluded are counter-revolutionaries, former landlords and rich peasants, criminals, rightists and the disabled. This could be an extremely large group. The ordinary militiamen receive military training during the very limited "free time" when they are not involved in production.

The only aspect of the militia organization that is standardized is the terminology. The militia is organized into divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons and squads, but the size of a unit depends on the size of the production organ with which it is associated. Normally the basic and ordinary militiamen seem to be organized into mixed units. There is a basic squad in each platoon, a basic platoon in each company, etc., and the commanders of the basic units are concurrently commanders of the next higher mixed organization. In the countryside the militia is based on the communes, while in urban areas units are formed by government organs, factories and schools, or by the now rapidly multiplying urban communes.

Since the militia is an "organization of the masses," rather than a professional army, the use of military ranks, uniforms and salutes is frowned upon.<sup>4</sup> Although the appropriate leaders are sometimes called division, regimental or battalion commanders, militia "officers" are usually referred to as "cadres." Those chosen to be cadres are former regular army personnel or civilian activists, many of them Party members. Commissars are also attached to the militia units to further insure political control.

The mere fact that a totalitarian régime can enroll tens of millions of people in a military organization in a very short period does not mean that it has achieved its full objectives. The hastily enlarged militia suffered from a "degree of formalism"—a Marxian euphemism for a paper organization—and many of the units were not "pure" enough, meaning that in their enthusiasm local Party committees had conscripted some undesirable elements. The peasants in the communes were being driven so hard, what with labor, military drills and indoctrination meetings, that in December 1958 the Central Committee of the Party felt it must order that members of the communes be permitted eight hours

<sup>4</sup> *China News Analysis*, "The Militia," Sept. 4, 1959, p. 6. This is a valuable, documented article concerning the role of the militia in the Chinese Communist movement.

sleep and four hours for meals and recreation. But a national militia conference, held in January 1960, decided "unequivocally" to further intensify militia work. In April, an array of top Party leaders participated in a conference of militia representatives to give prestige and emphasis to the militia campaign. Despite opposition, even within the Party, there was to be no turning back.

Reports of the conferences and stories in the press reveal that the first concern regarding the militia is still to assure complete Party control. Militia work has been placed on the agenda of Party committees. Stress is laid on the necessity to increase the political education and "revolutionary enthusiasm" of the militiamen. The principal target for propaganda is the basic militiaman. As for the ordinary militiaman, his political education can be combined with social education. Special emphasis is placed on training cadres, for they are the activists in production and the officers in time of war.

It is a question whether or not the Chinese Communists are actually arming the masses. Sometimes, speaking figuratively or for propaganda effect, official sources do proclaim that the "people" are being armed. However, the first indications are that only a minority of the militiamen are actually armed or even engage in firing practice. Most if not all of these are basic militiamen selected for their reliability. The actual situation is typified by the statement of a senior Party leader, who in a single address first bragged that only a country in which the people are the masters dares to give arms to the masses, and then called for a reorganization of the militia to assure that weapons are issued to those who are politically reliable.<sup>5</sup>

### III

The official press leaves no doubt that, except in case of war, the economic roles of the militia take precedence over military ones. Labor and military training are coördinated, with priority given to labor. Military instruction is not to be given at the expense of production, nor should military organization upset organization for production. Furthermore, training should be coördinated with the work load, emphasis being placed on training during slack periods.

Nevertheless, the universal militia has important military as-

<sup>5</sup> Huang Huo-ch'ing, *Liaoning Jih-pao*, Feb. 27, 1960, quoted in S.C.M.P., April 12, 1960, p. 13, 15.

pects and it has close relationships with the regular armed forces, the so-called "Peoples Liberation Army" (P.L.A.). In most of the coastal areas the two have joint defense commands. Although the P.L.A. has its own training schedule and devotes a tremendous amount of time to civilian construction projects, it is said to have given "enthusiastic" assistance to the expanding militia, both in training and in providing training equipment. Today the basic militia serves as a reserve for the regular forces and in the future it will also become a basis for the national conscription and retirement programs; conscripts will be drawn from the militia and discharged servicemen will rejoin militia units as "backbone elements." Each year a campaign will be carried out to select militiamen for the regular forces, which will mean that army recruits will already have had some basic military training. In addition, the militia might relieve the P.L.A. of some of the civilian production tasks that have irked the professional soldier.

The militia campaign is linked to the modernization of the P.L.A. Also, the great increase in the size of the militia will help to solve the contradiction between a "small" peacetime army and the large forces needed in time of war; for the Chinese Communists obviously do not look on the more than 2,500,000 men of the P.L.A. as a large peacetime force. Nevertheless, a decrease in the regular army has occurred since the victory on the Mainland, and one official source declares that the reduction of the army and the expansion of the militia will enable the government to divert part of the military budget to economic construction programs.<sup>6</sup> The militia provides both a large reserve and an inexpensive one; no mention has been found of any pay for its members beyond the limited rations and trivial pay that they receive for working in the fields or factories.

Militia organizations are not limited to infantry units, however, and they will become more expensive as technical troops are formed. Directives have been issued to form units of artillery, anti-aircraft, reconnaissance, signal corps, engineer, chemical warfare and civil defense. The purpose is, of course, not solely to provide reserves capable of employing modern conventional weapons but also to train skilled technicians for industry and agriculture.

So far, the training given to militia units—even to the basic militiamen—appears to be largely rudimentary, with only a small amount of specialized instruction. Though a number of part-time

<sup>6</sup> *Kiangsi Jih-pao*, Dec. 13, 1959, reported in S.C.M.P., Feb. 15, 1960, p. 39.

training schools have been established, militiamen must have little time for attendance. What arms and equipment are issued must constitute a logistical nightmare, for while the plan is to produce necessary arms in local arsenals, actually many weapons have been inherited from "revolutionary predecessors." In addition, the P.L.A. has provided a considerable amount of equipment for training purposes, and it is claimed that a number of organizations use not only rifles, but also automatic weapons and even artillery pieces.

After more than a year's experience, the Communist press has provided numerous statistics to demonstrate the advantages of using military organization and discipline to mobilize the people for production. Like the statistics regarding the "great leap forward" in production, the reports are obviously grossly exaggerated. They would be more credible if they did not include statements such as the one that a militia company commander developed a wiring machine that increased work efficiency by 50 times and solved the basic problems of machine building. It is more plausible that, among other Herculean tasks, some 71,000 militiamen in Shansi during 17 days of "bitter fighting" collected 1,900,000 piculs of manure.<sup>7</sup> One of their functions is to carry out organized hunts against wild animals and birds that might endanger human beings or livestock. It is claimed that in the first half of 1959, they killed almost 7,500,000 birds and beasts of prey.<sup>8</sup> The tremendous numbers of militiamen who are mobilized to work on varied public projects in industry and agriculture are indeed impressive. But one is reminded of the Chinese maxim that "Good iron is not beaten into nails; good men are not made into soldiers." In 1958 it was almost literally true that the good men of China were all soldiers making poor iron for the "great leap forward."

In purely military fields, the militia is given credit for assisting the P.L.A. in operations against Nationalist Chinese forces on the Fukien Coast and the "Yunnan frontier." They also guard factories, installations and lines of communication. Finally, at least the basic units are gradually improving their capabilities as a reserve for the regular forces. The progress is uneven but it goes on even though Communist China does not need such a large force to fight a conventional war beyond her frontiers.

<sup>7</sup> *Szechwan Jih-pao*, Jan. 22, 1960, quoted in S.C.M.P., March 29, 1960, p. 38, and *Shansi Jih-pao*, Feb. 16, 1960, quoted in S.C.M.P., April 6, 1960, p. 23.

<sup>8</sup> N.C.N.A., Peking, Feb. 8, 1960, S.C.M.P., Feb. 12, 1960, p. 4.



To offset the Communists' distortion and exaggeration of their achievements, their concept of self-criticism provides us with valuable information regarding some of the weaknesses of their program. According to scattered official sources, the reorganization of the militia in 1959 failed to eradicate many of the faults. Thus at least part of the units are still "rather loosely organized," while others do not carry out all their tasks. The training of technical troops must be improved, as must the political screening of militiamen and their morale and indoctrination; for instance, some of the militiamen "harbor the misgiving" that following their military training they might have to go to war. As usual, the cadres are scapegoats even when the trouble lies in the Party line. It is pointed out that part of the cadres are not qualified; they are too old, or are not interested in military matters, or believe that the militia is too large. Some are despotic, while others refuse to take a firm stand. It is claimed, however, that the false belief that militia work does not have a future has been eliminated. Despite all the indoctrination and the frantic pressures put on them, some of the cadres still appear to be human; for they display conceit by comparing ranks and seniority, utilize personal relationships and even complain to the local Party committee about living conditions.

Members of the militia are not the only ones to make complaints. Even Party committees have been worried that the great militia build-up would be detrimental to production, and some popular criticisms are admitted. The harshest official attacks are aimed at rightist deviationists—including Party members and military cadres—who fail to support the campaign to make "Everyone a Soldier" and indeed oppose all mass movements. The nationwide "struggle" against rightist tendencies indicates that they must extend high up into the Party as well as down into the masses.

#### IV

The first phase of the campaign to militarize the Chinese in a universal militia coincided with the Quemoy crisis. The second began in the period of the Camp David spirit and of the preparations for the summit conference. In this period the Chinese Communists adopted a militant attitude, paying only lip service to the concept of peaceful coexistence and maintaining that the threat of war still existed. Their accusations against Americans

became vitriolic. The United States is now accused of leading a "camp of imperialist aggressors" and of being the "most brutal enemy" of the peoples of the world. In particular it is charged with being extremely hostile to China and with making secret preparations for war against her under a cloak of peace.

One answer to the question why Communist China wants such an immense militia is that it is to be part of a defense against atomic attack and invasion. The Chinese Communists claim that "the East Wind prevails over the West Wind"—meaning that the world balance of power has shifted in favor of the Sino-Soviet bloc. But though declaring that they are going to have nuclear weapons, they have given no public indications that they have them yet—or long-range missiles either; and there is an interesting absence of references to any expectation of receiving such weapons from the Soviets. They may well believe, of course, that if they start a war the Soviet Union would be forced to assist them with nuclear armed forces or to supply atomic weapons to the P.L.A. But unless and until they either develop or are provided with atomic arms, they must depend on other means to deter a nuclear attack.

The Chinese Communist leaders no longer pooh-pooh the terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons, but they obviously still downgrade their effects, including fallout. They profess not to fear a war, and they still do not admit that an atomic war could destroy the Communist as well as the capitalist states. The basis for their confidence is this: "A sea formed by several hundred million militiamen is something which no modern weapon can destroy. This is the principal guarantee of our invincibility."<sup>9</sup> And the Minister of National Defense, Marshal Lin Piao, has stated: "The imperialists are now doing their utmost to prepare for large-scale guided missile and nuclear warfare. To deal with such a war, the most important thing for us to do is to mobilize and rely on the people to carry out a people's war. We are Marxist-Leninists, we fully realize men are the decisive factor in war; we also recognize the important role modern technology plays in war. We must therefore lose no time in vigorously improving the technical equipment of our forces and in strengthening the modernization of our forces."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Huang Huo-ch'ing, *Liaoning Jih-pao*, Feb. 27, 1960, quoted in S.C.M.P., April 12, 1960, p. 13. See also Jen-min Jih-pao, edit., April 19, 1960, quoted in S.C.M.P., April 29, 1960, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> N.C.N.A., Peking, April 27, 1960, quoted in S.C.M.P., May 6, 1960, p. 17.

The Party claims that the combination of regular forces and a massive militia would provide a "defense of steel," draw the "enemy into the inferno of an all-people's war" and drown him in a "great human sea." This represents a victory for Mao Tse-tung's concept of a people's war, a concept based on years of struggle against the Nationalist Government and the Japanese. He maintains his belief in the continuing supremacy of men over weapons, even in the atomic age and against the views of some of the professional officers of the P.L.A.<sup>11</sup>

In a similar way, at least one of the objectives in establishing the partially self-sufficient and highly dispersed communes was probably to provide a defense against atomic attack. As stated by the Minister of National Defense, the communes, combining political, economic, educational and military affairs, "are a powerful reserve to realize in a most effective way the plan of making everyone a soldier, to support the front line, protect the motherland, and lead the enemy to fatal disaster. . ."<sup>12</sup>

The Chinese Communist leaders may actually believe that the semi-autarchic communes and new industrial centers widely dispersed over vast distances, plus strong conventional forces and a universal militia, would permit the régime to survive a nuclear war. Events of the last decade demonstrate that the possible death of many millions of Chinese would not deter them from engaging in such a war. Actually, the evidence indicates that they are preparing to fight a broken-back war—the type of warfare that some military specialists believe is apt to follow an initial nuclear attack.

Apparently believing that the régime could be destroyed only if China were occupied by enemy forces, they plan to prevent this by a protracted mobile and guerrilla-type war—the kind of conflict that 25 years of experience would recommend to the older Party leaders. Judging from the warfare against Japan and the Nationalist Government, the Chinese Communists could be expected to utilize vast space and manpower, dispersal, tight discipline and centralized control, combined with widely delegated responsibility. As in the war against Japan, they would certainly exploit nationalism and patriotism. They would employ the basic militia as guerrillas and in a final crisis they would probably arm

<sup>11</sup> Lin Piao, N.C.N.A., Peking, Sept. 29, 1959, quoted in C.B., Oct. 7, 1959, p. 8; Hsieh, Alice Langley, "Communist China and Nuclear Warfare," *The China Quarterly*, No. 2, April-June, 1960, p. 8, 11-12, 14.

<sup>12</sup> N.C.N.A., Peking, Sept. 29, 1959, C.B., Oct. 7, 1959, p. 7.

the more reliable members of the ordinary militia with whatever arms were available, relying on patriotism to create support for the régime.

These military concepts may no longer be rational, but the Party leaders may well have faith in them still. Throughout modern history many intelligent military leaders and statesmen have clung to strategies and weapons systems that have proven to be outmoded. The better-informed Soviet leaders do not draw the same conclusions regarding the effects of a thermonuclear war as do their Chinese allies. Judging from their statements, the latter have much less fear of a major war—even of World War III.

Today the conventional forces of the P.L.A., supported by the militia reserves, are a threat mainly to China's non-Communist neighbors. Should the leaders of Red China obtain nuclear arms, it is of course possible that they might come to accept the view that no one can win an atomic war. It seems more likely that nuclear weapons would merely add the consciousness of possessing fantastically multiplied offensive striking power to their conviction that they, and perhaps they alone, could survive an atomic war. In that case, Communist China would truly become a menace to the whole world, her Soviet allies not excluded.

## BRITAIN, THE SIX AND AMERICAN POLICY

*By Miriam Camps*

IN recent months the British Government and people have been reëxamining their position with respect to the European Economic Community—"the Six"—more deeply and fundamentally than ever before. Although views differ about the terms on which an arrangement with the Six should be sought, there is overwhelming agreement in the government, in industry, in the trade unions and in the press that, despite the failure of past efforts, an arrangement must be found and at not too distant a date. Certain agricultural groups and the *Daily Express* have always opposed, and continue to oppose, free trade with the Continent; but with very few exceptions, the British public is today much more fully convinced of the need for far-reaching arrangements with the Six, and is much more vocal, than it ever was during the prolonged but abortive negotiations in the Maudling Committee.

### II

In these negotiations, which collapsed nearly two years ago, the United States played little part, but until comparatively recently we have generally encouraged the United Kingdom to become more closely linked with the continental countries, economically as well as politically and militarily. This was the consistent theme of American policy during the Marshall Plan period. Indeed, at times the United States appeared to the British Government to be unnecessarily zealous in urging the United Kingdom to join the continental countries in far-reaching economic arrangements. Somewhat ironically, our suggestion—when the O.E.E.C. was first being discussed—that the United Kingdom should join the continental countries in forming a customs union was considered by the British to be particularly inopportune and fanciful. Now the roles are reversed. In Europe today, most people identify the United States with those groups (the French Government, the Commission of the European Economic Community and some, although not all, of the convinced "Europeans") that are opposed to the formation of a free trade area or customs union

embracing both the Six and the Free Trade Association of "the Seven."<sup>1</sup>

Since the signing last November of the Convention for a Free Trade Association by the Outer Seven, there have been many pressures within the Six as well as in the other European countries for negotiations between the Six and the Seven, and the support that the United States has given to those who have opposed re-opening negotiations has been important, perhaps decisive. Our "unneutral" attitude and our intervention at several critical points during the last year in support of the alternative course of action advocated by the Commission of the Community has, not unnaturally, created resentment in the United Kingdom, in the other countries of the Seven, and even in some quarters within the European Community.

The course of action advocated by the Commission and favored by the United States has been one which, in effect, denied the need for arrangements between the Community and the other European countries that were different, in kind, from those established by the Community with the United States or any other close ally. The Commission did suggest that a "contact committee" should be established to examine and to seek to mitigate particular difficulties that might arise in trade between the Six and the Seven; but it was emphatic that this committee should be limited in scope and should not be used as a back-door approach to a new negotiation.<sup>2</sup> The Commission argued forcibly and persuasively that the right course now was not to continue the search for a Europe-wide arrangement but to press for the adoption of liberal and constructive economic policies on the part of the Community, a general lowering of trade barriers by the industrialized countries—including a substantial reduction in the common tariff of the Six—and better coördination of economic policies on the part of the major countries of the free

<sup>1</sup> The members of the European Economic Community ("the Six") are Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and West Germany. The members of the European Free Trade Association ("the Seven") are the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal. Throughout this article the expression "Europeans" (in quotation marks) is used to describe those people in the Community who are consciously seeking not only an economic union of the Six countries but some form of political federation as well.

<sup>2</sup> The "contact committee," as such, was never established; but the Committee on Trade Problems of the Twenty-One (the O.E.E.C. countries plus the United States and Canada, and the Commission of the European Economic Community) which was formed during the spring has taken its place. The Committee on Trade Problems is concentrating on particular trade difficulties and has been discouraged by the United States (and others) from embarking on discussions of a long-term settlement.



world—in particular, the Six, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Commission's advocacy of liberal and constructive commercial and economic policies was, of course, warmly welcomed by the United States. And, for a number of reasons, the Administration was ready to share and support the Commission's view that, given liberal, outward-looking policies on the part of the Community, a wider European free-trade arrangement was unwise as well as unnecessary.

In the first place, the Administration shared the judgment of the Commission, M. Monnet and others that while Dr. Adenauer—a convinced “European”—remained Chancellor and while the economic situation was favorable, over-riding priority should be given to the consolidation of the Community and to pushing the integration of the Six countries to the point where it could not be unravelled by political change or economic adversity. It also shared the view of the Commission that negotiations on a broader arrangement—whatever their outcome—would impede this process of consolidation. If the negotiations were successful there was the danger that the Community would not be able to preserve its identity within the larger framework and that it would be replaced by a looser, broader and less ambitious arrangement.

There were good reasons for this fear. Until the integration of the Six countries was further advanced, the identity of the Community depended, to a large extent, on the very differences in tariff treatment between the Six and the other European countries which a broader free-trade arrangement would eliminate. Industry in the Six countries was planning investments and making other arrangements on the assumption that the Common Market—but no inclusive European arrangement—would become a reality. And one of the strongest cards in the hands of the “Europeans” in their efforts to accelerate the establishment of the Common Market was the fact that industrial arrangements were tending to anticipate rather than to lag behind the reduction in barriers to intra-Community trade. There was also substance to the view that negotiations on a Europe-wide arrangement, whether or not they proved successful, would mean a delay in the development of the Community—and at a critical time—simply because the key people in the Commission and in the governments of the Six countries would not be able to concentrate on pushing ahead with the implementation of the Treaty of Rome,

but would instead be caught up in protracted and probably acrimonious bargaining.

The fact that the French Government was strongly against a renewal of negotiations (for rather different reasons) was also, of course, an important reason for the Commission's view. Soon after coming to power, the De Gaulle government had indicated that it regarded the Treaty of Rome as a binding international agreement. But it had shown little enthusiasm for doing more than carrying out the letter of the Treaty commitments. Many of the provisions provided only the bare bones of policy; the flesh remained to be put on by decisions taken by the Six governments on the basis of recommendations formulated by the Commission. French coöperation in the further development of the Community was uncertain at best, but it was essential; and an important condition of French support appeared to be opposition to a wider area of free trade.

Concern at the deterioration in the U.S. balance-of-payments position, and the danger that any new discrimination against American exports might intensify that problem (and might lead to new domestic protectionist pressure) were also strong reasons for our official coolness to a Europe-wide free-trade arrangement. The Common Market of the Six and the Free Trade Area of the Seven both involved discrimination against American exports, but a coming together of the two groups would have meant somewhat more discrimination since our European competitors, and in particular Britain and Germany, would then have had a better position than our own exporters, not only within the European group to which each now belongs, but in the other group as well.

The Administration's concern at the prospect of a coming together of the two groups also undoubtedly owed something to a deep-seated dislike of economic "regionalism." In the immediate postwar period the European countries had no effective choice between "globalism" and "regionalism;" had the United States insisted on a non-discriminatory system of quota liberalization the result would have been a continuation of strictly balanced bilateral trade arrangements and a disastrously low level of trade. Once the major European countries had become prosperous, and particularly since the convertibility moves at the end of 1958, the case for "regional" rather than "global" action had become less obvious. The Six, by endorsing the ultimate objective of economic and political unity, could be considered an embryonic

state and, in these terms, the Community was acceptable even to those who tended to oppose "regionalism." But the Seven and, to an even greater extent, a wider arrangement lacking the goal of eventual union encountered the traditional opposition to regional action on matters within the competence of global organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the GATT.

The policy pursued by the United States during the last year can be counted a success in terms of its immediate objectives of giving the Community time to consolidate and of encouraging the adoption of liberal trading policies. In May the Council of Ministers of the Community took important decisions to speed up the establishment of the Common Market. Although these decisions called for somewhat less rapid action than the Commission had proposed, the effect of them will be that at the end of the first four years of the transitional period the tariffs on trade within the Community will have been cut by at least 40 percent (and perhaps by 50 percent) rather than by the 30 percent required by the Treaty. And the first move toward establishing the common external tariff will be taken by the end of this year, rather than a year later as provided by the Treaty. As evidence of willingness to adopt liberal external policies, the Six tentatively reduced by 20 percent the common tariff toward which they are moving; the cut will become permanent if other countries make adequate concessions in the forthcoming GATT negotiations. Moreover, the Six have indicated that they are prepared for further reciprocal reductions in the future. This willingness to negotiate for lower tariffs has not been limited to the Six: the United Kingdom, in particular, has also made clear that it will be ready to negotiate substantial cuts in its own relatively high tariffs during the forthcoming GATT negotiations.

### III

Although the Community has taken an important step forward, and although the principal European countries appear ready to make significant tariff reductions (for suitable reciprocal concessions), the last six months have also revealed weaknesses and limitations in our policy. In the first place, by becoming so closely identified with the views of the most ardent "Europeans" we have sacrificed any claim to impartiality in the European dispute. In the second place, we have added to the already pervasive disenchantment with certain aspects of our foreign policy by

pressing as an alternative to a European settlement a course of action which we ourselves do not appear ready to make effective. It is possible that had the United States been ready to undertake a massive reduction in its own tariff and to give real powers to the successor organization to the O.E.E.C.—the proposed O.E.C.D. (Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development)—the other European countries would have felt it possible to work out their problem of relationship with the Six without recourse to special European arrangements. But although we have argued that the right course of action is to lower trade barriers globally and to coöperate closely on a broader than European basis, the terms of our existing trade-agreements legislation clearly rule out the possibility of the kind of reduction in the U.S. tariff that would be required to make global reductions an alternative to European free trade. And, largely because of our own reluctance to undertake any very far-reaching commitments in that context, the scope and powers proposed for the O.E.C.D. are so limited that it promises to be a somewhat weaker organization than its predecessor—the O.E.E.C. Finally, our unwillingness to admit the need for a European settlement, not necessarily now but at some not too distant date, may well weaken our ability to influence the timing and the terms of such a settlement.

Neither the French Government nor the Commission nor the United States could delay the opening of new negotiations if the United Kingdom were to indicate that it was ready to negotiate on terms for joining the Community. All Six governments and the Commission have repeatedly stated that their Community is “open” and that they would welcome participation by the United Kingdom in particular. Today, for the first time, many responsible people in Britain are seriously advocating taking the plunge and joining the Six in all their Communities.<sup>3</sup> The possibility of doing this has become a real issue for two different kinds of reasons: first, because the vast majority of those who have an important influence on policy genuinely want closer relationships with the Six (economically and politically) and believe that it is important for the British Government to give far greater priority to its European relationship than it has heretofore done; and second, because the attitude of the French Government and the Commission, and the support given to this position by Dr. Adenauer and the U.S. Government, have appeared to foreclose

<sup>3</sup> The European Economic Community, Euratom, the European Coal and Steel Community.

the United Kingdom's arriving at this objective by any means short of joining the Community.

It may well be desirable for the British to join the Community, but the decision is one that should be reached because it is found to be the right answer to the problem of their relationship with the Community and not because it is the only way to get the United States out of the room and to force the Six to negotiate. The crucial element in any eventual European settlement is the relationship to be established between Britain and the Community; the other European countries (and in particular the rest of the Seven) cannot be ignored, but it will be easier to find appropriate arrangements for them once the right central relationship has been found. An effective and harmonious relationship between Britain and the Community is of fundamental importance to the well-being of the West and it is a question that ought to be discussed in all its implications by the principal members of the NATO alliance. If we accept the need for an arrangement between the Six and the other European countries that is different in kind and goes deeper than the relationship between the Six and the United States, and if we show a willingness to help bring such an arrangement about, we can exert a powerful influence on the timing and the way that the relationship is to be established. If we continue to deny the need for a European settlement we are unlikely to prevent one, but we may well find ourselves in a position to have little say about the terms on which it is made.

Over the past few years many positions on both sides of the Channel and on both sides of the Atlantic have been adopted for essentially short-term, tactical reasons. Positions that were valid at a particular time and in particular circumstances tend to persist when conditions have changed, and short-term tactics tend to harden into long-term policies. The British Government is now examining various assumptions which in the past have appeared to impose limits on the kind of commitments to the Continent that it could assume. It is perhaps time for our Government also to examine afresh the relevance of some of its assumptions.

In the past the "Europeans" have argued that the Community could not be fitted into a broader European framework without fatally weakening the Community; that, in the modern world, trade could not be freed except on conditions approximating those in the Treaty of Rome; and that some day the United Kingdom would "face facts" and join the Treaty of Rome. They have also

described the ultimate objectives of the Community in terms of an economic union and some form of political federation and they have argued that an essential feature of their approach was the delegation of power to "supra-national" institutions. The United States has supported these concepts and these goals.

However, during the last year and a half the Community has not been developing as "supra-nationally" as some of its founders had hoped and the balance of power has been tipping away from the independent Commission to the Council of Ministers of the member governments, and, in particular, toward the French and German Governments. The Commission has more power and is far more important than the secretariat of an intergovernmental organization and it has played an indispensable part in the formulation of policy and in the implementation of decisions; but, thus far at least, it has acted as a goad on governments, as an honest broker among governments, and as the intellectual driving force of the Community, not as a "pre-federal" government. The customs-union features of the Treaty are being implemented without much difficulty, but much less is being done in those areas of the Treaty where the differences in concept and approach between the United Kingdom (and the rest of the Seven) and the "Europeans" today appear to be the most important. For the "Europeans," free trade within the area is only one aspect of what they are seeking to achieve; the real objective is to reach the point where all economic questions are considered not as national but as Community problems and solutions are sought not by reconciling conflicting national interests but by reference to the good of the Community. For the "Europeans" a Community policy is thus an objective to be sought as desirable in itself. The test of whether common policies are needed to make a customs union work—the test the British would be apt to apply—is largely irrelevant: a customs union is one aspect of common policy, not the reason why some kinds of common policy become necessary.

Although there are various aspects of the Treaty of Rome that it would be difficult for the British to accept (the agricultural provisions probably being the hardest) the biggest difficulty for Britain has never been the letter of the commitments of the Treaty, but the unwritten premises—what *The Observer* has called the parts written in invisible ink: that is, the acceptance of economic union and some form of political federation as the goal, and the delegation of appreciable powers to "supra-national"



institutions as the method. The British could accept much more easily the method that is in practice being followed today by the Community and the concepts of the ultimate objective that appear to be held by General de Gaulle. For there is little to suggest that the present French Government shares the aspirations and the unwritten premises of the "Europeans." President de Gaulle has frequently stated that he accepts the Treaty of Rome as a binding commitment which France will honor and he has recently spoken in warm tones of the economic advantages of the Community. But he has never endorsed "supra-nationalism" and he has explicitly rejected any path towards unity that involves a loss of national identity. If the British should eventually decide to join the Community they probably would do so because they believe in and could accept what today appears to be the official French view of the Community.

If the United Kingdom and presumably some of the rest of the Seven were eventually to join the Community, it is unlikely that there would be an appreciable watering down in the amount of "supra-nationalism" that exists today. Earlier fears that the process of integration might be stopped short even of the formation of a customs union are no longer valid. It is probably a safe guess that if the United Kingdom were to join the Six, British industry would be among those urging a more rapid dismantling of barriers to trade within the group. And the British Government would probably be one of the strongest proponents of liberal and outward-looking policies for the complex as a whole. On the other hand, the result of adding the United Kingdom (and presumably some of the others of the Seven) would almost certainly be to shift the balance within the Community and to strengthen the position of those who favor a more pragmatic, more evolutionary process of integration with fewer overtones of federalism than the "Europeans" and the United States have hitherto favored.

There is a chance that the Six, if left to themselves, might find their way to some new federal system, particularly if they were encouraged to do so by the United Kingdom as well as the United States. Despite their diversity, they are all probably closer to each other in their habits of thought, and in a multitude of other ways, than they are to the British and the Scandinavians. Throughout the postwar period the French have alternated between being the leaders and the laggards in the movement toward unity. It is dif-

difficult to know where they stand today and even more difficult to know where they may stand tomorrow. Each time General de Gaulle has referred to the Community he has done so in warmer terms than he had used before, and it is not impossible that his views will gradually become closer to those of the "Europeans." If the Six want to achieve a form of economic and political unity that goes well beyond a customs union, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that they would be more likely to do so if the Community were not expanded to include additional countries.

## IV

Looking ahead, it seems probable that if opinion in the United Kingdom continues to develop at the pace and in the direction it has recently been going, a choice will have to be made in the next few years between two broad types of European settlement: on the one hand, the addition of the United Kingdom, and perhaps most of the rest of the Seven, to the Community, or, on the other hand, the negotiation of a European economic arrangement (presumably a customs union) into which the Six would fit as a unit. British accession to the Treaty of Rome, if that were the course chosen, could not be a simple signing on the dotted line, for the Treaty is a highly negotiated instrument and almost every article reflects concessions to one or another of the member countries. The addition of the United Kingdom would upset this balance. Moreover, the British have special needs of their own for which provision must be made. The Six can reasonably require acceptance of the basic principles of the Treaty as a condition of membership; they cannot reasonably refuse to negotiate special arrangements for the United Kingdom, comparable to those they have already embodied in the Treaty for themselves.

It is not clear today which kind of European settlement would better serve the purposes of the West. It seems probable that either one would accomplish objectives that the United States has sought to promote by its support for the integration of Europe: the creation of a strong, dynamic and expanding economy, political stability, and the forging of strong links between Germany and her partners in the West. The choice may depend on whether the governments and peoples of the Six are ready for a deeper form of unity than is implicit in a customs union.

Until now the United Kingdom and the Six have not been negotiating with one another in an attempt to find their way to

an agreed objective, but against one another to rather different ends. Tactical manœuvring has too often taken the place of genuine negotiation. For a number of reasons it is probably still too soon to begin real negotiations on a long-term European settlement. In the first place, an eventual European settlement will be less disruptive of trade with the United States and other third countries if European tariffs can first be lowered by negotiation in the GATT. How much can be done in this direction will, of course, depend in large measure on our own willingness to make important tariff reductions. In the second place, suspicion and distrust of British motives are still too strong on the continent and particularly in France. In the third place, the fears of those who today see in a negotiation (looking forward to either kind of settlement) a threat to the impetus toward unity will tend to diminish if the Six can become more cohesive and can define with greater clarity their own ultimate goals. Finally, the British themselves have not yet completed their own reassessment of their relationship to the continent.

Despite considerable pressure upon it to force an immediate negotiation by making a dramatic bid for membership in the Communities, the British Government has recently made plain that it is not contemplating precipitate action. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that in the long run it will not accept the "global" alternative that has been advocated by the European Commission and supported by the United States. This is only partly because the prospects for substantial tariff reductions on a global basis and for far-reaching Atlantic coöperation do not look bright. A much more important reason for rejecting a "global" approach is the strong and growing desire on the part of the British Government and people for a political and economic relationship with the continent that would run far deeper than any that they have hitherto been prepared to contemplate.

# JAPAN'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

*By Saburo Okita*

JAPAN attracted world attention in June 1960 when large-scale demonstrations were conducted in opposition to ratification of the security pact with the United States and to the visit of President Eisenhower. Until then, most people had thought of Japan as a stable and prosperous nation making great economic progress under a conservative and pro-Western government. They were undoubtedly shocked by the unexpected incidents and they must have asked themselves: Where is Japan heading?

The question cannot easily be answered even by those living in Japan and with close knowledge of current events. The answer must be found not in short-term but in long-term considerations, and among these will be the probable future economic trends and conditions in Japan, which in turn will influence the social and political climate.

A study recently completed in Japan predicts a rather fundamental change in the nation's economic structure in the next 10 to 20 years from a labor-surplus economy containing many underdeveloped elements to a labor-shortage economy that can be described as highly developed.<sup>1</sup> Per capita national income is expected to rise from the present level of \$300 (estimated for 1960) to a level of about \$800 by 1980. This would be roughly equivalent to the current level of per capita national income in Western European countries.

In support of the above prediction there are, first of all, demographic factors. There was a rapid increase in population beginning with the modernization of Japan's economy in the early Meiji period. As the death rate declined and the birth rate continued at a high level, Japan's population increased rapidly from about 35,000,000 in the 1870s to about 85,000,000 by the early 1950s. After 1950, there was a sharp decline in the birth rate and in spite of a concurrent decline in the death rate, the net increase in population became smaller than in the earlier years. Japan now has reached a stage of demographic development similar to

<sup>1</sup> In May 1960, a committee attached to the Economic Planning Agency and chaired by Professor Seiichi Tobata published a report on the "Prospects of Japan's Economy in 1980." The Planning Bureau of the Agency, headed by the author, worked directly with that committee. The following discussion on the future course of Japan's economy is based mainly on that report.

that found among highly industrialized countries. Her rate of net increase in population (the difference between birth rate and death rate) is now roughly half that of many Asian countries.<sup>2</sup> The prospect is that Japan will finally be freed from its past problem of chronic population pressure.

Until about 1970, however, there will be a period of rapid increase in the work-age population because of the high birth rate and the sudden drop in the death rate in the postwar years. The annual increase in the work-age population (15 to 59 years of age) is expected to be about 1.3 to 1.4 million. After 1970, it is expected to decline to a level of 0.5 to 0.6 million a year. Obviously, this will greatly reduce the pressure on employment.

The second reason for the expected change in labor supply is the probable decline in the labor-participation rate, that is, the ratio of labor force to the total work-age population. This rate is now about 65 percent in Japan whereas in the Western countries generally it is about 55 to 60 percent. With rising levels of income, there will be less need to supplement the income of the family's principal income-earners, and therefore fewer people are expected to seek employment. Higher income of the parents will also enable a larger number of young people to enter high schools and universities, and this will lower the participation rate of the younger age group. Moreover, the expected decline in the agricultural population both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total population will further reduce the total labor force, since the labor-participation rate among farm families is at present very high. A decline in the labor-participation rate from 65 to 60 percent will mean a decrease of about 3,000,000 in the labor force.

The third factor affecting the labor supply is the reduction in work hours. So far, because of the low level of incomes, workers usually have preferred a larger pay-check to shorter hours. Now, however, the demand for shortening the workweek is becoming a hot issue in Japan and it is most likely that the demand will be realized, though gradually. If we assume that the present average of about 48 hours a week is reduced to 40 in the course of the coming 10 to 20 years, the result will be a reduction by nearly 20 percent in the potential labor supply.

<sup>2</sup> Criticisms have been heard to the effect that a considerable part of the decline in Japan's birth rate was brought about by means of induced abortion. In recent years, however, the number of cases of abortion has declined while the use of contraceptives has become more widespread. It may also be pointed out that in other countries, where abortion is illegal, the number of cases can never be obtained with any accuracy; in Japan relatively more reliable statistics are available.

On the demand side of the labor market there will be a continuing increase, assuming a relatively high rate of economic growth is maintained in the future. It is true that automation and mechanization of production usually reduce labor requirements for a given amount of production, but if it is assumed that the rate of economic growth will continue as it has in recent years, it will more than offset the reduction in labor demand due to higher productivity per worker. During the last several years, the annual average increase in productivity of about 5 percent was more than offset by the growth of total non-farm output of 9 percent. This increase was larger than that required to absorb the number of new workers entering the labor force each year. As a result, during the last four years there was a shift of 1.5 million agricultural workers, or about 10 percent of the total agricultural labor force, to non-agricultural industries.

There are already some signs of a labor shortage and indications that Japan is moving toward a full-employment economy. Although there are still big reserves of under-employed labor in rural districts remote from industrial centers and among middle-aged workers, the basic trend is toward labor demand increasing at a rate which more than balances the growth in the labor force.

Overpopulation and chronic under-employment, particularly in rural areas, have of course been basic features of Japan's economy and society. With the development of modern industries, beginning in the Meiji period, the economy of Japan came to have a dual structure, with modern and pre-modern industries existing side by side. The coexistence of very labor-intensive agriculture and small enterprises together with highly developed modern industries and institutions has been one of its basic characteristics. This economic structure, combined with the lack of labor mobility based on the Japanese practice of more or less lifetime employment, has created wide variations in the level of wages paid by different enterprises. According to government statistics, the average wage of small establishments with less than 30 employees is about 40 percent of that of large establishments with more than 500 employees. Very recently this wage gap has been somewhat narrowed because small enterprises have had to improve their conditions of employment in order to attract young workers. This is a very important development which, if it continues, will affect economic and social structure in Japan.

The report, "Prospects of Japan's Economy in 1980," predicts



that the agricultural labor force will be reduced by one-half in the course of the next two decades. This would mean that the proportion of agricultural workers in the total labor force would fall from the present 39 percent to 15 percent in 1980. Conversely, it is expected that the proportion of the labor force in secondary industry will increase from the present 25 percent to 40 percent in 1980, while the increase in tertiary industries will be from 36 percent to 44 percent. This pattern, if achieved, will be very similar to that of Western European countries, particularly West Germany today.

## II

The postwar recovery and expansion of Japan's economy with its very high rate of growth has often been called a miracle. During the immediate postwar period, 1946-52, the Gross National Product grew, in real terms, about 11 percent annually—a rate that was partly attributable to natural recovery from the deep drop in the economy after defeat. However, the rate of growth during more recent years has continued at a very high level. The estimate for the years 1953-1960 is about 8 percent per year—more than double that of Western countries, and even higher than that of the Soviet Union, whose rate of growth in recent years is estimated by Western experts at about 6 to 7 percent. Moreover, Japan's recent rate of growth is much higher than the prewar rate, which was 4 to 5 percent during the several decades preceding World War II. In the fiscal year 1959, the G.N.P. is estimated to have expanded by 16 percent without any appreciable price rise. Industrial output has more than doubled in the last four years.

Some of the factors contributing to Japan's rapid economic growth are these:

- (a) The availability of an abundant supply of labor, in contrast to most of the other industrialized countries, which have had full employment for some time and are experiencing labor shortages.
- (b) The high rate of capital formation (gross capital formation accounts for more than 30 percent of the G.N.P.) due to a combination of relatively high productivity and relatively low consumption.
- (c) The reduction in military expenditures, which accounted for about 7 percent of the national income in the prewar years 1934-36, compared to about 1.5 percent in recent years.

(d) Technological innovations, which have had a particular impact because Japan was isolated from many developments during the war and early postwar years.

(e) The avoidance since the war of any serious depression.

(f) The generally favorable environment for exports of manufactured industrial products, particularly to highly industrialized countries, including the United States. In these countries such factors as the maintenance of full employment, prevention of serious business cycles, higher purchasing power of the people, and free trade policies contributed to increasing Japan's exports of industrial products. With its relatively abundant labor supply, Japan has had a comparative advantage in world markets in commodities with a high labor content, such as transistor radios, cameras, toys, etc.

(g) The expansion in Japan's capital-goods industry during and after the war, which enabled her to provide her own needs in support of rapid economic growth without causing an undue strain on the balance of payments.

(h) The rate of increase in the work-age population due to the earlier high birth rate and the sharp decline in the death rate after the war. In recent years the labor force increased at an annual rate of 2 percent, although the increase in total population was around 1 percent per year. For several years this trend will continue.

(i) The positive and expansionist attitude of the business community including the liberal lending policies of bankers. Businessmen have successfully taken advantage of opportunities as they occurred, and they have been effective in developing mass-production techniques and in promoting sales in both domestic and foreign markets.

The most important reason for Japan's rapid economic growth may be that she is now undergoing a transition during which production can be vastly increased simply by the more efficient use of labor. In this respect, as Dr. Gerhard Colm of the U.S. National Planning Association pointed out while he was in Japan last spring, Japan is sharing common economic ground with the Soviet Union, despite the political differences, in that about 40 percent of the total labor force is in agriculture. This reserve of underutilized labor seems to be one of the most important factors supporting high rates of economic growth both in the Soviet Union and in Japan.

The dual nature of the Japanese economy (the modern combined with the pre-modern) also enables Japan to maintain high rates of capital accumulation, because the wage level is low relative to labor productivity. Moreover, the high rate of economic growth itself has contributed to high rates of saving because consumer expenditures have lagged behind the rise in income. These factors, in turn, enabled Japan to strengthen her competitive position in world trade, particularly in exports having a high labor content. In short, the high rate of capital accumulation, the expansion in export trade, together with the relatively abundant labor supply have been major factors in the remarkably high rate of economic growth attained without any appreciable rise in the price level.

The strength of Japan's economy, however, may be rather temporary in that rapid economic growth will gradually eliminate those conditions which supported Japan's high rate of growth in the first place. As the reserve of under-utilized labor is consumed, and as the dual structure gives way to a wholly modern economy, the rate of growth itself is likely to fall to a level nearer that of advanced economies of the West.

With these considerations in mind, the authors of "Prospects of Japan's Economy in 1980" assumed a 7 percent average annual rate of growth in the G.N.P. for the first ten years and 5 percent for the second decade ending in 1980. At these rates, the G.N.P. in 1980 is expected to be more than three times its present level, and because of the relatively low rate of population increase in the future (*i.e.* 17 percent during the 20 years to come), per capita G.N.P. will also be nearly tripled. If measured in terms of the per capita national income, the figure for 1980 will be, as mentioned earlier, about \$800 as compared with about \$300 today. More optimistic people argue that, as the rate may be even higher than the estimate and as the real purchasing power of the yen is somewhat undervalued at present, the per capita income in 1980 may be even higher than this.

### III

The leading sector for future economic growth will of course be industry. The report estimates that the industrial production index (1955 = 100) will reach about 900 in 1980, or about four times the 1960 level. Among the various branches of industry, machinery is expected to expand most rapidly; iron and steel,

petroleum refining and chemicals are expected to follow. Heavy and chemical industries, including machinery, are expected to account for about 70 percent of the total industrial output in 1980 as compared with the estimated figure of about 50 percent in 1959. Annual production of passenger cars in 1980 is estimated roughly at 1.2 million units and the number of passenger cars per thousand of population is to rise from 2.7 in 1958 to 42 in 1980. The latter figure nearly equals the present average for Western Europe.

Production of iron and steel measured in terms of crude steel is expected to reach some 38 million tons in 1970 and 65 million tons in 1980. Steel production in recent years has been rising very rapidly and is expected to reach 20 million tons in 1960, placing Japan fifth among the world's steel-producing countries.

Such marked industrial growth will place a heavy burden on Japan's relatively limited sources of energy, which are already inadequate. A major portion of the future increase in the energy requirement must be met by imported energy, particularly of petroleum. Thus dependence on imported fuels is expected to rise from about 25 percent in 1958 to 70 percent in 1980. Petroleum imports will probably expand from 25 million tons in 1959 to roughly 70 million in 1970 and 130 million tons in 1980. The actual amount will depend, of course, upon the extent to which atomic power can be put into practical use. Stations generating several million kilowatts of atomic energy may be installed by 1980, but their contribution to the total energy supply is not likely to be very large before 1980, as it is now believed that it will take a longer period than had been initially expected before atomic power generation will become economically feasible on a large scale.

With the rapid expansion of industrial production and with the changing pattern of food consumption, agriculture is also expected to undergo a rather fundamental change. As mentioned earlier, the agricultural labor force is expected to fall by at least a half during the next two decades. On the other hand it is estimated that agricultural production will double. With rising levels of income, the diet of the average Japanese has already changed markedly in recent years, shifting from the traditional foods—rice, soybeans, vegetables and fish—to a more Western type of diet—bread, butter, milk, meat and fruits. As incomes continue to rise, this shift is likely to go further; there will be a decline in the

consumption of cereals, including rice, and a sharp increase in the consumption of dairy and livestock products. Already, Japan has become almost self-sufficient in rice. Traditional emphasis on rice production is likely to lose ground gradually and, with the decline in agricultural workers, the heavy consumption of labor is likely to be replaced by labor-saving techniques. These developments, combined with the flow of labor off the land, are likely to have far-reaching effects upon Japan's social structure.

## IV

Japan, of course, is highly dependent on foreign trade because of the paucity of natural resources to support her growing economic activity. For her supply of important foodstuffs and raw materials, such as wheat, sugar, soybeans, salt, raw cotton, wool, petroleum, iron ore, coking coal, bauxite, etc., she must depend upon imports for all or a high percentage of the total. Imports of manufactured goods, such as machinery and chemicals, are increasing year by year, and with the recent decision to liberalize foreign exchange and import controls, they are likely to increase further in the future.

On the other hand, increased production of highly processed industrial products and the expansion of service industries will help to counter the growing dependence on imports. It is assumed that imports will rise from the present level of 13 or 14 percent of the national income to 16 percent by 1970, and that thereafter they will more or less level off. Based on these estimates, imports will amount to about \$8.5 billion in 1970 and \$14 billion in 1980, as compared with \$3.6 billion for 1959.

To meet the cost of imports of that magnitude, exports must be expanded equivalently. In 1959, total exports amounted to \$3.46 billion, and this figure is estimated to have accounted for about 3.5 percent of world export trade. If world trade is assumed to grow in the future at an average annual rate of 4 percent, Japan's share of the total must rise to 5.2 and 5.8 percent in 1970 and 1980 respectively. Such substantial expansion will not be easy. Among the prerequisite conditions are the maintenance of world peace, steady economic growth in developed countries, growing income in underdeveloped economies and generally freer trade.

As for the commodity structure of Japan's export trade, machinery, metals and chemical products are expected to become more important in the future while the relative importance of

light-industry products, including textiles, is likely to decline. For the time being, Japan's export trade has a dual character in that commodities with high labor content, such as cameras, radios, toys and clothes, are sold to high-income markets, while the relatively capital-intensive commodities such as machinery and equipment, steel, chemical fertilizer, etc., flow to low-income markets. In recent years, the former markets have grown faster than the latter. As a result, the United States, Canada and Europe have taken an increasing share of Japan's export trade. But as we have seen, her competitive advantage may gradually diminish as Japan moves toward a full-employment, high-income economy. Other newly industrializing countries, which have a more abundant labor supply and relatively low wages, may then take over Japan's markets for products of high labor content. Indications of such a trend can already be seen in the growing competition between Japan, India and Hong Kong in some of the simpler industrial products, such as gray cotton cloth, rubber shoes, bicycles and sewing machines. Japan's economic future, therefore, will depend very much upon her success in modernizing her economic structure and in developing lines of industry which require high technological standards and are relatively capital-intensive.

Japan is now undergoing a far-reaching and rapid process of transformation, both economic and social. With the expanding national income, living standards are also rising rapidly. The average real wage of workers has been rising 4 to 5 percent annually in recent years and this trend is likely to continue. There are, however, problems related to income distribution, such as the relatively low pay received by university professors, government employees, and other intellectual groups; the still conspicuous wage gap between large and small enterprises; and the low incomes found in agriculture, fishing, mining and small industries. There are also stresses and strains arising from the process of rapid economic change itself and from the time lag in social and political adjustments to the new economic conditions. However, in view of the fact that the free economic system, based upon private initiative, seems to be functioning efficiently, and further improvement in living standards and conditions of employment is in prospect, there is every reason to expect—despite apparent political and social instability—that Japan will continue to develop within a free and stable social and political system.



# THE FUTURE OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY

*By B. Shiva Rao*

THE two general elections held in India under the 1950 federal Constitution enable us to reach at least tentative conclusions as to how far our democratic institutions may be considered a success and the likely grouping of political forces in the near future. These conclusions are strengthened by what occurred in the state-wide elections in Kerala in February of this year, following the dismissal of the Communist Ministry there last summer after 28 months in office.

The framers of the Indian Constitution were inspired by principles of social equality and political justice to introduce adult suffrage immediately—a big step forward, since it expanded the electorate fivefold over what had been provided for under the 1935 Constitution. More than 170,000,000 voters, men and women, were brought onto the electoral rolls. They had their first taste of a general election in January 1952 for the lower House of the Federal Parliament and the State Legislative Assemblies. Though they lacked experience and the majority of them were illiterate, the vast electorate responded well. In the second general elections, held in 1957, approximately 121,000,000 out of a total of about 193,000,000 voters recorded their votes—not counting the two or three million whose votes were rejected on technical grounds. This works out at a poll of 63 percent. Even more remarkable was the result last winter in Kerala, where the voting was much heavier, with over 8,000,000 (roughly 83 percent) exercising their right to vote.

The conduct of a general election in India, through all the steps from the preparation of the electoral rolls to the final declaration of the results, is a major ordeal. The administration has faced it with encouraging efficiency and impartiality. But a statistical analysis can prove deceptive by concealing some of the deeper trends; and the Indian elections are no exception.

India has prided herself since independence on being a secular state with no bias in favor of or against any religious class or community. Mr. Nehru has vigorously and sincerely condemned any show of preference on grounds of caste or religion. In actual practice, however, almost every party, not excluding the Congress, often takes into account the caste (or subcaste) of candidates at

the time of their nomination. Voting also is influenced by caste considerations in many rural constituencies. The evil of casteism, as Mr. Nehru has described it, flourishes with impunity in some States under Congress ministries, where the only effective check comes from the State High Courts and the Supreme Court when some provision of the Constitution is flouted. As the electorate gathers experience, economic and political issues may come to loom more prominently than they do at present; and one may reasonably hope that with greater maturity the spell of caste and religion will gradually weaken. But as long as social tradition retains its present rigidity, democratic institutions will find it difficult to strike deep roots.

Statistics can be misleading for another reason. In the general elections of 1957, Congress candidates for the lower House of Parliament secured 58,000,000 out of a total of 121,000,000 votes. The Praja Socialists followed with 13,000,000, the Communists with 11,000,000 and the Jana Sangh with 7,000,000. Independent candidates, not belonging to any recognized party, obtained 32,000,000 votes. It would be a mistake to imagine that the Communist vote is limited to the official figure of 11,000,000. The Communist Party's practice has been to set up its own candidate or a fellow-traveler as an independent in constituencies where success depends on securing the support of voters uncommitted to any political party. How many of the 32,000,000 "independent" votes belong to the Communists cannot be said precisely; but their general position in the Punjab, West Bengal and Bombay justifies us in assuming that in these three States especially many "independent" votes were in support of Communists or fellow-travelers.

The disproportion between a party's voting strength and its strength in the legislatures has been a puzzling feature of the democratic experiment in India. The Congress Party, with a little less than half the total votes to its credit, emerged as the largest group in the federal lower House, with a strength of about 75 per cent of the membership (374 out of 505). In striking contrast, the other parties failed to be represented in the measure of their voting strength. For its 13,000,000 votes, the Praja Socialist Party, the next largest group, secured only 19 seats, while the Communists with 11,000,000 votes were comparatively better represented, with 31 seats.

The elections in Kerala brought out the caprices of the ballot

box even more glaringly. In the general elections of 1957, the Congress Party with a vote of 2,200,000 (of a total of 5,800,000) obtained 43 seats in a House of 126. The Communists, who followed close behind with 2,100,000 votes, fared far better, capturing 60 seats. The position was radically reversed (to the disadvantage of the Communists) by the elections in Kerala last February. This aspect of the Kerala elections needs mention because of the wrong impression otherwise likely to be created by the large drop in Communist strength in the State Legislature from 60 seats to 27. This result was possible primarily because the various anti-Communist groups reached an understanding at the beginning of the campaign to avoid triangular contests. Actually, the voting strength of the Communists increased by over a million votes.

Another factor which will continue to retard the growth of democratic institutions in India is the widespread tendency, not confined to any single party, to resort to Mr. Gandhi's technique of mass civil disobedience as a remedy for unresolved difficulties. This hangover from the days of British rule ignores the fundamental change brought about by independence and adult suffrage. Even in Kerala, the manner in which the Communist ministry was dismissed could hardly be described as democratic and constitutional. Mr. Nehru's Cabinet intervened only when such a step became unavoidable in order to prevent a mass rising against the Communist administration.

## II

In the first general elections under the permanent Constitution held early in 1952, the Congress Party's candidates enjoyed an enormous advantage over their rivals. They basked in the reflected glory of the freedom movement led and inspired for at least 30 years by Mr. Gandhi. His chief lieutenants—Mr. Nehru, Sardar Patel, Maulana Azad, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and C. Rajagopalachari (to mention only the top leaders)—had run the transitional Government in the stormy period following independence with commendable efficiency.

No government called upon to assume the burden of office in a new state could have had a combination of more baffling problems to tackle—the general insecurity of life (underlined by the Mahatma's assassination early in 1948), the rehabilitation of millions of refugees from Pakistan, the grave deficiency in food supply and the integration of the Princely States with India,

complicated by troubles in Hyderabad and Kashmir. These and other administrative problems were handled with restraint, confidence and courage. Sardar Patel's tact and statesmanship brought into the All-India Federation hundreds of the Princely States in a spirit of goodwill and mutual accommodation. The Constitution was completed in less than three years by a Constituent Assembly which functioned without interruption and for a time after independence played a secondary role as a provisional Parliament. These achievements enabled India to settle down to a long-term program of economic and social progress.

In a period of such acute economic strain it was inevitable that Mr. Nehru should have given first priority to a comprehensive plan for raising the living standards of the masses. The establishment of the Planning Commission was not, in the circumstances, a matter of controversy. For at least 20 years before independence, Mr. Nehru had thought in terms of national planning to stimulate India's all-round progress. It was widely agreed, when the opportunity presented itself, that an advisory body of experts attached to the Cabinet could be of considerable assistance in evolving plans of reconstruction, unhampered by administrative routine and red-tapism.

In the field of international relations, a policy of neutralism (non-alignment, as it has now come to be described) seemed both right and natural for a new state seeking its proper place in the world. The explanation of this policy in a spirit of judicial detachment by a jurist of the eminence of Sir Benegal Rau won prestige and respect for India in the United Nations, even if it failed on an issue like Kashmir to carry conviction with many member States.

It was on this record that the Congress Party faced the first elections in 1952. Pitted against it, the Communist Party had little hope of success except in isolated pockets in (former) Hyderabad, West Bengal and Kerala. The Communist Party also had to live down the fact that it had sided with the British in the latter half of the Second World War while the Congress leaders were in prison for supporting Mr. Gandhi's "Quit India" movement. In these circumstances its electoral successes were not considerable. However, after the failure of Sir Stafford Cripps' mission in 1942, the strength of the Party had been built up with active British encouragement in many of India's industrial centers and in feudal regions like Telengana, and it could not be dissipated by failure in a single general election.

A new spirit which crept into the administration during the five-year term of the Congress Government following the 1952 elections did not tend to strengthen democratic principles. Mr. Nehru's personal stature and influence, both within the Government and in the country, grew to such heights that even without seeking it, he came to exercise overwhelming authority. He was almost the only Congress leader after Mr. Gandhi with a phenomenal mass appeal. Of the colleagues who were more or less his equals during Mr. Gandhi's lifetime, death had removed Sardar Patel, easily the strongest restraining influence on the Prime Minister in the early years of independence; Dr. Rajendra Prasad had been elevated to the post of President, an office of dignity but with little real authority; Mr. Rajagopalachari had gone into retirement after being India's last Governor-General and, briefly, a Minister of Mr. Nehru's Cabinet.

Moreover, Mr. Nehru was not only India's Prime Minister; he became also the Chairman of the Planning Commission. In selecting colleagues for the Cabinet, he was at least restricted by certain parliamentary rules and observances. The Planning Commission, on the other hand, consisted of a body of nominated persons who owed their appointment entirely to him. Primarily for the sake of getting schemes and projects implemented more quickly, the Commission's powers and jurisdiction were enlarged, and by gradual stages it advanced from being an advisory body and became the Cabinet's equal. Members of the Cabinet, who were the Prime Minister's colleagues only in a formal sense, found themselves at a disadvantage in administering their respective departments. In important spheres of activity the initiative had passed to the Planning Commission for laying down the broad lines of policy and the targets to be achieved in a five-year period, and Ministers were assigned the modest role of justifying these decisions before Parliament. As a result the status of members of Mr. Nehru's Cabinet has been considerably lowered. The concentration of power and authority in the hands of a single individual, even one like Mr. Nehru, dedicated as he is to India's service, cannot augur well for the growth of democratic institutions.

Since the second general elections of 1957, the Congress Party has lost ground in several States more rapidly than in its first five-year term of office. The by-elections held in these three years do not indicate the real extent of the loss. Of 16 by-elections for the lower House of Parliament up to June 1960, the Congress Party

retained 11 out of its 14 seats. In 112 elections for State Legislatures (excluding Kerala, which has been discussed separately) the Congress obtained 58 seats, or only two less than in the general elections. But in a number of constituencies the margin of victory has thinned down to such narrow proportions as to render the position of Congress candidates precarious in the elections due early in 1962.

In these three years Mr. Nehru and the Congress Governments, both at the Center and in the States, have been thrown increasingly on the defensive by the sharp criticisms of some aspects of their domestic policies coming from leaders like Mr. Rajagopalachari. The points on which they have proved most vulnerable to attack are the legislation setting a maximum limit on land-holdings; the policy of State trading, especially in foodgrains; the starting of agricultural coöperatives; and the large number of restrictions and controls on individuals through legislative or administrative actions. Mr. Rajagopalachari and the new party of which he is the founder (the Swatantra Party) have concentrated their attack on the growing tendency towards the regimentation of Indian life. Mr. Nehru has been charged with introducing "a creeping totalitarian tyranny of the Socialist pattern" which, according to Mr. Rajagopalachari, is "a more dangerous evil than the avowed totalitarianism of the Communists."

Until the spring of 1959, when the Dalai Lama and several thousands of Tibetan refugees escaped into India, Mr. Nehru's foreign policy was on the whole beyond controversy, even though misgivings were sometimes voiced both in Parliament and outside about the way in which Mr. Krishna Menon interpreted non-alignment from the platform of the United Nations—so obviously different from that of his predecessors.

But within the last 18 months, Communist China's blatant aggression in Tibet and Ladakh has brought about a radical change in the situation. Mr. Nehru, whose chief adviser in the sphere of foreign policy is Mr. Krishna Menon, has experienced the severest shock of his long public life. The publication last year of the correspondence between the Governments of India and China since 1954 only deepened the public's anxieties. Questions are being asked which reflect this apprehensive mood. First, why was China allowed to overrun Tibet in 1950 and why was her "sovereignty" over the region officially accepted, although the instructions to the Indian Ambassador in Peking at the time ap-



pear to have been limited to accepting China's "suzerainty," subject to China's recognition of Tibet's complete autonomy in internal administration? Second, why did Mr. Nehru's Government relinquish unconditionally all the extraterritorial rights and privileges that India had inherited from the British? Third, what were the grounds for keeping back from Parliament and the Indian public for five years the correspondence between the Governments of India and China on various disputes along the Himalayan borders?

Through all the 10 years of China's illegal occupation of Tibet, it is now realized, Mr. Nehru was outmanœuvred by Mr. Chou-en-lai at every stage. The professions of "eternal friendship" for India and the signing of the Five Principles agreement (while the border disputes were actually in progress) are now dismissed in India as insincere gestures concealing China's aggressive and expansionist aims. Public feeling has hardened against China to such an extent that Mr. Nehru, always sensitive to public opinion, cannot compromise on the position which he has taken up in response to Chinese intransigence.

Since the deepening of the Sino-Indian crisis, the criticisms of Mr. Nehru's foreign policy have been crystalized by men like Mr. Rajagopalachari into some specific suggestions. This veteran statesman has demanded a complete reorientation of policy along the following lines: (1) the abandonment of non-alignment as being disastrous for a militarily weak power like India facing an aggressive power like China spread menacingly along 2,600 miles of the Himalayan border; (2) a settlement of all disputes with Pakistan so that India's resources may be mobilized to the maximum extent against China's aggression; (3) a joint understanding with neighbors like Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma and Malaya who share with India a common peril in greater or lesser degree; (4) acceptance, if necessary, of military aid from friendly countries like the United States.

On these points, Mr. Rajagopalachari has substantial support even outside the ranks of the Swatantra Party. Senior members of Parliament like Dr. Kunzru have in addition demanded the removal of Mr. Krishna Menon as Defense Minister because of his ambiguous statements on China. His abilities and drive in administration are not doubted; but frequently in the past he has given cause for suspicion that he leans toward appeasement of China. Significance is attached to the fact that his most ardent supporters

are the Communists in Parliament and Communist (or pro-Communist) journals in the country.

So far, Mr. Nehru has shown no inclination toward any modification of his foreign policy. Non-alignment, he has reiterated with emphasis, will continue to be its sheet anchor. Acceptance of foreign military aid he regards as incompatible with national self-respect. The only alteration in policy acceptable to him is greater concentration on the expansion of heavy industry. Regarding Mr. Krishna Menon, Mr. Nehru is clear that the suggestion he be removed implies lack of confidence in his own judgment and constitutes, indirectly, criticism of his stewardship as Prime Minister.

### III

In preparation for the next general elections, scheduled for early in 1962, a certain regrouping of existing political forces is almost certain to develop. The Congress Party will find its position challenged far more seriously than on the last two occasions, both on its domestic and its foreign policies. This is not a surprising phenomenon, nor one peculiar to India. A party long in office is bound to alienate sections of the people through implementing policies which generate hardship or cut into vested interests. After being the ruling party for an unbroken period of 13 years (except for a while in Kerala), the Congress inevitably has lost some of its influence. This has been reflected in the by-elections, as described above. More serious are the internal organizational problems which it faces. In practically every State the Congress Party is going through a phase of acute group and personal rivalries, each faction having its eye on the coming general elections.

Similar organizational cracks have appeared in the Communist Party. Since China's aggression in Tibet in the spring of 1959, the Indian Communists have been finding their position increasingly untenable. As open justification of Chinese expansionism would obviously be unwise, at least a section of the Party has been advocating unqualified support for Mr. Nehru's policy of seeking a friendly settlement of the border disputes, but without being seriously critical of China's aims and actions.

The varying tactics and policies pursued by the Indian Communists since this gospel first made its appearance in India in the early twenties indicates their likely course in the near future. From the beginning, they found that Mr. Gandhi's insistence on non-violence and truth was their foremost obstacle. They ex-

exploited Mr. Nehru's membership in the Executive of the League Against Imperialism in Brussels (from 1927 to 1931) and his uncompromising opposition to any form of association with Britain. They infiltrated into the Congress Party in numbers to support him in all his radical moves. Thus strengthened, Mr. Nehru succeeded in getting the Congress affiliated to the League and having its goal altered to complete independence of Britain. During the next few years, Mr. Nehru moved definitely to the left in spite of Mr. Gandhi's warnings. Nevertheless, on more than one critical occasion in his career, when he was faced with a choice between personal loyalty to Mr. Gandhi and an uncompromising line of action prompted by his own judgment, Mr. Nehru preferred the former course.

After the MacDonald Government's failure to reach a settlement with the Congress, political strife with the British was renewed in the thirties. This brought the Communists a fresh opportunity to infiltrate and work from within the Congress. Mr. Nehru's Socialist colleagues were keen on a coalition with all the left-wing elements, including the Communists, to prevent the older leaders from taking office under the 1935 Constitution, to which they were bitterly opposed. The coalition failed to materialize; but all the left-wing elements combined for the single purpose of pulling the Congress Ministers out of office shortly after the declaration of the Second World War.

A fundamental difference with the Communists developed after Russia's entry into the war in 1941. With their usual optimism, the Communists promptly declared that the war's character had now profoundly altered into a people's war. For Mr. Nehru it was a period of intense distress. His abhorrence of Hitlerism was so real and deep that he would probably have compromised with the British in 1942 (on the Cripps' offer) if there had not been opposition from Mr. Gandhi and some of his senior colleagues. Whatever the cause, the rupture between the Congress and the Communists was complete after the summer of 1942 and continued for several years.

#### IV

Now that the third general elections are approaching, the different groups are already making preliminary moves. The Swatantra Party, which broadly corresponds to the British Conservative Party, is likely to set up its own candidates in States where it is

strong and to support elsewhere those who are sympathetic to its program. One cannot say what are the prospects of success for a party which is barely a year old. But its nuisance value is likely to be considerable, especially in constituencies where the Congress Party's margin of power has become narrow.

To the left stand the Communists, so far the main opposition element in the federal Parliament and in some of the State Legislatures. Even before they were split by the Chinese aggression along the Himalayan border, they had been trying to adjust themselves to Indian conditions so as to become more acceptable to the people. They have committed themselves to the creed of non-violence. Mr. Namboodriped, their new General Secretary (and former Chief Minister of Kerala under Communist rule) has announced the Party's decision to adhere to constitutional techniques in opposing the Government. Their broad strategy for the next elections seems clear. In the last three years they have not hesitated to set up their candidates as "independents" or to take over locally-popular movements like the agitation for the breakup of Bombay State into two linguistic regions. Such tactics will continue. If expedient they also will infiltrate into the Congress Party as they did in the earlier stages of the freedom movement. In fact, for more than a year their leader in the federal lower House, Mr. S. A. Dange, has urged his fellow members to support "the progressive section" of the Congress Party led by Mr. Nehru and Mr. Krishna Menon to "safeguard democracy" from "the reactionary, right-wing elements." With the Congress Party riddled with factiousness, infiltration will present no serious difficulty.

Congress leaders in general have no illusions left about the Communists. The present President of the Party, Mr. Sanjiva Reddy, like his predecessor Mrs. Indira Gandhi (the Prime Minister's daughter), has denounced them as a party seeking its guidance from outside India. However attractively they may clothe their offer of support to Mr. Nehru, he is too seasoned a politician not to see through their moves. Open association with the Congress Party being ruled out, they can only seek to influence it from within, with the aid of some sympathetic elements. How far India will be steered clear of entanglement with the Communist creed or its policies will depend on how vigilantly the Congress leaders deal with risk of infiltration to which the party organization now stands exposed.

## RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*By Henry L. Roberts*

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N.Y.

### *General: Political, Military and Legal*

NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE. BY HUGH SETON-WATSON. New York: Praeger, 1960, 504 p. \$7.50.

This excellent survey of the troubled landscape of contemporary world politics centers on the forces of totalitarianism and nationalism and their disruptive impact. The subject is a vast one but, as Mr. Seton-Watson correctly observes, while a single author can see only part of the picture, this disadvantage can be outweighed—as it is in this case—by a unity of approach to world problems. As in his earlier works on Eastern Europe and Communism, the author writes both for the general reader and the specialist, and has much to say to both.

THE BLOWING UP OF THE PARTHENON. BY SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA. New York: Praeger, 1960, 93 p. \$2.95.

A brief but pungent essay on the nature of the cold war in its present phase.

FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEXT PHASE: THE 1960S. BY THOMAS K. FINLETTER. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1960, 240 p. \$4.00. (Paper; New York: Praeger, \$1.45.)

A revised version of a book first published in 1958 (noted here July 1958). Mr. Finletter's amplified proposals for strengthening our deterrent capabilities while working for disarmament and acting creatively in the areas of politics, economics and world opinion take full account of recent developments in international relations, from the Berlin crisis to the U-2 incident and the failure of the Summit Meeting in Paris.

THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT. BY THOMAS C. SCHELLING. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 309 p. \$6.25.

An exceptionally fruitful series of essays exploring that area of the theory of games that deals with situations involving common interest as well as conflict between adversaries. Technical in part, it has much of relevance to say on the types of problems encountered in power politics.

STRATÉGIE DE L'ÂGE NUCLÉAIRE. BY GENERAL P. GALLOIS. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1960, 238 p. NF. 7.50.

General Gallois is among those military thinkers who are making a serious effort to think through the full implications of nuclear power for a viable strategy that will neither set off an accidental war nor leave the West powerless. He sees the precariousness of the "equilibrium of terror" and also the impossibility of trying to sidestep this fateful development of our times. As M. Aron says in his preface, the author writes with an "esprit à la fois de géométrie et de finesse."

DISENGAGEMENT. BY EUGÈNE HINTERHOFF. London: Stevens, 1959, 445 p. 45/.

A substantially argued brief for "disengagement" or "withdrawal" in Europe as against "containment" or a continuation of the status quo, which the author sees as both eroding and dangerous. A useful appendix presents the various Eastern and Western plans and proposals on this subject.

**DEFENSE: POLICY AND STRATEGY.** BY AIR VICE-MARSHAL E. J. KINGSTON-McCLOUGHRY. New York: Praeger, 1960, 272 p. \$6.00.

Critical of present defense strategy among the Western powers, British Air Vice-Marshall Kingston-McCloughry attempts to suggest improvements, especially at the level of national and service strategies and organization.

**WAR THROUGH THE AGES.** BY LYNN MONTROSS. New York: Harper, 1960, 1,063 p. \$10.00.

This enlarged edition of a major history of warfare includes rewritten chapters on the Second World War and a new section on the Korean War.

**LIVE AND LET LIVE.** BY STUART CHASE. New York: Harper, 1960, 146 p. \$3.50.

In this brief appraisal of the state of the world, Mr. Chase is alarmed by the exponential rates of growth in such areas as technology and demography and sets forth a number of objectives and measures to help us keep up with our environment.

**THE LONG WAY TO FREEDOM.** BY JAMES T. SHOTWELL. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960, 639 p. \$7.50.

In this long book, the appropriate reflection of a long life and a long career as a scholar, Professor Shotwell undertakes to trace the halting progress of individual freedom over the centuries of man's history.

**THE ESSENTIALS OF FREEDOM.** EDITED BY RAYMOND ENGLISH. Gambier (Ohio): Kenyon College, 1960, 181 p. \$1.50.

A symposium of speeches on the nature, preconditions and meanings of freedom in the present century.

**BLOC POLITICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS.** BY THOMAS HOVET, JR. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 197 p. \$6.50.

A quite comprehensive analysis of the formation of the negotiating and voting blocs in the U.N. The author expects that bloc politics will play an increasingly important role in the organization.

**INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MARITIME ACTIVITIES.** BY LEE M. HYDEMAN AND WILLIAM H. BERMAN. Ann Arbor: Atomic Energy Research Project, University of Michigan Law School, 1960, 384 p. \$6.00.

This volume is chiefly concerned with problems of health and safety control, with a hope of finding solutions while the positions of national and international authorities in this new field are still fluid.

**DIE VORZEITIGE ANERKENNUNG IM VÖLKERRECHT.** BY HANS-HERBERT TEUSCHER. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1959, 125 p. DM. 16.

A study of the problem of "premature" recognition of a state, in international law and practice.

**TREATY-MAKING POWER.** BY HANS BLIX. New York: Praeger, 1960, 414 p. \$16.00.

A massive treatise devoted to two questions: the competence of diplomatic agents to negotiate treaties for their governments, and the competence of governments to bind the states they represent.



THE LEGACY OF IMPERIALISM. BY BARBARA WARD AND OTHERS. Pittsburgh: Chatham College, 1960, 94 p. \$2.00.

Four essays make up this volume: "Economic Imperialism and its Aftermath," by Barbara Ward; "Russian Imperialism Today," by Thomas P. Whitney; "Imperialism and Colonialism in the Far East," by Robert Strausz-Hupé; and "Independence: Reality and Myth," by Charles Malik.

BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE. BY HERBERT FEIS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 367 p. \$6.50.

Mr. Feis, who has written several notable books on recent diplomatic history, here continues the narrative of his earlier "Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin." The author had access to the State Department records on the Potsdam Conference, as well as to records in the possession of W. Averell Harriman and James Byrnes. The story is of a fateful and melancholy period of months: "History hints that what is done during the first few months after a great war ends is likely to determine the fate of the next generation, perhaps of many generations."

AU FEU DES ÉVÉNEMENTS. BY PAUL-LOUIS BRET. Paris: Plon, 1959, 443 p. NF. 17.50.

In these political memoirs the former chief of Havas-London deals centrally with the eve of the war in Europe and the war years in North Africa.

CONFLICT AND CONCORD: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP SINCE 1783. BY H. C. ALLEN. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 247 p. \$3.75.

A revised and expanded edition of the first part of the author's "Great Britain and the United States," which appeared in 1954.

GLI INTELLETTUALI E LA GUERRA DI SPAGNA. BY ALDO GAROSCI. Turin: Einaudi, 1959, 482 p. L. 3000.

A substantial study of the role and involvement of intellectuals, Spanish and foreign, in the Spanish civil war: Lorca, Alberti, Azaña, Sender, Kolzov, Malraux, Hemingway, Koestler, Orwell and Bernanos, among others.

THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY. VOLUME XII: THE ERA OF VIOLENCE, 1898-1945. EDITED BY DAVID THOMSON. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960, 602 p. \$7.50.

This is the last volume in the series but only the fourth to be published. Contributors to the chapters include such prominent historians as David Thomson, the late Sir Robert Ensor, D. W. Brogan, Bernard Lewis, Isaac Deutscher, Rohan Butler and Asa Briggs.

ISTORIJA DIPLOMATII. VOLUME I. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1959, 896 p.

This first volume of a revised and expanded edition of an official Soviet diplomatic history goes up to the Franco-Prussian War.

QUAKER WAYS IN FOREIGN POLICY. BY ROBERT O. BYRD. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960, 230 p. \$5.00.

An illuminating statement and exposition of the basic concepts, attitudes and practices that go to make up the Quaker approach to foreign policy and the problem of power.

IDEAS IN CONFLICT. BY EDWARD McNALL BURNS. New York: Norton, 1960, 587 p. \$6.95.

An ambitious summary and interpretation of "the leading political theories and ideological movements from about 1900 to the present"—liberal and democratic, collectivist, conservative, nationalist and imperialist.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE WEST. BY FREDE CASTBERG. Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1960, 475 p. (New York: Oceana Publications, \$7.50.)

A comparative study, by a Norwegian scholar, of the public law in France, the United States and Germany relating to freedom of speech.

HERBERT HOOVER AND GERMANY. BY LOUIS P. LOCHNER. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 244 p. \$5.00.

A somewhat disconnected account of Mr. Hoover's intermittent contacts with or activities concerning Germany over the years since 1913.

KHRUSHCHEV IN AMERICA. BY N. S. KHRUSHCHEV. New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960, 231 p. \$2.95.

A translation of the official Soviet texts of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches during his 1959 visit to the United States.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1959. EDITED BY PAUL E. ZINNER. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1960, 540 p. \$6.95.

The twenty-first volume of selected documents in the series originated by the World Peace Foundation and now prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations.

### *General: Economic, Social and Cultural*

THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH. BY W. W. ROSTOW. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960, 178 p. \$3.75. (Paper, \$1.45.)

This extended essay by a leading economic historian seeks to establish a pattern for economic growth on a scale equivalent to, though quite different from, Marx's massive model. The listing of his key concepts—traditional society, the "take-off," the drive to maturity, and the stage of high mass-consumption—cannot do justice to the wealth of insight or analytical ability contained in this important contribution to our understanding of social change.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SIZE OF NATIONS. EDITED BY E. A. G. ROBINSON. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 446 p. \$10.00.

These proceedings of a conference held in 1957 by the International Economic Association are directed to the complex problem of the causal relations between the size of a nation and its economic efficiency and potential for growth and development—a subject about which there has been no lack of easy generalizations. A very useful contribution by many skilled economists.

SMALL INDUSTRY ADVISORY SERVICES. BY JOSEPH E. STEPANEK. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1960, 193 p. \$6.00.

An interesting study of the very practical problem of getting industrial knowledge to small entrepreneurs, especially in newly industrializing countries.

THE TENDENCY TOWARDS REGIONALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 1928-1956. BY ERIK THORBECKE. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960, 223 p. Guilders 25.

A solid, empirical analysis of the principal changes in the network of world trade in the period 1928-1956, with particular attention to the tendency toward trade regionalization within various blocs.

GOLD AND THE DOLLAR CRISIS. BY ROBERT TRIFFIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960, 195 p. \$4.75.

The author of "Europe and the Mcney Muddle" here deals with the general problem of convertibility and outlines the reforms he deems necessary to check the malfunctioning of the monetary mechanism.

ESSAYS IN WORLD ECONOMICS. BY J. R. HICKS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 274 p. \$4.20.

Fourteen essays by an outstanding British economist dealing primarily with world trade and with the problems of underdeveloped countries.

LE MONDE EN FRICHE. BY GABRIEL ARDANT. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1959, 307 p. NF. 14.

A discussion of the various coördinated activities, non-economic as well as economic, that must be undertaken to meet the problem of "under-development."

STUDIES IN ECONOMIC NATIONALISM. BY MICHAEL A. HEILPERIN. Geneva: Droz, 1960, 230 p. Swiss Fr. 20.

These preliminary inquiries into the problem of twentieth century economic nationalism include both a historical sketch and a study of doctrines.

PROCEEDINGS, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1960, 380 p. \$10.00.

Papers on control of restrictive business practices in a number of West European, American and Asian countries.

### *The Second World War*

THE HOUSE BUILT ON SAND. BY GERALD REITLINGER. New York: Viking, 1960, 459 p. \$6.95.

The author of "The Final Solution" and "The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945" continues his study of Nazi policies with this work on German policy in Russia from 1941 to 1945. While the author has the benefit of a number of earlier books on this subject—including those by Braeutigam, Thorwald, Kleist, Fischer, Armstrong and Dallin—his is a useful addition, especially in its critical discussion of the various "might-have-beens." On the whole, he is skeptical of the chances of a markedly different outcome.

CHRONOLOGY 1941-1945. COMPILED BY MARY H. WILLIAMS. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960, 660 p. \$4.75.

A valuable reference providing the sequence of events from Pearl Harbor to VJ-Day; a volume in the "Special Studies" sub-series in the "United States Army in World War II."

THE ARMY AND INDUSTRIAL MANPOWER. BY BYRON FAIRCHILD AND JONATHAN GROSSMAN. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960, 291 p. \$2.75.

This volume in the sub-series on the War Department in the "United States Army in World War II" deals with the problem the Army was involved in in dealing with organized labor, enforcing manpower policies and handling labor disputes.

THE WAR MEMOIRS OF CHARLES DE GAULLE: SALVATION, 1944-1946. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960, 346 p. \$6.00.

A translation of the third and final volume of General de Gaulle's war memoirs (French edition noted here April 1960).

I WAS DEFEATED. BY YOSHIO KODAMA. Tokyo: Radiopress, 1959, 228 p.

The war memoirs of the author, written when he was confined as a "Class A war criminal suspect."

### *The United States*

AMERICA IN THE MODERN WORLD. BY D. W. BROGAN. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1960, 117 p. \$3.00.

In these five lectures, delivered in 1959, Mr. Brogan, a well-informed and sympathetic critic, discusses American life and culture with a particular eye to our current bafflements and uncertainties about the state of the world, the sense of "Paradise Lost, not just Paradise Misaid."

PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA. BY CLINTON ROSSITER. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960, 205 p. \$2.85.

A very readable little "introduction to the politics of American democracy—and to the two amazing parties that hold sway over it."

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS. BY L. K. HYDE, JR. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1960, 249 p. \$3.00.

This volume, one of three on the United States in the series of national studies on international organizations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, covers the field of public welfare and refugee aid, economic development, human rights.

CAN WE END THE COLD WAR? BY LEO PERLA. New York: Macmillan, 1960, 251 p. \$4.50.

A vigorous criticism of recent United States foreign policy and an exhortation for more morality and less militarism.

THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES. EDITED BY HENRY P. VAN DUSEN. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960, 232 p. \$3.95.

A selection of the late Secretary of State's speeches dealing with matters of faith, morality and the spiritual foundations of world order.

AMERICA AND THE WORLD OF OUR TIME: UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. BY JULES DAVIDS. New York: Random House, 1960, 597 p. \$7.50.

A good general history of American diplomacy from Theodore Roosevelt to the present.

AMERICA CHALLENGED. BY WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 74 p. \$2.50.

In these lectures Justice Douglas deals critically both with the domestic scene and with foreign affairs.

FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES. RECORDED IN TALKS WITH HARLAN B. PHILLIPS. New York: Reynal, 1960, 310 p. \$5.00.

These lively and informal reminiscences, which go up to Mr. Frankfurter's appointment to the Supreme Court in 1939, are taken from tape-recorded talks and

conversations made by the Columbia University Oral History Research Office.

AMERICAN COMMUNISM AND SOVIET RUSSIA. BY THEODORE DRAPER. New York: Viking, 1960, 558 p. \$8.50.

This sequel to Mr. Draper's first-rate study of "The Roots of American Communism" (1957) carries the story of the American Communist movement through the factional quarrels of the 1920s to the ouster of Jay Lovestone in 1929. By that time the pattern in the Party was set. "Each generation had to discover for itself in its own way that, even at the price of virtually committing political suicide, American Communism would continue above all to serve the interests of Soviet Russia." An absorbing and skillfully written narrative.

COMMUNISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS. BY DAVID J. SAPOSS. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960, 259 p. \$5.00.

Chiefly an account of Communist efforts, intermittently successful and unsuccessful, to penetrate and control other parties, state politics and labor unions in the last 25 years.

LAMENT FOR A GENERATION. BY RALPH DE TOLEDANO. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1960, 272 p. \$3.95.

An autobiographical account by a journalist, now with *Newsweek*, of various tumults in American politics since the 1930s.

THE KENNEDY FAMILY. BY JOSEPH F. DINNEEN. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960, 238 p. \$3.95.

A Boston newspaperman's group portrait of the Kennedys.

THE STRATEGY OF PEACE. BY JOHN F. KENNEDY. New York: Harper, 1960, 233 p. \$3.50.

A collection of Senator Kennedy's speeches and statements on foreign policy and national security.

MR. CITIZEN. BY HARRY S. TRUMAN. New York: Geis, 1960, 315 p. \$5.00.

A peppery account of Mr. Truman's activities, thoughts and controversies since he stepped down from the Presidency.

TRUMAN SPEAKS. BY HARRY S. TRUMAN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, 133 p. \$3.00.

The transcripts of former President Truman's informal addresses at Columbia University in April 1959—on the Presidency, the Constitution, statecraft and "Hysteria and Witch-Hunting."

TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES. BY ELBERT M. BYRD, JR. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960, 276 p. Guilders 21.

In attempting to reduce some widespread confusion, Mr. Byrd undertakes to determine the distinctive roles and limitations of both treaties and executive agreements within the constitutional framework.

GIANT AMONG NATIONS. BY PETER B. KENEN. New York: Harcourt, 1960, 232 p. \$5.00.

This is a first-rate survey, technically sound but popularly written, of the foreign economic policy of the United States.

POSTWAR ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES. EDITED BY RALPH E. FREEMAN. New York: Harper, 1960, 384 p. \$6.00.

These essays discuss the major developments in the American economy in the last 15 years.

THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING. BY FRANCIS M. BATOR. New York: Harper, 1960, 167 p. \$3.75.

Addressing himself to one of the major debates of our time, Mr. Bator contends in this well-reasoned book that much of our discussion of government spending has been off the point. His principal concern is with the question of choice rather than with the amount of spending. He does, however, challenge a number of the propositions of the opponents of public spending.

ORGANIZING FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS. BY ALEXANDER O. STANLEY. New York: American Management Association, 1960, 318 p. \$12.00.

An analysis of the overseas operations of some 30 U. S. corporations, with particular attention to the organizational framework.

THE OVERSEAS AMERICANS. BY HARLAN CLEVELAND AND OTHERS. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, 316 p. \$5.95.

As a non-fictional study of American representatives abroad, both public and private, this book is especially welcome. A product of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, which has pioneered in the study of "overseasmanship," it serves as a comprehensive introduction to the subject. Much of it is based on interviews with Americans serving abroad.

THE CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. BY ROSE HUM LEE. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960, 465 p. HK \$35. (New York: Oxford University Press, \$7.25.)

A good study of the Chinese in the United States—social and economic organization, the degree of acculturation and assimilation. The author, daughter of an early Chinese immigrant, is professor of sociology at Roosevelt University in Chicago.

### *Western Europe*

EUROPE WILL NOT WAIT. BY ANTHONY NUTTING. London: Hollis, 1960, 122 p. 12/6.

The former British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs makes a critical appraisal of Britain's relations with Europe since the war and finds a sad failure to provide leadership. He urges that England give up the old argument that "Commonwealth ties" prevent closer coöperation with the Continent.

THE COMMON MARKET. BY JEAN FRANÇOIS DENIAU. New York: Praeger, 1960, 139 p. \$4.50.

A French economist, an official of the E.E.C., provides an exposition of the Common Market Treaty and a discussion of the theory of the large market.

LA CRISE DE LA ZONE DE LIBRE-ÉCHANGE. BY EUROPEUS. Paris: Plon, 1959, 111 p. Fr. 495.

A man who has been close to the center of the efforts at Western European economic integration analyzes the breakdown of negotiations for a European Free Trade Area. Written in the spring of 1959, this account stresses economic disagreements rather than the political divisions that have loomed larger in more recent discussions.

EUROPE'S COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY. BY LOUIS LISTER. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1960, 495 p. \$8.00.



This is a careful, detailed study of the economic aspects of the coal and steel pool that contains a great deal of useful information and analysis. The author had experience with these industries as an American official.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1960 INSTITUTE ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. Washington: Federal Bar Association, 1960, 218 p. \$10.00.

A symposium dealing with the business and legal problems which face American lawyers in the six countries of the Community.

SCANDINAVIA PAST AND PRESENT. Copenhagen: Arnkroner, 1960, 3 v.

This huge panorama of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland past and present is presented as a gift to the people of the United States, and a very handsome one. The first two volumes comprise articles on Scandinavian history from the Vikings to the twentieth century; the third volume describes these nations today—their political, cultural and economic life.

LE CONFLIT SARROIS: 1945–1955. BY JACQUES FREYMOND. Brussels: Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1959, 439 p. Belgian Fr. 390.

A leading Swiss scholar, M. Freymond has prepared this historical and analytical study of the Saar conflict as one of the series of case studies of conflicts, sponsored by the European Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC. BY DOROTHY PICKLES. New York: Praeger, 1960, 222 p. \$3.50.

Mrs. Pickles, who has written a valuable study on the Fourth Republic, here discusses the political setting for the Constitution of October 4, 1958, and describes the resulting institutional rearrangements and innovations.

DEFEATED LEADERS. BY RUDOLPH BINION. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, 425 p. \$7.50.

The unusual program of this book is to study the faulty political régime of the Third Republic through the mixed and frustrated careers—each frustrated in a different way—of Joseph Caillaux, Henry de Jouvenel and André Tardieu. A very perceptive and excellently written work.

FOCH VERSUS CLEMENCEAU. BY JERE CLEMENS KING. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 137 p. \$4.00.

Mr. King deals with the struggle between Marshal Foch and Clemenceau on the nature of the peace treaty with Germany, an issue involving civil-military relations as well as the problem of the peace.

LES FINANCES EXTÉRIEURES DE LA FRANCE (1945–1958). BY ANDRÉ DE LATTRE. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1959, 391 p. Fr. 1800.

A wide-ranging and informative discussion by an official in the Ministry of Finance.

FRANCE: THE NEW REPUBLIC. BY RAYMOND ARON. New York: Oceana Publications (for the Fund for the Republic), 1960, 114 p. \$2.95.

An informal discussion of French politics and the Fifth Republic at a meeting held in October 1958.

LE FRONT POPULAIRE ET LES ÉLECTIONS DE 1936. BY GEORGES DUPEUX. Paris: Colin, 1959, 183 p. Fr. 1900.

A close study of the 1936 elections, the last to have taken place under the Third Republic, as a reflection of public opinion in France at that time.

DIE SCHLESWIG-FRAGE SEIT 1945. EDITED BY EBERHARD JÄCKEL. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1959, 150 p. DM. 19.80.

Documents concerning the position of minorities on both sides of the German-Danish frontier.

DAS DANZIG-PROBLEM IN DER DEUTSCHEN AUSSENPOLITIK 1934-39. BY LUDWIG DENNE. Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1959, 322 p. DM. 22.

A monograph on the role played by the Danzig question in the method and purposes of Nazi foreign policy.

GERMAN ELECTORAL POLITICS. BY U. W. KITZINGER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, 365 p. \$7.20.

A substantial analysis of the 1957 Bundestag election, one of the series of election surveys sponsored by Nuffield College, Oxford.

VIENNA AND THE YOUNG HITLER. BY WILLIAM A. JENKS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, 252 p. \$5.00.

A successful effort to recreate the cultural climate and political currents in Vienna during the years Hitler lived there, 1907-1913. Little new about Hitler himself.

HITLER, LA PRESSE ET LA NAISSANCE D'UNE DICTATURE. BY ALFRED GROSSER. Paris: Colin, 1959, 262 p. Fr. 750.

A selection of reactions by the European press to developments in Germany from May 1932 to July 1933.

DENN HEUTE GEHÖRT UNS DEUTSCHLAND. BY ERICH EBERMAYER. Hamburg: Zsolnay, 1959, 655 p. DM. 22.

A detailed personal and political diary covering events in Germany from January 1933 through December 1935.

DER FÜHRER INS NICHTS. BY HANS BUCHHEIM AND OTHERS. Rastatt: Grote, 1960, 88 p. DM. 4.80.

Four brief pieces interpreting Hitler as a politician, an ideologist, a soldier and a personality.

DUITSLAND 1945-1955. BY HERMAN WILLEM SANDBERG. Amsterdam, 1959, 248 p.

A monograph dealing with the political and diplomatic developments that led to the splitting of Germany after 1945. Has a short English summary.

DAS KOMMANDIERTE WUNDER. BY KURT PRITZKOLEIT. Munich: Desch, 1959, 802 p. DM. 26.

In this extensive interpretation of the course of German history in the twentieth century the author seeks certain continuing themes—especially in the role of the middle class and industry—through the Imperial régime, Weimar, the Third Reich and the Federal Republic.

POLITIKER OHNE PARTEI. BY HANS LUTHER. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1960, 437 p. DM. 27.80.

Memoirs of the Weimar era by a former Reichschancellor.

DER SCHWIERIGE AUSSENSEITER. BY WILHELM HOEGNER. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1959, 343 p. DM. 24.50.

Political memoirs of the former Social Democratic Prime Minister of Bavaria—in the years before 1933, during his exile and since 1945. A sequel to “Die Verratene Republik” (noted here July 1959).

ITALY IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. BY KAREL HOLBIK. Padua: C.E.D.A.M., 1959, 158 p. L. 2000.

A study of Italy's postwar economic growth in the setting of her coöperation in Western European regional projects.

IL MEZZOGIORNO OGGI. BY G. MACERA AND F. VENTRIGLIA. Milan: Edizioni 24 Ore, 1959, 728 p. L. 4000.

A lengthy collection of brief articles dealing with the problems of Southern Italy.

DA NAPOLI A FIRENZE (1954-1959). BY AMINTORE FANFANI. Milan: Garzanti, 1959, 339 p. L. 1500.

A selection of Fanfani's speeches and papers on the tasks of Italian politics and Christian democracy.

### *Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*

USSR: ITS PEOPLE, ITS SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE. BY THOMAS FITZSIMMONS AND OTHERS. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1960, 590 p. \$8.50. (New York: Taplinger, distributor.)

This volume, one in the series of surveys of world cultures prepared under the auspices of the Human Relations Area Files, undertakes “to define the dominant sociological, political and economic aspects of a functioning society, to present that society's strengths and weaknesses, and to identify the patterns of behavior characteristic of its members.” Contains a good deal of information, but for reference rather than steady reading.

THE SOVIET DICTATORSHIP. BY HERBERT McCLOSKEY AND JOHN E. TURNER. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, 657 p. \$10.95.

A general textbook on the background, development and organization of the Soviet political system.

RUSSLAND UNTER CHRUSCHTSCHOW. BY BORIS MEISSNER. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1960, 699 p. DM. 64.

A leading German “Kremlinologist” pursues in close detail political developments in the Soviet Union and the obscure struggle for power leading to Khrushchev's clear victory, from 1956 to 1959. Four hundred pages of documents.

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. BY JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR. New York: Praeger, 1960, 331 p. \$6.00.

While not enjoying quite the literary merits or richness of Leonard Schapiro's recent book on the same subject (noted here July 1960), this is a very able and well-grounded treatment of the tangled and difficult history of the C.P.S.U.

THE GREAT CONTEST. BY ISAAC DEUTSCHER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, 86 p. \$2.75.

In these lectures Mr. Deutscher presents briefly his views on the trends in post-Stalin Russia and their significance in the field of foreign policy.

THE UNION REPUBLICS IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY. BY VERNON V. ASPATURIAN. Geneva: Droz, 1960, 228 p. Swiss Fr. 20.

A monograph on the use by the Soviet State of its multinational composition and juridical structure as instruments of foreign policy.

THE IGNORANT ARMIES. BY E. M. HALLIDAY. New York: Harper, 1960, 232 p. \$4.50.

An interesting account of the campaigns of the American Expeditionary Force in North Russia in 1918-1919, an episode that still plays a role in Soviet-American relations.

SOVIET ECONOMIC POWER. BY ROBERT W. CAMPBELL. Boston: Houghton, 1960, 209 p. \$4.75.

A very useful, concise survey, intended for the interested non-specialist, of the Soviet economic performance and its implications for us. The author takes the Soviet potential for the future very seriously.

DIE SOWJETISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK AM SCHEIDEWEGE. BY ERIK BOETTCHER. Tübingen: Mohr, 1959, 307 p. DM. 22.50.

An able and well-developed argument of the thesis that the Soviet economic system is forced to deal with certain basic problems and requirements—especially as regards the increasingly intensive rather than extensive use of labor—that have also confronted other industrializing societies.

SOVIET ECONOMIC WARFARE. BY ROBERT LORING ALLEN. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960, 293 p. \$5.00.

An extensive analysis of the external economic activities of the Soviet Union: its political and economic motivations, trade, credits, assistance and regional interests. The central conclusion: "The Soviet Union uses all of its foreign economic policies and relations consistently and exclusively to promote the interests of the Soviet state and the philosophy on which it is founded."

L'OURS DANS LA BERGERIE. BY MICHEL LUBRANO-LAVADERA. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1960, 203 p. NF. 9.60.

About half this book lists Soviet aid, trade and other transactions with underdeveloped countries. The rest discusses the motives, character and possible consequences of the Soviet economic offensive and relates it to broader Soviet interests.

INTERVAL OF FREEDOM. BY GEORGE GIBIAN. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960, 180 p. \$4.25.

A perceptive examination of new or rediscovered themes in the brief thaw in Soviet literature during the years roughly between Stalin's death and the tightening of the reins after the Hungarian revolution.

THE POLITICS OF SOVIET EDUCATION. EDITED BY GEORGE Z. F. BEREDAY AND JAAN PENNAR. New York: Praeger, 1960, 217 p. \$6.00.

A collection of essays on various aspects of Soviet secondary and higher education.

RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA, 1867-1917. BY RICHARD A. PIERCE. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960, 359 p. \$7.00.

A scholarly account of Russia's expansion into Central Asia and its pre-Revolutionary activities in administration, colonization and economic development.

POPULATION TRENDS IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE USSR AND MAINLAND CHINA. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1960, 336 p. \$2.00.

Papers on demographic changes within the Communist bloc.

MUISTELMIA. BY ONNI TALAS. Helsinki: Söderström, 1960, 380 p. Fmk. 800.

The memoirs of a leading Finnish politician and diplomat (1877-1941) whose longest tours of duty were at Madrid, Copenhagen, Budapest, Ankara and Rome.

POLISH WESTERN TERRITORIES. BY BOHDAN GRUCHMAN AND OTHERS. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1959, 267 p.

The Polish case for the retention of the territory gained since 1945.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE NAGY AFFAIR: FACTS, DOCUMENTS, COMMENTS. New York: Praeger (for the Congress for Cultural Freedom), 1960, 215 p. \$7.50.

A documentary collection relating to the trial, indictment and execution of Imre Nagy.

### *The British Commonwealth of Nations*

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ERNEST BEVIN. VOLUME ONE: TRADE UNION LEADER, 1881-1940. BY ALAN BULLOCK. London: Heinemann, 1960, 672 p. 50/.

The author of an admirable life of Hitler here turns to an infinitely more attractive subject. This first volume is confined to Bevin's career as a trade-union leader from 1910 to 1940, years in which he gained both the experience and the reputation that led to his later ministerial positions. An excellent, sympathetic, well-researched but not "official" life.

THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND NATIONAL SERVICE. BY SIR GODFREY INCE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, 215 p. \$4.00. (London: Allen and Unwin, 25/.)

This volume in the New Whitehall series of books on the major departments of the British Government is written by the former permanent secretary to the Ministry of Labor.

THE YEARS OF CHALLENGE. BY DON TAYLOR. New York: Praeger, 1960, 255 p. \$4.50.

The editor of the journal, *New Commonwealth*, deals with developments in the Commonwealth and British Empire over the critical years 1945-1958 and with prospects for the future.

CANADA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. BY JOHN A. STOVEL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 364 p. \$7.50.

A study centering on changes in the Canadian balance of trade and balance of payments, including an extended critique of Jacob Viner's earlier book on the subject.

THE TRUE FACE OF DUPLESSIS. BY PIERRE LAPORTE. Montreal: Harvest House, 1960, 140 p. \$1.50.

A brief, critical, political sketch of the late prime minister of Quebec.

### *The Middle East*

THE MIDDLE EAST IN WORLD POLITICS. BY J. K. BANERJI. Calcutta: World Press, 1960, 390 p. Rs. 20.50.

This rather uneven book is perhaps most interesting in presenting the Middle East from the Indian perspective.

ATLAS OF THE ARAB WORLD AND THE MIDDLE EAST. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 60 p. \$9.00.

A good, new reference work.

LE GOLFE PERSIQUE. BY JEAN-JACQUES BERREBY. Paris: Payot, 1959, 228 p. Fr. 1700.

A general survey of the countries bordering the Persian Gulf, by the author of "La Péninsule Arabique" (noted here July 1959).

THE NATION ON THE FLYING TRAPEZE. BY JAMES SAXON CHILDERS. New York: McKay, 1960, 284 p. \$4.50.

A report on a trip through the Far and Middle East, on developments in these areas and on attitudes toward the United States.

DE CABOUL À PÉKIN: RYTHMES ET PERSPECTIVES D'EXPANSION ÉCONOMIQUE. BY GILBERT ÉTIENNE. Geneva: Droz, 1959, 268 p. Swiss Fr. 20.

A study of living standards and the prospects for economic growth in Afghanistan, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaya, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia, India and Communist China.

THE ISLAMIC NEAR EAST. EDITED BY DOUGLAS GRANT. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960, 296 p. \$2.50.

A symposium of pieces on various aspects of the culture and politics of the Near East.

LA LIBIA E IL MONDO ARABO. BY GIORGIO ASSAN. Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1959, 234 p. L. 1300.

A report on Libya since independence, especially in connection with developments in the Arab world.

### *South and Southeast Asia*

INDIA: THE MOST DANGEROUS DECADES. BY SELIG S. HARRISON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 350 p. \$6.50.

In this sober and somber discussion of India's political prospects Mr. Harrison examines the various points of stress—regional interest, caste problems, Communism. His conclusion is that "Indian nationalism will most probably survive at the price of a series of authoritarian political forms."

INDIA, MIXED ENTERPRISE AND WESTERN BUSINESS. BY DANIEL L. SPENCER. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959, 252 p. Guilders 15.75.

An examination of the problems of participation by Western business in the Indian mixture of public and private enterprise.

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN SOUTH INDIA. BY GEORGE B. BALDWIN. Glen-coe (Ill.): Free Press, 1960, 339 p. \$6.00.

This volume consists of a series of 37 case studies of modern industrial enterprise, chiefly in Mysore, both private and public.

INDIA AND ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS (1917-1947). BY CHATTAR SINGH SAMRA. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1959, 186 p. \$4.50.

On the whole an able little study of the interplay of Anglo-Soviet relations and the developing Indian independence movement.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF INDIAN PARLIAMENT. BY S. S. MORE. Bombay: Thacker, 1960, 569 p. Rs. 27.50.

A thorough guide to Indian parliamentary procedure.



INDIA WINS FREEDOM. BY MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD. New York: Longmans, 1960, 293 p. \$6.00.

An autobiographical narrative by the late President of the Indian National Congress, from 1939 to 1946.

NEPAL: A CULTURAL AND PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY. BY PRADYUMNA P. KARAN WITH THE COLLABORATION OF WILLIAM M. JENKINS. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960, 100 p. \$10.00.

A useful reference, apparently the first published geography of Nepal.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN. BY G. W. CHOUDHURY. New York: Longmans (in coöperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1960, 272 p. \$4.50.

A careful study of constitutional development between 1947 and 1956, now partly overtaken by subsequent events.

CEYLON: DILEMMAS OF A NEW NATION. BY W. HOWARD WRIGGINS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 505 p. \$10.00.

An excellent, probably the best, general study of political, constitutional, economic and cultural development in Ceylon since 1947.

FOREIGN AID: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN SOUTHERN ASIA. BY CHARLES WOLF, JR. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 442 p. \$7.50.

Mr. Wolf here tackles seriously an issue about which much has been said without producing much enlightenment, namely the relative shares that should be allocated to the military and economic sections in our foreign aid program in order to achieve optimum results. Using South and Southeast Asia as a testing ground, the book is both empirical and analytical, indeed in part fairly mathematical. A very substantial contribution.

THE NATION THAT REFUSED TO STARVE. BY JOHN W. O'DANIEL. New York: Coward-McCann, 1960, 121 p. \$2.75.

A brief report on Vietnam since 1954, written especially for young people, by an enthusiastic former U.S. adviser.

INDONESIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION. BY BRUCE LANNES SMITH. East Lansing: Michigan State University, Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, 1960, 133 p. \$3.00.

This volume is one of a series on relations between American universities and those of other countries.

### *The Far East and Pacific Ocean*

EAST WIND RISING. BY RELMAN MORIN. New York: Knopf, 1960, 359 p. \$5.00.

A reporter's account of the Far East during the mounting crises of the 1930s.

THE HUNDRED FLOWERS CAMPAIGN AND THE CHINESE INTELLECTUALS. BY RODERICK MACFARQUHAR. New York: Praeger, 1960, 324 p. \$6.75. (London: Stevens, 42/, under title "The Hundred Flowers.")

Largely a documentary record of the brief course of the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1957 and its repressive aftermath.

ECONOMIC PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION IN MAINLAND CHINA: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY (1949-1957). VOLUME I. BY CHAO KUO-CHÜN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 273 p. \$4.00.

This is a companion to the author's earlier documentary study on "Agrarian Policies of Mainland China" (noted here April 1958).

**TIBET FIGHTS FOR FREEDOM.** EDITED BY RAJA HUTHEESING. Bombay: Orient Longmans (for the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom), 1960, 241 p. Rs. 15.

Documents on the March 1959 uprising.

**LAND AND POLITY IN TIBET.** BY PEDRO CARRASCO. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960, 307 p. \$5.75.

A social study centering on the peasantry and the land system, especially before Communist China's repression of the Tibetan revolt in 1959.

**FREEDOM, NATIONHOOD AND CULTURE.** BY RAUL S. MANGLAPUS. Manila: Carmelo and Bauermann, 1959, 215 p. Pesos 6.

A collection of quite lively speeches delivered from 1954 to 1959 by a leading young Filipino politician and statesman.

**AMERIKA SAMOA.** BY CAPTAIN J. A. C. GRAY. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1960, 295 p. \$6.00.

A history of American Samoa and of the U.S. Naval administration of the islands from 1900 to 1951, at which time they were transferred to the Department of the Interior.

### *Africa*

**THE ROAD TO SELF-RULE.** BY W. M. MACMILLAN. New York: Praeger, 1960, 296 p. \$7.50.

A study of the gradual evolution of self-rule in colonial Africa.

**AFRICA TODAY—AND TOMORROW.** BY JOHN HATCH. New York: Praeger, 1960, 289 p. \$4.00.

A competent general survey of an area that is changing with staggering rapidity. The author is Commonwealth Officer of the British Labor Party.

**L'ALLEMAGNE ET L'AFRIQUE.** BY PAUL GACHE AND ROBERT MERCIER. Paris: Éditions des Relations Internationales, 1960, 177 p. NF. 18.50.

A study of the recent development and expansion of German trade and commerce with the various parts of Africa.

**LIBERIA'S PAST AND PRESENT.** BY NATHANIEL R. RICHARDSON. London: Diplomatic Press, 1959, 348 p. (New York: Liberian Publications, \$8.82.)

A scissors-and-paste history.

**SUDANESE-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS.** BY ABD EL-FATTAH IBRAHIM EL-SAYED BADDOUR. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960, 264 p. Guilders 20.

A chronological review of Sudanese-Egyptian relations, from the Egyptian perspective and critical of past British policy.

**TRIBES OF THE SAHARA.** BY LLOYD CABOT BRIGGS. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 295 p. \$6.00.

This anthropologist's study of the tribes of the Sahara—Tuareg, Teda, Nemadi and others—is especially concerned with dispelling the "balderdash" that has been written about these peoples.

CONTRIBUTION À L'ÉTUDE DES PROBLÈMES POLITIQUES EN AFRIQUE NOIRE. BY MAJHEMOUT DIOP. Paris: Présence Africaine, 1959, 267 p. Fr. 1200.

A vehemently Leninist interpretation of Africa's problems, politics and future.

PERMANENT WAY. VOLUME II: THE STORY OF THE TANGANYIKA RAILWAYS. BY M. F. HILL. Nairobi: East African Railways and Harbours, 1960, 295 p.

This is a companion volume to "The Story of the Kenya and Uganda Railway," both written by the editor of the *Kenya Weekly News*. They are much more than a history of the railways; they describe the economic development of the region and throw light on the political march of events there, from the days of the great Arab ruler, Seyyid Said, through the period of German rule, the two world wars and down to the present.

BUGANDA AND BRITISH OVERRULE: 1900-1955. BY D. ANTHONY LOW AND R. CRANFORD PRATT. New York: Oxford University Press (for East African Institute of Social Research), 1960, 373 p. \$7.70.

In these two studies of the Buganda Kingdom Mr. Low deals with the making of the Uganda agreement in 1900, and Mr. Pratt with the "politics of indirect rule" in the succeeding half-century.

HISTOIRE DE MADAGASCAR. BY HUBERT DESCHAMPS. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1960, 348 p. NF. 19.50.

An authoritative one-volume history by a leading French scholar.

### *Latin America and the West Indies*

A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMY OF LATIN AMERICA. BY F. BENHAM AND H. A. HOLLEY. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1960, 169 p. \$2.90.

This useful little volume is one of a series of Chatham House publications dealing with Latin America. The material is organized by topic and by country.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS IN MEXICO. BY E. DAVID CRONON. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960, 369 p. \$6.00.

A careful study of United States-Mexican relations during the Ambassadorship of Josephus Daniels, 1933-1941.

CUBA: ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION. BY LEO HUBERMAN AND PAUL M. SWEETZ. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960, 176 p. \$3.50.

In this very favorable report on the Castro régime Messrs. Sweezy and Huberman feel that Soviet trade with and aid to Cuba will assist it in achieving real independence against "imperialism and counter-revolution" and that the island "positively reeks of freedom."

THE CARIBBEAN: NATURAL RESOURCES. EDITED BY A. CURTIS WILGUS. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959, 315 p. \$6.50.

A symposium by 20 specialists on the agricultural, mineral, water and human resources of the area as a whole.

# SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

## I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain*: British Information Services, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations*, *International Court of Justice*, *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.*, *Food and Agric. Org.*: Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office*: 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community*, *European Economic Community*, *Euratom*: 220 Southern Bldg., Washington 5, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 86th Congress, 2nd Session. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

### AFRICA

OFFICIAL publications of Somaliland, 1941-1959; comp. by H. F. Conover. Washington, Library of Congress, 1960. 41 p. 45¢.

OFFICIAL publications of French West Africa, 1946-1958; a guide comp. by H. F. Conover. Washington, Library of Congress, 1960. 88 p. 75¢.

ALGERIA's development, 1959. Paris, Information Service, Delegation General, French Government in Algeria, 1959. 120 p.

HISTORICAL survey of the origins and growth of Mau Mau. London, 1960. 321 p. (Cmnd. 1030.) 15s.

### AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL credit in economically underdeveloped countries, by Horace Belshaw. Rome, FAO, 1959. 255 p. (FAO agricultural studies, 46.) \$3.50.

FAO Mediterranean development project. The integrated development of Mediterranean agriculture and forestry in relation to economic growth; a study and proposals for action. Rome, FAO, 1959. 213 p. \$2.00.

### CLAIMS

AMENDING the international claims settlement act of 1949. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. 2634, May 24, 1960. Washington, 1960. 9 p. (S. Rept. 1419.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN claims fund. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 3008, Apr. 12, 1960. Washington, 1960. 84 p.

PHILIPPINE war damage claims. Hearings, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Mar. 17-Apr. 28, 1960. Washington, 1960. 93 p.

Supplemental hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H. R. 12078, Je. 9, 1960. Washington, 1960. 25 p.

Report, Je. 27, 1960. Washington, 1960. 25 p. (H. Rept. 2014.)

### CULTURAL QUESTIONS

AGREEMENT on importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Jan. 26, 1960. Washington, 1960. 52 p.

BASIC facts and figures; international statistics relating to education, culture and mass communication, 1959. Paris, UNESCO, 1960. 198 p. \$3.00.

FORMAL programmes of international co-operation between university institutions; report of an International Committee of Experts. Paris, UNESCO, 1960. 39 p. (Educational studies and documents, 37.) 50¢.

Co-OPERATION in the field of scientific and technical research. Report by Dana Wilgress. Paris, OEEC, 1960. 27 p.

### EAST-WEST RELATIONS

EVENTS incident to the summit conference. Background documents, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, May 27, 1960. Washington, 1960. 75 p. (Com. print.)

Hearings, May 27-Je. 1, 1960. Washington, 1960. 302 p.

Report, Je. 28, 1960. Washington, 1960. 36 p. (S. Rept. 1761.)

KHRUSHCHEV's strategy and its meaning for America. A study . . . prepared by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the Univ. of Pennsylvania . . . Committee on the Judiciary, Senate. Washington, 1960. 40 p. (Com. print.)

DIE SOWJETISCHE Konzeption der Koexistenz, by G. A. Wetter. Bonn, Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst, 1959. 45 p.

### EASTERN EUROPE

RESTORATION of freedom to captive nations. Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, to accompany H. Con. Res. 633, May 2, 1960. Washington, 1960. 5 p. (H. Rept. 1562.)

WESTERN and northern territories of Poland; demographic problems, Pt. 1. Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Zachodnie, 1959. 98 p. (Studies and monographs, Pamphlet, 4.)

#### EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

A REMODELED economic organisation. A report by the Group of Four established by the Resolution of the 14th Jan. 1960, of the Twenty Governments and the Commission of the European Economic Community. Paris, OEEC, 1960. 78 p. 50¢.

LONG-TERM trends and problems of the European steel industry. N. Y., 1959. 176 p. (60. II. E. 3.) \$2.00.

SOCIAL research and industry in Europe; problems and perspectives. Report on the international meeting on social research organized by the European Productivity Agency, 8th-10th July 1959. Paris, OEEC, 1960. 96 p. \$1.00.

#### FAR EAST AND ASIA

TREATY of mutual cooperation and security with Japan. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on Ex. E, Je. 7, 1960. Washington, 1960. 101 p.

BANKERS' mission to India and Pakistan, Feb.-Mar., 1960. A letter to Mr. Eugene R. Black, President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, from Mr. Hermann J. Abs, Chairman, Deutsche Bank of Frankfurt. . . . [Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1960.] 27 p.

#### FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

CODE of liberalisation of capital movements. Paris, OEEC, 1960. 48 p. 75¢.

EUROPEAN monetary agreement. First annual report, 1959. Paris, OEEC, 1960. 65 p. 75¢.

INTERNATIONAL Development Association act. Hearings, Subcommittee no. 1, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, on H. R. 11001, Mar. 15-17, 1960. Washington, 1960. 111 p.

— Report, Je. 8, 1960. Washington, 1960. 13 p. (H. Rept. 1766.)

— Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 3074, Mar. 18-21, 1960. Washington, 1960. 122 p.

— Report, May 13, 1960. Washington, 1960. 9 p. (S. Rept. 1349.)

SPECIAL report of the National Advisory Council on the proposed International Development Association. . . , Feb. 18, 1960. Washington, 1960. 50 p. (H. Doc. 345.)

STAFF memorandum on international lending agencies, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 27, 1960. Washington, 1960. 175 p. (Com. print.)

FOREIGN investment incentive tax act of 1960. Report, Committee on Ways and Means, House, to accompany H. R. 5, Feb. 19, 1960. Washington, 1960. 82 p. (H. Rept. 1282.)

OPERATIONS of the Development Loan Fund. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, House, Aug. 18, 1959-Mar. 7, 1960. Washington, 1960. 636 p.

STATISTICS of sources and uses of finance, 1948-1958. Paris, OEEC, 1960. 195 p. \$2.50.

#### GERMANY

THE ANTI-semitic and nazi incidents from 25 Dec. 1959 until 28 Jan. 1960. White paper of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. Bonn, Author, 1960. 79 p.

BERICHT der Bundesrepublik Deutschland über die wirtschaftliche Lage und die Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten bis zum Jahre 1960. Bonn, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1959. 57 p.

GERMANY and Berlin; an analysis of the 1959 Geneva conference, with documents, by Wilhelm Grewe. Washington, German Embassy, Press and Information Office, 1960. 38 p.

EASTERN underground activity against West Berlin; memorandum. Berlin, Senator for the Interior, 1959. 71 p.

VERTRÄGE der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Serie A: Multilateral Verträge. Bonn, Heymanns, 1959-1960.

V. 11. Nr. 113-133. 597 p. *Suppl. I.* Verzeichnis und Stand der Verträge. v.p.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS

EUROPEAN Commission of Human Rights. Documents and decisions, 1955-1957. The Hague, Nijhoff, 1959. 276 p.

#### INTERNATIONAL LAW

COMPULSORY jurisdiction, International Court of Justice. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. Res. 94, Jan. 27-Feb. 17, 1960. Washington, 1960. 520 p.

#### LATIN AMERICA

FUNDAMENTAL law of Cuba, 1959. Washington, Pan American Union, 1959. 86 p. 50¢.

LATIN America in Soviet writing, 1945-1958, a bibliography comp. by L. A. Okinshevich. . . . Washington, Library of Congress, 1959. 257 p. (Hispanic Foundation Bibliographical Series, 5.)

STUDY mission in the Caribbean and Northern South America, Nov. 1959. Report of Senator Homer E. Capehart to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Apr. 1, 1960. Washington, 1960. 45 p.

MENSAJE presentado por el Presidente de la Republica al Congreso Nacional, 29 de Abril de 1960. Realizaciones del primer año del gobierno constitucional y lineamientos del plan cuatrienal. Caracas, Secretaria General de la Presidencia de la Republica, 1960. 115 p.

HACIA la independencia economica de Venezuela; ley de reforma agraria. Campo de Carabobo 5 de Marzo, 1960. Discursos del Presidente Betancourt. . . Caracas, Secretaria General de la Presidencia de la Republica, 1960. 111 p.

THE WORLD Bank in Latin America; a summary of activities. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1960. 73 p.

#### NEAR EAST

5 YEARS of CENTO: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom, with the support of the United States. Ankara, Central Treaty Organization, 1960. n. p.

#### NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

GREATER cooperation among Atlantic democracies. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. Con. Res. 17, Jan. 19, 1960. Washington, 1960. 56 p.

ATLANTIC convention. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H. Con. Res. 107, May 17, 1960. Washington, 1960. 42 p.

#### OUTER SPACE

TO AMEND the National Aeronautics and Space act of 1958. Hearings, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House, on H. R. 9675, Mar. 8-Apr. 4, 1960. Washington, 1960. 579 p.

Report, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House, to accompany H. R. 12049, May 19, 1960. Washington, 1960. 61 p. (H. Rept. 1633.)

1961 NASA authorization. Hearings, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House, on H. R. 10246, Feb. 17-26, 1960. Washington, 1960. 492 p.

Hearings, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Senate, on H. R. 10809, Mar. 28-30, 1960. Washington, 1960. 574 p.

Report, Apr. 29, 1960. Washington, 1960. 90 p. (S. Rept. 1300.)

Conference report, May 19, 1960. Washington, 1960. 4 p. (H. Rept. 1629.)

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#### RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

THE MUTUAL security act of 1960. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 3058, Mar. 22-Apr. 5, 1960. Washington, 1960. 672 p.

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
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